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The Supreme Court Judgment in Shreya Singhal and What It Does for Intermediary Liability in India?

jyoti — 2015-04-17T23:59:34Z

Even as free speech advocates and users celebrate the Supreme Court of India's landmark judgment striking down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000, news that the Central government has begun work on drafting a new provision to replace the said section of the Act has been trickling in.

The SC judgement in upholding the constitutionality of Section 69A (procedure for blocking websites) and in reading down Section 79 (exemption from liability of intermediaries) of the IT Act, raises crucial questions regarding transparency, accountability and under what circumstances may reasonable restrictions be placed on free speech on the Internet. While discussions and analysis of S. 66A continue, in this post I will focus on the aspect of the judgment related to intermediary liability that could benefit from further clarification from the apex court and in doing so, will briefly touch upon S. 69A and secret blocking.

Conditions qualifying intermediary for exemption and obligations not related to exemption

The intermediary liability regime in India is defined under S. 79 and assosciated rules that were introduced to protect intermediaries for liability from user generated content and ensure the Internet continues to evolve as a “marketplace of ideas”. But as intermediaries may not have sufficient legal competence or resources to deliberate on the legality of an expression, they may end up erring on the side of caution and takedown lawful expression. As a study by Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in 2012 revealed, the criteria, procedure and safeguards for administration of the takedowns as prescribed by the rules lead to a chilling effect on online free expression.

S. 69A grants powers to the Central Government to “issue directions for blocking of public access to any information through any computer resource”. The 2009 rules allow the blocking of websites by a court order, and sets in place a review committee to review the decision to block websites as also establishes penalties for the intermediary that fails to extend cooperation in this respect.

There are two key aspects of both these provisions that must be noted:

a) S. 79 is an exemption provision that qualifies the intermediary for conditional immunity, as long as they fulfil the conditions of the section. The judgement notes this distinction, adding that “being an exemption provision, it is closely related to provisions which provide for offences including S. 69A.”

b) S. 69A does not contribute to immunity for the intermediary rather places additional obligations on the intermediary and as the judgement notes “intermediary who finally fails to comply with the directions issued who is punishable under sub-section (3) of 69A.” The provision though outside of the conditional immunity liability regime enacted through S. 79 contributes to the restriction of access to, or removing content online by placing liability on intermediaries to block unlawful third party content or information that is being generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted by them. Therefore restriction requests must fall within the contours outlined in Article 19(2) and include principles of natural justice and elements of due process.

Subjective Determination of Knowledge

The provisions for exemption laid down in S. 79 do not apply when they receive “actual knowledge” of illegal content under section 79(3)(b). Prior to the court's verdict actual knowledge could have been interpreted to mean the intermediary is called upon its own judgement under sub-rule (4) to restrict impugned content in order to seek exemption from liability. Removing the need for intermediaries to take on an adjudicatory role and deciding on which content to restrict or takedown, the SC has read down “actual knowledge” to mean that there has to be a court order directing the intermediary to expeditiously remove or disable access to content online. The court also read down “upon obtaining knowledge by itself” and “brought to actual knowledge” under Rule 3(4) in the same manner as 79(3)(b).

Under S.79(3)(b) the intermediary must comply with the orders from the executive in order to qualify for immunity. Further, S. 79 (3)(b) goes beyond the specific categories of restriction identified in Article 19(2) by including the term “unlawful acts” and places the executive in an adjudicatory role of determining the illegality of content. The government cannot emulate private regulation as it is bound by the Constitution and the court addresses this issue by applying the limitation of 19(2) on unlawful acts, “the court order and/or the notification by the appropriate government or its agency must strictly conform to the subject matters aid down in Article 19(2).”

By reading down of S. 79 (3) (b) the court has addressed the issue of intermediaries complying with takedown requests from non-government entities and has made government notifications and court orders to be consistent with reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2). This is an important clarification from the court, because this places limits on the private censorship of intermediaries and the invisible censorship of opaque government takedown requests as they must and should adhere, to the boundaries set by Article 19(2).

Procedural Safeguards

The SC does not touch upon other parts of the rules and in not doing so, has left significant procedural issues open for debate. It is relevant to bear in mind and as established above, S. 69A blocking and restriction requirements for the intermediary are part of their additional obligations and do not qualify them for immunity. The court ruled in favour of upholding S. 69A as constitutional on the basis that blocking orders are issued when the executive has sufficiently established that it is absolutely necessary to do so, and that the necessity is relatable to only some subjects set out in Article 19(2). Further the court notes that reasons for the blocking orders must be recorded in writing so that they may be challenged through writ petitions. The court also goes on to specify that under S. 69A the intermediary and the 'originator' if identified, have the right to be heard before the committee decides to issue the blocking order.

Under S. 79 the intermediary must also comply with government restriction orders and the procedure for notice and takedown is not sufficiently transparent and lacks procedural safeguards that have been included in the notice and takedown procedures under S. 69. For example, there is no requirement for committee to evaluate the necessity of issuing the restriction order, though the ruling does clarify that these restriction notices must be within the confines of Article 19(2). The judgement could have gone further to directing the government to state their entire cause of action and provide reasonable level of proof (prima facie). It should have also addressed issues such as the government using extra-judicial measures to restrict content including collateral pressures to force changes in terms of service, to promote or enforce so-called "voluntary" practices.

Accountability

The judgement could also have delved deeper into issues of accountability such as the need to consider 'udi alteram partem' by providing the owner of the information or the intermediary a hearing prior to issuing the restriction or blocking order nor is an post-facto review or appeal mechanism made available except for the recourse of writ petition. Procedural uncertainty around wrongly restricted content remains, including what limitations should be placed on the length, duration and geographical scope of the restriction. The court also does not address the issue of providing a recourse for the third party provider of information to have the removed information restored or put-back remains unclear. Relatedly, the court also does not clarify the concerns related to frivolous requests by establishing penalties nor is there a codified recourse under the rules presently, for the intermediary to claim damages even if it can be established that the takedown process is being abused.

Transparency

The bench in para 113 in addressing S. 79 notes that the intermediary in addition to publishing rules and regulations, privacy policy and user agreement for access or usage of their service has to also inform users of the due diligence requirements including content restriction policy under rule 3(2). However, the court ought to have noted the differentiation between different categories of intermediaries which may require different terms of use. Rather than stressing a standard terms of use as a procedural safeguard, the court should have insisted on establishing terms of use and content restriction obligations that is proportional to the role of the intermediary and based on the liability accrued in providing the service, including the impact of the restriction by the intermediary both on access and free speech. By placing requirement of disclosure or transparency on the intermediary including what has been restricted under the intermediary's own terms of service, the judgment could have gone a step further than merely informing users of their rights in using the service as it stands presently, to ensuring that users can review and have knowledge of what information has been restricted and why. The judgment also does not touch upon broader issues of intermediary liability such as proactive filtering sought by government and private parties, an important consideration given the recent developments around the right to be forgotten in Europe and around issues of defamation and pornography in India.

The judgment, while a welcome one in the direction of ensuring the Internet remains a democratic space where free speech thrives, could benefit from the application of the recently launched Manila principles developed by CIS and others. The Manila Principles is a framework of baseline safeguards and best practices that should be considered by policymakers and intermediaries when developing, adopting, and reviewing legislation, policies and practices that govern the liability of intermediaries for third-party content.

The court's ruling is truly worth celebrating, in terms of the tone it sets on how we think of free speech and the contours of censorship that exist in the digital space. But the real impact of this judgment lies in the debates and discussions which it will throw open about content removal practices that involve intermediaries making determinations on requests received, or those which only respond to the interests of the party requesting removal. As the Manila Principles highlight a balance between public and private interests can be obtained through a mechanism where power is distributed between the parties involved, and where an impartial, independent, and accountable oversight mechanism exists.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sc-judgment-in-shreya-singhal-what-it-means-for-intermediary-liability

Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age: Effective Research, Policy Formation & the Development of Regulatory Frameworks in South Asia

jyoti — 2015-04-12T03:53:04Z

The Centre for Internet & Society cordially invites you to a panel discussion on Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age. The event organized by Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, Observer Research Foundation and the Centre for Internet and Society will be held at Observer Research Foundation on April 21, 2015 from 11.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m.

The discussion will highlight the challenges in promoting and strengthening online freedom of expression and evaluating the application of existing regulatory frameworks in South Asia. Click to view the invite.

International Frameworks and Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression-an important fundamental right in itself, is also critical for defending and upholding other freedoms and rights. We exercise this right in our day-to-day lives, through the exchange of ideas, opinions and information. Understanding the means and structures of communication, and the regulation of environments that facilitate such exchange therefore become crucial for those seeking to realize freedom of expression.

Freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 19 of both theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The UDHR holds that " everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" . The ICCPR holds that, " everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice".

Freedom of expression has also been enshrined in regional conventions and charters, for example the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights4, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter") .

The former UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, highlighted in his 2013 report report that these frameworks are applicable to actions that take place online.6 While there may be no disagreements on freedom of expression as a legal right, it is important to bear in mind that it is not a non-derogable right, and may therefore be limited subject to safeguards indicated, for example, in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.

While there may be limitations are placed on the exercise of freedom of expression, there is limited clarity on when and how freedom of expression can be legitimately circumscribed. There have been attempts by civil society groups to articulate more clearly the specific conditions when freedom of expression may be derogated, most notably the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Siracusa Principles" ), and the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information ("Johannesburg Principles").

Freedom of Expression and Communications

Over the years, the norms and standards required for freedom of expression in the traditional media world have received much attention. When regulating communication, some restrictions upon freedom of expression have been regarded necessary and are enforceable by national or international courts. Such restrictions have been defined in international human rights laws and cover issues such as defamation, incitement to violence and hate speech. While these restrictions are not affected by the introduction of new means of communication, the proliferation of digital communications does warrant the recognition that there are new forms of censorship, unsettled questions of jurisdiction, and the need to develop new norms and standards that can keep pace with the myriad forms of expression and information sharing.

Communication in the digital age has led to the evolution of the Internet as a medium that has revolutionised largely local capacity for communication into a worldwide phenomenon that encompasses everything from personal one-to-one emails, social networks and reaching out to large audiences globally. The proliferation of digital technologies has not only fostered unprecedented access to information; the very environment stands transformed by the introduction of new kinds of information from voice, sound, image, text and code, that are accessible on a range of devices and across several types of technologies.

