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Internet and Society in Asia: Challenges and Next Steps

nishant — 2011-12-23T05:56:15Z

The ubiquitous presence of internet technologies, in our age of digital revolution, has demanded the attention of various disciplines of study and movements for change around the globe. As more of our environment gets connected to the circuits of the World Wide Web, we witness a significant transformation in the way we understand the politics, mechanics and aesthetics of the world we live in, says Nishant Shah in this peer reviewed essay published in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 11, Number 1, March 2010.

Traces of digital environments and internet technologies are all around us – we can see them in the rise of Digital Natives who are increasingly experiencing and living their lives mediated by digital technologies; we can see them in new forms of social interactions, such as blogs, peer-to-peer networks, internet relay chat, podcasts and so on, which are progressively becoming the primary points of information dissemination and production; we experience them in the tools and techniques of political mobilisation in large scale democratic elections and also in sub-cultural and smaller phenomena, such as flash-mobs and viral networking; we are incessantly reminded of them in the discourse around questions of safety and danger, especially with reference to activities such as internet pornography, child sexual abuse, piracy, identity theft, etc.

Internet technologies have become so intricately entwined with our daily practices and experiences that it is necessary to seriously look at these technologised circuits and the technology mediated identities thus produced. Increasingly, we see many different disciplines extending their methodologies and perspectives to include cyberspaces and digital behaviour in their purview. We already have a new breed of cyber-psychologists who are looking at the interaction between the human mind, the sense of the self and digital environments. The law, perhaps most concerned with questions of property, trade and commerce, is also examining questions of what it means to be human, with the emergence of post-human categories like cyborgs, cybrids, and genetically modified life forms. Anthropologists and sociologists have discovered cyberspace as a site that significantly influences the behaviour and thought of individuals as well as communities that come into being in the digital deliriums of the networked world. Feminism and Gender and Sexuality Studies have found great theoretical and political interest in the ways in which the internet technologies change the way we understand our bodies and practices. New disciplines like Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Cybernetiques, Cyborg Studies, etc. are slowly garnering importance and evolving as the spread of digital technologies increases exponentially. Cybercultures, a discipline (or perhaps, rather, a combination of various disciplines interested in studying cyberspaces) that comes into being because of the rise of Internet Technologies, is now already institutionalised in many universities and research spaces, concentrating on understanding the complex forms of interaction, representation and negotiation that happen in the fluid and rapidly changing landscape of digital cyberspaces.

As Internet Technologies continue to grow and become a more integral part of our lifestyles, cultural production, and forms of social transformation and political mobilisation, there are a few challenges that we face, especially when writing from and about Asia.

Following the trajectory of the development and spread of internet technologies, academic attention and research has primarily emerged in the North-West and slowly penetrated through disciplines and contexts in other parts of the world. It was only after the 1990s, once the digital revolution reached the ‘rest of the world’, that interest in and research on the phenomenon started to feature in studies in Asia. However, the initial research on and the major interest in the relationship between internet technologies and society has been dependent upon the theoretical categories, examples or ideas produced in primarily Western contexts. This has led to the production of a narrative where the digital technologies of information and communication (like the internet) are looked at as being seamlessly exported from the West to the East, without any attention given to the geo-political contexts and socio-cultural changes that accompany this penetration of technologies. There has been a blindsiding of the role that the State, educational institutions and globalised economic powers have played in the introduction, the proliferation and the acceptance of the internet technologies and digitally mediated lifestyles that have become so commonplace in developing Asia today. Research is oblivious to the context within which these technologies emerge and the kind of negotiations and interactions they have with the larger social and cultural fabric of the region.

One of the main reasons why such a narrative gains currency is that we have no vocabulary but that granted by Western scholars and practitioners to talk of the technologies and the technologised socio-cultural productions that emerge in our own local and regional contexts. With the rhetoric of globalisation and homogenisation on the one hand and the logic of the universalising nature of internet technologies on the other, there has been an un-reflexive theorising of digital identities, productions and interactions; this makes Asia more an exemplar for the existing Western ideas and hypotheses than a site where the drama of these technologies is still unfolding. This process is aided and abetted by the accelerated urbanisation that seeks to create nondescript and sterile spaces of consumption and lifestyle that subscribe to the idea of ‘Global’ or ‘Mega’ cities. Hence, across Asia, we see the mushrooming of cities and city-states – Singapore, Tokyo, Shanghai, Taipei, Bangalore – that work at actively erasing histories and producing these bubbles of consumption and globalisation that are disturbingly similar to each other.

Such theorising also reinforces the disconnect that Western Cybercultures has been encouraging between the networked worlds and ‘reality’, which, though affected and changed by the rise of these technologies, still remains strangely continuous and coherent in the midst of transformations. Moreover, it contains most theoretical and political interventions within the zones of urban consumption and change, thus producing a certain middle-class, self-referential work that concentrates on these areas, forgetting other crises and problems that still need attention. It also encourages a view of Asia as a docile, non-agential site upon which technologies are mapped, despite the fact that every year in this new century has seen Asian countries emerging as substantial stake-holders and players in production, proliferation and consumption of internet technologies. Along with the liberalisation of markets, the global digital revolution has also seen boundaries in social norms, cultural mores and political processes being pushed. We have been witness to formerly closed governments attempting to restructure themselves in the global world and to an unprecedented inflation and consumption in the developing Asian countries. We are in the middle of radical reconstruction of academic processes and market economies as public private partnerships become the norm. However, these landmark changes are often ignored or explored from a West-centric view-point, producing extreme and polarised reactions to the spread of Internet Technologies and the changes it entails.

Beyond Euphoria and Fear

Most responses to the widespread reach of internet technologies and digital forms have been grounded in euphoria or fear. There is a certain boundless celebration on the one hand, that proclaims the internet as forming the new public sphere, heralding the democratic potential and transparent structures that these networks have within them. The gurus have looked upon the internet in a ‘convergence theory’ mode where they announce, severally and variously, the death of earlier cultural productions like books, movies and music. The ability of digital technologies to aid innovation and creativity, as well as new forms of employment and entrepreneurship, has spurred the writing of many books and essays documenting the process. The roles that internet technologies have played in granting voice, visibility, and expression to many underprivileged communities, and the way they offer social and economic mobility in developing countries, have been unabashedly celebrated. Governments, civil society practitioners and theoreticians have all looked upon the internet as the panacea that will help level the landscape of social justice and political participation around the world.

Simultaneously, there has also been a construction of ‘ecology of fear’ around the rise and spread of internet technologies. Massive global alarm exists around questions of easy access to pornography and other sexual behaviours online, not only for young adults but also for mature audiences of potential behaviour addicts. Online gambling has emerged as a huge concern and has been at the centre of much debate. Cyber-bullying on social networking systems, and cyber-terrorism on a much larger scale, have shocked us as new technologies get implicated in actions that have disastrous results both at the individual and the community level. With the tightening Intellectual Property regimes, there has also been great debate around digital piracy and the ability of the internet peer-to-peer networks to encourage acts of theft and copyright infringement. As the world becomes more digitised, attacks on sensitive information by crackers and scammers are also on the increase in various forms. The internet has been looked at with growing concern and alarm by parents, educators, policy-makers and corporate entities, who are all deeply involved in assuring safety, creating opportunities and catering to the needs of citizens and consumers.

This simultaneously celebratory and pathologised approach often cripples research in the field of Internet and Society, because it constructs technology mediated practices and identities as at once universal (hence general) and unique (hence particular). Research that emerges is, consequently, confined to producing case-studies explaining what happens in each particular incident online and is unable to examine either the conditions within which the technologies emerge or the contexts that circumscribe certain socio-cultural behaviour. Such research, instead of examining the aesthetics and politics of technology mediated identities and practices, keeps on documenting the extremely fluid and rapidly changing landscape of the digital world – documenting fads, evolutions, innovations and the smaller changes therein – thus missing the forest for the leaf; the research ends up in concentrating on the ‘what happened’ rather than treating these happenings as symptomatic of larger paradigmatic changes that they often hint at.

Internet and the Convergence Theory

This is further complicated by the fact that many theorists and analysts seem to treat the internet more as a platform for convergence of old media forms in new digital packages. Such a view of internet technologies and digital cyberspaces leads to the populist descriptions of blogs as extensions of personal diaries, of digital cinema as a continuation of the celluloid image, of digitally morphed pictures as more sophisticated versions of earlier experiments with still images, of social networking systems as evolution of pre-existing social structures, of MMORPGs (Massive Multiple Online Role Playing Games) as merely complex forms of gaming. These descriptions fail to take into account that internet technologies, especially digital cyberspaces, while indeed affecting and transforming existing forms of media and cultural production, also lead to the emergence of new and interesting forms of expression, consumption and interaction.

Just as the field of Cybercultures has only a vocabulary granted by the West, it also lacks a vocabulary that is its own – most research in Cybercultures, especially in emerging information societies, relies on categories, concepts and ideas that were relevant for earlier popular cultural forms like books and movies. Transplanting categories of authorship, production, consumption, distribution, etc., and trying to map them onto the digital world leads to severe confusion and is a futile exercise. For example, if we look at the discourse around the online user generated encyclopaedia – Wikipedia - and use the earlier existing categories of an author, a reader, an editor and an institutional structure of producing knowledge, we immediately realise that the discussion cannot be sustained; the categories presuppose other forms of writing and production which are not as relevant in the digital worlds. Similarly, legal categories like possession, ownership, labour and copying are also being made redundant by the advent of the internet. As these categories fail to capture the new digital worlds, they also fail to explain the human-technology relationship that the field of Internet and Society seeks to explore. Despite investment in terms of efforts, time and money, much of the research becomes redundant because it does not have the vocabulary or the idea that analysis of these new digital spaces entails.

The imagination of the convergent multimedia internet distracts from the fact that what appear to be earlier historic forms like text and moving images are, in the context of cyberspace and the Web 2.0 revolution, actually new forms that need their own vocabulary that does not carry the baggage of earlier popular technologies. It is time to move away from talking about the Internet and its effects in analogies and to seek and create an independent and effective language that takes into account the mechanics and the potentials of the Internet revolution.

Institutional Spaces: Internet & Society

It is within such contexts and to address questions like these that institutional spaces emerge in the field of Internet and Society. As more and more disciplines start focusing on internet technologies and their intersections with areas as diverse as identity, sexuality, governance, cultural production, political mobilisation and social transformation, institutions in this space are faced with the daunting question of what to concentrate on and how to define the scope of their activities. Many global organisations and interventions narrowly define the field through their own disciplinary positions and perspectives. The Berkman Centre of Internet and Society at the Harvard Law School, for example, examines the law and its intersections with the new internet technologies and practices. Sarai - a new media organisation in India - concentrates on art and cultural production as affected by digital technologies and practices. The Association of Internet Researchers builds a network of multi-disciplinary researchers and practitioners across the globe to meet annually for workshops and conferences and also share ideas through a mailing list, concentrating on existing phenomena on the World Wide Web. Several Communications and Media Studies schools also have established labs and workshops that focus on the internet technologies from their disciplinary grounding.

The Centre for Internet and Society, a newly established research and advocacy centre founded in Bangalore, India, makes a shift from these discipline-bound approaches to Internet and Society, and inaugurates a multi-disciplinary, interactive space for theorists, researchers, students, practitioners, activists, artists and the larger public to initiate a dialogue in the field of Internet and Society. Rather than adopting a disciplinary framework, it takes the model of Asian Cultural Studies, seeking to produce a sustainable scholarship and methodology to talk of the relationship between emergent Internet technologies and the changes they produce in the Global South. It sets out to critically engage with concerns of digital pluralism, public accountability and new pedagogic practices through multidisciplinary research, intervention and collaboration, to understand and affect the shape and form of the internet and its relationship with the political, cultural, and social milieu of our times.

