We are anonymous, we are legion

ICANN’s Problems with Accountability and the .WEB Controversy

Padma Venkataraman — 2017-10-28T15:49:38Z

The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction earlier this year has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. This post examines the .WEB auction as a case study to better understand exact gaps in accountability.

Chronological Background of the .WEB Auction

In June 2012, ICANN launched a new phase for the creation and operation of Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs). After confirming the eligibility of seven applicants for the rights of the .WEB domain name, ICANN placed them in a string contention set (a group of applications with similar or identical applied for gTLDs).^[1]

[Quick Note: ICANN procedure encourages the resolving of this contention set by voluntary settlement amongst the contending applicants (also referred to as a private auction), wherein individual participation fees of US $185,000 go to ICANN and the auction proceeds are distributed among the bidders. If a private auction fails, the provision for a last resort auction conducted by ICANN is invoked - here the total auction proceeds go to ICANN along with the participation fees.^[2]]

In June 2016, NuDotCo LLC, a bidder that had previously participated in nine private auctions without any objection, withdrew its consent to the voluntary settlement. Ruby Glen LLC, another bidder, contacted NDC to ask if it would reconsider its withdrawal, and was made aware of changes in NDC’s Board membership, financial position, management and a potential change in ownership, by NDC’s Chief Financial Officer.^[3] Concerned about the transparency of the auction process, Ruby Glen requested ICANN to postpone the auction on June 22, in order to investigate the discrepancies between NDC’s official application and its representation to Ruby Glen.^[4] The Vice President of ICANN’s gTLD Operations and the independent ICANN Ombudsman led separate investigations, both of which were limited to few e-mails seeking NDC’s confirmation of status quo. On the basis of NDC’s denial of any material changes, ICANN announced that the auction would proceed as planned, as no grounds had been found for its postponement.^[5]

On July 27, NDC’s winning bid – USD 135 million – beat the previous record by $90 million, doubling ICANN’s total net proceeds from the past fifteen auctions it had conducted.^[6] Soon after NDC’s win, Verisign, Inc., the market giant that owns the .com and .net domain names, issued a public statement that it had used NDC as a front for the auction, and that it had been involved in its funding from the very beginning. Verisign agreed to transfer USD 130 million to NDC, allowing the latter to retain a $5 million stake in .WEB.^[7]

Ruby Glen LLC filed for an injunction against the transfer of .WEB rights to NDC, and sought expedited discovery^[8] against ICANN and NDC in order to gather evidentiary support for the temporary restraining order.^[9] Donuts Inc., the parent company of Ruby Glen, simultaneously filed for recovery of economic loss due to negligence, fraud and breach of bylaws among other grounds, and Affilias, the second highest bidder, demanded that the .WEB rights be handed over by ICANN.^[10] Furthermore, at ICANN57, Affilias publicly brought up the issue in front of ICANN’s Board, and Verisign followed with a rebuttal. However, ICANN’s Board refused to comment on the issue at that point as the matter was still engaged in ongoing litigation.^[11]

Issues Regarding ICANN’s Assurance of Accountability

The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. ICANN’s arbitrary enforcement of policies that should have been mandatory, with regard to internal accountability mechanisms, fiduciary responsibilities and the promotion of competition, has violated Bylaws that obligate it to operate ‘consistently, neutrally, objectively, and fairly, without singling out any particular party for discriminatory treatment’.^[12]

Though the US court ruled in favour of ICANN, the discrepancies that were made visible with regard to ICANN’s differing emphasis on procedural and substantive compliance with its rules and regulations, have forced the community to acknowledge that corporate strategies, latent interests and financial advantages undermine ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The approval of NDC’s ridiculously high bid with minimal investigation or hesitation, even after Verisign’s takeover, signifies pressing concerns that stand in the way of a convincing commitment to accountability, such as:

The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability at ICANN (A Superficial Investigation)
ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity
The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds

The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability in its Screening Processes:

Ruby Glen’s claim that ICANN conducted a cursory investigation of NDC’s misleading and unethical behaviour brought to light the ease and arbitrariness with which applications are deemed valid and eligible.

Disclosure of Significant Details Unique to Applicant Profiles: In the initial stage, applications for the gTLD auctions require disclosure of background information such as proof of legal establishment, financial statements, primary and secondary contacts to represent the company, officers, directors, partners, major shareholders, etc. At this stage, TAS User Registration IDs, which require VAT/tax/business IDs, principal business address, phone, fax, etc. of the applicants, are created to build unique profiles for different parties in an auction.^[13] Any important change in an applicant’s details would thus significantly alter the unique profile, leading to uncertainty regarding the parties involved and the validity of transactions undertaken. NDC’s application clearly didn’t meet the requirements here, as its financial statements, secondary contact, board members and ownership all changed at some point before the auction took place (either prior to or post submission of the application).^[14]

Mandatory Declaration of Third Party Funding: Applications presupposing a future joint venture or any organisational unpredictability are not deemed eligible by ICANN, and if any third party is involved in the funding of the applicant, the latter is to provide evidence of such commitment to funding at the time of submission of its financial documents.^[15] Verisign’s public announcement that it was involved in NDC’s funding from the very beginning (well before the auction) and its management later, proves that NDC’s failure to notify ICANN made its application ineligible, or irregular at the very least.^[16]

Vague Consequences of Failure to Notify ICANN of Changes: If in any situation, certain material changes occur in the composition of the management, ownership or financial position of the applicant, ICANN is liable to be notified of the changes by the submission of updated documents. Here, however, the applicant may be subjected to re-evaluation if a material change is concerned, at ICANN’s will (there is no mention of what a material change might be). In the event of failure to notify ICANN of changes that would lead the previous information submitted to be false or misleading, ICANN may reject or deny the application concerned.^[17] NDC’s absolute and repeated denial of any changes, during the extremely brief e-mail ‘investigation’ conducted by ICANN and the Ombudsman, show that at no point was NDC planning on revealing its intimacy with Verisign. No extended evaluation was conducted by ICANN at any point.^[18] Note: The arbitrary power allowed here and the vague use of the term ‘material’ obstruct any real accountability on ICANN’s part to ensure that checks are carried out to discourage dishonest behaviour, at all stages.

Arbitrary Enforcement of Background Checks: In order to confirm the eligibility of all applicants, ICANN conducts background screening during its initial evaluation process to verify the information disclosed, at the individual and entity levels.^[19] The applicants may be asked to produce any and all documents/evidence to help ICANN complete this successfully, and any relevant information received from ‘any source’ may be taken into account here. However, this screening is conducted only with regard to two criteria: general business diligence and criminal history, and any record of cybersquatting behaviour.^[20] In this case, ICANN’s background screening was clearly not thorough, in light of Verisign’s confirmed involvement since the beginning, and at no point was NDC asked to submit any extra documents (apart from the exchange of e-mails between NDC and ICANN and its Ombudsman) to enable ICANN’s inquiry into its business diligence.^[21] Further, ICANN also said that it was not required to conduct background checks or a screening process, as the provisions only mention that ICANN is allowed to do so, when it feels the need.^[22] This ludicrous loophole hinders transparency efforts by giving ICANN the authority to ignore any questionable details in applications it desires to deem eligible, based on its own strategic leanings, advantageous circumstances or any other beneficial interests.

ICANN’s deliberate avoidance of discussing or investigating the ‘allegations’ against NDC (that were eventually proved true), as well as a visible compromise in fairness and equity of the application process point to the conclusion it desired.

ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity:

ICANN’s lack of substantive compliance, with California’s laws and its own rules and regulations, leave us with the realisation that efforts towards transparency, enforcement and compliance (even with emphasis on the IANA Stewardship and Accountability Process) barely meet the procedural minimum.

Rejection of Request for Postponement of Auction: ICANN’s intent to ‘initiate the Auction process once the composition of the set is stabilised’ implies that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms with regard to any applicant.^[23] When ICANN itself determines the opening and closing of investigations or reviews concerning applicants, arbitrariness on ICANN’s part in deciding on which date the mechanisms are to be deemed as pending, may affect an applicant’s claim about procedural irregularity. In this case, ICANN had already scheduled the auction for July 27, 2016, before Ruby Glen sent in a request for postponement of the auction and inquiry into NDC’s eligibility on June 22, 2016.^[24] Even though the ongoing accountability mechanisms had begun after initiation of the auction process, ICANN confirmed the continuance of the process without assurance about the stability of the contention set as required by procedure. Ruby Glen’s claim about this violation in auction rules was dismissed by ICANN on the basis that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms at the time of scheduling of the auction.^[25] This means that if any objection is raised or any dispute resolution or accountability mechanism is initiated with regard to an applicant, at any point after fixing the date of the auction, the auction process continues even though the contention set may not be stabilised. This line of defence made by ICANN is not in conformity with the purpose behind the wording of its auction procedure as discussed above.