These networks and services democratized communication by lowering barriers to access and creating new space for publishing and peer-to-peer collaboration. Bypassing traditional gatekeepers of other forms of media, users can take on the role of writers, broadcasters or publishers on the Internet thus creating limitless possibilities for producing, sharing and exchanging all kinds of content. From this view, the Internet has sprung up as a globally accessible means of communication that is free from traditional restraints on free speech and expression. However, there are other unintended consequences that the Internet has had on both forms of power and control in the regulation of content, as online content has become increasingly contested, enclosed in a nationalized sphere challenging the free flow of information and freedom of expression.

Freedom of Expression in South Asia

As a network of networks, the internet has no overarching jurisdiction and with no single entity governing the totality of the internet, there exists a jurisdictional vacuum over content on the web. Further, there are no means of regulating content internationally or even a broad consensus on the norms that should be applied for restricting freedom of expression either on traditional or modern media. This has led to adverse consequences such as states adopting arbitrary actions and standards or companies exercising private censorship with content online.

South Asia has an important role in global development, with its share of the world's largest working-age population, a quarter of the world's middle-class consumers, the largest number of poor and undernourished in the world, and several fragile states of global geopolitical importance. With inclusive growth, South Asia has the potential to change the global order and communications and technology continue to play a critical role in realising the region's potential. Unfortunately, the history of colonial rule, authoritarian governments and a turbulent geo-political landscape have resulted in a tendency to over-regulate speech. Governments have construed the advent of the Internet as a challenge to their authority and their anxiousness to restrict use of the medium by citizens has resulted in often regressive and sometimes draconian laws such as Myanmar's Electronic Transactions Law, India's IT Act and Pakistan's Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act.

As the Internet expands and provides greater access, it also places censorship and surveillance capacities in the hands of states and corporations. It is therefore crucial that there exist strong protections of the right to freedom of expression that balance state powers and citizen rights. While the Internet has thrown up its own set of challenges such as hate speech, the verbal online abuse of women and the use of the Internet to spread rumours of violence, the regulation of content is a question that is far from being settled and needs our urgent attention. What role can and should the law play? When is it justified for the government to intervene? What can be expected from intermediaries, such as social networks and ISPs? And what can users do to protect the right to free speech - their own and that of others?

Balancing freedom of expression with other rights is further complicated by the challenges of fast paced and changing regulatory environment. By highlighting these challenges and questioning the application of existing frameworks we aim to contribute to further promoting and strengthening the right to freedom of expression, in India and beyond.

Introduction to panel and conference:

This is the context in which the Centre for Internet and Society, the Observer Research Foundation, the University of Pennsylvania's Internet Policy Observatory, and the Programme for Comparative Media Law and Policy at Oxford University are coming together to organise an event under the title 'Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age'. The event is a discussion and deliberation on 'Effective Research, Policy Formation, & the Development of Regulatory Frameworks in South Asia', aimed at bringing together policymakers, researchers, experts and civil society in discussing some of the most crucial issues in this space. The event would seek to look at past experiences, look at current realities and look ahead to how things could be made better in the South Asian context. The program agenda includes

Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age' Effective Research, Policy Formation, & the Development of Regulatory Frameworks in South Asia
Program Agenda and Article Submission Tracks
Learnings from the past		Current Realities		Looking ahead
11:00 - 1:00	1:00 - 2:00	2:00 - 4:00	4:00- 4:15	4:15-6:00
Welcome and Introductions		Welcome and Introductions		Welcome and Introductions
Overview of existing policies and regulatory models and their impact on FoEx online including the implementation of these models across South Asia	Lunch	How FoEx is being enabled online in different jurisdications and sectors of society across South Asia	Coffee break	Challenges associated with formulating a standard, harmonized, and adaptable regulation that is applicable to multiple digital platforms, both at the national and international level and possible solutions
FoEx as defined in jurisdictions across South Asia and as compared to international standards		Ways in which FoEx is, or may be, curtailed online		Ways forward to bridge existing gaps between policy formation and policy implementation with respect to FOEX online
Emerging technologies, markets, services and platforms and how they have shaped FoEx across South Asia		Online FoEx and the present need to balance it against other digital rights in jurisdictions across South Asia		Exploration of emerging regulatory questions such as whether online speech should be regulated in the same manner as offline speech or, if there are there are particular forms of online speech that are difficult to regulate such as defamation, hate speech, if there are effective models of remedy for violation of FOEX online
Impact of challenges on FoEx online such as barriers of entry, access, accessibility, cost, liability, policies and enforcement mechanisms differing across platforms across South Asia		The impact of jurisdiction, multi-national platforms, and domestic regulation on FOEX online		Ways in which civil society can impact and influence the development and implementation of Internet regulation
Research techniques that have been applied to the issue and have been effective in different political contexts across South Asia		Role and responsibility of intermediaries in regulating online speech as per governmental standards via content policies, terms of service, and other practices across South Asia		Exploration of the future role and interplay of technology and policy in enabling FOEX online
Q&A		Q&A		Q&A

About the Organisers

The Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania-has created the Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) to research the dynamic technological and political contexts in which these Internet governance debates take place. The IPO serves as a platform for informing relevant communities of activists, academics, and policy makers, and for displaying collected data and analysis. The Observatory encourages and sponsors research and studies ongoing events, key decisions and proposals, on Internet policy. The IPO seeks to deepen understanding of the evolution of mechanisms and processes that affect domestic Internet policies in key jurisdictions and the legal, political, economic, international and social factors that influence the implementation, or non-implementation, of such policies.The IPO also seeks to understand the relationship between national efforts and international policy formations and the role of civil society in domestic Internet policy processes and control.

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS)-is a non-profit research organization working to explore, understand and affect the shape and form of the Internet and its relationship with the political, cultural, and social milieu of our times. CIS' multidisciplinary research, intervention and collaboration engages with policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, openness (including open government data, free/open source software, open standards, open access to scholarly literature, open educational resources, and open video). CIS also engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities.

The Observer Research Foundation (ORF)- is India's premier independent public policy think tank and is engaged in developing and discussing policy alternatives on a wide range of issues of national and international significance. The fundamental objective of ORF is to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India in a globalised world. It hosts India's largest annual cyber conference - CyFy: the India Conference on Cyber Security and Internet Governance.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/freedom-of-expression-in-digital-age

Smriti Irani brings back focus on voyeurism prevailing in our country

praskrishna — 2015-05-08T00:59:30Z

The case of Union minister Smriti Irani finding a CCTV camera at Goa's Fab India has again brought back the focus on digital voyeurism and how a critical issue like surveillance can be exploited. Irani's case comes days after a woman found a mobile phone strapped to a changing room door of a Van Heusen store in Lajpat Nagar's Central market, a popular shopping hub.

The article by Amrita Madhukalya was published in DNA on April 6, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

Bangalore girl Sumitra (name changed) remembers the day in 2009 she saw a camera when trying on a skirt at Palika Bazaar. "I looked around the tiny changing room and saw a camera with a dipping red light. I quickly rushed out and accused the shopkeeper. But, Palika is not a place of great repute, and my friend who was accompanying me asked me to forget the matter," she says, and that's what she did. She was a degree student at Delhi University, and being relatively unaware of the city, decided to keep mum. "But look at what has happened: if they can film a Union minister at a Fab India store, they will film anyone. We need stringent action."

One of the first cases of digital voyeurism was reported in Pune in 2003 when a peon in an establishment at Sahakar Nagar installed a web camera in a changing room. In 2005, landowner Mohan Kulkarni from Navi Peth was arrested for filming women tenants. In 2007, two MMS clips from the changing rooms of a renowned departmental store in Kolkata started making the rounds. In one, a girl was shown changing clothes while in the other a couple was shown having sex. Then a year later, shop assistant Sunil Kumar Jha was found filming women in a clothes store from below the trial room door in Kolkata.

Debarati Halder, advocate and founder of the Centre for Cyber Victim Counselling, feels that had it not been a politician like Irani, the case would not have been highlighted at all. "People would have brushed off the incident had it been another woman. It is hard to escape the amount of negative publicity a case like this garners," she says. This is reflected in the case of a woman who was filmed in a leading store in Mumbai and was scared to approach the police, as she and her father did not want to go through the "legal hassles" of the case. The woman spoke of her story to a journalist of a leading daily and the ensuing report eventually led to the arrest of the shop assistant.

Cyber security expert Pranesh Prakash says that digital voyeurism is a huge problem in India and elsewhere. "There is a mismatch between privacy protection provided in the IT Act against non-consensual sharing of certain forms of sexual images, and the utter disregard for privacy in other parts of the law. Given that cybercafes have often been places where users are secretly filmed, the law should seek to crack down on such invasions of privacy. Instead, the law doesn't prohibit that, and in fact the Cybercafe Rules, encourage cybercafe owners to photograph all users, including minors. The rules say that untrustworthy cybercafe owners keep these records for a minimum period of one year, but there is no maximum period," says Prakash.

Section 66E of the Information Technology Act, 2000, amended in 2008, deals with digital voyeurism. And section 354 (C) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) deals with voyeurism in general.

But, there are many loopholes. "When the footage is shot by a government-run establishment, then the clause of surveillance is a cover, like in an MMS of Delhi Metro (where a couple was shown making out)."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/dna-april-6-2015-amrita-madhukalya-smriti-irani-brings-back-focus-on-voyeurism-prevailing-in-the-country

GSMA Research Outputs

elonnai — 2015-04-06T14:18:18Z

This is a collection of research under our GSMA project that we have undertaken in collaboration with Privacy International. The research has sought to understand different legal and regulatory aspects of security and surveillance in India and consists of blog entries and reports. Any feedback or comment is welcome.