At CIS, we recognise the contexts within which this field has developed and emerged and have initiated many programmes, projects and structures to deal with the questions that this essay has charted. Drawing from the pedagogy and frameworks developed within Cultural Studies in Asia, the research at CIS investigates the local, the contextual, the emergent and the negotiated nature of digital spaces and internet technologies at three levels – At the national level, looking to produce models of research by examining the history, the politics, the growth and the significance of internet technologies in the context of globalised India; At the regional level, focusing on the similarities that global urbanisation and digitisation are bringing to the emerging information societies in Asia and the acknowledging the dissimilarities that need to be addressed in each of these societies; At the global level, engaging with a much larger South-South discourse that strengthens the move to approach internet technologies as integral to our ways of living rather than of foreign import. Such an approach allows us to escape the often restrictive constraints of cybercultures discourse that stays within the domains of internet technologies and produces disconnect between Internet and Society. Instead, we expand the scope of internet technologies to see their relationships with larger political, social and cultural economies, lifestyles and consumption patterns, and identity and transformation structures in the rapidly changing world. In the first two years, for example, we are investing a large part of our research energies into producing the Histories of the Internets in India – inviting different disciplines and standpoints to trace the diverse historically important and culturally significant growth of Internet Technologies in India, thus de-homogenising the internet as well as the discourse within cybercultures.

The policy and advocacy work at the Centre for Internet and Society, also contributes hugely to this localisation and narrativisation of the internet in India, by recognising the law and the State as the largest stakeholders in the growth and proliferation of these technologies. We have initiated campaigns and projects examining national laws regarding intellectual property rights regimes, piracy, e-commerce and security, accessibility and disability, to see how they are subject to modification with the growth of digital technologies. Original field work and ethnography with the consumers, practitioners, stakeholders and law enforcers about the nature of technology, its role in the larger imagination of the globalised Indian State, and the need to make sensitive and informed decisions, has already been initiated, along with dissemination platforms like workshops, seminars, meetings and conferences.

Keeping in tune with our model of collaboration and consultation, the Society Members have also helped us generate a healthy momentum by representing us and helping us find resources around the globe. Prof. Subbiah Arunachalam has been travelling across Asia, Europe and North America, at international policy and activist forums, promoting Open Access to information and knowledge. Lawrence Liang has been involved in teaching both at the local and international levels, apart from presenting original and influential research examining the relationship that internet technologies have with questions of knowledge production, ownership and the law. Achal Prabala has been actively working with the Wikimedia foundation to facilitate user participation in knowledge production online. Atul Ramachandran has been working on developing mobile internet platforms for sharing news and information within the underprivileged communities in India. Vibodh Parthsarthy has been designing academic courses and encouraging research in the fields of internet technologies, governance and democracy.

Because these questions have a much larger regional relevance – with the increasing description of Asia as the Mecca of piracy and digital infractions – we are also in the process of starting projects that do a survey of the laws around intellectual property rights, innovation and access in the Asian region, with Sunil Abraham (Director – Policy) guiding a team of in-house researchers and external collaborators. Cross-boundary research and analysis has also been initiated in terms of dialogues and comparative study of technology, space and globalisation, initiated by my seven month residential project in Shanghai, where we are examining the conditions of technologisation that make global spaces possible, in countries like China and India. Apart from these, the team of seven people has been making interventions in international workshops, conferences and forums, to start dialogues and discussions in the field of Internet and Society.

A significant effort has been spent in starting awareness for the public – from the first documentation on our website of work in progress by our research and policy collaborators to regular contributions to local media sources to organisation of public talks and events – which is aimed at demystifying the internet technologies and giving more ownership and assurance to a larger public. Jimmy Wales, the founder of Wikipedia, gave a public talk on freedom, expression and the internet, citing anecdotes and examples from the phenomenal success and growth of Wikipedia. In a different media, independent film maker Jamie King screened his movies on the piracy cultures and innovation, in Bangalore, sparking conversations and debates about copyright, creative commons and the domain of cultural expression. Students and visiting artists from different countries, through the Shrishti School of Art Design and the efforts of Zeenath Hassan, came together at CIS for a discussion on fear and gender in public space and how digital technologies contribute to it. The discussion feels timely because only a month later, India saw the right wing cultural police tyrannising Bangalore and other parts of Karnataka, by perpetrating acts of brutal violence against women who they saw as progressive or in defiance of the right wing codes of decorum and behaviour. CIS was an active part of the ‘Pink Chaddi’ and ‘Reclaim the Night’ campaigneering, mobilising and participation at a local and national level, as a response to these acts of regressive violence, using digital environments and platforms to garner support and ‘recruit’ people into showing their protest against such fundamental ideas and practices.

Moreover, in order to develop and establish a more accessible vocabulary and understanding both within research, higher education and practice of internet and society questions, CIS has been investing in building national and regional networks of scholars, students and theorists in different disciplines to come and discuss the area. Courses have been designed and administered for undergraduate, post graduate and research students, in the disciplines of social sciences, management and media studies, journalism and communication studies, cultural studies etc. Networking with institutional and university spaces like the Centre for Culture, Media and Governance at the Jamia Millia Islamia in Delhi, Mudra Institute of Communications, Ahmedabad, Centre for the Study of Culture and Society, Bangalore, Christ University, Bangalore, Centre for Media and Culture Studies, at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai. We are also in conversation with regional spaces like the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the Shanghai University, The Open Source Initiative, International Development Research Centre, Hivos and the Asia Scholarship Foundation in Thailand, for extending our regional and global networks.

The Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, is less than a year old and has already embarked upon so many different projects, found a wide range of collaborations, initiated diverse enquiries and has received the support and interest of a varied and credible list of organisations. This warm reception and enthused interest, is as much a sign of the evolving and dynamic nature of collaboration and consultation in Asia, as it is of the need for interdisciplinary spaces like The Centre for Internet and Society, in our times. We see our rapid progress as symptomatic of a much larger need to establish more institutional spaces that can cater to the widely expanding horizon of the field of Internet and Society. While it is indeed laudable that different disciplines have already started showing interest in studying and analysing these often invisible links between Internet and Society, it is also now time, to start looking at technology as more than just an object or platform of study. We can already see how, in the foreseeable future, the internet technologies are only going to become more ubiquitous and central to the crucial mechanics of survival and living. Spaces like CIS help us look at technologies like the internet, as not merely tools and techniques, but as entwined in the politics, aesthetics and economies of the time and spaces we live in.

About the Author

Nishant Shah is the co-founder and Director for Research at the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore. Nishant’s doctoral work examines the construction of technosocial subjectivities in India, at the intersections of digital technology, cyborg identities and globalised spaces. Nishant is the recipient of the Asia Scholarship Foundation’s grant which places him in Shanghai for a project on IT and the globalisation of Asian cities.

Read the original published by Inter-Asia Cultural Studies here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/internet-society-challenges-next-steps

Internet and Banking: A Trust Broken

Roshan Gupta — 2017-12-19T16:10:43Z

Strap: Some cut down their daily meals and some lost their jobs as the banking sector took a major hit during internet shutdowns.

Darjeeling, West Bengal: As the Internet shutdown in Darjeeling touched the notorious landmark of 100 days in late September, its impact was felt by members of Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) — the party agitating for a separate state of Gorkhaland. The state government’s move had managed to impair the communication and coordination among the agitators.

However, for most residents, lack of access to the internet meant months of crippled bank transactions and mounting financial strain. The impact of the move was felt by all sections of society and most services experienced a slowdown or complete paralysis.

Students from the town were among the worst hit as the internet ban cut off a steady flow of money from home for academic purposes.

“I had to cut down my daily meals to once a day to save whatever little currency notes I had, especially since it was not clear when the ban would be lifted,” said Shradha Subba, a resident of Darjeeling who is pursuing her Bachelors degree in Kolkata.

Her parents were not able to send her money due to the ban and arranging cash from another state was also not an option. “I had no option but to borrow money and even that was difficult as all my friends were from the hills and faced the same problem,” said Subba.

The parents of many students also felt hard done by the shutdown and said they often found it difficult to communicate with their children. Transferring money for their monthly educational needs was also impossible. “We were able to make phone-calls to our children once in a while, but we could not see them as video-calling was out of the question. We also could not send the money for their semester fees on time and had to ask our relatives in Sikkim to arrange cash for them,” said a concerned mother whose daughter was studying in Delhi.

The ban on mobile internet was imposed on June 18, 2017. Two days later, broadband service was also restricted. The initial shutdown was meant to last for only a week but it had since seen several extensions owing to non-cessation of agitations. Banks were left helpless especially in the face of uncertainty regarding when the restrictions would be lifted.

“None of the banking services were functional and no transactions were done during the period of internet shutdown. Even the ATMs were closed and people could not be provided normal service,” said Jagabandhu Mondal, district branch manager, State Bank of India.

People routinely missed bill payments and no online transactions were done during the course of the ban. Reports emerged of people travelling over 80 kilometres, either to Siliguri or to Sikkim, just to withdraw some money.

Those who had purchased new vehicles found themselves struggling to pay their monthly instalments despite having cash in their accounts. Travelling to Siliguri to pay the instalment was also daunting as the road transportation was restricted by agitating political parties and supporters picketing on the streets.

Santosh Rai, a resident who had purchased a car just before the internet ban, said: “I could not go to Siliguri or even pay online. Now I’m facing claims for penalty. It was very hard for the vehicle owners to pay the EMI for three months along with a penalty. I asked for help from my friends but how long will they pay.”

He claimed that several people were forced to default on payments due to the blanket ban imposed by the government. “We could have deposited the EMI but the banks were closed, and that is not our fault,” said Rai.

Another victim, Mukesh Rai, also echoed Santosh’s sentiments while describing how he had to default on EMI payments towards his new car. “I used to walk towards Melli, Rangpo, or Singtam (all small towns in Sikkim) to withdraw money as my family and I were in need of liquid cash. Even that became difficult mid-monsoon,” he said.

Experts also pointed out that the ban was enforced even as the rest of the country discussed Digital India and a push towards cashless economy.

Another resident, Pema Namgyal, said he had lost a job because of the ban on internet services. He had opted to work from home for an advertising agency based out of Bangalore. “I had taken up an editing and copywriting job with an advertising agency. I had an issue with my spine and since long leaves are not possible in creative agencies, I opted to work from home. Five days after I reached here, an indefinite strike was called and the internet was shut down. I couldn’t work as per my client’s schedule and when I could not coordinate with him, he looked for another copywriter and asked me to refund an advance payment he had made,” said Namgyal.

The manager of an HDFC bank branch, Paul Tshring Lepcha, said, “We use BSNL connections usually for banking work and once the network was down we had a hard time updating our system… there are alternative portals like Airtel and Vodafone but even that was of no use at the time,” recalls Lepcha,

Book size of private banks too saw a drop in these 100 days and the regulation regarding monthly maintenance of ₹5,000 in their customers’ accounts could not be continued. Officials from Indusland Bank said that people even started preferring government banks as they have a lower maintenance requirement. “During the ban period, no new account holders were registered and the mutual funds market also experienced a lull,” said an official from a private bank.

Roshan Gupta is a Siliguri-based journalist and a member of 101Reporters.com, a pan-India network of grassroots reporters.

Shutdown stories are the output of a collaboration between 101 Reporters and CIS with support from Facebook.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internet-and-banking-a-trust-broken

Internet Analysts Question India’s Efforts to Stem Panic

praskrishna — 2012-09-04T11:46:03Z

The Indian government’s efforts to stem a weeklong panic among some ethnic minorities has again put it at odds with Internet companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter.

This article by Vikas Bajaj was published by New York Times on August 21, 2012. Sunil Abraham is quoted. This was reposted in NDTV on August 22, 2012.

Officials in New Delhi, who have had disagreements with the companies over restrictions on free speech, say the sites are not responding quickly enough to their requests to delete and trace the origins of doctored photos and incendiary posts aimed at people from northeastern India. After receiving threats online and on their phones, tens of thousands of students and migrants from the northeast have left cities like Bangalore, Pune and Chennai in the last week.

The government has blocked 245 Web pages since Friday, but still many sites are said to contain fabricated images of violence against Muslims in the northeast and in neighboring Myanmar meant to incite Muslims in cities like Bangalore and Mumbai to attack people from the northeast. India also restricted cellphone users to five text messages a day each for 15 days in an effort to limit the spread of rumors.