Lack of Adequate Participation in the Discovery Planning Process: In order to gather evidentiary support and start the discovery process for the passing of the injunction, ICANN was required to engage with Ruby Glen in a conference, under Federal law. However, due to a disagreement as to the extent of participation required from both parties involved in the process, ICANN recorded only a single appearance at court, after which it refused to engage with Ruby Glen.^[26] ICANN should have conducted a thorough investigation, based on both NDC’s and Verisign’s public statements, and engaged more cooperatively in the conference, to comply substantively with its internal procedure as well jurisdictional obligations. Under ICANN’s Bylaws, it is to ensure that an applicant does not assign its rights or obligations in connection with the application to another party, as NDC did, in order to promote a competitive market and ensure certainty in transactions.^[27] However, due to its lack of substantive compliance with due procedure, such bylaws have been rendered weak.

Demand to Dismiss Ruby Glen’s Complaint: ICANN demanded the dismissal of Ruby Glen’s complaint on the basis that the complaint was vague and unsubstantiated.^[28] After the auction, Ruby Glen’s allegations and suspicions about NDC’s dishonest behaviour were confirmed publicly by Verisign, making the above demand for dismissal of the complaint ridiculous.

Inapplicability of ICANN’s Bylaws to its Contractual Relationships: ICANN maintained that its bylaws are not part of application documents or contracts with applicants (as it is a not-for-profit public benefit corporation), and that ICANN’s liability, with respect to a breach of ICANN’s foundational documents, extends only to officers, directors, members, etc.^[29] In addition, it said that Ruby Glen had not included any facts that suggested a duty of care arose from the contractual relationship with Ruby Glen and Donuts Inc.^[30] Its dismissal of and considerable disregard for fiduciary obligations like duty of care and duty of inquiry in contractual relationships, prove the contravention of promised commitments and core values (integral to its entire accountability process), which are to ‘apply in the broadest possible range of circumstances’.^[31]

ICANN’s Legal Waiver and Public Policy: Ruby Glen had submitted that, under the California Civil Code 1668, a covenant not to sue was against policy, and that the legal waiver all applicants were made to sign in the application was unenforceable.^[32] This waiver releases ICANN from ‘any claims arising out of, or related to, any action or failure to act’, and the complaint claimed that such an agreement ‘not to challenge ICANN in court, irrevocably waiving the right to sue on basis of any legal claim’ was unconscionable.^[33] However, ICANN defended the enforceability of the legal waiver, saying that only a covenant not to sue that is specifically designed to avoid responsibility for own fraud or willful injury is invalidated under the provisions of the California Civil Code.^[34] A waiver, incorporating the availability of accountability mechanisms ‘within ICANN’s bylaws to challenge any final decision of ICANN’s with respect to an application’, was argued as completely valid under California’s laws. It must be kept in mind that challenges to ICANN’s final decisions can make headway only through its own accountability mechanisms (including the Reconsideration Requests Process, the Independent Review Panel and the Ombudsman), which are mostly conducted by, accountable to and applicable at the discretion of the Board.^[35] This means that the only recourse for dissatisfied applicants is through processes managed by ICANN, leaving no scope for independence and impartiality in the review or inquiry concerned, as the .WEB case has shown.

Note: ICANN has also previously argued that its waivers are not restricted by S. 1668 because the parties involved are sophisticated - without an element of oppression, and that these transactions don’t involve public interest as ICANN doesn’t provide necessary services such as health, transportation, etc.^[36] Such line of argument shows its continuous refusal to acknowledge responsibility for ensuring access to an essential good, in a diverse community, justifying concerns about ICANN’s commitment to accessibility and human rights.

Required to remain accountable to the stakeholders of the community through mechanisms listed in its Bylaws, ICANN’s repeated difficulty in ensuring these mechanisms adhere to the purpose behind jurisdictional regulations confirm hindrances to impartiality, independence and effectiveness.

The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds:

The use and distribution of significant auction proceeds accruing to ICANN have been identified by the internet community as issues central to financial transparency, especially in a future of increasing instances of contention sets.

Private Inurement Prohibition and Legal Requirements of Tax-Exempted Organisations: Subject to California’s state laws as well as federal laws, tax exemptions and tax-deductible charitable donations (available to not-for-profit public benefit corporations) are dependent on the fulfillment of jurisdictional obligations by ICANN, including avoiding contracts that may result in excessive economic benefit to a party involved, or lead to any deviation from purely charitable and scientific purposes.^[37] ICANN’s Articles require that it ‘shall pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet’.^[38] Due to this, ICANN’s accumulation of around USD 60 million (the total net proceeds from over 14 contention sets) since 2014 has been treated with unease, making it impossible to ignore the exponential increase in the same after the .WEB controversy.^[39] With its dedication to a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder policy development process, the use of a single and ambiguous footnote, in ICANN’s Guidebook, to tackle the complications involving significant funds that accrue from last resort auctions (without even mentioning the arbiters of their ‘appropriate’ use) is grossly insufficient.^[40]

Need for Careful and Inclusive Deliberation Over the Use of Auction Proceeds: At the end of the fiscal year 2016, ICANN’s balance sheet showed a total of USD 399.6 million. However, the .WEB sale amount was not included in this figure, as the auction happened after the last date (June 30, 2016).^[41] Around seven times the average winning bid, a USD 135 million hike in ICANN’s accounts shows the need for greater scrutiny on ICANN’s process of allocation and distribution of these auction proceeds.^[42] While finding an ‘appropriate purpose’ for these funds, it is important that ICANN’s legal nature under US jurisdiction as well as its vision, mission and commitments be adhered to, in order to help increase public confidence and financial transparency.

The CCWG Charter on New gTLD Auction Proceeds: ICANN has always maintained that it recognised the concern of ‘significant funds accruing as a result of several auctions’ at the outset.^[43] In March 2015, the GNSO brought up issues relating to the distribution of auction proceeds at ICANN52, to address growing concerns of the community.^[44] A Charter was then drafted, proposing the formation of a Cross-Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds, to help ICANN’s Board in allocating these funds.^[45] After being discussed in detail at ICANN56, the draft charter was forwarded to the various supporting organisations for comments.^[46] The Charter received no objections from 2 organisations and was adopted by the ALAC, ASO, ccNSO and GNSO, following which members and co-chairs were identified from the organisations to constitute the CCWG.^[47] It was decided that while ICANN’s Board will have final responsibility in disbursement of the proceeds, the CCWG will be responsible for the submission of proposals regarding the mechanism for the allocation of funds, keeping ICANN’s fiduciary and legal obligations in mind.^[48] While creating proposals, the CCWG must recommend how to avoid possible conflicts of interest, maintain ICANN’s tax-exempt status, and ensure diversity and inclusivity in the entire process.^[49] It is important to note that the CCWG cannot make recommendations ‘regarding which organisations are to be funded or not’, but is to merely submit a proposal for the process by which allocation is undertaken.^[50] ICANN’s Guidebook mentions possible uses for proceeds, such as ‘grants to support new gTLD applications or registry operators from communities’, the creation of a fund for ‘specific projects for the benefit of the Internet community’, the ‘establishment of a security fund to expand use of secure protocols’, among others, to be decided by the Board.^[51]

A Slow Process and the Need for More Official Updates: The lack of sufficient communication/updates about any allocation or the process behind such, in light of ICANN’s current total net auction proceeds of USD 233,455,563, speaks of an urgent need for a decision by the Board (based on a recommendation by CCWG), regarding a timeframe for the allocation of such proceeds.^[52] However, the entire process has been very slow, with the first CCWG meeting on auction proceeds scheduled for 26 January 2016, and the lists of members and observers being made public only recently.^[53] Here, even parties interested in applying for the same funds at a later stage are allowed to participate in meetings, as long as they include such information in a Statement of Interest and Declaration of Intention, to satisfy CCWG’s efforts towards transparency and accountability.^[54]

The worrying consequences of ICANN’s lack of financial as well as legal accountability (especially in light of its controversies), reminds us of the need for constant reassessment of its commitment to substantive transparency, enforcement and compliance with its rules and regulations. Its current obsessive courtship with only procedural regularity must not be mistaken for a greater commitment to accountability, as assured by the post-transition IANA.

^[1] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 2. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.p df)

^[2] 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[3] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[4] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[5] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4-7. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf)

^[6] PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE THIRD PARTY DISCOVERY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ISSUE A SCHEDULING ORDER, 3.