Indian Law and the Necessary Proportionate Principles

The presentation shows that there are no comprehensive provisions for the principles of legitimate aim, competent judicial authority, proportionality, transparency, etc. whereas these are partially present for the principles of legality, necessity, adequacy, public oversight, safeguards for international cooperation, etc. The presentation also looks at the Indian intelligence agencies and shows us that there are nine agencies authorized to intercept communications along with at least eleven additional agencies. It further dwelves into the establishment and structure of Indian intelligence agencies and whom they report to, the sharing of information internationally as well as nationally. It shows us that India has MLAT agreements with 36 countries and request to CBI can be initiated informally or formally through court order. It then lists out the various regulatory and important bodies responsible for national security. Some cases of unlawful interception / leaks have been discussed along with examples of arrests based on digital evidence. The various government schemes, the telecommunication companies in India, telecom licenses requirements, government developed security and surveillance solutions, private security companies, security expos, export, import and selling of security and surveillance equipment, and the way forward are also discussed.

Click to download the PDF

Security, Surveillance and Data Sharing Schemes and Bodies in India

Following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, India had implemented a wide range of data sharing and surveillance schemes. Though developed under different governments the purpose of these schemes has been to increase public safety and security by tackling crime and terrorism. As such, two data sharing schemes have been proposed - the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) and the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS), as well as several surveillance systems, such as the Lawful Intercept and Monitoring (LIM) system, the Network Traffic Analysis system (NETRA), state Internet Monitoring Systems and the Central Monitoring System (CMS). This chapter details the various schemes and provides policy recommendations for their improvement, with regards to the protection of the right to privacy and other human rights.

Click to download the PDF

Export and Import of Security Technologies in India: QA

The write-up examines in question-answer format the standards regulating the export of technologies that can be used for surveillance purposes, the department and legislation that governs exports and imports of security technologies in India, the procedure for obtaining an export licence for the export of SCOMET items, what is ITC (HS) and why is it important, and examples of ITC codes for technologies that can facilitate security or surveillance. The research finds answers to all these queries.

Click to download the PDF

Regulation of CCTV’s in India

In light of the increasing use and installation of CCTV’s in cities across India, and the role that CCTVs play in the Home Ministry's plans for implementing "Mega Policing Cities", this blog seeks to review various attempts to regulate the use of CCTV's in India, review international best practices, and provide preliminary recommendations for the regulation of CCTV's in India.

Click to download the PDF

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Cross Border Sharing of Information in India

It is unclear the exact process that intelligence agencies in India share information with other agencies internationally. India is a member of Interpol and the Central Bureau of Investigation, which is a Federal/Central investigating agency functioning under the Central Government, Department of Personnel & Training is designated as the National Central Bureau of India.

Click to download the PDF

Composition of Service Providers in India

Telecom, at present, is one of the fastest-growing industries in India. As of January 2014, according to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) there are 922 million wireless and over the wire subscribers in India, and 56.90 million broadband subscribers including wired, wireless and wimax subscribers. India’s overall wireless teledensity was quoted as having 893.31million subscribers, with a 0.79% (7.02 million) monthly addition.

Click to download the PDF

The Surveillance and Security Industry in India - An Analysis of Indian Security Expos

The ‘Spy Files’, a series of documents released by whistleblower website WikiLeaks over the last few years, exposed the tremendous growth of the private surveillance industry across the world – a multi-billion dollar industry thriving on increasing governmental and private capabilities for mass surveillance of individuals. These documents showed how mass surveillance is increasingly made possible through new technologies developed by private players, often exploiting the framework of nascent but burgeoning information and communication technologies like the internet and communication satellites.

Click to download the PDF

An Analysis of News Items and Cases on Surveillance and Digital Evidence in India

In a technologically advanced era, with preponderance of electronic communications in both professional and social interactions and the ability to store such information in digital form, digital evidence has gained significance in civil as well as criminal litigation in India. In order to match the pace with the progressive technology, the Indian Courts have embarked on placing more and more reliance on the digital evidence and a portion of such digital evidence is obtained through electronic surveillance.

Click to download the PDF

Policy Recommendations for Surveillance Law in India and an Analysis of Legal Provisions on Surveillance in India and the Necessary & Proportionate Principles

The Government of India has created a legal framework which supports the carrying out of surveillance by authorities through its various laws and license agreements for service providers. The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) acknowledges that lawful, warranted, targeted surveillance can potentially be a useful tool in aiding law enforcement agencies in tackling crime and terrorism. However, current Indian laws and license agreements appear to overextend the Government's surveillance capabilities in certain cases, while inadequately safeguarding individuals' right to privacy and data protection.

Click to download the PDF

The Surveillance Industry in India

India has the world's second largest population, an expanding middle class and undoubtedly a huge market which attracts international investors. Some of the world's largest corporations have offices in India, such as Google Incorporated and BlackBerry Limited. In the Information Age, the market revolves around data and companies which produce technologies capable of mining such data are on the rise. Simultaneously, companies selling surveillance technologies appear to be on the peak too, especially since the global War on Terror requires law enforcement agencies around the world to be equipped with the latest surveillance gear.

Click to download the PDF

State of Cyber Security and Surveillance in India: A Review of the Legal Landscape

The issue of cyber security and surveillance, especially unauthorised surveillance, though traditionally unprioritised, has recently gained much traction due to the increasing number of news reports regarding various instances of unauthorised surveillance and cyber crimes. In the case of unauthorised surveillance, more than the frequency of the instances, it is their sheer magnitude that has shocked civil society and especially civil rights groups. In the background of this ever increasing concern regarding surveillance as well as increasing concerns regarding cyber security due to the increased pervasiveness of technology in our society, this paper tries to discuss the legal and regulatory landscape regarding surveillance as well as cyber security.

Click to download the PDF

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gsma-research-outputs

The block heads

praskrishna — 2015-05-07T11:51:48Z

An entire government department is on the job, but can it really take down ‘offending’ online content?

The article by Sibi Arasu was published in the Hindu Businessline on April 3, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

The Department of Electronics and Information Technology’s (Deity) offices are as layered as its official website. From inside ‘Electronics Niketan’ at the Central Government Offices (CGO) complex in south Delhi, Deity’s army of director-generals, joint secretaries, department heads, scientists, clerks and staff of various grades and ranks keep an eye on how the country engages with the world wide web.

One set of cubicles is dedicated to the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the nodal agency meant to combat hacking, phishing and generally fortify the internet in India. This includes the task of blocking and unblocking websites. A rather complicated job in a country where, according to one senior government official, “it’s technically infeasible to completely block content. If it’s at the gateway level, then we can filter it out. But for videos and other similar content, it is just not possible to completely block them.”

No bandwidth

Be it the AIB roasts that were taken down from YouTube or the controversial documentary India’s Daughter, which was blocked within eight hours of going online, the CERT and other allied departments have been kept busy over the past few months.

In a classic example of how blocking can go wrong, more than 36 websites were taken down in December last year to “prevent the spread of ISIS propaganda” only to be unblocked within weeks. Like elsewhere in the world, the attempt to “protect” citizens had unwittingly ended up hurting legitimate websites, including video sharing sites vimeo.com, dailymotion.com and the reference site archive.org. It was embarrassingly similar to the Chinese government’s actions in 2010 when it blocked all images of empty chairs, stools and tables as it attempted to staunch discussions about Liu Xiabo, the Nobel Peace Prize winner that year, who was missing from the awards ceremony as he was incarcerated in China.

Terming such government actions as dangerous and Orwellian, Apar Gupta, a cyber law specialist in Delhi who appeared for the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in the PIL against Section 66A of the IT Act, says, “Any piece of content is contained within several file formats and obscured through technical devices like encryption, making its complete removal and eradication impossible.”

Internet freedom campaigners have maintained that Section 66A, which prescribed “punishment for sending offensive messages through a communication service”, was created solely to muzzle dissent and differences of opinion.

Although Section 66A was recently struck down, the law authorising blocking of content — namely, Section 69A — remains intact. The Central Government can block content it believes threatens the security of the State; the sovereignty, integrity or defence of India; friendly relations with foreign States; public order; or incites committing a cognisable offence related to any of the above. The government must, however, adhere to a set of procedures and safeguards, known as Blocking Rules.

“Larger, overbroad technical blocks can impede the functioning of the internet,” says internet policy analyst Raman Chima. “When a large website ‘blacklist’ and internet filter was proposed for Australia in 2009-10, research established that it would likely result in double-digit reductions in the internet’s speed and efficiency in that country.”

The ‘Streisand effect’, named after the Hollywood actress, is another common consequence of blocking. As Chima says, “Specific bans tend to be counterproductive and, more often than not, result in more awareness and interest in the banned content.”

Political manoeuvres

‘Ethical hacktivist’ and Hackers Hat founder Satish Ashwin sees banning and blocking as purely vote bank politics.

“Technically anything can be blocked or banned and it’s not a big deal, but the sheer volume of data uploaded makes it next to impossible to monitor and censor,” he says.

To those heralding the striking down of 66A as a victory for free speech, Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bengaluru-based Centre for Internet and Society, points to the larger picture. “Nobody is really aware of the scale of censorship in India. Thousands of websites are blocked under Section 69A, mostly due to the maximalist enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). While 66A is gone, there are many other provisions within the IT Act that still regulate speech online. It is important to have quality laws drafted through an open, participatory process, where all stakeholders are consulted and responded to before bills are introduced in Parliament."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindu-businessline-april-3-2015-sibi-arasu-the-block-heads

‘Smack’ the Trolls!

praskrishna — 2015-04-04T06:38:10Z

A car was put up for sale on a Facebook (FB) page by a woman. The first few comments were genuine questions asking about the price and the woman was asked to check her inbox, where price negotiations were carried out.

The article by Marianne De Nazareth published in the Citizen on March 31, 2015 quotes Rohini Lakshané.

All in a very cordial fashion. Suddenly in a matter of seconds a nasty gender remark was made, as the car was being sold by a lady, which was taken up by a flurry of similar trolls making snide remarks on her gender and therefore the quality of the car for sale. The woman felt harassed and violated.

These faceless nasty internet beings are called trolls and we need to fight them. " Most people shy away from confronting harassment because either they are mostly unaware of how to handle it or they are scared of the harassment shifting to their daily lives in real world. The scare is not unfounded because there have been several instances of that happening around the world," says Chinmayi SK from the Bachchao project .

" A certain type of troll reacts strongly and negatively to high profile women out of a desire to correct those who have been 'taken in' by them," says Pamela Srinivasan, who uses social media frequently to buy and sell." It's an attack on the idea that the women can be powerful and can be experts. The attack is designed to remove the woman's authority."