Officials from Google and industry associations said they were cooperating fully with the authorities. Some industry executives and analysts added that some requests had not been heeded because they were overly broad or violated internal policies and the rights of users.

The government, used to exerting significant control over media like newspapers, films and television, has in recent months been frustrated in its effort to extend similar and greater regulations to Web sites, most of which are based in the United States. Late last year, an Indian minister tried to get social media sites to prescreen content created by their users before it was posted. The companies refused and the attempt failed under withering public criticism.

While just 100 million of India’s 1.2 billion people use the Internet regularly, the numbers are growing fast among people younger than 25, who make up about half the country’s population. For instance, there were an estimated 46 million active Indian users on Facebook at the end of 2011, up 132 percent from a year earlier.

Sunil Abraham, an analyst who has closely followed India’s battles with Internet companies, said last week’s effort to tackle hate speech was justified but poorly managed. He said the first directive from the government was impractically broad, asking all Internet “intermediaries” — a category that includes small cybercafes, Internet service providers and companies like Google and Facebook — to disable all content that was “inflammatory, hateful and inciting violence.”

“The Internet intermediaries are responding slowly because now they have to trawl through their networks and identify hate speech,” said Mr. Abraham, executive director of the Center for Internet and Society, a research and advocacy group based in Bangalore. “The government acted appropriately, but without sufficient sophistication.”

In the days since the first advisory went out on Aug. 17, government officials have asked companies to delete dozens of specific Web pages. Most of them have been blocked, but officials have not publicly identified them or specified the sites on which they were hosted. Ministers have blamed groups in Pakistan, a neighbor with which India has tense relations, for creating and uploading many of the hateful pages and doctored images.

A minister in the Indian government, Milind Deora, acknowledged that officials had received assistance from social media sites but said officials were hoping that the companies would move faster.

“There is a sense of importance and urgency, and that’s why the government has taken these out-of-the-way decisions with regards to even curtailing communications,” Mr. Deora, a junior minister of communications and information technology, said in a telephone interview. “And we are hoping for cooperation from the platforms and companies to help us as quickly as possible.”

Indian officials have long been concerned about the power of modern communications to exacerbate strife and tension among the nation’s many ethnic and religious groups. While communal violence has broadly declined in the last decade, in part because of faster economic growth, many grievances simmer under the surface. Most recently, fighting between the Bodo tribe and Muslims in the northeastern state of Assam has displaced about half a million people and, through text messages and online posts, affected thousands more across India.

Officials at social media companies, speaking on the condition of anonymity to avoid offending political leaders, said that they were moving as fast as they could but that policy makers must realize that the company officials have to follow their own internal procedures before deleting content and revealing information like the Internet protocol addresses of users.

“Content intended to incite violence, such as hate speech, is prohibited on Google products where we host content, including YouTube, Google Plus and Blogger,” Google said in a statement. “We act quickly to remove such material flagged by our users. We also comply with valid legal requests from authorities wherever possible.”

Facebook said in a statement that it also restricts hate speech and “direct calls for violence” and added that it was “working through” requests to remove content. Twitter declined to comment on the Indian government’s request.

Telecommunications company executives criticized the government’s response to the crisis as being excessive and clumsy. There was no need to limit text messages to just five a day across the country when problems were concentrated in a handful of big cities, said Rajan Mathews, director general of the Cellular Operators Association of India.

“It could have been handled much more tactically,” he said.

Others said the government could have been more effective had it quickly countered hateful and threatening speech by sending out its own messages, which it was slow to do when migrants from the northeast began leaving Bangalore on Aug. 15.

“It has to also reach out on social networking and Internet platforms and dismantle these rumors,” Mr. Abraham said, “and demonstrate that they are false.”

A version of this article appeared in print on August 22, 2012, on page B4 of the New York edition with the headline: Internet Moves by India to Stem Rumors and Panic Raise Questions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/www-nytimes-vikas-bajaj-aug-21-2012-internet-analysts-question-indias-efforts-to-stem-panic

International View of the State-of-the-Art of Cryptography and Security and its Use in Practice (IV)

praskrishna — 2013-12-26T09:05:40Z

Building on the workshop in Dagstuhl in June-July 2011 (International View of the State-of-the-Art of Cryptography and Security and its Use in Practice), Beijing (International View of the State-of-the-Art of Cryptography and Security and its Use in Practice II), and Athens (International View of the State-of-the-Art of Cryptography and Security and its Use in Practice III) that set the stage for discussions on cryptography among a group of key researchers from Europe, Asia, and North America, the one day workshop in Bangalore, following AsiaCrypt 2013 will again bring together internationally recognized scientists to discuss direction and development in theoretical and applied cryptography and surrounding societal issues.

There will be four focus areas:

Real-life cryptography
Standardization
Regulatory requirements
Innovative use cases for cryptography

Each focus area will be anchored in an invited talk and/or panel, but the emphasis will be on discussion. The participants will address broad research directions in encryption and secure computation and their applications in cloud computing, smart grid, mobile and embedded computing, hardware, software, and network security. They will also examine non-technical issues surrounding deployment and adoption of new security technologies using encryption, such as privacy or economic consideration. Approaches and projects in different countries will be discussed, in order to increase awareness of the R&D activities internationally and continue to for a strong community of research and practice and in order to generate new ideas in this field.

Although the workshop will cover a broad spectrum of issues from the list presented below with a specific focus that will be announced shortly. The topics of interest include (but are not limited to) the following subjects:

Secret versus public ciphers
Cipher and algorithm development process
Algorithms maturity and review
Lightweight cryptography
New requirements for cryptography for novel applications
Cipher implementation and interoperability
Standardization
Regulatory initiatives
Privacy enhancing cryptography

8:15 a.m.	Registration
8:30 a.m.	Opening statement (Organizers)
8:40 a.m.	Opening keynote (TBD)
9:10 a.m.	Panel 1 and discussion: Advances in cryptography; new use cases, Participants: Dan Bernstein (University of Illinois at Chicago), Tanja Lange (Eindhoven), Veni Madhavan (ERNET), others TBD
10.30 a.m.	Coffee break
11.00 a.m.	Panel II and discussion: Regulatory environment and standardization: Sunil Abraham (India CIS), Kazue Sako (NEC), Claire Vishik (Intel), others TBD
12.30 a.m.	Lunch
1.30 p.m.	Panel 3 and discussion: Implementation and interoperability for new environments (e.g., smart grid, Internet of things): Reji Kumar (Smart Grid India), other TBD
3.00 p.m.	Coffee break
3.30 p.m.	Panel IV and discussion: Privacy, social networking, ubiquitous connectivity and cryptography: Rene Peralta (NIST), Kumar Ranganathan, others TBD
5.00 p.m.	Thoughts and next workshop
5.20 p.m.	Closing statements (Organizers)
5.30 p.m.	Adjourn

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/international-view-of-state-of-the-art-of-cryptography-and-security-and-its-use-in-practice

International Symposium on Electronic Art (ISEA 2017)

praskrishna — 2017-07-07T01:49:34Z

Sharat Chandra Ram was part of a 90 minute academic panel at ISEA 2017 organized by the University of Caldas, Manizales in Columbia. The event was held from June 11 to 16, 2017.

The Panel was titled - “Biocreation of Informatics: Rethinking Data Ecosystems in the Network Economy. The Panel consisted of 4 papers:

1. Pilar Saenz - Karisma Foundation, Bogota - Data and Public Policy

2. Offray Vladimir Luna - HackBo & University of Caldas - Civic Media and Data (H)ac(K)tivism

3. Jose Cuartas - Los Libertadores & University of Caldas - Democratisation of Data and Internet of Things

4. Sharath Chandra Ram - Signal Territories, Infrastructures and Intermediaries

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/international-symposium-on-electronic-art-isea-2017

International Summer School: "Digitization and its Impact on Society"

praskrishna — 2013-11-20T10:00:59Z

Dr. Nishant Shah will be the key note speaker in the session "Social Networks and the Revolution of Political Communication". The event is being hosted by the Dresden Center for Digital Linguistics from September 29 to October 5, 2013.

Click to read the full programme schedule published by the Dresden Center for Digital Linguistics. More details on the program here.

The Summer School takes place on the TUD campus, mainly in the buildings of the Faculty of Computer Science (Nöthnitzer Straße 46) and the Max Planck Institute for the Physics of Complex Systems (Nöthnitzer Straße 38).

Co - Conveners and Scientific Committee

Noah Bubenhofer, Dresden Center for Digital Linguistics, TU Dresden
Thomas Bürger, Saxon State and University Library Dresden (SLUB)
Wolfgang Donsbach, Chair of Communication Studies I, Institute of Media and Communication, TU Dresden
Katrin Etzrodt, Institute of Media and Communication, TU Dresden
Horst - Peter Götting, Chair of Civil Law and Intellectual Property Law, Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Media Law, TU Dresden
Lutz Hagen, Chair of Communications Studies II, Institute of Media and Communication, TU Dresden
Thomas Köhler, Professorship for Educational Technology, Institute for Vocational Education, TU Dresden
Holger Kuße,Chair of Linguistics and History of Slavonic Languages, Institute of Slavonic Studies, TU Dresden
Claudia Lange, Chair of English Linguistics, Institute of English and American Studies, TU Dresden
Rebecca Renatus, Institute of Media and Communication, TU Dresden
Anne Lauber-Rönsberg, Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Media Law, TU Dresden
Joachim Scharloth, Chair of Applied Linguistics, Institute of German Studies, TU Dresden
Eric Schoop, Chair of Business Informatics, esp Information Management, Faculty of Business and Economics
Marcel Thum, Chair of Public Economics, TU Dresden

Coordination: Dresden Center for Digital Linguistics, Joachim Scharloth, Noah Bubenhofer, Yvonne Krämer

Website: http://linguistik.zih.tu-dresden.de/digitization/
Email: summerschool.gsw@tu-dresden.de

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/digitization-and-its-impact-on-society

International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 2018

Admin — 2018-12-04T15:46:02Z

The event was co-organized by Feminist Approaches to Bioethics and Sama - A Resource Centre for Women and Health and was held at St. John's Medical College in Bangalore between December 3 and 5, 2018.

Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon participated in the event as speakers. Aayush presented a paper 'Sexual Surveillance and Data Regimes: Development in the Data Economy' co-authored by himself and Ambika.

Download the agenda

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/international-network-on-feminist-approaches-to-bioethics-2018

International human rights community vs SOPA

praskrishna — 2011-11-28T10:15:11Z

The Centre for Internet and Society was mentioned in a news story published in BoingBoing. Cory Doctorow wrote the story published on November 17, 2011.

An enormous, diverse global coalition of press freedom and human rights groups have signed onto a letter (PDF) opposing America's Stop Online Piracy Act, the worst proposed Internet law in the USA's legislative history. Included signatories are as varied as India's Center for Internet and Society, the Church of Sweden, Colombia's Karisma, the UK Open Rights Group, and Reporters Without Borders. The letter itself is a great piece of writing: "This is as unacceptable to the international community as it would be if a foreign country were to impose similar measures on the United States." (Thanks, Alan!)

Read the original published in BoingBoing here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/sopa

International Cooperation in Cybercrime: The Budapest Convention

vipul — 2019-04-29T22:35:37Z

In today’s increasingly digitized world where an increasing volume of information is being stored in the digital format, access to data generated by digital technologies and on digital platforms is important in solving crimes online and offline.