(https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf)

^[7](https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz)

^[8] An expedited discovery request can provide the required evidentiary support needed to meet the Plaintiff’s burden to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. (http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html)

^[9] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 2. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[10] (http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction); (https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/)

^[11] (http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html)

^[12] Art III, Bylaws of Public Technical Identifiers, ICANN. (https://pti.icann.org/bylaws)

^[13] 1.4.1.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-39.(https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[14] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[15] 1.2.1; 1.2.2, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[16](https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz)

^[17] 1.2.7, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-30. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[18] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf)

^[19] 1.1.2.5, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-8. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[20] 1.2.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[21] DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 7. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf)

^[22] 6.8; 6.11, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-5 (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb);

DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 10. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[23] 1.1.2.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[24] NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[25] DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[26] 26(f); 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/); (https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/)

^[27] 6.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-6. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb); (https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct)

^[28] 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 6. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[29] DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[30] PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 12.

(https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf)

^[31] (https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm); Art. 1(c), Bylaws for ICANN. (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en)

^[32] (http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668); NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 24. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf)

^[33] 6.6, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-4. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[34] DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 18. (http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf)

^[35] (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en)

^[36] AMENDED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 4. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf)

^[37] 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, USA. (https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations)

^[38] Art. II, Public Technical Identifiers, Articles of Incorporation, ICANN. (https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation)

^[39](https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace)

^[40] (https://www.icann.org/policy); 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[41]5, Internet Corporation for ASsigned Names and Numbers, Fiscal Statements As of and for the Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015. (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf);

(http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29)

^[42] (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web)

^[43](https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home)

^[44] (https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en)

^[45] (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

^[46] (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

^[47](https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en);

(https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home)

^[48] (https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf); (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

^[49] (https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en)

^[50] (https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter)

^[51] 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb)

^[52] (https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds)

^[53] (https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102)

^[54] (https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy

ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy – I: DIDP Basics

Vinayak Mithal — 2014-07-01T13:01:34Z

In a series of blogposts, Vinayak Mithal analyses ICANN's reactive transparency mechanism, comparing it with freedom of information best practices. In this post, he describes the DIDP and its relevance for the Internet community.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) is a non-profit corporation incorporated in the state of California and vested with the responsibility of managing the DNS root, generic and country-code Top Level Domain name system, allocation of IP addresses and assignment of protocol identifiers. As an internationally organized corporation with its own multi-stakeholder community of Advisory Groups and Supporting Organisations, ICANN is a large and intricately woven governance structure. Necessarily, ICANN undertakes through its Bye-laws that “in performing its functions ICANN shall remain accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness”. While many of its documents, such as its Annual Reports, financial statements and minutes of Board meetings, are public, ICANN has instituted the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”), which like the RTI in India, is a mechanism through which public is granted access to documents with ICANN which are not otherwise available publicly. It is this policy – the DIDP – that I propose to study.

In a series of blogposts, I propose to introduce the DIDP to unfamiliar ears, and to analyse it against certain freedom of information best practices. Further, I will analyse ICANN’s responsiveness to DIDP requests to test the effectiveness of the policy. However, before I undertake such analysis, it is first good to know what the DIDP is, and how it is crucial to ICANN’s present and future accountability.

What is the DIDP?

One of the core values of the organization as enshrined under Article I Section 4.10 of the Bye-laws note that “in performing its functions ICANN shall remain accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN’s effectiveness”. Further, Article III of the ICANN Bye-laws, which sets out the transparency standard required to be maintained by the organization in the preliminary, states - “ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness”.

Accordingly, ICANN is under an obligation to maintain a publicly accessible website with information relating to its Board meetings, pending policy matters, agendas, budget, annual audit report and other related matters. It is also required to maintain on its website, information about the availability of accountability mechanisms, including reconsideration, independent review, and Ombudsman activities, as well as information about the outcome of specific requests and complaints invoking these mechanisms.

Pursuant to Article III of the ICANN Bye-laws for Transparency, ICANN also adopted the DIDP for disclosure of publicly unavailable documents and publish them over the Internet. This becomes essential in order to safeguard the effectiveness of its international multi-stakeholder operating model and its accountability towards the Internet community. Thereby, upon request made by members of the public, ICANN undertakes to furnish documents that are in possession, custody or control of ICANN and which are not otherwise publicly available, provided it does not fall under any of the defined conditions for non-disclosure. Such information can be requested via an email to didp@icann.org.

Procedure

Upon the receipt of a DIDP request, it is reviewed by the ICANN staff.
Relevant documents are identified and interview of the appropriate staff members is conducted.
The documents so identified are then assessed whether they come under the ambit of the conditions for non-disclosure.
- Yes - A review is conducted as to whether, under the particular circumstances, the public interest in disclosing the documentary information outweighs the harm that may be caused by such disclosure.
- Documents which are considered as responsive and appropriate for public disclosure are posted on the ICANN website.
- In case of request of documents whose publication is appropriate but premature at the time of response then the same is indicated in the response and upon publication thereafter, is notified to the requester.

Time Period and Publication

The response to the DIDP request is prepared by the staff and is made available to the requestor within a period of 30 days of receipt of request via email. The Request and the Response is also posted on the DIDP page http://www.icann.org/en/about/transparency in accordance with the posting guidelines set forth at http://www.icann.org/en/about/transparency/didp.

Conditions for Non-Disclosure

There are certain circumstances under which ICANN may refuse to provide the documents requested by the public. The conditions so identified by ICANN have been categorized under 12 heads and includes internal information, third-party contracts, non-disclosure agreements, drafts of all reports, documents, etc., confidential business information, trade secrets, information protected under attorney-client privilege or any other such privilege, information which relates to the security and stability of the internet, etc.

Moreover, ICANN may refuse to provide information which is not designated under the specified conditions for non-disclosure if in its opinion the harm in disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. Further, requests for information already available publicly and to create or compile summaries of any documented information may be declined by ICANN.

Grievance Redressal Mechanism

In certain circumstances the requestor might be aggrieved by the response received and so he has a right to appeal any decision of denial of information by ICANN through the Reconsideration Request procedure or the Independent Review procedure established under Section 2 and 3 of Article IV of the ICANN Bye-laws respectively. The application for review is made to the Board which has designated a Board Governance Committee for such reconsideration. The Independent Review is done by an independent third-party of Board actions, which are allegedly inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bye-laws of ICANN.

Why does the DIDP matter?

The breadth of ICANN’s work and its intimate relationship to the continued functioning of the Internet must be appreciated before our analysis of the DIDP can be of help. ICANN manages registration and operations of generic and country-code Top Level Domains (TLD) in the world. This is a TLD:

(Source: here)

Operation of many gTLDs, such as .com, .biz or .info, is under contract with ICANN and an entity to which such operation is delegated. For instance, Verisign operates the .com Registry. Any organization that wishes to allow others to register new domain names under a gTLD (sub-domains such as ‘benefithealth’ in the above example) must apply to ICANN to be an ICANN-accredited Registrar. GoDaddy, for instance, is one such ICANN-accredited Registrar. Someone like you or me, who wants to get our own website – say, vinayak.com – buys from GoDaddy, which has a contract with ICANN under which it pays periodic sums for registration and renewal of individual domain names. When I buy from an ICANN-accredited Registrar, the Registrar informs the Registry Operator (say, Verisign), who then adds the new domain name (vinayak.com) to its registry list, and then it can be accessed on the Internet.

ICANN’s reach doesn’t stop here, technically. To add a new gTLD, an entity has to apply to ICANN, after which the gTLD has to be added to the root file of the Internet. The root file, which has the list of all TLDs (or all ‘legitimate’ TLDs, some would say), is amended by Verisign under its tripartite contract with the US Government and ICANN, after which Verisign updates the file in its ‘A’ root server. The other 12 root servers use the same root file as the Verisign root server. Effectively, this means that only ICANN-approved TLDs (and all sub-domains such as ‘benefithealth’ or ‘vinayak’) are available across the Internet, on a global scale. Or at least, ICANN-approved TLDs have the most and widest reach. ICANN similarly manages country-code TLDs, such as .in for India, .pk for Pakistan or .uk for the United Kingdom.

All of this leads us to wonder whether the extent of ICANN’s voluntary and reactive transparency is sufficient for an organization of such scale and impact on the Internet, perhaps as much impact as the governments do. In the next post, I will analyse the DIDP’s conditions for non-disclosure of information with certain freedom of information best practices.

Vinayak Mithal is a final year student at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. His interests lie in Internet governance and other aspects of tech law, which he hopes to explore during his internship at CIS and beyond. He may be reached at vinayakmithal@gmail.com.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-documentary-information-disclosure-policy-2013-i-didp-basics

ICANN Workstream 2 Recommendations on Accountability

akriti — 2018-11-23T14:56:20Z

One of the most significant initiatives to improve the accountability of the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) commenced in 2014, when the Cross Community Working Group on Accountability was created. Its role was to develop a set of proposed enhancements to ICANN’s accountability to the global Internet community. This resulted in the first Work Stream (WS1) recommendations, which were eventually approved and incorporated into the bylaws of ICANN in 2016. These included a provision expressing the need for a second WS since the first one, done on a tight deadline,did not cover all the requisite issues. Instead WS1 only focused on issues that were needed to complete the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority(IANA) transition.