Chinmayi advises," But, one needs to talk about online harassment because it exists. Because not talking about will not make it go away. Online harassers are like bullies enabled by the anonymity online personas provide. They are unafraid of consequences in the virtual world, which they would otherwise fear in real world. Hence changes will not happen unless you stand up to them. They will continue to harass and their harassment will only grow with time if ignored."

FB sites where people with common interests like gardening or birding or even Cuckoo clock lovers are happily free of trolls. But sites on which commercial selling of used goods happens, or discussions on touchy political topics, that's where people are viciously attacked if the administrator is not vigilant.

" It is best to have a code of conduct laid down and strictly enforced by the moderators of online communities," says Rohini Lakshané, a researcher at the Centre for Internet and Society. " Large online forums can have many, active administrators to whom users can report abuse. It also helps to report abuse to the website/ platform. However, on platforms such as Facebook, where the volume of posts is high, the review process takes time and sometimes reviewers don't understand the nuances of culture or language or other contexts. An effective, easy-to-implement, and less time-consuming measure then is for the community to police itself and smack those who walk out of line."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-citizen-march-31-2015-marianne-de-nazareth-smack-the-trolls

Security, Governments and Data: Technology and Policy

elonnai — 2015-04-04T05:59:19Z

On January 8, 2015, the Centre for Internet and Society, in collaboration with the Observer research foundation, hosted the day long conference "Security, Governments, and Data: Technology and Policy" The conference discussed a range of topics including internet governance, surveillance, privacy, and cyber security.

The full report written and compiled by Lovisha Aggarwal and Nehaa Chaudhari and edited by Elonnai Hickok can be accessed here.

The conference was focused on the technologies, policies, and practices around cyber security and surveillance. The conference reached out to a number of key stakeholders including civil society, industry, law enforcement, government, and academia and explored the present scenario in India to reflect on ways forward. The conference was a part of CIS’s work around privacy and surveillance, supported by Privacy International.

Welcome Address

The welcome address opened with a reference to a document circulated by CIS in 2014 which contained hypothetical scenarios of potential threats to Indian cyber security. This document highlighted the complexity of cyber security and the challenges that governments face in defending their digital borders. When talking about cyber security it is important that certain principles are upheld and security is not pursued only for the sake of security. This approach allows for security to be designed and to support other rights such as the right of access, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to privacy. Indeed, the generation, use, and protection of communications data by the private sector and the government are a predominant theme across the globe today. This cannot be truer for India, as India hosts the third largest population on the internet in the world.

During the welcome, a brief introduction to the Centre for Internet and Society was given. It was noted that CIS is a 6.5 half year old organization that is comprised of lawyers, mathematicians, sociologists, and computer scientists and works across multiple focus areas including accessibility, internet governance, telecom, openness, and access to knowledge. CIS began researching privacy and surveillance in 2010, and has recently begun to expand their research into cyber security. The purpose of this is to understand the relationship between privacy, surveillance, and security and is the beginning of a learning process for CIS. In 2013 CIS undertook a process to attempt to evolve a legal regime to intelligently and adequately deal with privacy in India. Industry specific requirements are key in the Indian context and this process was meant to try and evolve a consensus on what a privacy law in India should look like by bringing together key stakeholders for roundtables. CIS is now in the final stages of preparing individual legal proposals that will be sent to the Government – to hopefully have an informed Privacy Law in India. This event represents CIS’s first attempt to have a simultaneous dialogue on surveillance, cyber security, and privacy. As part of this event and research CIS is trying to understand the technology and market involved in surveillance and cyber security as these are important factors in the development of policy and law.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/security-governments-datat-technology-and-policy

You can still get into trouble for online posts: Digital law experts

praskrishna — 2015-04-02T01:44:32Z

The internet in India is freer now, but individuals could still to get into trouble for online posts, say digital media and law experts. Hailing the Supreme Court judgment on Tuesday as a landmark verdict for free speech in India, experts who have closely read the judgment say there is much to be careful about too.

The article by Kim Arora was published in the Times of India on March 30, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The scrapping of the contentious section doesn't mean that one has a free run, cautions Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet and Society. An online comment can still land you in jail, he says.

"The judgement in no way means that speech on online platforms will be unregulated now. You can still be charged for pornography or voyeurism under the IT Act. There are many provisions in the Constitution and Indian Penal Code that the government can use to target people it wants to go after. You can be still charged for hate speech or defamation - which is a criminal offence in India - for an online comment," says Abraham.

While lawyer Apar Gupta found the judgment to be forward-looking, he pointed to Para 98 of the 120 page judgment, which addresses Article 14 of the Constitution regarding "discrimination" and talks of the distinction between online and other media.

"We make it clear that there is an intelligible differentia between speech on the internet and other mediums of communication for which separate offences can certainly be created by legislation," says the judgment. "The court has indicated that special offences can be created for the internet. Constant vigilance is the price of liberty. We need to constantly engage with these issues to keep the internet free," says Gupta.

The judgment has been praised for making a distinction between online posts and messages that pertain to advocacy, discussion and incitement. "This is an excellent decision. The SC is saying that no matter what the medium, we stand for constitutional rights. The judges were ready to listen, and ready to share their experience of using the internet also," says Mishi Choudhary, legal director at Software Freedom Law Center, adding, "It was a lost opportunity for the Modi government. They should have gotten rid of section 66 A themselves."

Section 69A of the Act, which stands as is, allows non-transparent blocking of online content in the interest of "sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above." However, Choudhary says that since it is a narrowly-drawn provision, it ensures more safeguards.

"It will be noticed that Section 69A unlike Section 66A is a narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards. First and foremost, blocking can only be resorted to where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Secondly, such necessity is relatable only to some of the subjects set out in Article 19(2). Thirdly, reasons have to be recorded in writing in such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution," she says.

Going forward, the government plan of action should focus on balancing safety and freedom on the internet, says Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, who himself was one of the petitioners. "The final endgame has to be one where we have a new law or even a new IT Act which meets the twin objectives of a safe and free internet. The two need not be mutually exclusive," he says.

(With inputs from Anand J in Bengaluru)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/times-of-india-march-30-2015-kim-arora-you-can-still-get-into-trouble-for-online-posts

SECTION 66A: DELETE

praskrishna — 2015-03-30T01:32:18Z

The Supreme Court has killed a law that allowed the Government to control social media. What’s the Net worth of freedom hereafter?

The article by Kumar Anshuman was published in the Open Magazine on March 27, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

It was in 2009 that Section 66A was added as an amendment to India’s IT Act by the then UPA Government, but it took three years before it came to the notice of Shreya Singhal, a student of Law at Delhi University. By then, the Section had already earned itself a fair amount of notoriety for how much leeway it provided for the police and politicians to abuse the law.

The first time was in September 2011 when Musafir Baitha, a famous poet and government employee in Bihar, was suspended from his job because he criticised the state government on Facebook. An uproar followed, as people realised that freedom of speech in social media could now be construed as a criminal activity. Ambikesh Mahapatra, a professor at Jadavpur Unversity, became a target of the Mamata Banerjee government in April 2012 when he made cartoons of her. In September 2012, cartoonist Aseem Trivedi was arrested in Mumbai for a caricature of corruption under the UPA. But the case that caught Shreya Singhal’s attention was perhaps the most shocking of all. In November 2012, after Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray’s death, Shaheen Dhada, a Thane resident, posted a comment on her Facebook page criticising the near-total shutdown of Mumbai for the funeral. She wrote that Mumbai was shut not in respect, but fear, and that a leader should earn respect instead of forcing it out of people. Her friend Renu Srinivasan ‘liked’ this post. Hours later, both were arrested and booked under Section 66A. "I was shocked when I heard of this news," Singhal says, "I went and checked the post and there was nothing which could have provoked such an outrage." Her mother, Manali Singhal, a lawyer at the Supreme Court, advised her to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the Section.

The case continued for two years in the Supreme Court, while arbitrary arrests continued to be made. The UPA Government first defended 66A in court, taking the position that the current NDA Government took as well. It argued that the law would be used only in extreme cases where a person overreaches his or her online freedom to curtail the rights of others. Unconvinced, on 24 March, the apex court struck 66A down, saying that it could not allow such a law to exist on mere government assurances. The Court found several terms in the Act, such as ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘insult’, that were not clearly defined and could be interpreted arbitrarily to suit one’s convenience. ‘It is clear that Section 66A is unconstitutionally vague and it takes away a guaranteed freedom,’ observed the bench of Justice J Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Nariman.

"We can celebrate the scrapping of Section 66A, but with caution," says Sunil Abraham, executive director at The Centre for Internet & Society in Bangalore. "[As for] those who are booked under Section 66A, the police also imposes different sections of the Indian Penal Code to justify their arrest." There are examples to support his statement, a recent one being the arrest of a Bareilly-based student, Gulrez Khan, who had posted a picture on Facebook of UP minister Azam Khan along with some derogatory comments about Hindus that he allegedly made. Gulrez Khan denied the comments, saying that his image was being maligned. The boy was arrested and booked. "People are making it out as a moment of triumph against the UP government. The fact is this boy had been arrested under Section 153A and 504 of the IPC along with Section 66A of the IT Act. We have said this even in the Supreme Court," says Gaurav Bhatia, a spokesperson of the Samajwadi Party and also a senior advocate.

But the import of scrapping Section 66A is that there is now one less law that can be misused, one that specifically stifles online freedom. "It’s an excellent judgment," says Lawrence Liang of Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore. “It couldn’t have been better than this. The fact that the apex court termed it ‘vague and overreaching’ signifies how important it was to scrap this."

Once the 122-page judgment arrived, there was a rush to welcome it—even by those who were responsible for Section 66A to begin with. Former Congress minister Kapil Sibal was one of them. "The Supreme Court has scrapped Section 66A to allow freedom of speech in cyberspace and we should welcome it,” he said. His former cabinet colleague P Chidambaram went to the extent of saying that it was poorly drafted. But the Congress as a party also warned of the possible misuse of this freedom, saying that it had woven various safeguards into Section 66A, including the condition that an arrest could only be made after an officer of the level of Inspector General or Superintendent of Police had okayed it. "The Supreme Court, it appears, has not found the safeguards sufficient," says Congress spokesperson and senior lawyer Abhishek Manu Singhvi. “It is now up to the current Government [to decide] how to strike the right balance between freedom of speech on one hand and [prevention of] abuse and hounding of groups or individuals through obscene or incorrigibly false information [on the other] to deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace." The Left parties, which were supporting the UPA Government back when Section 66A was imposed, have expressed happiness over the verdict. “The draconian provision of 66A was used to arrest people who express dissenting views against the Government and the State and to suppress criticism of those in power,” says senior CPM leader Sitaram Yechury.