Click to download the file here

However, the global nature of the internet challenges traditional methods of law enforcement by forcing states to cooperate with each other for a greater variety and number of cases than ever before in the past. The challenges associated with accessing data across borders in order to be able to fully investigate crimes which may otherwise have no international connection forces states to think of easier and more efficient ways of international cooperation in criminal investigations. One such mechanism for international cooperation is the Convention on Cybercrime adopted in Budapest (“Budapest Convention”). Drafted by the Council of Europe along with Canada, Japan, South Africa and the United States of America it is the first and one of the most important multilateral treaties addressing the issue of cybercrime and international cooperation.^{^[1]}

Extradition

Article 24 of the Budapest Convention deals with the issue of extradition of individuals for offences specified in Articles 2 to 11 of the Convention. Since the Convention allows Parties to prescribe different penalties for the contraventions contained in Articles 2-11, it specifies that extradition cannot be asked for unless the crime committed by the individual carries a maximum punishment of deprivation of liberty for atleast one year.^{^[2]} In order to not complicate issues for Parties which may already have extradition treaties in place, the Convention clearly mentions that in cases where such treaties exist, extradition will be subject to the conditions provided for in such extradition treaties.^{^[3]} Although extradition is also subject to the laws of the requested Party, if the laws provide for the existence of an extradition treaty, such a requirement shall be deemed to be satisfied by considering the Convention as the legal basis for the extradition.^{^[4]} The Convention also specifies that the offences mentioned in Articles 2 to 11 shall be deemed to be included in existing extradition treaties and Parties shall include them in future extradition treaties to be executed.^{^[5]}

The Convention also recognises the principle of "aut dedere aut judicare" (extradite or prosecute) and provides that if a Party refuses to extradite an offender solely on the basis that it shall not extradite their own citizens,^{^[6]} then, if so requested, such Party shall prosecute the offender for the offences alleged in the same manner as if the person had committed a similar offence in the requested Party itself.^{^[7]} The Convention also requires the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to maintain an updated register containing the authorities designated by each of the Parties for making or receiving requests for extradition or provisional arrest in the absence of a treaty.^{^[8]}

Mutual Assistance Requests

The Convention imposes an obligation upon the Parties to provide mutual assistance “to the widest extent possible” for investigations or proceedings of criminal offences related to computer systems and data.^{^[9]} Just as in the case of extradition, the mutual assistance to be provided is also subject to the conditions prescribed by the domestic law of the Parties as well as mutual assistance treaties between the Parties.^{^[10]} However, it is in cases where no mutual assistance treaties exist between the Parties that the Convention tries to fill the lacuna and provide for a mechanism for mutual assistance.

The Convention requires each Party to designate an authority for the purpose of sending and answering mutual assistance requests from other Parties as well as transmitting the same to the relevant authority in their home country. Similar to the case of authorities for extradition, the Secretary General is required to maintain an updated register of the central authorities designated by each Party.^{^[11]} Recognising the fact that admissibility of the evidence obtained through mutual assistance in the domestic courts of the requesting Party is a major concern, the Convention provides that the mutual assistance requests are to be executed in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the requesting Party unless such procedures are incompatible with the laws of the requested Party.^{^[12]}

Parties are allowed to refuse a request for mutual assistance on the grounds that (i) the domestic laws of the requested party do not allow it to carry out the request;^{^[13]} (ii) the request concerns an offence considered as a political offence by the requested Party;^{^[14]} or (iii) in the opinion of the requested Party such a request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests.^{^[15]} The requested Party is also allowed to postpone any action on the request if it thinks that acting on the request would prejudice criminal investigations or proceedings by its own authorities.^{^[16]} In cases where assistance would be refused or postponed, the requested Party may consult with the other Party and consider whether partial or conditional assistance may be provided.^{^[17]}

In practice it has been found that though States refuse requests on a number of grounds,^{^[18]} some states even refuse cooperation in the event that the case is minor but requires an excessive burden on the requested state.^{^[19]} A case study of a true instance recounted below gives an idea of the effort and resources it may take for a requested state to carry out a mutual assistance request:

“In the beginning of 2005, a Norwegian citizen (let’s call him A.T.) attacked a bank in Oslo. He intended to steal money and he did so effectively. During his action, a police officer was killed. A.T. ran away and could not be found in Norway. Some days later, police found and searched his home and computer and discovered that A.T. was the owner of an email account from a provider in the United Kingdom. International co-operation was required from British authorities which asked the provider to put his email account under surveillance. One day, A.T. used his email account to send an email message. In the United Kingdom, police asked the ISP information about the IP address where the communication came from and it was found that it came from Spain.

British and Spanish authorities installed an alert system whose objective was to know, each time that A.T. used his email account, where he was. Thus, each time A.T. used his account, British police obtained the IP address of the computer in the origin of the communication and provided it immediately to Spanish police. Then, Spanish police asked the Spanish ISPs about the owner or user of the IP address. All the connexions were made from cybercafés in Madrid. Even proceeding to that area very quickly, during a long period of time it was not possible to arrive at those places before A.T. was gone.

Later, A.T. began to use his email account from a cybercafé in Malaga. This is a smaller town than Madrid and there it was possible to put all the cybercafés from a certain area permanently under physical surveillance. After some days of surveillance, British police announced that A.T. was online, using his email account, and provided the IP address. Very rapidly, the Spanish ISP informed Spanish police from the concrete location of the cybercafé what allowed the officers in the street to identify and arrest A.T. in place.

A.T. was extradited to Norway and prosecuted.”^{^[20]}

It is clear from the above that although the crime occurred in Norway, a lot of work was actually done by the authorities in the United Kingdom and Spain. In a serious case such as this where there was a bank robbery as well as a murder involved, the amount of effort expended by authorities from other states may be appropriate but it is unlikely that the authorities in Britain and Spain would have allocated such resources for a petty crime.

In sensitive cases where the requests have to be kept secret or confidential for any reason, the requesting Party has to specify that the request should be kept confidential except to the extent required to execute the request (such as disclosure in front of appropriate authorities to obtain the necessary permissions). In case confidentiality cannot be maintained the requested Party shall inform the requesting Party of this fact, which shall then take a decision regarding whether to withdraw the request or not.^{^[21]} On the other hand the requested Party may also make its supply of information conditional to it being kept confidential and that it not be used in proceedings or investigations other than those stated in the request.^{^[22]} If the requesting Party cannot comply with these conditions it shall inform the requested Party which will then decide whether to supply the information or not.^{^[23]}

In the normal course the Convention envisages requests being made and executed through the respective designated central authorities, however it also makes a provision, in urgent cases, for requests being made directly by the judicial authorities or even the Interpol.^{^[24]} Even in non urgent cases, if the authority of the requested Party is able to comply with the request without making use of coercive action, requests may be transmitted directly to the competent authority without the intervention of the central authority.^{^[25]}

The Convention clarifies that through these mutual assistance requests a Party may ask another to (i) either search, seize or disclose computer data within its territory,^{^[26]} (ii) provide real time collection of traffic data with specified communications in its territory;^{^[27]} and (iii) provide real time collection or recording of content data of specified communications.^{^[28]} The provision of mutual assistance specified above has to be in accordance with the domestic laws of the requested Party.

The procedure for sending mutual assistance requests under the Convention is usually the following:

Preparation of a request for mutual assistance by the prosecutor or enforcement agency which is responsible for an investigation.
Sending the request by the prosecutor or enforcement agency to the Central Authority for verification (and translation, if necessary).
The Central Authority then submits the request either, (i) to the foreign central authority, or (ii) directly to the requested judicial authority.

The following procedure is then followed in the corresponding receiving Party:

Receipt of the request by the Central Authority.
Central Authority then examines the request against formal and legal requirements (and translates it, if necessary).
Central Authority then transmits the request to the competent prosecutor or enforcement agency to obtain court order (if needed).
Issuance of a court order (if needed).
Prosecutor orders law enforcement (e.g. cybercrime unit) to obtain the requested data.
Data obtained is examined against the MLA request, which may entail translation or

using a specialist in the language.

The information is then transmitted to requesting State via MLA channels.^{^[29]}

In practice, the MLA process has generally been found to be inefficient and this inefficiency is even more pronounced with respect to electronic evidence. The general response times range from six months to two years and many requests (and consequently) investigations are often abandoned.^{^[30]} Further, the lack of awareness regarding procedure and applicable legislation of the requested State lead to formal requirements not being met. Requests are often incomplete or too broad; do not meet legal thresholds or the dual criminality requirement.^{^[31]}

Preservation Requests

The Budapest Convention recognises the fact that computer data is highly volatile and may be deleted, altered or moved, rendering it impossible to trace a crime to its perpetrator or destroying critical proof of guilt. The Convention therefore envisioned the concept of preservation orders which is a limited, provisional measure intended to take place much more rapidly than the execution of a traditional mutual assistance. Thus the Convention gives the Parties the legal ability to obtain the expeditious preservation of data stored in the territory of another (requested) Party, so that the data is not altered, removed or deleted during the time taken to prepare, transmit and execute a request for mutual assistance to obtain the data.

The Convention therefore provides that a Party may request another Party to obtain the expeditious preservation of specified computer data in respect of which such Party intends to submit a mutual assistance request. Once such a request is received the other Party has to take all appropriate measures to ensure compliance with such a request. The Convention also specifies that dual criminality is not a condition to comply with such requests for preservation of data since these are considered to be less intrusive than other measures such as seizure, etc.^{^[32]} However in cases where parties have a dual criminality requirement for providing mutual assistance they may refuse a preservation request on the ground that at the time of providing the data the dual criminality condition would not be met, although in regard to the offences covered under Articles 2 to 11 of the Convention, the requirement of dual criminality will be deemed to have been satisfied.^{^[33]} In addition to dual criminality a preservation request may also be refused on the grounds that (i) the offence alleged is a political offence; and (ii) execution of the request would likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of the requested Party.^{^[34]}

In case the requested Party feels that preservation will not ensure the future availability of the data or will otherwise prejudice the investigation, it shall promptly inform the requesting Party which shall then take a decision as to whether to ask for the preservation irrespective.^{^[35]} Preservation of the data pursuant to a request will be for a minimum period of 60 days and upon receipt of a mutual assistance request will continue to be preserved till a decision is taken on the mutual assistance request.^{^[36]} If the requested Party finds out in the course of executing the preservation request that the data has been transmitted through a third state or the requesting Party itself, it has a duty to inform the requesting Party of such facts as well as provide it with sufficient traffic data in order for it to be able to identify the service provider in the other state.^{^[37]}

Jurisdiction and Access to Stored Data

The problem of accessing data across international borders stems from the international law principle which provides that the authority to enforce (an action) on the territory of another State is permitted only if the latter provides consent for such behaviour. States that do not acquire such consent may therefore be acting contrary to the principle of non-intervention and may be in violation of the sovereignty of the other State.^{^[38]} The Convention specifies two situations in which a Party may access computer data stored in another Party’s jurisdiction; (i) when such data is publicly available; and (ii) when the Party has accessed such data located in another state through a computer system located in its own territory provided it has obtained the “lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system”.^{^[39]} These are two fairly obvious situations where a state should be allowed to use the computer data without asking another state, infact if a state was required to take the permission of the state in the territory of which the data was physically located even in these situations, then it would likely delay a large number of regular investigations where the data would otherwise be available but could not be legally used unless the other country provided it under the terms of the Convention or some other legal instrument. At the time of drafting the Convention it appears that Parties could not agree upon any other situations where it would be universally acceptable for a state to unilaterally access data located in another state, however it must be noted that other situations for unilaterally accessing data are neither authorized, nor precluded.^{^[40]}

Since the language of the Budapest Convention stopped shy of addressing other situations law enforcement agencies had been engaged in unilateral access to data stored in other jurisdictions on an uncertain legal basis risking the privacy rights of individuals raising concerns regarding national sovereignty.^{^[41]} It was to address this problem that the Cybercrime Committee established the “ad-hoc sub-group of the T-CY on jurisdiction and transborder access to data and data flows” (the “Transborder Group”) in November 2011 which came out with a Guidance Note clarigying the legal position under Article 32.