At the ICANN meeting in March of 2017 in Finland, the second Work Stream (WS2) was launched. The Cross Community Working Group submitted their final report at the end of June 2018 and the purpose of this blog is to look at the main recommendations given and the steps ahead to its implementation.

The new Workstream was structured into the following 8 independent sub groups as per the topics laid down in the WS1 final report, each headed by a Rapporteur:

1. Diversity

2. Guidelines for Standards of Conduct Presumed to be in Good Faith Associated with Exercising Removal of Individual ICANN Board Directors. (Guidelines for Good Faith)

3. Human Rights Framework of Interpretation (HR-FOI)

4. Jurisdiction

5. Office of the Ombuds

6. Supporting Organization/ Advisory Committee Accountability

7. Staff Accountability

8. ICANN Transparency

1. DIVERSITY Recommendations

The sub-group on Diversity suggested ways by which ICANN can define, measure, report, support and promote diversity. They proposed 7 key factors to guide all diversity considerations: Language, Gender, Age, Physical Disability, Diverse skills, Geographical representation and stakeholder group. Each charting organization within ICANN is asked to undertake an exercise whereby they publish their diversity obligations on their website, for each level of employment including leadership either under their own charter or ICANN Bylaws. This should be followed by a diversity assessment of their existing structures and consequently used to formulate their diversity objectives/criteria and steps on how to achieve the same along with the timeline to do so. These diversity assessments should be conducted annually and at the very least, every 3 years. ICANN staff has been tasked with developing a mechanism for dealing with complaints arising out of diversity and related issues. Eventually, it is envisioned that ICANN will create a Diversity section on their website where an Annual Diversity Report will be published. All information regarding Diversity should also be published in their Annual Report.

The recommendations leave much upto the organization without establishing specific recruitment policies for equal opportunities. In their 7 parameters, race was left out as a criteria for diversity. The criteria of ‘diverse skills’ is also ambiguous; and within stakeholder group, it would have been more useful to highlight the priority for diversity of opinions within the same stakeholder group. So for example, to have two civil society organizations (CSOs) advocating for contrasting stances as opposed to having many CSO’s supporting one stance. However, these steps should be a good starting point to improve the diversity of an organization which in our earlier research we have found to be neither global nor multistakeholder. In fact, our recent diversity analysis has shown concerns such as the vast number of the end users participating and as an extension, influencing ICANN work are male. The mailing list where the majority of discussions take place are dominated by individuals from industry bodies. This coupled with the relative minority presence of the other stakeholders, especially geographically (14.7% participation from Asian countries), creates an environment where concerns emanating from other sections of the society could be overshadowed. Moreover, when we have questioned ICANN’s existing diversity of employees based on their race and citizenship, they did not give us the figures citing either lack of information or confidentiality.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK OF INTERPRETATION (HR-FOI)

A Framework of Interpretation was developed by the WS2 for ICANN Bylaws relating to Human Rights which clarified that Human Rights are not a Commitment for the organization but is a Core Value. The former being an obligation while the latter are “not necessarily intended to apply consistently and comprehensively to ICANN’s activities”.

To summarize the FOI, if the applicable law i.e. the law practiced in the jurisdiction where ICANN is operating, does not mandate certain human rights then they do not raise issues under the core value. As such, there can be no enforcement of human rights obligations by ICANN or any other party against any other party. Thus, contingent on the seat of the operations the law can vary though by in large ICANN recognizes and can be guided by significant internationally respected human rights such as those enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights was recognized as useful in the process of applying the core value in operations since it discusses corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Building on this, Human Right Impact Assessments (HRIA) with respect to ICANN policy development processes are currently being formulated by the Cross Community Working Group on Human Rights. Complementing this, ICANN is also undertaking an internal HRIA of the organization’s operations. It is important to remember that the international human rights instruments that are relevant here are those required by the applicable law.

Apart from its legal responsibility to uphold the HR laws of an area, the framework is worded negatively in that it says ICANN should in general avoid violating human rights. It is also said that they should take into account HR when making policies but these fall short from saying that HR considerations should be given prominent weightage and since there are many core values, at any point one of the others can be used to sidestep human rights. One core value in particular says that ICANN should duly consider the public policy advice of governments and other authorities when arriving at a decision. Thus, if governments want to promote a decision to further national interests at the expense of citizen’s human rights then that would be very much possible within this FOI.

3. JURISDICTION

A highly contentious issue in WS2 was that of Jurisdiction, and the recommendations formed to tackle it were quite disappointing. Despite initial discussion by the group on ICANN’s location, they did not address the elephant in the room in their report. Even after the transition, ICANN’s new by-laws state that it is subject to California Law since it was incorporated there. This is partly the fault of the first Workstream because when enumerating the issues for WS2 with respect to jurisdiction, they left it ambiguous by stating: :

“At this point in the CCWG Accountability’s work, the main issues that need within Work Stream 2 relate to the influence that ICANN ́s existing jurisdiction may have on the actual operation of policies and accountability mechanisms. This refers primarily to the process for the settlement of disputes within ICANN, involving the choice of jurisdiction and of the applicable laws, but not necessarily the location where ICANN is incorporated.”

Jurisdiction can often play a significant role in the laws that ICANN will have to abide by in terms of financial reporting, consumer protection, competition and labour laws, legal challenges to ICANN’s actions and finally, in resolving contractual disputes. In its present state, the operations of ICANN could, if such a situation arises, see interference from US authorities by way of legislature, tribunals, enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies.

CIS has, in the past, discussed the concept of “jurisdictional resilience”, which calls for:

Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated.
Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions
Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions

Proposing to change ICANN’s seat of headquarters or at the very least, suggest ways for ICANN to gain partial immunity for its policy development processes under the US law would have gone a long way in making ICANN truly a global body. It would have also ensured that as an organization, ICANN would have been equally accountable to all its stakeholders as opposed to now, where by virtue of its incorporation, it has higher legal and possible political, obligations to the United States. This was (initially?) expressed by Brazil who dissented from the majority conclusions of the sub-group and drafted their own minority report, which was supported by countries like Russia. They were unhappy that all countries are still not at an equal footing in the participation of management of Internet resources, which goes against the fundamentals of the multi-stakeholder system approach.

Recommendations:

The recommendations passed were in two categories:

Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)

OFAC is an office of the US Treasury administering and enforcing economic and trade sanctions based on the American foreign policy and national security objectives. It is pertinent because, for ICANN to enter into a Registration Accreditation Agreement (RAA) with an applicant from a sanctioned country, it will need an OFAC license. What happens right now is that ICANN is under no obligation to request for this license and in either case, OFAC can refuse to provide it. The sub group recommended that the terms of the RAA be modified so that ICANN is required to apply for and put their best efforts in securing the license if the applicant is qualified to be a registrar and not individually subject to sanctions. While the licensing process is underway they should also be helpful and transparent, and maintain on-going communication with the applicant. The same recommendation was made for applicants to the new gTLD program, from sanctioned countries. Other general licenses are needed from OFAC for certain ICANN transactions and hence it was proposed that ICANN pursue the same.

2. Choice of law and Choice of Venue Provisions in ICANN Agreements

In ICANN’S Registry Agreements (RA) and Registration Accreditation Agreement (RAA) the absence of a choice of law provision means that the governing law of these contracts is undetermined until later decided by a judge or arbitrator or an agreement between the parties. It was collectively seen that increased freedom of choice for the parties in the agreement could help in customizing the agreements and make it easier for registries and such to contractually engage with ICANN. Out of various options, the group decided that a Menu approach would be best whereby a host of options(decided by ICANN) can be provided and the party in case choose the most appropriate from them such as the jurisdiction of their incorporation.In RAs, the choice of venue was pre determined as Los Angeles, California but the group recommended that instead of imposing this choice on the party it would be better to offer a list of possible venues for arbitration. The registry can then choose amongst these options when entering into the contract. There were other issues discussed which did not reach fruition due to lack of unanimity such as discussions on immunity of ICANN from US jurisdiction.

4. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDS

Subsequent to the external evaluation of the ICANN Office of the Ombuds (IOO), there were a couple of recommendations to strengthen the office. They were divided into procedural aspects that the office should carry out to improve their complaint mechanism such as differentiating between categories of complaints and explaining how each type would be handled with. The issues that would not invoke actions from the IOO should also be established clearly and if and where these could be transferred to any other channel. The response from all the relevant parties of ICANN to a formal request or report from the IOO should take place within 90 days, and 120 at the maximum if an explanation for the same can be provided. An internal timeline will be defined by the office for handling of complaints and document a report on these every quarter or annually. A recommendation for the IOO to be formally trained in mediation and have such experience within its ranks was further given. Reiterating the importance of diversity, even this sub group emphasized on the IOO bearing a diverse group in terms of gender and other parameters. This ensures that a complainant has a choice in who to approach in the office making them more comfortable. To enhance the independence of the Ombuds, their employment contract should have a 5 year fixed term which only allows for one extension of maximum 3 years. An Ombuds Advisory Panel is to be constituted by ICANN comprising five members to act as advisers, supporters and counsel for the IOO with at least 2 members having Ombudsman experience and the remaining possessing extensive ICANN experience. They would be responsible for selecting the new Ombuds and conducting the IOO’s evaluation every 5 years amongst others. Lastly, the IOO should proactively document their work by publishing reports on activity, collecting and publicizing statistics, user satisfaction information a well any improvements to the process.

These proposals still do not address the opacity of how the Office of the Ombuds resolve these cases since it does not call for; a) a compilation of all the cases that have been decided by the office in the history of the organization b) the details of the parties that are involved if the parties have allowed that to be revealed and if not at the very least, the non sensitive data such as their nationality and stakeholder affiliation and c) a description of the proceedings of the case and who won in each of them. When CIS asked for the above in 2015, the information was denied on ground of confidentiality. Yet, it is vital to know these details since the Ombuds hear complaints against the Board, Staff and other constituent bodies and by not reporting on this, ICANN is rendering the process much less accountable and transparent. This conflict resolution process and its efficacy is even more essential in a multi-stakeholder environment so as to give parties the faith to engage in the process, knowing that the redressal mechanisms are strong. It is also problematic that sexual harassments complaints are dealt by the Ombuds and that ICANN does not have a specific Anti-Sexual Harassment Committee. The committee should be neutral and approachable and while it is useful for the Office of the Ombuds to be trained in sexual harassment cases, it is by no means a comprehensive and ideal approach to deal with complaints of this nature. Despite ICANN facing a sexual harassment claim in 2016, the recommendations do not specifically address the approach the Ombuds should take in tackling sexual harassment.

5. SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION/ ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACCOUNTABILITY

The sub group presented the outcomes under the main heads of Accountability, Transparency, Participation, Outreach and Updates to policies and procedures. They suggested these as good practices that can be followed by the organizations and did not recommend that implementation of the same be required. The accountability aspect had suggestions of better documentation of procedures and decision-making. Proposals of listing members of such organizations publicly, making their meetings open to public observation including minutes and transcripts along with disclosing their correspondence with ICANN were aimed at making these entities more transparent. In the same vein, rules of membership and eligibility criteria, the process of application and a process of appeal should be well defined. Newsletters should be published by the SO/AC to help non-members understand the benefit and the process of becoming a member. Policies were asked to be reviewed at regular intervals and these internal reviews should not extend beyond a year.

6. STAFF ACCOUNTABILITY

Improving the ICANN staff’s Accountability was the job of a different group who assessed it at the service delivery, departmental or organizational level not at an individual or personnel level. They did this by analysing the roles and responsibilities of the Board, staff and community members and the nexus between them. Their observations culminated in the understanding that ICANN needs to take steps such as make visible their performance management system and process, their vision for the departmental goals and how they tie in to the organization’s strategic goals and objectives. They note that several new mechanisms have already been established yet have not been used enough to ascertain their efficacy and thus, propose a regular information acquisition mechanism. Most importantly, they have asked ICANN to standardize and publish guidelines for suitable timeframes for acknowledging and responding to requests from the community.

7. ICANN TRANSPARENCY

The last group of the WS2 was one specifically looking at the transparency of the organization.

a. The Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP)

Currently the DIDP process only applies to ICANN’s “operational activities”, it was recommended to delete this caveat to cover a wider breadth of the organization’s activities. As CIS has experienced, request for information is often met with an answer that such information is not documented and to remedy the same, a documentation policy was proposed where if significant elements of a decision making process are taking place orally then the participants will be required to document the substance of the conversation. Many a times DIDP requests are refused because one aspect of the information sought is subject to confidentiality. hus one of the changes is to introduce a severability clause so that in such cases, information can still be disclosed with the sensitive aspect redacted or severed. In scenarios of redaction, the rationale should be provided citing one of the given DIDP exceptions along with the process for appeal. ICANN’s contracts should be under the purview of the DIDP except when subject to a non-disclosure agreement and further, the burden is on the other party to convince ICANN that it has a legitimate commercial reason for requested the NDA. No longer would any information pertaining to the security and stability of the Internet be outside the ambit of the DIDP but only if it is harmful to the security and stability. Finally, ICANN should review the DIDP every five years to see how it can be improved.

b. Documenting and Reporting on ICANN’s Interactions with the Government

In a prominent step towards being more transparent with their expenditure and lobbying, the group recommended that ICANN begins disclosing publicly on at least an annual basis, sums of $20,000 per year devoted to “political activities” both in the US and abroad. All expenditures should be done on an itemized basis by ICANN for both outside contractors and internal personnel along with the identities of the persons engaging in such activities and the type of engagement used for such activities amongst others.

cc. Transparency of Board Deliberations

The bylaws were recommended to be revised so that material may be removed from the minutes of the Board if subject to a DIDP exception. The exception for deliberative processes should not apply to any factual information, technical report or reports on the performance or effectiveness of a particular body or strategy. When any information is removed from the minutes of the Board meeting, they should be disclosed after a particular period of time as and when the window of harm has passed.

d. ICANN’s Anonymous Hotline (Whistle-blower Protection)

To begin with, ICANN was recommended to devise a way such that when anyone searches their website for the term “whistle-blower”, it should redirect to their Hotline policy since people are unlikely to be aware that in ICANN parlance it is referred to as the Hotline policy. Instead of only “serious crimes” that are currently reported, all issues and concerns that violate local laws should be. Complaints should not be classified as ‘urgent’ and ‘non-urgent’ but all reports should be a priority and receive a formal acknowledgment within 48 hours at the maximum. ICANN should make it clear that any retaliation against the reporter will be taken and investigated as seriously as the original alleged wrongdoing. Employees should be provided with data about the use of the Hotline, including the types of incidents reported. Few member of this group came out with a Minority Statement expressing their disapproval with one particular aspect of the recommendations that they felt was not developed enough, the one pertaining to ICANN’s attorney-client privilege. The recommendation did not delve into specifics but merely stated that ICANN should expand transparency in their legal processes including clarifying how attorney-client privilege is invoked. The dissidents thought ICANN should go farther and enumerate principles where the privilege would be waived in the interests of transparency and account for voluntary disclosure as well.

The transparency recommendations did not focus on the financial reporting aspects of ICANN which we have found ambiguities with before. Some examples are; the Registries and Registrars are the main sources of revenue though there is ambiguity as to the classifications provided by ICANN such as the difference between RYG and RYN. The mode of contribution of sponsors isn’t clear either so we do not know if this was done through travel, money, media partnerships etc. Several entities have been listed from different places in different years, sometimes depending on the role they have played such as whether they are a sponsor or registry. Moreover, the Regional Internet Registries are clubbed under one heading and as a consequence it is not possible to determine individual RIR contribution like how much did APNIC pay for the Asia and Pacific region. Thus, there is a lot more scope for ICANN to be transparent which goes beyond the proposals in the report.

It is worth noting that whereas the mandate of the WS1 included the implementation of the recommendations, this is not the case for WS2 and thus, by creating a report itself the mission of the group is concluded. This difference can be attributed to the fact that during the first WS, there was a need to see it through since the IANA transition would not happen otherwise. The change in circumstances and the corresponding lack of urgency render the process less powerful, the second time round. The final recommendations are now being discussed in the relevant charting organizations within ICANN such as the Government Advisory Council (GAC) and subsequent to their approval,, it will be sent to the Board who will decide to adopt them or not. If adopted, ICANN and its sub organizations will have to see how they can implement these recommendations. The co-chairs of the group will be the point of reference for the chartering organizations and an implementation oversight team has been formed, consisting of the Rapporteurs of the sub teams and the co-chairs. A Feasibility Assessment Report will be made public in due time which will describe the resources that would take to implement the recommendations. Since it would be a huge undertaking for ICANN to implement the above, the compliance process is expected to take a few years. .

The link to report can be found here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-work-stream-2-recommendations-on-accountability

ICANN takes one step forward in its human rights and accountability commitments

Akriti Bopanna and Ephraim Percy Kenyanito — 2019-12-19T11:35:16Z

Akriti Bopanna and Ephraim Percy Kenyanito take a look at ICANN's Implementation Assessment Report for the Workstream 2 recommendations and break down the key human rights considerations in it. Akriti chairs the Cross Community Working Party on Human Rights at ICANN and Ephraim works on Human Rights and Business for Article 19, leading their ICANN engagement.