The NDA Government has also welcomed the verdict. "The Government absolutely respects the right to freedom of speech and expression on social media and has no intention of curbing it," says Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister for Information Technology.

But the scrapping of the Section leaves the Government with very little power to act against real abuse of online freedoms. Like Congress leader Milind Deora says, "An unregulated internet can be more dangerous than a regulated one." This argument is easily countered: there are enough provisions in existing laws that prevent a person from misusing freedom of speech. Says Apar Gupta, a senior lawyer, “Section 66A was a bailable section and arrests were made only with further imposition of IPC acts." While Article 19 (1) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, at the same time Article 19 (2) provides a list of reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech. This is enough, experts believe, to curtail misuse of the internet. The court judgment also grants the Centre the freedom to enact any other law specific to the internet, provided it does not violate the provisions of freedom of speech as laid down by the Constitution of India.

This does, however, put a question mark on the necessity of Section 66A to begin with, if existing laws were quite enough to address freedom-of- speech abuses. "Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, was enacted to prevent online abuse and hounding of groups and individuals, check the propagation of obscene or incorrigibly false information with the intent to create social divides and unrest, and deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace. This Act came into effect in 2008 when social media was yet evolving," says Singhvi. But experts disagree with this argument. "It is a perfect case of confusion and mixing up of facts,” says Sunil Abraham. “The purpose of this law was to curb unsolicited messages, spamming and harassing someone through fake identities in the internet space." He says that the Government claimed to borrow law provisions from the US, Canada and other countries, but the legislation was so poorly drafted that it didn’t have any teeth for action against spammers. "Even words like ‘unsolicited commercial mails’ were not included in the Act and that is the reason not a single person has been arrested in India for spam mails even after this Act came into being."

A section of the Indian legal fraternity believes that the country’s apex court should also have made a statement about the problem of spamming and harassment on the internet.

But there is bad news too. The same judgment that struck down Section 66A has upheld Section 69A of the IT Act as constitutionally valid. This allows the Government to block any website which it deems a direct threat to public order and security that might spread propaganda.

"In this case, the Government [can decide] to block a website without notifying [it with any] reason for it. If I am an internet user who wants to visit this site, I am also not notified why that website has been taken down. It is just the whims and fancies of a few officials in the Government, what to block and what not," says Apar Gupta. Using the section, the Union Government had blocked 32 websites just this January, saying that anti- national groups were using these websites for ‘jihadi propaganda’.

All major democracies have some form of legal net regulation. "Laws in foreign jurisdictions vary widely as per the guarantees of civil rights afforded to citizens in any legal system," adds Gupta. "The legislations of the United States, which borrowed certain phrases in Section 66A, have already been declared unconstitutional. In the United Kingdom, similar phrases have come under fierce critique and have been limited by guidelines issued by the office of prosecutions. In these jurisdictions, as in India, existing criminal law applies equally to online speech as much as to offline."

Also, while social media enthusiasts rejoice over their first big victory against restrictions on online freedom of speech, the internet is still a matter of great concern for any government, thanks to its reach and influence. The Union Government walks a thin line while dealing with instances of abuse on social media, and many believe India needs an IT Act drafted in proper consultation with all stakeholders.

For now, a young law student has found a place in the legal history of India. "It will always be remembered as Shreya Singhal vs Union of India," says Singhal.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT

‘66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device:

Any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
Any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device;
Any electronic mail or message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages...

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine’

SUPREME COURT ORDER

‘In conclusion, we may summarise what has been held by us: Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is struck down in its entirety being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2)’

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/open-magazine-march-27-2015-kumar-anshuman-section-66a-delete

Three reasons why 66A verdict is momentous

pranesh — 2015-03-29T16:22:51Z

Earlier this week, the fundamental right to freedom of expression posted a momentous victory. The nation's top court struck down the much-reviled Section 66A of the IT Act — which criminalized communications that are "grossly offensive", cause "annoyance", etc — as "unconstitutionally vague", "arbitrarily, excessively, and disproportionately" encumbering freedom of speech, and likely to have a "chilling effect" on legitimate speech.

The article was published in the Times of India on March 29, 2015.

It also struck down Sec 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act on similar grounds. This is a landmark judgment, as it's possibly the first time since 1973's Bennett Coleman case that statutory law was struck down by the Supreme Court for violating our right to free expression.

The SC also significantly 'read down' the draconian 'Intermediary Guidelines Rules' which specify when intermediaries — website hosts and search engines — may be held liable for what is said online by their users. The SC held that intermediaries should not be forced to decide whether the online speech of their users is lawful or not. While the judgment leaves unresolved many questions — phrases like "grossly offensive", which the SC ruled were vague in 66A, occur in the Rules as well — the court's insistence on requiring either a court or a government order to be able to compel an intermediary to remove speech reduces the 'invisible censorship' that results from privatized speech regulation.

The SC upheld the constitutional validity of Sec 69A and the Website Blocking Rules, noting they had several safeguards: providing a hearing to the website owner, providing written reasons for the blocking, etc. However, these safeguards are not practised by courts. Na Vijayashankar, a legal academic in Bengaluru, found a blogpost of his — ironically, on the topic of website blocking — had been blocked by a Delhi court without even informing him. He only got to find out when I published the government response to my RTI on blocked websites. Last December, Github, Vimeo and some other websites were blocked without being given a chance to contest it. As long as lower courts don't follow "principles of natural justice" and due process, we'll continue to see such absurd website blocking, especially in cases of copyright complaints, without any way of opposing or correcting them.

There are three main outcomes of this judgment. First is the legal victory: SC's analysis while striking down 66A is a masterclass of legal clarity and a significant contribution to free speech jurisprudence. This benefits not only future cases in India, but all jurisdictions whose laws are similar to ours, such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and the UK.

Second is the moral victory for free speech. Sec 66A was not merely a badly written law, it became a totem of governmental excess and hubris. Even when political parties realized they had passed 66A without a debate, they did not apologize to the public and revise it; instead, they defended it. Only a few MPs, such as P Rajeev and Baijayant Panda, challenged it. Even the NDA, which condemned the law in the UPA era, supported it in court. By striking down this totem, the SC has restored the primacy of the Constitution. For instance, while this ruling doesn't directly affect the censor board's arbitrary rules, it does morally undermine them.

Third, this verdict shows that given proper judicial reading, the Indian constitutional system of allowing for a specific list of purposes for which reasonable restrictions are permissible, might in fact be as good or even better in some cases, than the American First Amendment. The US law baldly states that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. However, the US Supreme Court has never held the opinion that freedom of speech is absolute. The limits of Congress's powers are entirely judicially constructed, and till the 1930s, the US court never struck down a law for violating freedom of speech, and has upheld laws banning obscenity, public indecency, offensive speech in public, etc. However, in India, the Constitution itself places hard limits on Parliament's powers, and also, since the first amendment to our Constitution, allows the judiciary to determine if the restrictions placed by Parliament are "reasonable". In the judgment Justice Nariman quotes Mark Antony from Julius Caesar. He could also have quoted Cassius: "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves." Judges like Justice Nariman show the constitutional limits to free speech can be read both narrowly and judiciously: we can no longer complain about the Constitution as the primary reason we have so many restrictions on freedom of expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/times-of-india-march-29-2015-pranesh-prakash-three-reasons-why-66a-is-momentous

India's landmark online speech ruling is step toward greater press freedom

praskrishna — 2015-03-29T00:55:35Z

In an historic decision, India's Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down part of a law used to silence criticism and free expression. While this marks a pivotal victory that has been welcomed in many quarters, many challenges remain for press freedom in the country.

The blog post by Sumit Galhotra was published by CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) on March 28, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act--the vaguely worded provision struck down by the court--criminalized online speech deemed "grossly offensive" or "menacing," along with information for the purpose of causing "annoyance" or "inconvenience." Individuals convicted under the provision could face up to three years in prison. This law, along with others that remain on the books, has allowed India to become a paradise for the offended.

The law was challenged by a public interest litigation mounted by Shreya Singhal, in 2012. Singhal, who had just returned to Delhi from her studies in the U.K., was infuriated at how the law was being used to stifle debate and criticism in her home country, according to reports.

The September 2012 arrest of cartoonist Aseem Trivedi, on a range of charges including one under Section 66A, over his cartoons on politics and corruption, caught Singhal's attention. A few weeks later, she learned of the arrest of 21-year-old Shaheen Dhada, who questioned on Facebook the shutdown of Mumbai following the death of a politician, Singhal said. Dhada's friend, Renu Srinivasan, who had merely "liked" the comment, was arrested under the law. According to news reports, both were charged. These cases sparked a national debate on the space for free expression in the world's largest democracy, and led Singhal to challenge the law, she told reporters.

"It's a big victory," Singhal, who is currently studying law in Delhi, told the media following Tuesday's decision. "The Internet is so far-reaching and so many people use it now, it's very important for us to protect this right."

India is expected to overtake the U.S. as the second largest population of Internet users in the world, behind only China, according to the Internet and Mobile Association of India, a nonprofit group representing the Web and mobile industry. As Internet usage accelerates in India, thanks in large part to the widespread use of mobile devices, there has been an ongoing debate on how best to policeit in a country that has to contend with frequent episodes of violence, civil unrest, and terrorist attacks.


Karuna Nundy, an advocate at the Supreme Court of India who helped the legal challenge, says the country has several laws that are a threat to press freedom. (Geoffrey King)

Lawrence Liang, a lawyer and researcher at the Bangalore-based Alternative Law Forum, an Indian legal research organization, shared in Singhal's welcoming of the decision. "It is important to note that this is the first judgment in decades in which the Supreme Court has struck down a legal provision for violating freedom of speech, and in doing so, it simultaneously builds upon a rich body of free speech cases in India and paves the way for a jurisprudence of free speech in the 21st century, the era of the Internet and social media," he told CPJ.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, an organization that focuses on issues of digital pluralism, called the judgment "a moral victory." He said the decision "furthers free speech jurisprudence in India, but also in all those other countries where an Indian precedent would be important," including many countries in Asia, and places such as South Africa.