The Guidance Note # 3 on Article 32 by the Cybercrime Committee specifies that Article 32(b) would not cover situations where the data is not stored in another Party or where it is uncertain where the data is located. A Party is also not allowed to use Article 32(b) to obtain disclosure of data that is stored domestically. Since the Convention neither authorizes nor precludes other situations, therefore if it is unknown or uncertain that data is stored in another Party, Parties may need to evaluate themselves the legitimacy of a search or other type of access in the light of domestic law, relevant international law principles or considerations of international relations.^{^[42]} The Budapest Convention does not require notification to the other Party but parties are free to notify the other Party if they deem it appropriate.^{^[43]} The “voluntary and lawful consent” of the person means that the consent must be obtained without force or deception. Giving consent in order to avoid or reduce criminal charges would also constitute lawful and voluntary consent. If cooperation in a criminal investigation requires explicit consent in a Party, this requirement would not be fulfilled by agreeing to the general terms and conditions of an online service, even if the terms and conditions indicate that data would be shared with criminal justice authorities.^{^[44]}

The person who is lawfully authorized to give consent is unlikely to include service providers with respect to their users’ data. This is because normally service providers would only be holders of the data, they would not own or control the data and therefore cannot give valid consent to share the data.^{^[45]} The Guidance Note also specifies that with respect to the location of the person providing access or consent, while the standard assumption is that the person would be physically located in the requesting Party however there may be other situations, “It is conceivable that the physical or legal person is located in the territory of the requesting law enforcement authority when agreeing to disclose or actually providing access, or only when agreeing to disclose but not when providing access, or the person is located in the country where the data is stored when agreeing to disclose and/or providing access. The person may also be physically located in a third country when agreeing to cooperate or when actually providing access. If the person is a legal person (such as a private sector entity), this person may be represented in the territory of the requesting law enforcement authority, the territory hosting the data or even a third country at the same time.” Parties are also required to take into account the fact that third Parties may object (and some even consider it a criminal offence) if a person physically located in their territory is directly approached by a foreign law enforcement authority to seek his or her cooperation.^{^[46]}

Production Order

A similar problem arises in case of Article 18 of the Convention which requires Parties to put in place procedural provisions to compel a person in their territory to provide specified stored computer data, or a service provider offering services in their territory to submit subscriber information.^{^[47]} It must be noted here, that the data in question must be already stored or existing data, which implies that this provision does not cover data that has not yet come into existence such as traffic data or content data related to future communications.^{^[48]} Since the term used in this provision is that the data must be within the “possession or control” of the person or the service provider, therefore this provision is also capable of being used to access data stored in the territory of a third party as long as the data is within the possession and control of the person on whom the Production Order has been served. In this regard it must be noted that the Article makes a distinction between computer data and subscriber information and specifies that computer data can only be asked for from a person (including a service provider) located within the territory of the ordering Party even if the data is stored in the territory of a third Party.^{^[49]} However subscriber information^{^[50]} can be ordered only from a service provider even if the service provider is not located within the territory of the ordering Party as long as it is offering its services in the territory of that Party and the subscriber information relates to the service offered in the ordering Party’s territory.^{^[51]}

Since the power under Article 18 is a domestic power which potentially can be used to access subscriber data located in another State, the use of this Article may raise complicated jurisdictional issues. This combined with the growth of cloud computing and remote data storage also raises concerns regarding privacy and data protection, the jurisdictional basis pertaining to services offered without the service provider being established in that territory, as well as access to data stored in foreign jurisdictions or in unknown or multiple locations “within the cloud”.^{^[52]} Even though some of these issues require further discussions and a more nuanced treatment, the Cybercrime Committee felt the need to issue a Guidance Note to Article 18 in order to avoid some of the confusion regarding the implementation of this provision.

Article 18(1)(b) may include a situation where a service provider is located in one jurisdiction, but stores the data in another jurisdiction. Data may also be mirrored in several jurisdictions or move between jurisdictions without the knowledge or control of the subscriber. In this regard the Guidance Note points out that legal regimes increasingly recognize that, both in the criminal justice sphere and in the privacy and data protection sphere, the location of the data is not the determining factor for establishing jurisdiction.^{^[53]}

The Guidance Note further tries to clarify the term “offering services in its territory” by saying that Parties may consider that a service provider is offering services if: (i) the service provider enables people in the territory of the Party to subscribe to its services (and does not, for example, block access to such services); and (ii) the service provider has established a real and substantial connection that Party. Relevant factors to determine whether such a connection has been established include “the extent to which a service provider orients its activities toward such subscribers (for example, by providing local advertising or advertising in the language of the territory of the Party), makes use of the subscriber information (or associated traffic data) in the course of its activities, interacts with subscribers in the Party, and may otherwise be considered established in the territory of a Party”.^{^[54]} A service provider will not be presumed to be offering services within the territory of a Party just because it uses a domain name or email address connected to that country.^{^[55]} The Guidance Note provides a very elegant tabular illustration of its requirements to serve a valid Production Order on a service provider:^{^[56]}

PRODUCTION ORDER CAN BE SERVED
IF The criminal justice authority has jurisdiction over the offence
AND The service provider is in possession or control of the subscriber information
AND
The service provider is in the territory of the Party (Article 18(1)(a))	Or	A Party considers that a service provider is “offering its services in the territory of the Party” when, for example: - the service provider enables persons in the territory of the Party to subscribe to its services (and does not, for example, block access to such services); and - the service provider has established a real and substantial connection to a Party. Relevant factors include the extent to which a service provider orients its activities toward such subscribers (for example, by providing local advertising or advertising in the language of the territory of the Party), makes use of the subscriber information (or associated traffic data) in the course of its activities, interacts with subscribers in the Party, and may otherwise be considered established in the territory of a Party. (Article 18(1)(b))
AND
		the subscriber information to be submitted is relating to services of a provider offered in the territory of the Party.

The existing processes for accessing data across international borders, whether through MLATs or through the mechanism established under the Budapest Convention are clearly too slow to be a satisfactory long term solution. It is precisely for that reason that the Cybercrime Committee has suggested alternatives to the existing mechanism such as granting access to data without consent in certain specific emergency situations;^{^[57]} or access to data stored in another country through a computer in its own territory provided the credentials for such access are obtained through lawful investigative activities.^{^[58]} Another option suggested by the Cybercrime Committee is to look beyond the principle of territoriality, specially in light of the recent developments in cloud computing where the location of the data may not be certain or data may be located in multiple locations,^{^[59]} and look at a connecting legal factor as an alternative such as the “power of disposal”. This option implies that even if the location of the data cannot be determined it can be connected to the person having the power to “alter, delete, suppress or render unusable as well as the right to exclude other from access and any usage whatsoever”.^{^[60]}

Language of Requests

It was found from practice that the question of the language in which the mutual assistance requests were made was a big issue in most States since it created problems such as delays due to translations, costly translations, quality of translations, etc. The Cybercrime Committee therefore suggested that an additional protocol be added to the Budapest Convention to stipulate that requests sent by Parties should be accepted in English atleast in urgent cases since most States accepted a request in English.^{^[61]} Due to these problems associated with the language of assistance requests, the Cybercrime Convention Committee has already released a provisional draft Additional Protocol to address the issue of language of mutual assistance requests for public comments.^{^[62]}

24/7 Network

Parties are required to designate a point of contact available on a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a week basis, in order to ensure the provision of immediate assistance for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence, in electronic form, of a criminal offence. The point of contact for each Party is required to have the capacity to carry out communications with the points of contact for any other Party on an expedited basis. It is the duty of the Parties to ensure that trained and properly equipped personnel are available in order to facilitate the operation of the network.^{^[63]} The Parties recognized that establishment of this network is among the most important means provided by the Convention of ensuring that Parties can respond effectively to the law enforcement challenges posed by computer-or computer-related crimes.^{^[64]} In practice however it has been found that in a number of Parties there seems to be a disconnect between the 24/7 point of contact and the MLA request authorities leading to situations where the contact points may not be informed about whether preservation requests are followed up by MLA authorities or not.^{^[65]}

Drawbacks and Improvements

The Budapest Convention, whilst being the most comprehensive and widely accepted document on international cooperation in the field of cybercrime, has its own share of limitations and drawbacks. Some of the major limitations which can be gleaned from the discussion above (and potential recommendations for the same) are listed below:

Weakness and Delays in Mutual Assistance: In practice it has been found that though States refuse requests on a number of grounds,^{^[66]} some states even refuse cooperation in the event that the case is minor but requires an excessive burden on the requested state. Further, the delays associated with the mutual assistance process are another major hurdle, and are perhaps the reason by police-to-police cooperation for the sharing of data related to cybercrime and e-evidence is much more frequent than mutual legal assistance.^{^[67]} The lack of regulatory and legal awareness often leads to procedural lapses due to which requests do not meet legal thresholds. More training, more information on requirements to be met and standardised and multilingual templates for requests may be a useful tool to address this concern.

Access to data stored outside the territory: Access to data located in another country without consent of the authorities in that country poses another challenge. The age of cloud computing with processes of data duplication and delocalisation of data have added a new dimension to this problem.^{^[68]} It is precisely for that reason that the Cybercrime Committee has suggested alternatives to the existing mechanism such as granting access to data without consent in certain specific emergency situations;^{^[69]} or access to data stored in another country through a computer in its own territory provided the credentials for such access are obtained through lawful investigative activities.^{^[70]} Another option suggested by the Cybercrime Committee is to look beyond the principle of territoriality and look at a connecting legal factor as an alternative such as the “power of disposal”.

Language of requests: Language of requests create a number of problems such as delays due to translations, cost of translations, quality of translations, etc. Due to these problems, the Cybercrime Convention Committee has already released for public comment, a provisional draft Additional Protocol to address the issue.^{^[71]}

Bypassing of 24/7 points of contact: Although 24/7 points have been set up in most States, it has been found that there is often a disconnect between the 24/7 point of contact and the MLA request authorities leading to situations where the contact points may not be informed about whether preservation requests are followed up by MLA authorities or not.^{^[72]}

India and the Budapest Convention

Although countries outside the European Union have the option on signing the Budapest Convention and getting onboard the international cooperation mechanism envisaged therein, India has so far refrained from signing the Budapest Convention. The reasons for this refusal appear to be as follows:

India did not participate in the drafting of the treaty and therefore should not sign. This concern, while valid is not a consistent foreign policy stand that India has taken for all treaties, since India has signed other treaties, where it had no hand in the initial drafting and negotiations.^{^[73]}
Article 32(b) of the Budapest Convention involves tricky issues of national sovereignty since it allows for cross border access to data without the consent of the other party. Although, as discussed above, the Guidance Note on Article 32 clarified this issue to an extent, it appears that arguments have been raised in some quarters of the government that the options provided by Article 32 are too limited and additional means may be needed to deal with cross border data access.^{^[74]}
The mutual legal assistance framework under the Convention is not effective enough and the promise of cooperation is not firm enough since States can refuse to cooperate on a number of grounds.^{^[75]}
It is a criminal justice treaty and does not cover state actors; further the states from which most attacks affecting India are likely to emanate are not signatories to the Convention either.^{^[76]}
Instead of joining the Budapest Convention, India should work for and promote a treaty at the UN level.^{^[77]}

Although in January 2018 there were a number of news reports indicating that India is seriously considering signing the Budapest Convention and joining the international cooperation mechanism under it, there have been no updates on the status of this proposal.^{^[78]}

Conclusion

The Budapest Convention has faced a number of challenges over the years as far as provisions regarding international cooperation are concerned. These include delays in getting responses from other states, requests not being responded to due to various reasons (language, costs, etc.), requests being overridden by mutual agreements, etc. The only other alternative which is the MLAT system is no better due to delays in providing access to requested data.^{^[79]} This however does not mean that international cooperation through the Budapest Convention is always late and inefficient, as was evident from the example of the Norwegian bank robber-murderer given above. There is no doubt that the current mechanisms are woefully inadequate to deal with the challenges of cyber crime and even regular crimes (specially in the financial sector) which may involve examination of electronic evidence. However that does not mean the end of the road for the Budapest Convention, one has to recognize the fact that it is the pre-eminent document on international cooperation on electronic evidence with 62 State Parties as well as another 10 Observer States. Any mechanism which offers a solution to the thorny issues of international cooperation in the field of cyber crime would require most of the nations of the world to sign up to it; till such time that happens, expanding the scope of the Budapest Convention to address atleast some of the issues discussed above by leveraging the work already done by the Cybercrime Committee through various reports and Guidance Notes (some of which have been referenced in this paper itself) may be a good option as this could be an incentive for non signatories to become parties to a better and more efficient Budapest Convention providing a more robust international cooperation regime.

^{^[1]} Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b, para 304.