The article was first published on Article 19 on December 16, 2019

ICANN is the international non-profit organization that brings together various stakeholders to create policies aimed at coordinating the Domain Name System. Some of these stakeholders include representatives from government, civil society, academia, the private sector, and the technical community.

During the recently concluded 66th International Meeting of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in Montreal (Canada); the ICANN board adopted by consensus the recommendations contained within the Work Stream 2 (WS2) Final Report. This report was generated as part of steps towards accountability after the September 30th 2016 U.S. government handing over of its unilateral control over ICANN, through its previous stewardship role of the Internet Assigned Names and Numbers Authority (IANA).

The Workstream 2 Recommendations on Accountability are seen as a big step ahead in the incorporation of human rights in ICANN’s various processes, with over 100 recommendations on aspects ranging from diversity to transparency. An Implementation Team has been constituted which comprises the Co-chairs and the rapporteurs from the WS2 subgroups. They will primarily help the ICANN organization in interpreting recommendations of the groups where further clarification is needed on how to implement the same. As the next step, an Implementation Assessment Report has recently been published which looks at the various resources and steps needed. The steps are categorized into actions meant for one of the 3; the ICANN Board, Community and the ICANN organization itself. These will be funded by ICANN’s General Operating Fund, the Board and the org.

The report is divided into the following 8 issues: 1) Diversity, 2) Guidelines for Good Faith, 3) Recommendations for a Framework of Interpretation for Human Rights, 4) Jurisdiction of Settlement of Dispute Issues, 5) Recommendations for Improving the ICANN Office of the Ombudsman, 6) Recommendations to increase SO/ AC Accountability, 7) Recommendations to increase Staff Accountability and 8) Recommendations to improve ICANN Transparency.

This blog will take a look at the essential human rights related considerations of the report and how the digital rights community can get involved with the effectuation of the recommendations.

Diversity

The core issues concerning the issue of diversity revolve around the need for a uniform definition of the parameters of diversity and a community discussion on the ones already identified; geographic representation, language, gender, age, physical disability, diverse skills and stakeholder constituency. An agreed upon definition of all of these is necessary before its Board approval and application consistently through the various parts of ICANN. In addition, it is also required to formulate a standard template for diversity data collection and report generation. This sub group’s recommendations are estimated to be implemented in 6-18 months. Many of the recommendations need to be analyzed for compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) such as collecting of information relating to disability. For now, the GDPR is only referenced with no further details on how steps considered will either comply or contrast the law.

Good faith Guidelines

The Empowered Community (EC) which includes all the Supporting Organizations, At-Large-Advisory-Committee and Government Advisory Council, are called upon to conceptualize guidelines to be followed when individuals from the EC are participating in Board Removal Processes. Subsequent to this, the implementation will take 6-12 months.

Framework of Interpretation for Human Rights

Central to the human rights conversation and finally approved, is the Human Rights Framework of Interpretation. However the report does not give a specific timeline for its implementation, only mentioning that this process will take more than 12 months. The task within this is to establish practices of how the core value of respecting human rights will be balanced with other core values while developing ICANN policies and execution of its operations. All policy development processes, reviews, Cross Community Working Group recommendations will need a framework to consider and incorporate human rights, in tandem with the Framework of Interpretation. It will also have to be shown that policies and recommendations sent to the Board have factored in the FOI.

Transparency

The recommendations focus on the following four key areas as listed below:
1. Improving ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP).
2. Documenting and Reporting on ICANN’s Interactions with Governments.
3. Improving Transparency of Board Deliberations.
4. Improving ICANN’s Anonymous Hotline (Whistleblower Protection).

The bulk of the burden for implementation is put on ICANN org with the community providing oversight and ensuring ICANN lives up to its commitments under various policies and laws. Subsequent to this, the implementation will take 6-12 months.

How the ICANN community can contribute to this work

This is a defining moment on the future of ICANN and there are great opportunities for the ICANN multistakeholder community to continue shaping the future of the Internet. Some of the envisioned actions by the community include:

monitoring and assessing the performance of the various ICANN bodies, and acting on the recommendations that emerge from those accountability processes. This will only be done through collaborative formulation of processes and procedures for PDPS, CCWGs etc to incorporate HR considerations and subsequently implementation of the best practices suggested for improving SO/ACs accountability and transparency;
conducting diversity assessments to inform objectives and strategies for diversity criteria;
supporting contracted parties through legal advice for change in their agreements when it comes to choice of law and venue recommendations;
contributing to conversations where the Ombudsman can expand his/her involvement that go beyond current jurisdiction and authority

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/article-19-akriti-bopanna-and-ephraim-percy-kenyanito-december-16-2019-icann-takes-one-step-forward-in-its-human-rights-and-accountability-commitments

ICANN Sexual Harassment Case Highlights Lack of Procedure at Global Internet Body

praskrishna — 2016-04-01T15:42:49Z

Alleged perpetrator files counter-complaint with ombudsman’s office after being publicly identified.

The article was published in the Wire on March 24, 2016.

A female researcher associated with the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society has alleged that she was sexually harassed at an ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) public meeting held in Morocco earlier this month, in an incident that highlights a lack of established procedure at the global body responsible for maintaining the technical backbone of the Internet.

According to the woman, who is currently a law student but was representing CIS at the meeting, she was sexually harassed by a participant from the private sector constituency on March 6th at a working session.

“I felt like my space and safety as a young woman in the ICANN community was at stake,” she said.

ICANN-organised events currently do not have a formal redressal system for these type of complaints nor does it have a specific anti-sexual harassment committee to which community members can file an official complaint.

The CIS representative, therefore, has taken up her case with ICANN’s ombudsman office, an office that does not have an explicit mandate to deal with incidents of sexual harassment.

“I currently am unclear as to the exact status of my complaint. The ombudsman office does not have a clear sexual harassment procedure, it has only a standards of behaviour. When I first went to them, they told me nobody has officially complained of sexual harassment since 1998,” she told The Wire.

“I understand the evidential burden that needs to be fulfilled for this [allegation] to be proven. I know it’s difficult to prove this. I just want an enquiry conducted properly and impartially.”

The Centre for Internet and Society released a sharp statement on Monday, pointing out that since the woman was “given no immediate remedy or formal recourse”, she had no choice but to make “the incident publicly known in the interim.”

CIS Executive Director Sunil Abraham pointed out that while the ombudsman office has been in touch with the organisation’s representative, “this administrative process is simply inadequate for rights-violation”.

To that end, CIS has called upon ICANN to “institute a formal redressal system with regard to sexual harassment and institute an anti-sexual harassment committee that is neutral and approachable”.

“Merely having an ombudsman who is a white male, however well intentioned, is inadequate and completely unhelpful to the complainant. The present situation is one where the ombudsman has no effective power and only advises the board ,” the CIS’s statement reads.

ICANN perspective

When asked for a comment, ICANN media representatives pointed The Wire to the written transcript of a public session in which this particular issue of sexual harassment was raised. In that meeting, ICANN board member Markus Kummer specifically condemns “improper conduct of any kind such as harassment” while calling for zero tolerance on such issues within the larger ICANN community.

On the issue of whether ICANN could adopt a broader policy on sexual harassment, Kummer acknowledges that while the organisation’s expected standards of behaviour “could be a bit more specific as regards harassment”, the standards are applicable to “staff and board members and we have to undergo training”.

“Now, we could also make this also available to the community but the board thought it might not be the appropriate way to go about and impose something on the community. It might be more appropriate for the community to come up with these standards…Let me once again assure the community that the board is fully cognizant of the importance of this issue and supports the community in developing standards that may be more explicit in regard of these issues,” Kummer is quoted as saying in the transcript.

Complaint, Counter-Complaint

The incident, however, took a different turn on Tuesday after the ICANN ombudsman wrote to the CIS representative informing her that the investigation had become “very difficult” because she had identified and named the alleged perpetrator in a public social media posting.

“By naming [the alleged perpetrator] before the process was completed, this has meant that the confidentiality of my office has been compromised and his privacy has been compromised. Leaving aside the issue of whether he actually made the comments and behaved as you describe [sic], he is entitled to a fair and impartial investigation,” the ombudsman office’s letter says.

The alleged perpetrator now, according to the letter, has filed a counter-complaint with the ombudsman and has asked the office to undertake an investigation into the female student’s actions in this regard.

“I remind you that his [the perpetrator] initial response on the initial discussion was that he could not recall making the remark. So I sought your comments. I would have liked to take your comments back to him and had some form of conversation. This may still be possible but the force of your complaint is diluted by the problem of procedural fairness by the premature publication of his name,” the letter adds.