As part of the judgment, the court narrowed its reading of Section 79 of the IT Act, under which private parties could submit notice-and-takedown orders directly to Internet intermediaries. The court held that intermediary liability can be pursued only through a court order or other government order, reports said.

Liang told CPJ the judgment falls short in some areas. The Supreme Court's 123-page judgment kept in place Section 69A of the IT Act and Information Technology Rules 2009 that allows the government to block websites if the content in question has the potential to create communal discord, social disorder, or impact India's relations with other countries, according to news reports.

"I would say that if there is missed opportunity in the judgment, it is the clarification of the process of blocking websites. If Section 66A was found to be arbitrary in that its scope covered protected and unprotected speech, then the procedure for blocking websites as laid out in Section 69A is also beset with similar problems," Liang said.

According to Chinmayi Arun, research director at the Centre for Communications Governance at the National Law University in Delhi, the 2009 rules require blocking requests and implementation to be kept confidential. "This means that speakers will have no way of finding out that the government has ordered intermediaries to block their content. Speakers will therefore not be able to question unconstitutional blocking orders before the judiciary--this is a clear interference with their constitutional rights," she told CPJ via email, referring to online users who could fall foul of the law.

Academic in me: As a matter of legal & constitutional analysis, the SC judgment is at its best on #66A, but weaker on 69A & weakest on 79.
-- Pranesh Prakash (@pranesh_prakash) March 24, 2015

For some journalists, the decision highlights how virtually no national party in India, including the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is a champion of these rights. In a piece for independent news website Scroll, journalist Shivam Vij criticizes the current Narendra Modi-led government for missing an opportunity by not acting decisively to address the problematic law. "It has become routine for India's politicians to avoid taking tough political decisions if they can be left to the courts," he said. "When in power, the BJP is as happy as the Congress to have at its disposal laws that can muzzle voices of dissent."

Trivedi told CPJ he agreed that the previous and current government did little to address abuses of the law. Trivedi, who up until the court decision, faced charges under Section 66A, and had joined Singhal as a petitioner in the case, added: "This decision marks a strong first step." The cartoonist's lawyer, Vijay Hiremath, told CPJ that the Section 66A charge has now been removed, but Trivedi still faces charges under the National Emblem Act.

While the striking down of Section 66A is a step in the right direction, many challenges remain for press freedom in India. Karuna Nundy, an advocate at the Supreme Court of India, who was at the forefront of the legal challenge, told CPJ numerous colonial-era laws, particularly in India's penal code, continue to pose threats to free speech and press freedom in India. CPJ has long documented cases of Indian journalists being threatened with sedition, defamation, and laws that criminalize "outraging religious sentiment."

Actually, next step(s): a review of the constitutionality of sedition, challenge criminal defamation, constitutionalise civil defamation.
-- Gautam Bhatia (@gautambhatia88) March 24, 2015

But Nundy expressed optimism for the challenges ahead for press freedom in India and elsewhere. She said the judgment shows, "If you do the work, you take the trouble, you make the challenge, you can achieve the kinds of values that you stand for. That is the work that is the duty of all us as national citizens and citizens of the world."

[Geoffrey King, CPJ Internet Advocacy Coordinator, contributed to this report from Manila]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cpj-march-28-2015-sumit-galhotra-indias-landmark-online-speech-ruling-is-step-toward-greater-press-freedom

66A DEAD. LONG LIVE 66A!

praskrishna — 2015-04-01T02:11:27Z

Last Tuesday, Twitter CEO Dick Costolo walked into Prime Minister Narendra Modi's office. India's most compulsive and most-followed tweeter, Modi, as Gujarat chief minister, had protested when the Manmohan Singh government blocked the micro-blogging site of a few journalists. Modi had blacked out his own Twitter profile and tweeted: “May God give good sense to everyone.”

The article by Soni Mishra was published in the Week on March 28, 2015. T. Vishnu Vardhan gave his inputs.

Today, with 11 million followers on Twitter, and 27.6 million likes on Facebook, Modi rules the virtual world and India. He received Costolo warmly and told him how Twitter could help his Clean India, girl child and yoga campaigns. Impressed, Costolo told Modi how Indian youth were innovating on Twitter.

But, the greatest and the most fundamental boost for all social media in India was being effected a few minutes drive away from the PMO. Ironically, in the Supreme Court of India, Modi's lawyers were defending a law made by the United Progressive Alliance government—section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which curbed free speech on social media.

Anything posted on the internet can go viral worldwide and reach millions in no time, argued Additional Solicitor General Tushar Mehta. While the traditional media is ruled by licences and checks, social media has nothing, he said. Finally, Mehta made an impassioned plea that the government meant well. Section 66A will be administered reasonably and will not be misused, he assured the court.

It seemed he, and the government, had forgotten an old saying: if there is a bad law, someone will use it. Luckily for India, and its liberal democracy, the judges saw a bad law and struck it down. “If section 66A is otherwise invalid, it cannot be saved by an assurance from the learned additional solicitor general,” said the bench comprising Justice Rohinton Nariman and Justice J. Chelameswar.

The fact is that 66A was knee-jerk legislation. Almost as thoughtless and compulsive as a netizen's derisive tweet. On December 22, 2008, the penultimate day of the winter session, the UPA government had got seven bills passed in seven minutes in the Lok Sabha; the opposition BJP had played along.

One of the bills was to amend the IT Act. It went to the Rajya Sabha the next day, when members were hurrying to catch their trains and flights home for the year-end vacation. They just okayed the bill and hurried home.

The argument then was that there was no need to discuss the bill as it had been examined by a standing committee of Parliament. Indeed, it had been. But, the committee, headed by Nikhil Kumar of the Congress, had met only for 23 hours and five minutes. Nine of its 31 members had not attended a single meeting. Ravi Shankar Prasad, the current Union minister for IT, was one among the 31.

Apparently, everyone wanted the bill, so did not bother to apply their minds. Only a CPI(M) member, A. Vijayaraghavan, had a few dissenting suggestions to the committee report. No one else bothered to mull over a law that was “unconstitutional, vague” and which would have a “chilling effect” on free speech.

Once the law was made, it was constable raj across India. Shaheen Dhada from Palghar simply commented on Facebook about a Shiv Sena bandh on the death of Bal Thackeray. Her friend Rinu Srinivasan liked it. The two teenagers were bundled into a police station. Rinu still remembers with a chill how “a mob of about 200 people gathered outside the police station that day.” This was when the Congress was ruling Maharashtra.

Jadavpur University professor Ambikesh Mahapatra was picked up by the police in Trinamool Congress-ruled West Bengal in April 2012, for posting a cartoon ridiculing Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. “I was thrashed several times in police custody,” said the professor, who got relief from the West Bengal Human Rights Commission.

Vickey Khan, 22, was arrested in Rampur, UP, for a Facebook post on Samajwadi Party leader Azam Khan. Rampur is, of course, Khan's pocket borough. The Uttar Pradesh Police, controlled by the Samajwadi Party government, also arrested dalit writer Kanwal Bharti from Rampur for criticising the UP government's suspension of IAS officer Durga Shakti Nagpal in 2013.

At least 30 people in AIADMK-ruled Chennai have been booked under 66A; four of them this year. Ravi Srinivasan, general secretary of the Aam Aadmi Party in Puducherry, was picked up in October 2012 for his tweets on Karti Chidambaram, son of then Union home minister P. Chidambaram. “He was not even in India when I tweeted,” said Ravi. “He sent the complaint by fax from abroad and everything happened [fast] as Puducherry is a Union Territory and can be controlled by the home ministry.”

Whistleblower A. Shankar of Chennai was pulled up by the Madras High Court for the content on his blog, Savukku. The Orissa Police, controlled by the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) government, took Facebook to court in 2011 asking who created a Facebook page in the name of Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik. It is another thing that the page had no content.

Indeed, there had been stray political voices opposing the law. In Parliament, the CPI(M)'s P. Rajeeve, the BJD's Jay Panda and independent MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar pushed several times for scrapping 66A. Panda moved a private members bill, and Rajeeve moved a resolution. “I only wish we in Parliament had heeded the people's voice and repealed it, instead of yet again letting the judiciary do our work for us,” Panda said after the law was scrapped.

Finally, it was left to a young law student, Shreya Singhal, to move the Supreme Court on behalf of the Palghar girls. Singhal pointed out that several provisions in 66A violated fundamental rights guaranteed by article 19(1)(a)—the right to freedom of speech and expression. Several more cases followed and, finally, the court heard them together.

Indeed, Justices Nariman and Chelameswar have been extremely restrained in their comments. But, the fact that Parliament had not applied its mind comes through in the judgment.

The court “had raised serious concerns with the manner in which section 66A of the IT Act has been drafted and implemented across the country,” pointed out Supreme Court lawyer Shivshankar Panicker. Added Kiran Shanmugam, a cyber forensic expert and CEO of ECD Global Bengaluru: “The law lacked foresight in estimating the magnitude of the way the electronic media would grow.”

Apparently the government, too, knew it was defending the indefensible, and tried to win the case highlighting the benign nature of the democratic state. But, the court was not impressed. “Governments may come and governments may go, but section 66A goes on forever,” the judges noted. “An assurance from the present government, even if carried out faithfully, would not bind any successor government.”

Clearly, Mehta was defending the indefensible, a law that, the court found, would have a “chilling effect on free speech”. Moreover, as the judges found out, the new law did not provide even the safeguards that the older Criminal Procedure Code had provided. “Safeguards that are to be found in sections 95 and 96 of the CrPC are also absent when it comes to section 66A,” the judges said. For example, according to the CrPC, a book or document that contained objectionable matter could be seized by the police, but it also allowed the publisher to move court. The new law did not provide even such a cushion.

All the same, the court was careful and did not overturn the entire law. It scrapped section 66A, and section 118(D) of the Kerala Police Act, but upheld section 69A and section 79 of the IT Act, which too had been questioned by the litigants (see box on page 45).