^{^[2]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 24(1)(a). Except in cases where a different minimum threshold has been provided by a mutual arrangement, in which case such other minimum threshold shall be applied.

^{^[3]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 24(5).

^{^[4]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 24(3).

^{^[5]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 24(2).

^{^[6]} Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Para 304, https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b, para 251.

^{^[7]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 24(6).

^{^[8]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 24(7).

^{^[9]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 25(1).

^{^[10]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 25(4).

^{^[11]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(2).

^{^[12]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(3) read with para 267 of the Explanatory Note to the Budapest Convention.

^{^[13]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 25(4).

^{^[14]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(4)(a).

^{^[15]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(4)(b).

^{^[16]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(5).

^{^[17]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(6).

^{^[18]} Some of the grounds listed by Parties for refusal are: (i) grounds listed in Article 27 of the Convention, (ii) the request does not meet formal or other requirements, (iii) the request is motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, political opinion or similar, (iv) the request concerns a political or military offence, (v) Cooperation may lead to torture or death penalty, (vi) Granting the request would prejudice sovereignty, security, public order or national interest or other essential interests, (vii) the person has already been punished or acquitted or pardoned for the same offence “Ne bis in idem”, (viii) the investigation would impose an excessive burden on the requested State or create practical difficulties, (ix) Granting the request would interfere in an ongoing investigation (in which case the execution of the request may be postponed). Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 34.

^{^[19]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 34.

^{^[20]} Pedro Verdelho, Discussion Paper: The effectiveness of international cooperation against cybercrime: examples of good practice, 2008, pg. 5, https://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/T-CY/DOC-567study4-Version7_en.PDF, accessed on March 28, 2019.

^{^[21]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(8).

^{^[22]} However, disclosure of the material to the defence and the judicial authorities is an implicit exception to this rule. Further the ability to use the material in a trial (which is generally a public proceeding) is also a recognised exception to the right to limit usage of the material. See para 278 of the the Explanatory Note to the Budapest Convention.

^{^[23]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 28.

^{^[24]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(9)(a) and (b).

^{^[25]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 27(9)(d) read with para 274 of the Explanatory Note to the Budapest Convention.

^{^[26]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 31.

^{^[27]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 33.

^{^[28]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 34.

^{^[29]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 37.

^{^[30]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 123.

^{^[31]} Ibid at 124.

^{^[32]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 29(3) read with para 285 of the Explanatory Note to the Budapest Convention.

^{^[33]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 29(4).

^{^[34]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 29(5).

^{^[35]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 29(6).

^{^[36]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 29(7).

^{^[37]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 30.

^{^[38]} Anna-Maria Osula, Accessing Extraterritorially Located Data: Options for States, http://ccdcoe.eu/uploads/2018/10/Accessing-extraterritorially-located-data-options-for-States_Anna-Maria_Osula.pdf, accessed on March 28, 2019.

^{^[39]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 32.

^{^[40]} Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Para 304, https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b, para 293.

^{^[41]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee, Report of the Transborder Group, Transborder access and jurisdiction: What are the options?, December 2012, para 310.

^{^[42]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note # 3, Transborder access to data (Article 32), para 3.2.

^{^[43]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note # 3, Transborder access to data (Article 32), para 3.3.

^{^[44]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note # 3, Transborder access to data (Article 32), para 3.4.

^{^[45]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note # 3, Transborder access to data (Article 32), para 3.6.

^{^[46]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note # 3, Transborder access to data (Article 32), para 3.8.

^{^[47]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 18.

^{^[48]} Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Para 304, https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b, para 170.

^{^[49]} Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Para 304, https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b, para 173.

^{^[50]} Defined in Article 18(3) as “any information contained in the form of computer data or any other form that is held by a service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content data and by which can be established:

a. the type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of service;

b. the subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement;

c. any other information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement.

^{^[51]} Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Para 304, https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b, para 173.

^{^[52]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note #10, Production orders for subscriber information (Article 18 Budapest Convention), at pg.3.

^{^[53]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note #10, Production orders for subscriber information (Article 18 Budapest Convention), para 3.5 at pg. 7.

^{^[54]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note #10, Production orders for subscriber information (Article 18 Budapest Convention), para 3.6 at pg. 8.

^{^[55]} Id.

^{^[56]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Guidance Note #10, Production orders for subscriber information (Article 18 Budapest Convention), para 3.8 at pg. 9.

^{^[57]} Situations such as preventions of imminent danger, physical harm, the escape of a suspect or similar situations including risk of destruction of relevant evidence.

^{^[58]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee, Subgroup on Transborder Access, (Draft) Elements of an Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime Regarding Transborder Access to Data, April 2013, pg. 49.

^{^[59]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee Cloud Evidence Group, Criminal justice access to data in the cloud: challenges (Discussion paper), May 2015, pgs 10-14.

^{^[60]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee, Subgroup on Transborder Access, (Draft) Elements of an Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime Regarding Transborder Access to Data, April 9, 2013, pg. 50.

^{^[61]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 35.

^{^[62]} https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/-/towards-a-protocol-to-the-budapest-convention-further-consultatio-1

^{^[63]} Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, Article 35.

^{^[64]} Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Para 304, https://rm.coe.int/16800cce5b, para 298.

^{^[65]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 86.

^{^[66]} Some of the grounds listed by Parties for refusal are: (i) grounds listed in Article 27 of the Convention, (ii) the request does not meet formal or other requirements, (iii) the request is motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, political opinion or similar, (iv) the request concerns a political or military offence, (v) Cooperation may lead to torture or death penalty, (vi) Granting the request would prejudice sovereignty, security, public order or national interest or other essential interests, (vii) the person has already been punished or acquitted or pardoned for the same offence “Ne bis in idem”, (viii) the investigation would impose an excessive burden on the requested State or create practical difficulties, (ix) Granting the request would interfere in an ongoing investigation (in which case the execution of the request may be postponed). Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 34.

^{^[67]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 7.

^{^[68]} Giovanni Buttarelli, Fundamental Legal Principles for a Balanced Approach, Selected papers and contributions from the International Conference on “Cybercrime: Global Phenomenon and its Challenges”, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy available at ispac.cnpds.org/download.php?fld=pub_files&f=ispacottobre2012bassa.pdf

^{^[69]} Situations such as preventions of imminent danger, physical harm, the escape of a suspect or similar situations including risk of destruction of relevant evidence.

^{^[70]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee, Subgroup on Transborder Access, (Draft) Elements of an Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime Regarding Transborder Access to Data, April 2013, pg. 49.

^{^[71]} https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/-/towards-a-protocol-to-the-budapest-convention-further-consultatio-1

^{^[72]} Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee assessment report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, December 2014, pg. 86.

^{^[73]} Dr. Anja Kovaks, India and the Budapest Convention - To Sign or not? Considerations for Indian Stakeholders, available at https://internetdemocracy.in/reports/india-and-the-budapest-convention-to-sign-or-not-considerations-for-indian-stakeholders/

^{^[74]} Alexander Seger, India and the Budapest Convention: Why not?, Digital Debates: The CyFy Journal, Vol III, available at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-the-budapest-convention-why-not/

^{^[75]} Id.

^{^[76]} Id.

^{^[77]} Id.

^{^[78]} https://indianexpress.com/article/india/home-ministry-pitches-for-budapest-convention-on-cyber-security-rajnath-singh-5029314/

^{^[79]} Elonnai Hickok and Vipul Kharbanda, Cross Border Cooperation on Criminal Matters - A perspective from India, available at https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cross-border-cooperation-on-criminal-matters

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/vipul-kharbanda-april-29-2019-international-cooperation-in-cybercrime-the-budapest-convention

International Conference on Mobile Law

praskrishna — 2012-04-03T08:24:37Z

Pranesh Prakash spoke in the panel on Mobiles - Privacy and Social Media on March 1, 2012.

Draft Agenda

March 1, 2012

9:00am to 9:30am	Registration
9:30am to 10:45am	Inauguration Session
10:45am to 11:15am	Icml Tea
11:15am to 11:45am	Session I: Mobile law- An introduction
11:45am to 1:15pm	Session II: Mobile Revolution, Mcommerce and Crimes
1:15pm to 2:00pm	Icml Lunch
2:00pm to 3:15pm	Session III: Mobiles - Privacy & Social Media
3:15pm to 3:30pm	Icml Tea
3:30pm to 4:45pm	Session IV: Mobiles & Security
4:45pm to 6:00pm	Session V: Safe Harbour Protection for Mobiles Service Providers In India

March 2, 2012

9:30am to 11:00am	Session VI-Mobile Banking & Payments
11:00am to 11:30am	Icml Tea
11:30 am to 12:15pm	Session VII: Mobile Law Challenges in India
12:15pm to 1:30pm	Icml Lunch
1:30pm to 2:15pm	Session VIII: Mobile Governance
2:15pm to 3:30pm	Icml Tea
3:30pm to 3:45pm	Session IX: Internet Governance In The Mobile Ecosystem
3:45pm to 5:00pm	Session X : 2G Spectrum Allocation: Post Supreme Court Judgment- Challenges & Opportunities
5:00pm	Valedictory Function

Read the original here

Venue: ASSOCHAM House, 47, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi, India

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/intl-conferernce-on-mobile-law

International Conference on Justice Education:Legal Implications of Artificial Intelligence

Admin — 2019-03-20T15:52:29Z

Arindrajit Basu attended the International Conference on Justice Education with the theme "Artificial Intelligence and its Legal Implications" at Institute of Law Nirma University. The event was organized by Nirma University in Ahmedabad on March 15 - 16, 2019. Arindrajit was a theme speaker for the panel on Legal Implications of Artificial Intelligence and was a judge of the presentations in the same session.

Click to read the agenda

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/international-conference-on-justice-education-legal-implications-of-artificial-intelligence

International Conference on Cyberlaw & Cybercrime

praskrishna — 2014-04-04T08:56:42Z

The International Conference on Cyberlaw and Cybercrime will take place on March 13, 2014. The event is organized by Cyberlaws.net and Pawan Duggal Associates. Sunil Abraham is participating in the event as a panelist.

Read more on the conference on cybercrime.com. For speakers list click here.

The objectives of the International Conference on #Cyberlaw & #Cybercrime are as follows:

To identify the emerging #Cyberlaw trends and jurisprudence impacting #cyberspace in today’s scenario.
To create far more awareness about the newly emerging kinds of #cybercrimes that are impacting all stakeholders in the digital and mobile ecosystem.
To identify the areas in #cyber crimes where #Cyberlaw needs to be further evolved so as to meet with the expectation and needs of the relevant stakeholders of the digital and #mobile ecosystem.
To work in the direction of creating an international network of #cybercrimes and cyber-legal law professionals which could then be an important voice in the further development of #cybercrimes and #Cyberlaw jurisprudence across the world.

The International Conference on #Cyberlaw & #Cybercrime will look at the emerging legal, policy and regulatory issues pertaining to cyberspace and #cybercrimes.

Cyber crimes are now beginning to impact corporates in their new avatar. What are the major international Cyberlaw and #Cybercrime trends? What kind of new manifestations of #cybercrimes are beginning to emerge that corporate need to be careful of? What international best practices need to be kept in mind by corporates for protecting themselves from being victims of #cybercrimes? What kind of overall anti-cybercrime strategies do corporates need to have in place? These and a variety of other issues are sought to be addressed in the International Conference on #Cyberlaw & #Cybercrime.