Cleaning up

While the CIS representative’s complaint may be the first officially recorded incident at an ICANN meeting, sexual harassment and inappropriate gender bias at numerous technical conferences across the world (ICANN or not) has been a well-documented phenomenon.

In 2012, ICANN ombudsman Chris LaHette was forced to step in after a complaint was lodged regarding the insensitive advertising and promotion surrounding the ICANN 44 meeting in Prague.

While ICANN’s “expected standards of behaviour” – basically a code of conduct – explicitly states that all “members of the ICANN community be treated equally irrespective of nationality or gender..”, there is no official policy that states what aggrieved parties should do after an incident occurs.

Such a policy must be created, CIS points out, and must be “displayed on the ICANN website, at the venue of meetings, and made available in delegate kits”.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-march-24-2016-icann-sexual-harassment-case-highlights-lack-of-procedure-at-global-internet-body

ICANN response to DIDP #31 on diversity

Akriti Bopanna and Akash Sriram — 2018-08-21T17:35:06Z

This post summarizes the response of ICANN to our inquiry on the diversity of their employees.

The file can be found here

In our 31st DIDP request, we had asked ICANN to disclose information pertaining to the diversity of employees based on their race and citizenship. ICANN states that they are an equal opportunities employer and to ascertain the extent of people from different backgrounds in their ranks, we were hoping to be given the information.

However the response provided to us did not shed any light on this because of two reasons; firstly, ICANN has this information solely for two countries namely USA and Singapore as legislation in these countries compels employers to record this information. In the US, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that any organization with 100 or more employees have to file an Employer Information Report wherein the employment data is categorized by race/ethnicity/, gender and job category. Whereas in Singapore, information on race is gathered from the employee to assess which Self-Help group fund an employee should contribute to under Singaporean law.

Secondly, for the two countries, they refused to divulge information on the basis of their conditions of nondisclosure. The conditions pertinent here were:

Information provided by or to a government or international organization, or any form of recitation of such information, in the expectation that the information will be kept confidential and/or would or likely would materially prejudice ICANN's relationship with that party.
Personnel, medical, contractual, remuneration, and similar records relating to an individual's personal information, when the disclosure of such information would or likely would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, as well as proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations.
Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication

We had only enquired about the percentage of representation of employees at each level by their race or citizenship but this was deemed dangerous to disclose by ICANN. They did not volunteer anymore information such as an anonymized data set and hence we will now file a DIDP to ask them for the same.

Given the global and multi-stakeholder nature of the processes at ICANN, it is also of importance that their workforce represents true diversity as well. Their bylaws mandate diversity amongst its Board of Directors and some of its constituent bodies but there is no concrete proof of this being imbibed within their recruitment ICANN also did not think it was necessary to disclose our requested information in the benefit of public interest because it does not outweigh the harm that could be caused by the requested disclosure.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-response-to-didp-31-on-diversity

ICANN Masterclass

Admin — 2019-06-22T03:57:07Z

ICANN organized a masterclass in Bangalore on June 19, 2019.

It was ICANN's first-ever such initiative within civil society to inform and spread awareness about their functioning. The workshop was conducted by Mary Wong who is the Vice President for Strategic Comunications Operations, Planning and Engagement and is a member of the Policy Team performing global policy development work. She was joined by Samiran Gupta who is the Head of India for ICANN. He is the primary representative of ICANN in the country and responsible for all stakeholder engagements here.

Agenda

10.00 a.m. - 11.45 a.m.: Introduction to ICANN and the role of ICANN Org to facilitate the community’s work
10.45 a.m. - 12.00: Tea break
12.00 - 1.30 p.m.: ICANN’s Policy Development Process (will be conducted in an interactive mode to simulate a Policy Development Process working group meeting).
1.30 p.m - 2.30 p.m.: Lunch
2.30 p.m - 3.30 p.m.: The role of Governmental Advisory Committee (India’s GAC-related engagement in specific terms).
3.30 p.m. - 3.45 p.m.: Tea break
3.45 p.m - 4.30 p.m.: Open Q&A session.(Also open so that in case prior segments over-run, we still have some time on hand to complete the agenda comfortably).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-masterclass

ICANN Diversity Analysis

akriti — 2018-08-29T11:19:46Z

The by-laws of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) state that it is a non-profit public-benefit corporation which is responsible at the overall level, for the coordination of the “global internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the internet's unique identifier systems”. As key stakeholders of ICANN are spread across the world, much of the communication discussing the work of ICANN takes place over email. This analysis of the diversity of participation at the ICANN processes, through a study of their mailing lists, was undertaken by Paul Kurian and Akriti Bopanna.

The by-laws of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) state that it is a non-profit public-benefit corporation which is responsible at the overall level, for the coordination of the “global internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the internet's unique identifier systems”.^{^[1]}Previously, this was overseen by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) under a US Government contract but in 2016, the oversight was handed over to ICANN, as a global multi-stakeholder body.^{^[2]} Given the significance of the multistakeholder nature of ICANN, it is imperative that stakeholders continue to question and improve the inclusiveness of its processes. The current blog post seeks to focus on the diversity of participation at the ICANN process.

As stakeholders are spread across the world, much of the communication discussing the work of ICANN takes place over email. Various [or X number of ] mailing lists inform members of ICANN activities and are used for discussions between them from policy advice to organizational building matters. Many of these lists are public and hence can be subscribed to by anyone and also can be viewed by non-members through the archives.

CIS analysed the five most active mailing lists amongst the working group mailing lists from January 2016 to May 2018, namely:

Outreach & Engagement,
Technology,
At-Large Review 2015 - 2019,
IANA Transition & ICANN Accountability, and
Finance & Budget mailing lists.

We looked at the diversity among these active participants by focusing on their gender, stakeholder grouping and region. In order to arrive at the data, we referred to public records such as the Statement of Interests which members have to give to the Generic Names Supporting Organization(GNSO) Council if they want to participate in their working groups. We also used, where available, ICANN Wiki and the LinkedIn profiles of these participants. Given below are some of the observations we made subsequent to surveying the data. We acknowledge that there might be some inadvertent errors made in the categorization of these participants, but are of the opinion that our inference from the data would not be drastically affected by a few errors.

The following findings were observed:

A total of 218 participants were present on the 5 mailing lists that were looked at.
Of these,, 92 were determined to be active participants (participants who had sent more than the median number of mails in their working group) out of which 75 were non-staff members.

Among the active non-staff participants:

Out of the 75 participants, 56 (74.7%) were male and 19 (25.3%) were female.
57.3% were identified to be members of the industry and technological community and 1.3% were identified as government representatives. 8.0% were representatives from Academia, 25.3% represented civil society and the remaining 8.0% were from fields that were uncategorizable with respect to the above, but were related to law and consultancy.
Only 14.7% of the participants were from Asia while the majority belonged to Africa and then North America with 24% and 22.7% participation respectively
Within Asia, we identified only one active participant from China.

Concerns

The vast number of the people participating and as an extension, influencing ICANN work are male constituting three fourth of the participants.
The mailing list are dominated by individuals from industry.. This coupled with the relative minority presence of the other stakeholders creates an environment where concerns emanating from other sections of the society could be overshadowed.
Only 14.7% of the participants were from Asia, which is concerning since 48.7% of internet users worldwide belong to Asia.^{^[3]}
China which has the world’s largest population of internet users (700 million people)^{^[4]} had only one active participant on these mailing lists.

ICANN being a global multistakeholder organization should ideally have the number of representatives from each region be proportionate to the number of internet users in that region. In addition to this, participation of women on these mailing lists need to increase to ensure that there is inclusive contribution in the functioning of the organization. We did not come across any indication of participation of individuals of non binary genders.

^{^[1]} https://cis-india.org/telecom/knowledge-repository-on-internet-access/icann

^{^[2]} https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2016-10-01-en

^{^[3]} https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm

^{^[4]} https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-diversity-analysis

ICANN and Global Internet Governance: The Road to São Paulo, and Beyond

praskrishna — 2014-04-03T09:54:08Z

A conference to be held on Friday 21 March 2014 at the ICANN 49 meeting venue, the Raffles City Convention Centre, Singapore, in the Olivia Room, from 10:00 to 18:00. Organized by the NonCommercial Users Constituency (NCUC) of the Generic Names Supporting Organization, with the generous support of ICANN. Geetha Hariharan participated in this event.

Click to read more on the conference here.

The NETMundial Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of the Internet Governance will be held in São Paulo, Brazil on 23-24 April 2014.

Initiated by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and ICANN CEO Fadi Chehadé, and co-organized by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and /1Net, the meeting will bring together a wide range of government, business, technical community, civil society and academic participants from around the world. The organizers describe its objectives as, “crafting Internet governance principles and proposing a roadmap for the further evolution of the Internet governance ecosystem.”