The judgment has set the cyberworld rocking. “I am so happy now, I do not know how to express it,” said Rinu, now an audio-engineering student in Kerala. Shaheen is married and lives in Bengaluru. Vickey Khan is relieved. “Some people had told me that I could be jailed for three years,” he said. But, Azam Khan took it out on the media and said it “favours criminals”.

Karti, who claims to be a votary of free speech, however, wants “some protection” against defamation. “I filed a complaint in an existing provision of law,” he said. “If that provision is not available, then I will have to seek other provisions to safeguard my reputation.”

Mahapatra is still apprehensive. “The government will still try to harass me,” he said. “But I know that in the end I will win.” Shankar of Chennai called it “a huge relief for people like me, who are active on social media.” Ravi Srinivasan, who locked horns with Karti, said he felt “relieved and happy”.

The hard rap on the knuckles for their legislative laxity has sobered the political class. The Congress, the progenitor of 66A, admitted that the vagueness of the law was its undoing. “If in a particular area, the local constabulary took action to stifle dissent, it was never the purpose of the act,” said Congress spokesperson Abhishek Manu Singhvi. The Modi government officially welcomed the judgment, and its spokespersons are blaming the UPA for the law.

Apparently, the scrapped law was made after a series of grossly offensive posts appeared on the social media five years ago. “If such content is not blocked online, it would immediately lead to riots,” said a law ministry official, who said the posts had been shown to the court, too. He said the government would take some time to draft a new law.

But, is a new law required? Opinion is still divided. What if someone is defamed on the net? “There are defamation laws which can deal with these,” said T. Vishnuvardhan, programme director, Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru. “Also, the IT Act has various provisions. If somebody misuses your picture on social media, you can report it to the website immediately. The website is liable to take action on it within 36 hours.”

Smarika Kumar of Bengaluru-based Alternative Law Forum said the scrapping of 66A does not mean one can post anything online. “The Supreme Court has said that speech can be censored when it falls under the restrictions provided under article 19(2) of the Constitution,” she said. “But, if you prevent speech on any other ground, it is going to be unconstitutional.”

But, even critics of 66A think a replacement law is needed. Said Rajeev Chandrasekhar: “The government needs to act quickly and create a much more contemporaneous Act, via multi-stakeholder consultations, general consensus and collaboration, so that there is less ambiguity and freedom of expression is preserved.”

Senior Supreme Court advocate Pravin H. Parekh said, “As the cyberworld is growing day by day and there is increase in the number of social media users, we do require a proper mechanism which can regulate the expression of views on the internet.”

The government is putting forth the argument of national security. “If the security establishment says the present act is not sufficient, we will look into it. The government will consider it, but only with adequate safeguards,” said Ravi Shankar Prasad.

That will call for a legislative process undertaken in a cool and calm house, and not hurried through when the members are ready to hurry home.

Sound judgment

Thumbs down
The Supreme Court set aside section 66A of the IT act, which says any person who sends offensive, menacing or false information to cause annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, or uses email to trouble its recipient or deceive him/her about the origin of such messages, can be punished with a jail term up to three years and a fine.

The court also struck down section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, which says any person who makes indecent comments by calls, mails, messages or any such means causing grave violation of public order or danger can be punished with imprisonment up to three years or a fine not exceeding Rs10,000, or both.

Thumbs up
The Supreme Court upheld section 69A of the IT act, which allows the government to block the public's access to information in national interest and penalise intermediaries [telecom or internet service providers and web hosting services] who fail to comply with the government's directives.

Section 79 of the IT Act, which deals with intermediaries' exemption from liability in certain cases, too, was upheld.

With R. Prasanan, Mini P. Thoma, Ajay Uprety, Lakshmi Subramanian, Rabi Banerjee and Sharmista Chaudhury

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-week-march-28-2015-soni-mishra-66a-dead-long-live-66a

SC has set a high threshold for tolerance: Lawrence Liang

praskrishna — 2015-03-28T16:18:18Z

Lawyer-activist Lawrence Liang on why SC upheld section 69A and the implications of striking down section 66A.

The article by Dhamini Ratnam was published in Livemint on March 28, 2015. Lawrence Liang gave his inputs.

Tuesday marked a landmark in the fight for free speech in our country, as the Supreme Court struck down the contentious section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000. The section, which was introduced through an amendment in 2009, penalized those who wrote messages online that could be deemed as being false or grossly offensive. However, the apex court turned down a plea to strike down sections 69A (procedure for blocking websites) and 79 (exemption from liability of intermediaries) of the same law. Lawrence Liang, a lawyer who co-founded the Alternative Law Forum in Bengaluru, a fellow at the Centre for Internet and Society, and author of The Public is Watching: Sex, Laws and Videotape and A Guide to Open Content Licenses, spoke in an interview on the wide-ranging implications of the judgement. Edited excerpts:

What was the impetus to fight section 66A?

Over the past few years, there have been numerous cases in which section 66A has been used in bad faith against individuals online. One of the cases that became well-known by virtue of just how ridiculous it was involved the arrest of Shaheen Dhada and her friend Renu Srinivasan (which led petitioner Shreya Singhal to file a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court that eventually led to this judgement), but there have been more, so it was inevitable that a law as draconian as section 66A would be challenged for its constitutional validity.

The judgement begins by noting a distinction between three forms of speech—discussion, advocacy and incitement—and says discussion and advocacy of a particular cause, howsoever unpopular, is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution (all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression). Only when they reach the level of incitement can they be legitimately prohibited. While the judgement does not provide a new definition of incitement, it affirms what was laid down in the Rangarajan test (1989), in which the courts had established that for censorship to be justified, the “expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest”. There should be an immediate and direct relation between speech and effect.

The court said that section 66A is “cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the mores of the day would be caught within its net”. The courts have also historically held that Article 19(1)(a) is as much about the right to receive information as it is to disseminate, and when there is a chilling effect on speech, it also violates the right to receive information. However, I would say that the court missed an opportunity to consider the blocking of websites under section 69A.

Why did the court uphold section 69A, and which other parts of the IT Act did it examine?

If section 66A was found to be arbitrary, then the procedure for blocking websites, as laid out in section 69A, is also beset with similar problems. The court, however, upheld this section and the rules under the IT Act on the grounds that there are internal safeguards and reasonable procedures. This section allows the government to block any site or information that violates Article 19(2) of the Constitution (which enables the legislature to impose certain restrictions on free speech).

The problem is that often there is no hearing or notice given to the owner of information, there is no transparency since blocks can happen on a confidential basis and these can have serious implications for the right to receive information.

The court read down section 79, which used to provide an intermediary exemption from liability with the exception that if it received “actual knowledge” of any illegal content, it was obliged to act within 36 hours. A study by the Centre for Internet and Society showed that even on sending frivolous takedown notices, intermediaries tended to comply to be on the safe side. The court’s decision has read down section 79 now to mean that “actual knowledge” means either an order of a court or the government. It moves it away from a subjective determination by intermediaries.

The court could have, like it did with section 79, retained section 66A while clarifying a procedure that would maintain a balance between the need sometimes to block and public interest, and transparency.

What does the judgement open up for the free speech debate?

The judgement speaks of chilling effects, because if one is not careful, one runs the risk of endangering political discourse through self-censorship. This is terrible for a democratic culture, which is premised on the ability to debate and dissent. Much of the use of section 66A has been politically motivated to silence criticism, and the judgement goes a long way towards promoting a culture of critique.

As the first major Supreme Court case on free speech in the 21st century, it sets the tone on how we think of free speech in a context where every individual with a smartphone is potentially a writer, a publisher and a distributor. By setting a high threshold for what is tolerated in online speech, it ensures that the online space is not doomed to be infantilized.

What position must the law take to protect rights and minority identities?

I think it is important to distinguish between different effects of speech. The court has merely reaffirmed a position that has been held in India for a long time (such as through the Ram Manohar Lohia judgement of 1960, which interpreted what “restriction made in the interests of public order” in Article 19(2) means). In other words, if someone is inciting violence, especially if they have the power to effect such violence (such as a politician), then their speech can be regulated, but the court also held that the idea of threat to public order is often imaginary.

For instance, in what way would Shaheen Dhada’s post on Facebook have incited violence? (In November 2012, Dhada, then a student and based in Palghar, Maharashtra, had written a post on Facebook commenting on the state of shutdown that followed politician Bal Thackeray’s death. Her comment was liked by her friend Srinivasan, and both of them were charged under section 66A.) So, the court is distinguishing between speech that is critical and speech that is dangerous. There are laws that deal with the latter, such as 153A and 295A of the IPC (Indian Penal Code).

It must be noted, however, that provisions also suffer from the same vice of vagueness. What we need is a more nuanced understanding of hate speech that addresses speech that incites violence or hatred against a community, but one in which the test is not of subjective hurt sentiment. The problem with hate speech laws is that they collapse questions of law and order with questions of subjective hurt, and we run the risk of becoming a republic of hurt sentiments where anyone can claim that their sentiments are hurt, especially their religious sentiments.

What happens to existing cases that are being tried under section 66A, such as the one against the organizers and participants of the All India Bakchod Roast?

Court judgements do not necessarily have retrospective effect, so cases that have been filed will continue. We must also remember that the cases filed under section 66A were also accompanied by other provisions. Of course, a judgement as significant as this, which completely delegitimizes section 66A, will have a profound impact on the ongoing cases insofar as they relate to the offence under the section, but the other charges remain.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-dhamini-ratnam-march-28-2015-sc-has-set-a-high-threshold-for-tolerance

What 66A Judgment Means For Free Speech Online

geetha — 2015-03-27T16:50:43Z

This week India's Supreme Court redefined the boundaries of freedom of speech on the internet. With the Court's decision in Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, has been struck down in entirety and is no longer good law.

Geetha Hariharan's article was originally published in the Huffington Post on March 26, 2015.

This week India's Supreme Court redefined the boundaries of freedom of speech on the internet. With the Court's decision in Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, has been struck down in entirety and is no longer good law. Through a structured, well-reasoned and heartening judgment, the court talks us through the nuances of free speech and valid restrictions. While previously, intermediaries were required to take down content upon suo moto determination of lawfulness, Section 79(3)(b) of the Act -- the intermediary liability provision -- has been read down to require actual knowledge of a court order or a government notification to take down content. Section 69A of the Act and its corresponding Rules, the provisions enabling the blocking of web content, have been left intact by the court, though infirmities persist.