Agenda

8:00 am – 9:00 am	Registration/Collection of Badges
9:00 am – 10:15 am	Pavan Duggal President, Cyberlaws.Net & Advocate, Supreme Court of India Inaugural of the Conference and Inaugural Address: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Madan B Lokur, Hon’ble Judge, Supreme Court of India Address: P K Malhotra, Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India Prof. Antonino Zichichi President of World Federation of Scientists (WFS) Steve Crocker, Chairman, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN)
10:15 am – 10:30 am	Networking Tea
10:30 am – 11:45 am	Session I- What You Need To Know About Cyberlaw Today? (Cyberlaw-Existing Cyber Legal Issues, Regimes & Challenges) Pavan Duggal President, Cyberlaws.Net & Advocate, Supreme Court of India Dr. Henning Wegener, Chairman, Permanent Monitoring Panel on Information Security, World Federation of Scientists, Geneva Shri T A Khan, Controller of Certifying Authorities
11:45 am to 1:15 pm	Session II- Is Cyber Security A Fad or Do We Need To Be Concerned? (Cyber Security- Cyberlaw & Cybercrime) Dr. Gulshan Rai Director General, CERT-In Jagdish Mahapatra, MD, India & SAARC McAfee Prof. Rajat Moona Director General, C-DAC Vijay Sethi, CIO & Vice President Information Systems, Hero MotoCorp Ltd Prasanto Roy, Chief Editor of the ICT group of CyberMedia Subramanian Chandrasekhar Group Director Government Affairs Microsoft India Aditya Mishra, Inspector General Border Security Force Ram Mohan Executive Vice President & Chief Technology Officer, Afilias Limited Subimal Bhattacharjee, Former Country Head, General Dynamics & Cyber Security Professional
1:15 pm to 2:00 pm	Networking Lunch & Luncheon Addresses
	Session III- Cybercrime, Cybercrime Everywhere, Not Many Convictions in Sight (Cybercrime In The Digital And Mobile Ecosystem – Issues concerning Detection, Investigation And Prosecution Of Cybercrimes) Laurel G. Bellows, Immediate Past President, American Bar Association Navneet R Wasan, Additional Director General at National Investigation Agency Loknath Behra, IGP Bureau of Police Research and Development, India Muktesh Chander, Joint Commissioner of Police Alok Vijayant, Director, IDG, NTRO Dr. Arun Mohan, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India Rajiv Prakash Saxena Deputy Director General NIC Dr. Raymond Choo, PhD in Information Security Roland Trope, Partner- Trope and Schramm LLP. Felix Mohan, Former CISO, Airtel
3:15 pm to 3:30 pm	Networking Tea
3:30 pm to 4:45 pm	Session IV- As Corporates & Intermediaries, How Much Are We Liable Today For Third Party Data? (Liabilities of Intermediaries, Service Providers and Corporates in today’s scenario- The Current and Future Paths) Hon’ble Mr. Justice (Retd.) Rajesh Tandon, Former Chairperson, Cyber Appellate Tribunal Rajesh Agarwal, IT Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra Rajesh Chharia President ISPAI Abhilash Nair, Northumbria University Sunil Abraham Executive Director the Centre for Internet and Society Dr. H K Hirve, CGM DIT, Reserve Bank of India, (RBI) Anja Kovacs, researcher and activist, and Director of the Internet Democracy
4:45pm to 5:55pm	Address by Mr. Mohan Parasaran, Solicitor General of India
4:55 pm to 6:25 pm	Session V- Crystal Gazing All To The horizon – What we need to be prepared regarding Cyberlaw & Cybercrime (Emerging Trends Concerning Cyberlaw & Cybercrime – The Way Forward) Prof. (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, Founder Vice-Chancellor of National Law University, Delhi Giancarlo Frosio, SJD, Intermediary Liability Fellow, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School Markus Kummer Vice President, Public Policy Elizabeth T. Ploshay, Manager of Communications at Bitcoin Magazine Dhrupad Mathur, Director, Industry Interface and Associate Professor, Information Technology S P Jain School of Global Management – Dubai, Singapore, Sydney Dr. Hemant Darbari, Executive Director, Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) Prof. Rajni Jindal, Dean, Research and Collaboration and Head, Indira Gandhi Delhi Technical University for Women (IGDTUW) Dr. Govind, CEO, National Internet Exchange of India Jagdish Mahapatra, MD, India & SAARC McAfee Saket Modi, CEO, Lucideus Tech Private Limited Usha Ramanathan, Independent Law Researcher and Magsasay Award Winner R M Aggarwal, DDG DOT Tulika Pandey Additional Director, Government of India, Ministry of Communications & Department of Information Technology Prasanto Roy, Chief Editor of the ICT group of Cyber Media Navin Chopra, CEO Agile Group Deepak Maheshwari, Public Policy professional Pavan Duggal President, Cyberlaws.Net & Advocate, Supreme Court of India
	Summing up of the Conference – Mr. Pavan Duggal President, Cyberlaws.Net & Advocate, Supreme Court of India Valedictory Address by Shri J. Satyanarayana, Secretary, Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India
6:45 pm to 7:30 pm	Vote of Thanks & High Tea

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/intl-conference-cyberlaw-crime

International Communication Association Pre-Conference on 'India and Communication Studies'

sachia — 2011-04-02T15:56:35Z

Sunil Abraham, Director-Policy, CIS, is to take part in a panel discussion on 'Media, Technology, and Governance' at the International Communication Association Pre-Conference on 'India and Communication Studies' on 21 May 2009, 1.00-2.15 pm.

PRECONFERENCE #2

Sponsored by the Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University for Pennsylvania, and Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi

Title: India and Communication Studies

Time: Wednesday, May 20, 13:00 – 19:00 and
Thursday, May 21, 8:00 – 17:00

Limit: 50 persons

Cost: $100.00USD (Includes refreshment breaks, lunch and reception)
$50.00USD Students

Organizers:

• Monroe Price, Director, Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania
• Biswajit Das, Director, Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi
• Aswin Punathambekar, Assistant Professor, Communication Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
• Radhika Parameswaran, Associate Professor, School of Journalism, Indiana University, Bloomington

Overview:

India plays an increasingly important role in the processes of globalization, including the global production of culture and the communications technology industry. At the same time, the field of communication studies in India is expanding. Yet there is no Indian Communications Association and little in the way of considered and formal review of contributions to the field.

This pre-conference is an effort to create a new coherence and a new salience for this subject by mapping the area of communication and culture studies in India; to strengthen ties among leading and emerging scholars and institutions in India and elsewhere; to develop and cultivate a research agenda for the field; and to explore the creation of an Indian Communication Studies Association.

The pre-conference will take place over 2 days. The first day will be dedicated to paper presentations from emerging scholars on a diverse range of issues, including media and cultural representations, gender, minorities, issues of nationalism and culture, and structural questions of governance.

The second day will be centered around three panels, which will address the development of communication studies in India; issues of technology, governance and development; and a discussion of scholarship about India. The organized panels will draw from academia, business, civil society, and government/policy-making circles.
Schedule for India and Communication Studies ICA Pre-Conference:

May 20 (Day One):

13.00 – 13.15 Opening Remarks, Monroe Price and organizers
13.15 – 14.30 Paper presentations: Session 1
14.30 – 15.45 Paper presentations: Session 2
15.45 – 16.00 Break
16.00 – 17.15 Paper presentations: Session 3

Moderators for paper sessions: TBC

17.30 – 19.00 Reception for pre-conference participants and guests

May 21 (Day Two):

8.00 – 9.00: Breakfast for pre-conference participants

9.00 – 10.15 Opening Keynote Discussion -- India and Cultural Pathways: Reflections on Identity, History and Scholarship:

The opening keynote will address the history of communications/media studies in and about India, placing it in the broader context of global communication studies and globalization and international relations.

• Biswajit Das, Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia University
• Radhika Gajjala, Bowling Green University
• Sevanti Ninan, Honorary Secretary, The Media Foundation (TBC)
• Arvind Singhal, University of Texas (TBC)
• Daya Thussu, University of Westminster

Moderator: Monroe Price, Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania

10.15 – 10.30 – Coffee Break

10.30 -- 11.45 Panel One: The Complex Challenge of Developing Communications Studies in India

This panel will seek to begin mapping the intellectual network of scholars that has informed communications scholarship in and about India. Panelists will discuss the history and development of "Indian" communication studies, including the approaches taken towards this subject; the competition between production and commercial goals and theoretical study; and the institutional and other pressures and challenges encountered by emerging programs..

• Biswajit Das, Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia University
• Vinod Pavarala, University of Hyderabad
• Anjali Monteiro, Tata Institute of Social Sciences
• Atul Tandon, MICA
• Peng Hwa Ang, MICORE

Moderator: Noshir Contractor, Northwestern University

11.45 – 13.00 –Lunch

13.00 – 14.15 Panel Two: "Media, Technology & Governance"

This panel will be approached through cases as presented by the panelists. It seeks to (a) open the door to the growing work on the IT industry and ICT for Development; and (b) outline a tighter set of analytics to encourage a stronger connection between academic research & public policy in India.

• David Page or William Crawley (TBC), Media South Asia Project, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University, UK
• Victoria Farmer, Department of Political Science and International Relations SUNY-Geneseo
• Steve McDowell, Department of Communication, Florida State University
• Sunil Abraham, Director (Policy), Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore

Moderator: Vibodh Parthasarathi, Associate Professor, Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia University

14.15 – 14.30 Coffee Break

14.30 – 15.45 Panel Three: Nodes of Contact: How to Map Scholarship about India

This panel aims to map the intellectual patterns and trajectories in media and communications scholarship on India. Panelists will address specific areas within communications research--gender and interdisciplinarity, new media, diaspora, television, and media production and reception--to chart and analyze the theoretical and empirical terrain that scholars have covered, and to suggest new and productive directions for future research.

• Radha Hegde, Department of Media, Culture, and Communication, New York University
• Shanti Kumar, Department of Radio-Television-Film, The University of Texas at Austin
• William Mazzarella, University of Chicago
• Ananda Mitra, Department of Communication, Wake Forest University
• Hemant Shah, School of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Moderator: Radhika Parameswaran, School of Journalism, Indiana University

15.45 – 16.15 Concluding Remarks and Wrap-up

This last part of the ICA Pre-Conference Program will feature open discussion and commentary from the organizers and audience.

For more information about this pre-conference, please contact Susan Abbott, Associate Director, Center for Global Communication Studies: sabbott@asc.upenn.edu

-----

Click here to read this information on the ICA website.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ica-preconference

Intermediary Liability Resources

elonnai — 2014-07-03T06:45:48Z

We bring you a list of intermediary resources as part of research on internet governance. This blog post will be updated on an ongoing basis.