The purpose of this NCUC conference is to provide a first opportunity for intensive, F2F cross-community dialogue on the main substantive topics likely to be addressed in São Paulo. Stakeholders from across the ICANN community have expressed a range of views and uncertainties about the meeting’s precise substantive focus, expected outcomes, and potential significance in the continuing evolution of the global Internet governance ecosystem. It is hoped that the NCUC conference will help the community to work through the issues at stake and to prepare for its participation in the NETMundial.

On Site Participation
The meeting is free of charge and open to all members of the ICANN community. People wishing to attend must register for the conference and indicate whether they wish to be included in the lunch and/or the reception. Attendees must also register for the ICANN meeting in order to access the conference venue.

Remote Participation
ICANN will provide live remote participation via Adobe Connect, audiocast, and telephone dial-in. They also will videotape the conference for subsequent web access. For access please visit http://singapore49.icann.org/en/schedule/fri-ncuc-ig

Written Inputs
Members of the ICANN community are invited to provide personal or organizational written inputs related to the four panel topics indicated on the conference program. These will be added to the online repository associated with each of the sessions. If interested, please send your inputs to ncuc@ncuc.org.

Programme details here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/non-commercial-users-constituency-icann-and-global-internet-governance

ICANN 65 De-briefing Meeting

Admin — 2019-07-21T15:02:03Z

The Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) organized an ICANN65 de-briefing meeting on July 16, 2019. Akriti Bopanna remotely presented on the Human Rights related developments that took place at the Marrakech meeting, over the course of the 4 days.

Akriti's updates related to Workstream 2 Recommendations on Accountability, the Government Advisory Council's options in incorporating HR in their communication to the Board, their interest in our Human Rights Impact Assessment work and having a high interest session on the same at ICANN66. She also spoke about her contributions to the ICANN Board on their Anti-Harassment Policy along with details on the working group established to discussing the policy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-65-de-briefing-meeting

ICANN 65

Admin — 2019-07-06T01:08:36Z

Akriti Bopanna attended ICANN 65 in Marrakech, Morocco from 24 - 27 June 2019.

Akriti spoke on ICANN and Human Rights at a session organized by the At-Large and Non-Commercial Users Constituency.
The Government Advisory Council discussed how government representatives can get involved in the Human Rights Impact Assessment work which the working party that she co-chairs on Human Rights at ICANN has been conducting. Akriti spoke on the feasibility of organizing a High Interest Session on Human Rights at ICANN66.
Akriti participated in a public meeting of ICANN's Board on their Anti-Harassment Policy and my suggestions/remarks on improving the samte were received well.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-65

ICANN 61 Readout

Admin — 2018-05-05T09:18:03Z

Akriti Bopanna attended an ICANN61 Readout session on the 19th of April at the International Institute of Information Technology at Electronic City in Bengaluru.

Click to read the agenda here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-61-readout

ICANN 57

praskrishna — 2016-11-08T01:14:37Z

ICANN 57 is being hosted by the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, Government of India from November 3 to 9, 2016 in Hyderabad at Hyderabad International Convention Centre. Vidushi Marda participated in the event as a speaker.

As part of her work for the Cross Community Working Party on ICANN's Corporate and Social Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, Vidushi presented her work on the Human Rights Impact of new gTLD Subsequent Procedures in Hyderabad.

India’s Minister of Law & Justice and Minister of Electronics and Information Technology Ravi Shankar Prasad reiterated India’s commitment to the multistakeholder model during the Opening Ceremony of the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN’s) 57th Public Meeting. The meeting, also known as ICANN57, is taking place in Hyderabad, India, from November 3 – 9, 2016 and has convened thousands of the global Internet community members (both on-site and remotely) to discuss and develop policies related to the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). It is hosted by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), with support from the Government of Telangana.

ICANN57 is the first post-IANA stewardship transition public meeting and also the first Annual General Meeting under the new Meetings Strategy. ICANN meetings are held three times a year in different regions to enable attendees from around the world to participate in person. These meetings offer a variety of sessions such as workshops, open forums and working meetings on the development and implementation of Internet policies. ICANN meetings offer the best opportunity for face-to-face discussions and exchange of opinions among attendees dedicated to the continued stable and secure operation of the Domain Name System.

For more info about the event, visit the ICANN website.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad

ICANN 55

praskrishna — 2016-03-30T14:41:34Z

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) held its 55th meeting in Marrakech, Morocco from March 5 to 10, 2016. Padmini Baruah and Vidushi Marda attended the event organized by Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Consular and Social Affairs.

The Centre for Internet & Society's (CIS) work during this meeting revolved mainly around ICANN's accountability (DIDP and Reconsideration requests), transparency, its commitment to human rights, diversity, and questions surrounding the IANA transition. CIS research was circulated via a submission booklet to different people that we met through the course of the conference. A session-wise account of our work at ICANN55 can be accessed here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-55

IBSA Seminar on Global Internet Governance

praskrishna — 2011-09-13T09:53:41Z

The seminar will take place at Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV) - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, September 1-2, 2011.

Day 1: September, 1

08.30 - 09.00: Arrival and Accreditation of Participants

09.00 - 10.00: Opening Session

Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal - President of FGV
Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado, Undersecretary-General of Environment, Energy, Science and Technology, MRE, Brazil
Ambassador Gilberto Fonseca Guimaraes de Moura, Director of the Department of Inter-regional Mechanisms, MRE, Brazil
Representative of the Government of India - Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) or Department of Information Technology (DIT)
Mr. Moseamo Sebola - Director of Bilateral Relations - Department of Communications (DoC)
Prof. Hartmut Glaser - Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br)
Viviana Munoz - South Centre

10.00 - 10.15: Coffee Break

10.15 - 11.15: Session 1: A Diagnosis of the Main Challenges for Developing Countries on the Global Internet Governance Regime (10 Minutes to Each Speaker)

Moderation: Ambassador Benedicto Fonseca Filho, MRE, Brazil

Government of India
DIRCO South Africa
Secretary Romulo Neves, Head of the Division for the Information Society, MRE
Parminder Jeet Singh - IT for Change, India
Carlos Afonso - NUPEF, Brazil
Mark Weinberg - Alternative Information Development Centre, South Africa

11.15 - 12.30: Discussion

12.30 - 14.00 Lunch

14.00 - 1530: Session 2: A Development Agenda for IG: Infrastructure and Critical Internet Resources (10 Minutes to Each Speaker)

Goal: reach a more round understanding about: a) which topics are priority for developing countries; b) what are the policy issues related to them; and c) what could be a future strategy for action.

Moderation: CGI.br

Government of India
DIRCO South Africa
Jeferson Nacif, National Agency of Telecommunications - ANATEL
Pranesh Prakash, Centre for Internet and Society, India
Shaun Pather, Faculty Informatics & Design, Cape Peninsula University of Technology
Joao Brant, Intervozes, Brazil
Carlos Affonso - CTS/FGV, Brazil
Demi Getschko - CGI.br, Brazil

15.30 - 16.15: Discussion

16.15 - 16.30: Coffee Break

16.30 - 17.30: Session 3: Global Online Trade and Services from Developing Countries' Perspective (10 Minutes to Each Speaker)

Moderation: Civil Society Representative (Brazil, India or South Africa)

Government of India
DIRCO South Africa
Antenor Correa, MCTI - Brasil
Artur Coimbra - Ministry of Communications
Pranesh Prakash, Centre for Internet and Society, India
Mark Wienberg, Alternative Information Development, South Africa

17.30 - 18.30: Discussion

18.30 - 20.00: Free Meetings

Day 2: September 2

09.00 - 10.30: Session 4: A Development Agenda for IG: The New Global Information and Communications Systems - Its Rights and Principles (10 Minutes to Each Speaker)

Moderation: CTS/FGV Representative

DIRCO
Government of India
Viviana Munoz - South Centre
Anriette Estherhuysen, APC
Graciela Selaimen - Nupef
Joana Varon (CTS/FGV) - (Approach: Intellectual Property and Access to Knowledge)
Pranesh Prakash, Centre for Internet and Society, India

10.30 - 11.20: Discussion

11.30 - 12.30: Session 5: Institutional Arrangements for Internet Governance and Participation from Developing Countries (10 Minutes to Each Speaker)

Moderation: Ambassador Benedicto Fonseca Filho, MRE, Brazil

Government of India
DIRCO South Africa
Parminder Jeet Singh, IT for Change, India
Marilia Maciel, CTS/FGV, Brazil
Anriette Estherrhuysen, APC, South Africa
Secretary Romulo Neves, Head of the Division for the Information Society, MRE, Brazil

12.30 - 13.20: Discussion

13.20 - 14.30: Lunch

14.30 - 16.00: Taking Stocks and the Way Forward

16.00 - 18.00: Governmental Representatives Meeting - Separated

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ibsa-seminar