The Supreme Court's decision comes at a critical moment for freedom of speech in India. In recent years, the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has suffered unmitigated misery: Wendy Doniger's The Hindus: An Alternative History was banned for hurting religious sentiments, publisher Orient Blackswan fearing legal action stayed its release of an academic work on sexual violence in Ahmedabad, the author Perumal Murugan faced harsh criticism for his novel One Part Woman and chose to slay his authorial identity.

"The Supreme Court's decision comes at a critical moment for freedom of speech in India. In recent years, the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has suffered unmitigated misery."

The tale of free speech on the Internet is similar. In response to takedown requests, intermediaries prefer to tread a safe path, taking down even legitimate content for fear of triggering penalties under Section 79 of the IT Act. The government has blocked websites in ways that transgress the bounds of 'reasonable restrictions' on speech. Section 66A alone has gathered astounding arrests and controversy. In 2012, Shaheen Dhada and her friend were arrested in Maharashtra for observing that Bal Thackeray's funeral shut down Mumbai, Devu Chodankar in Goa and Syed Waqar in Karnataka were arrested in 2014 for making posts about PM Narendra Modi, and a Puducherry man was arrested for criticizing P. Chidambaram's son. The misuse of Section 66A, and the inadequacy of other provisions of the IT Act, were well-documented.

Section 66A: No longer draconian

In a writ petition filed in 2012, the law student Shreya Singhal challenged the constitutionality of Section 66A on grounds, inter alia, of vagueness and its chilling effect. More petitions were filed challenging other provisions of the IT Act including Section 69A (website blocking) and Section 79 (intermediary liability), and these were heard jointly by justices Rohinton F. Nariman and G. Chelameshwar. Section 66A, implicating grave issues of freedom of speech on the internet, was at the centre of the challenge.

"It is difficult -impossible, in fact - to foresee or predict what speech is permitted or criminalised under Section 66A. As a result, there is a chilling effect on free speech online, resulting in self-censorship."

Section 66A makes it a criminal offence to send any online communication that is "grossly offensive" or "menacing", or false information sent for the purposes of causing "annoyance, inconvenience, insult, injury, obstruction, enmity, hatred, ill will", etc. These terms are not defined. Neither do they fall within one of the eight subjects for limitation under Article 19(2). It is difficult -impossible, in fact - to foresee or predict what speech is permitted or criminalised under Section 66A. As a result, there is a chilling effect on free speech online, resulting in self-censorship.

With yesterday's decision, the Supreme Court has struck down Section 66A on grounds of vagueness, excessive range and chilling effects on speech online. What is perhaps most uplifting is the court's affirmation of the value of free speech. In the midst of rising conservatism towards free speech, the Court reminds us that an "informed citizenry" and a "culture of open dialogue" are crucial to our democracy. Article 19(1)(a) shields us from "occasional tyrannies of governing majorities", and its restriction should be within Constitutional bounds enumerated in Article 19(2).

What speech is protected?

There are three types of speech, the court says: Discussion, advocacy and incitement. Discussion and advocacy are at the heart of Article 19(1)(a), and are unquestionably protected. But when speech amounts to incitement - that is, if it is expected to cause harm, danger or public disorder- it can be reasonably restricted for any of these reasons: public order, sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State and friendly relations with foreign states.

" The Union of India argued that Section 66A is saved by the clauses "public order", "defamation", "incitement to an offence" and "decency, morality". But as the court finds that these are spurious grounds."

Section 66A, however, does not meet the legal standards for any of the limitation-clauses under Article 19(2), and so is unconstitutional. The Union of India argued that Section 66A is saved by the clauses "public order", "defamation", "incitement to an offence" and "decency, morality". But as the court finds that these are spurious grounds. For instance, Section 66A covers "all information" sent via the Internet, but does not make any reference (express or implied) to public order. Section 66A is not saved by incitement, either. The ingredients of "incitement" are that there must be a "clear tendency to disrupt public order", or an express or implied call to violence or disorder, and Section 66A is remarkably silent on these. By its vague and wide scope, Section 66A may apply to one-on-one online communication or to public posts, and so its applicability is uncertain. For these grounds, Section 66A has been struck down.

For freedom of speech on the internet, this is fantastic news! The unpredictability and threat of Section 66A has been lifted. Political commentary, criticism and dialogue are clearly protected under Article 19(1)(a). Of course, the government is still keen to regulate online speech, but the bounds within which it may do so have been reasserted and fortified.

Section 69A and website blocking

Section 69A empowers the government and its agencies to block websites on any of six grounds: "in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above". The blocking procedure is set out in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. It requires that a Committee for Examination of Request (CER) examines each blocking request, and gives the content-generator or host 48 hours to make a representation. The Secretary of the Department of Electronics and Information Technology then issues the blocking direction to the intermediary.

"[The court has] failed to consider the impact of Section 69A and its Rules. Our free speech rights as listeners are equally affected when legitimate websites containing information are blocked. Transparency, blockpage notifications and judicial review are essential to determine whether each blocking direction is valid."

Now, the Supreme Court decision has left Section 69A and its Rules intact, stating that it is a "narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards". However, the Court has overlooked some crucial details. For instance, no judicial review is available to test the validity of each blocking direction. Moreover, Rule 14 of the Blocking Rules requires that all blocking requests and directions are kept confidential. This means that neither the content-generator, nor the reader/listener or general public, will have any idea of how many blocking directions have been issued or why. There is no standard blockpage display in India, either, and this further aggravates the transparency problem.

Lamentably, the Supreme Court has not considered this. Though the court has recognised and upheld the rights of viewers, readers and listeners in its decision on Section 66A, it failed to consider the impact of Section 69A and its Rules on readers and listeners. Our free speech rights as listeners are equally affected when legitimate websites containing information are blocked. Transparency, blockpage notifications and judicial review are essential to determine whether each blocking direction is valid.

Section 79 and the intermediary as a judge

Section 79 provides a safe harbour for intermediaries: if they abide by the requirements of Section 79(2), they retain immunity. But under Section 79(3)(b), intermediaries can lose their immunity from prosecution if, after receiving a takedown notice, they do not take down content in three circumstances: (1) if they have actual knowledge that third-party information within their control is being used to commit an unlawful act (i.e., by suo moto deciding the lawfulness of content); (2) if a court order requires takedown of content; (3) if a government notification requires takedown. Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011 has a similar provision.

"The Supreme Court has wisely put an end to private adjudication of lawfulness. Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(4) have been read down to mean that the intermediary must have actual knowledge of a court order or government notification."

This leads to a situation where a private intermediary is responsible for deciding what constitutes lawful content. Previous studies have shown that, when placed in such a position, intermediaries prefer overbroad blocking to escape liability. As readers, we can then only access uncontroversial content. But the freedom of speech includes, as the European Court of Human Rights emphasised in Otto-Preminger Institut, the freedom to "offend, shock and disturb".

In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court has wisely put an end to private adjudication of lawfulness. Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(4) have been read down to mean that the intermediary must have actual knowledge of a court order or government notification. Even if an intermediary chooses not to act in response to a private takedown notice, it will retain its immunity under Section 79.

With Shreya Singhal, India has reaffirmed its protections for freedom of speech on the internet. One may now freely speak online without fear of illegitimate and unconstitutional prosecution. However, a re-examination of the blocking procedure, with its infirmities and direct impact on speech diversity, is essential. But today, we celebrate!

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/huffington-post-geetha-hariharan-march-26-2015-what-66-a-judgment-means-for-free-speech-online

India's Supreme Court Axes Online Censorship Law, But Challenges Remain

subha — 2015-03-27T02:38:20Z

The Supreme Court of India took a remarkable step to protect free expression on March 24, 2015, striking down controversial section 66A of the IT Act that criminalized “grossly offensive” content online. In response to a public interest litigation filed by Indian law student Shreya Singhal, the court made this landmark judgement calling the section “vague”, “broad” and “unconstitutional”. Since Tuesday's announcement, the news has trended nationally on Twitter, with more than 50,000 tweets bearing the hashtags #Sec66A and #66A.

The blog entry by Subhashish Panigrahi was originally published by Global Voices Online on March 25, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Section 66A allowed police to arrest any person who sent online communications deemed “grossly offensive” or known to be false. This has enabled the government take down many websites with allegedly objectionable content. Among various cases since the law was updated in 2008, two people were arrested for making comments on Facebook regarding India's prime minister Narendra Modi and one man was arrested for commenting on public service closures following the death of political leader Bal Thakrey.

The now-defunct Section 66A reads as follows:

66-A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.
—Any person who sends, by means of a computer
resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal
intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or
recipient about the origin of such messages, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Internet rights advocate and lawyer Pranesh Prakash, who works with the Center for Internet and Society in Bangalore, has been one of the law's most outspoken critics in recent years. Immediately following the ruling, he tweeted:

Nikhil Pahwa, independent journalist and founder of the MeddiaNama blog, offered his take on the ruling:

This is a great decision for freedom of speech in India…66A is far too vague, and lends itself to arbitrary implementation by the police, especially phrases like “grossly offensive”, annoyance, inconvenience, ill will. Remember that even the right to offend is an integral part of free speech.

Journalist and author Sagarika Ghose sarcastically wondered if the government of India would retroactively offer recompense for all of the actions taken against citizens for violating 66A.

Some were playful in their response to the decision. Siddharth Sing set out to “test” the efficacy of the ruling with a tweet mocking prominent public figures in Indian politics:

Section 69, which provides authorities with the power to censor websites that “create communal disturbance, social disorder, or affect India's relationship with other countries” was upheld however. The Court has yet to clarify this decision. CIS India's Pranesh Prakash tweeted:

Unfortunately 69A (website blocking) has been upheld despite many issues, incl lack of transparency. Need to read full judgment to see why.

— Pranesh Prakash (@pranesh_prakash) March 24, 2015

Tuesday's decision comes after the government of India was heavily criticized in January 2015 for blocking 32 websites in the country.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-voices-march-25-2014-subhashish-panigrahi-indias-supreme-court-axes-online-censorship-law-but-challenges-remain