Shielding the Messengers: Protecting Platforms for Expression and Innovation. The Centre for Democracy and Technology. December 2012, available at: https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Intermediary-Liability-2012.pdf: This paper analyses the impact that intermediary liability regimes have on freedom of expression, privacy, and innovation. In doing so, the paper highlights different models of intermediary liability regimes, reviews different technological means of restricting access to content, and provides recommendations for intermediary liability regimes and provides alternative ways of addressing illegal content online.
Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability: Article 19. 2013, available at: http://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf:This Policy Document reviews different components of intermediary liability and highlights the challenges and risks that current models of liability have to online freedom of expression. Relying on international standards for freedom of expression and comparative law, the document includes recommendations and alternative models that provide stronger protection for freedom of expression. The key recommendation in the document include: web hosting providers or hosts should be immune from liability to third party content if they have not modified the content, privatised enforcement should not be a model and removal orders should come only from courts or adjudicatory bodies, the model of notice to notice should replace notice and takedown regimes, in cases of alleged serious criminality clear conditions should be in place and defined.
Comparative Analysis of the National Approaches to the Liability of Internet Intermediaries: Prepared by Daniel Seng for WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf:This Report reviews the intermediary liability regimes and associated laws in place across fifteen different contexts with a focus on civil copyright liability for internet intermediaries. The Report seeks to find similarities and differences across the regimes studied and highlight principles and components in different that can be used in international treaties and instruments, upcoming policies, and court decisions.
Freedom of Expression, Indirect Censorship, & Liability for Internet Intermediaries. The Electronic Frontier Foundation. February 2011, available at: http://infojustice.org/download/tpp/tpp-civil-society/EFF%20presentation%20ISPs%20and%20Freedom%20of%20Expression.pdf:This presentation was created for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Stakeholder Forum in Chile and highlights that for freedom of expression to be protected, clear legal protections for internet intermediaries are needed and advocates for a regime that provides blanket immunity to intermediaries or is based on judicial takedown notices.
Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries. Contracted by the European Commission. 2007, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf. This Report provides insight on the application of the intermediary liability sections of the EU e-commerce directive and studies the impact of the regulations under the Directive on the functioning of intermediary information society services. To achieve this objective, the study identifies relavant case law across member states, calls out and evaluates developing trends across Member States, and draws conclusions.
Internet Intermediary Liability: Identifying Best Practices for Africa. Nicolo Zingales for the Association for Progressive Communications, available at: https://www.apc.org/en/system/files/APCInternetIntermediaryLiability_BestPracticesAfrica_20131125.pdf: This background paper seeks to identify challenges and opportunities in addressing intermediary liability for countries in the African Union and recommend safeguards that can be included in emerging intermediary liability regimes in the context of human rights. The paper also reviews different models of intermediary liability and discusses the limitations, scope, and modes of operation of each model.
The Liability of Internet Intermediaries in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda: An uncertain terrain. Association for Progressive Communications. October 2012, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2484536/The_liability_of_internet_intermediaries_in_Nigeria_Kenya_South_Africa_and_Uganda_An_uncertain_terrain:This Report reviews intermediary liability in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda – providing background to the political context, relevant legislation, and present challenges . In doing so, the Report provides insight into how intermediary liability has changed in recent years in these contexts and explores past and present debates on intermediary liability. The Report concludes with recommendations for stakeholders affected by intermediary liability.
The Fragmentation of intermediary liability in the UK. Daithi Mac Sithigh. 2013, available at: http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/7/521.full.pdf?keytype=ref&ijkey=zuL8aFSzKJqkozT. This article looks at the application of the Electronic Commerce Directive across Europe and argues that it is being intermixed and subsequently replaced with provisions from national legislation and provisions of law from area specific legislation. Thus, the article argues that systems for intermediary liability are diving into multiple systems – for example for content related to copyright intermediaries are being placed with new responsibilities while for content related to defamation, there is a reducing in the liability that intermediaries are held to.
Regimes of Legal Liability for Online Intermediaries: an Overview. OECD, available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/45509050.pdf. This article provides an overview of different intermediary liability regimes including EU and US.
Closing the Gap: Indian Online Intermediaries and a Liability System Not Yet Fit for Purpose. GNI. 2014, available at: http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Closing%20the%20Gap%20-%20Copenhagen%20Economics_March%202014_0.pdf. This Report argues that the provisions of the Information Technology Act 2000 are not adequate to deal with ICT innovations , and argues that the current liability regime in India is hurting the Indian internet economy.
Intermediary Liability in India. Centre for Internet and Society. 2011, available at: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf. This report reviews and ‘tests’ the effect of the Indian intermediary liability on freedom of expression. The report concludes that the present regime in India has a chilling effect on free expression and offers recommendations on how the Indian regime can be amended to protect this right.
The Liability of Internet Service providers and the exercise of the freedom of expression in Latin America have been explored in detail through the course of this research paper by Claudio Ruiz Gallardo and J. Carlos Lara Galvez. The paper explores the efficacy and the implementation of proposals to put digital communication channels under the oversight of certain State sponsored institutions in varying degrees. The potential consequence of legal intervention in media and digital platforms, on the development of individual rights and freedoms has been addressed through the course of this study. The paper tries to arrive at relevant conclusions with respect to the enforcement of penalties that seek to redress the liability of communication intermediaries and the mechanism that may be used to oversee the balance between the interests at stake as well as take comparative experiences into account. The paper also analyses the liability of technical facilitators of communications while at the same time attempting to define a threshold beyond which the interference into the working of these intermediaries may constitute an offence of the infringement of the privacy of users. Ultimately, it aims to derive a balance between the necessity for intervention, the right of the users who communicate via the internet and interests of the economic actors who may be responsible for the service: http://www.palermo.edu/cele/pdf/english/Internet-Free-of-Censorship/02-Liability_Internet_Service_Providers_exercise_freedom_expression_Latin_America_Ruiz_Gallardo_Lara_Galvez.pdf

Click to read the newsletter from the Association of Progressive Communications. The summaries for the reports can be found below:

Internet Intermediaries: The Dilemma of Liability in Africa. APC News, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/node/19279/. This report summarizes the challenges facing internet content regulators in Africa, and the effects of these regulations on the state of the internet in Africa. Many African countries do not protect intermediaries from potential liability, so some intermediaries are too afraid to transmit or host content on the internet in those countries. The report calls for a universal rights protection for internet intermediaries.

APC’s Frequently Asked Questions on Internet Intermediary Liability: APC, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/node/19291/. This report addresses common questions pertaining to internet intermediaries, which are entities which provide services that enable people to use the internet, from network providers to search engines to comments sections on blogs. Specifically, the report outlines different models of intermediary liability, defining two main models. The “Generalist” model intermediary liability is judged according to the general rules of civil and criminal law, while the “Safe Harbour” model protects intermediaries with a legal safe zone.

New Developments in South Africa: APC News, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/intermediary-liability-new-developments-south-afri. This interview with researchers Alex Comninos and Andrew Rens goes into detail about the challenges of intermediary in South Africa. The researchers discuss the balance that needs to be struck between insulating intermediaries from a fear of liability and protecting women’s rights in an environment that is having trouble dealing with violence against women. They also discuss South Africa’s three strikes policy for those who pirate material.

Preventing Hate Speech Online In Kenya: APCNews, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/intermediary-liability-preventing-hate-speech-onli. This interview with Grace Githaiga investigates the uncertain fate of internet intermediaries under Kenya’s new regime. The new government has mandated everyone to register their SIM cards, and indicated that it was monitoring text messages and flagging those that were deemed risky. This has led to a reduction in the amount of hate speech via text messages. Many intermediaries, such as newspaper comments sections, have established rules on how readers should post on their platforms. Githaiga goes on to discuss the issue of surveillance and the lack of a data protection law in Kenya, which she sees as the most pressing internet issue in Kenya.

New Laws in Uganda Make Internet Providers More Vulnerable to Liability and State Intervention: APCNews, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/new-laws-uganda-make-internet-providers-more-vulne. In an interview, Lilian Nalwoga discusses Uganda’s recent anti-pornography law that can send intermediaries to prison. The Anti-Pornography Act of 2014 criminalizes any sort of association with any form of pornography, and targets ISPs, content providers, and developers, making them liable for content that goes through their systems. This makes being an intermediary extremely risky in Uganda. The other issue with the law is a vague definition of pornography. Nalwoga also explains the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014 bans any promotion or recognition of homosexual relations, and the monitoring technology the government is using to enforce these laws.

New Laws Affecting Intermediary Liability in Nigeria: APCNews, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/new-laws-affecting-intermediary-liability-nigeria. Gbenga Sesan, executive director of Paradigm Initiative Nigeria, expounds on the latest trends in Nigerian intermediary liability. The Nigerian Communications Commission has a new law that mandates ISPs store users data for at least here years, and wants to make content hosts responsible for what users do on their networks. Additionally, in Nigeria, internet users register with their real name and prove that you are the person who is registration. Sesan goes on to discuss the lack of safe harbor provisions for intermediaries and the remaining freedom of anonymity on social networks in Nigeria.

Internet Policies That Affect Africans: APC News, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/intermediary-liability-internet-policies-affect-af. The Associsation for Progressive Communcations interviews researcher Nicolo Zingales about the trend among African governments establishing further regulations to control the flow of information on the internet and hold intermediaries liable for content they circulate. Zingales criticizes intermediary liability for “creating a system of adverse incentives for free speech.” He goes on to offer examples of intermediaries and explain the concept of “safe harbor” legislative frameworks. Asked to identify best and worst practices in Africa, he highlights South Africa’s safe harbor as a good practice, and mentions the registration of users via ID cards as a worst practice.

Towards Internet Intermediary Responsibility: Carly Nyst, November 2013, available at: http://www.genderit.org/feminist-talk/towards-internet-intermediary-responsibility. Nyst argues for a middle ground between competing goals in internet regulation in Africa. Achieving one goal, of protecting free speech through internet intermediaries seems at odds with the goal of protecting women’s rights and limiting hate speech, because one demands intermediaries be protected in a legal safe harbor and the other requires intermediaries be vigilant and police their content. Nyst’s solution is not intermediary liability but responsibility, a role defined by empowerment, and establishing an intermediary responsibility to promote positive gender attitudes.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/intermediary-liability-resources

Intermediary liability law needs updating

sunil — 2019-02-13T00:05:30Z

The time has come for India to exert its foreign policy muscle. There is a less charitable name for intermediary liability regimes like Sec 79 of the IT Act — private censorship regimes.

The article was published in Business Standard on February 9, 2019.

Intermediaries get immunity from liability emerging from user-generated and third-party content because they have no “actual knowledge” until it is brought to their notice using “take down” requests or orders.

Since some of the harm caused is immediate, irreparable and irreversible, it is the preferred alternative to approaching courts for each case. When intermediary liability regimes were first enacted, most intermediaries were acting as common carriers — ie they did not curate the experience of users in a substantial fashion. While some intermediaries like Wikipedia continue this common carrier tradition, others driven by advertising revenue no longer treat all parties and all pieces of content neutrally. Facebook, Google and Twitter do everything they can to raise advertising revenues. They make you depressed. And if they like you, they get you to go out and vote. There is an urgent need to update intermediary liability law.

In response to being summoned by multiple governments, Facebook has announced the establishment of an independent oversight board. A global free speech court for the world’s biggest online country. The time has come for India to exert its foreign policy muscle. The amendments to our intermediary liability regime can have global repercussions, and shape the structure and functioning of this and other global courts.

While with one hand Facebook dealt the oversight board, with the other hand it took down APIs that would enable press and civil society to monitor political advertising in real time. How could they do that with no legal consequences? The answer is simple — those APIs were provided on a voluntary basis. There was no law requiring them to do so.

There are two approaches that could be followed. One, as scholar of regulatory theory Amba Kak puts it, is to “disincentivise the black box”. Most transparency reports produced by intermediaries today are on a voluntary basis; there is no requirement for this under law. Our new law could require a extensive transparency with appropriate privacy safeguards for the government, affected parties and the general public in terms of revenues, content production and consumption, policy development, contracts, service-level agreements, enforcement, adjudication and appeal. User empowerment measures in the user interface and algorithm explainability could be required. The key word in this approach is transparency.

The alternative is to incentivise the black box. Here faith is placed in technological solutions like artificial intelligence. To be fair, technological solutions may be desirable for battling child pornography, where pre-censorship (or deletion before content is published) is required. Fingerprinting technology is used to determine if the content exists in a global database maintained by organisations like the Internet Watch Foundation. A similar technology called Content ID is used pre-censor copyright infringement. Unfortunately, this is done by ignoring the flexibilities that exist in Indian copyright law to promote education, protect access knowledge by the disabled, etc. Even within such narrow application of technologies, there have been false positives. Recently, a video of a blogger testing his microphone was identified as a pre-existing copyrighted work.

The goal of a policy-maker working on this amendment should be to prevent repeats of the Shreya Singhal judgment where sections of the IT Act were read down or struck down. To avoid similar constitution challenges in the future, the rules should not specify any new categories of illegal content, because that would be outside the scope of the parent clause. The fifth ground in the list is sufficient — “violates any law for the time being in force”. Additional grounds, such as “harms minors in anyway”, is vague and cannot apply to all categories of intermediaries — for example, a dating site for sexual minorities. The rights of children need to be protected. But that is best done within the ongoing amendment to the POCSO Act.

As an engineer, I vote to eliminate redundancy. If there are specific offences that cannot fit in other parts of the law, those offences can be added as separate sections in the IT Act. For example, even though voyeurism is criminalised in the IT Act, the non-consensual distribution of intimate content could be criminalised, as it has been done in the Philippines.

Provisions that have to do with data retention and government access to that data for the purposes of national security, law enforcement and also anonymised datasets for the public interest should be in the upcoming Data Protection law. The rules for intermediary liability is not the correct place to deal with it, because data retention may also be required of those intermediaries that don’t handle any third-party information or user generated content. Finally, there have to be clear procedures in place for reinstatement of content that has been taken down.

Disclosure: The Centre for Internet and Society receives grants from Facebook, Google and Wikimedia Foundation

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/business-standard-february-9-2019-sunil-abraham-intermediary-liability-law-needs-updating