We are anonymous, we are legion

Mapping Web Censorship & Net Neutrality Violations

pranav — 2020-10-05T07:59:47Z

For over a year, researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society have been studying website blocking by internet service providers (ISPs) in India. We have learned that major ISPs don’t always block the same websites, and also use different blocking techniques. To take this study further, and map net neutrality violations by ISPs, we need your help. We have developed CensorWatch, a research tool to collect empirical evidence about what websites are blocked by Indian ISPs, and which blocking methods are being used to do so. Read more about this project (link), download CensorWatch (link), and help determine if ISPs are complying with India’s net neutrality regulations.

Learn more about website blocking in India, through our recent work on the issue —

Using information from court orders, user reports, and government orders, and running network tests from six ISPs, Kushagra Singh, Gurshabad Grover and Varun Bansal presented the largest study of web blocking in India. Through their work, they demonstrated that major ISPs in India use different techniques to block websites, and that they don’t block the same websites (link).
Gurshabad Grover and Kushagra Singh collaborated with Simone Basso of the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) to study HTTPS traffic blocking in India by running experiments on the networks of three popular Indian ISPs: ACT Fibernet, Bharti Airtel, and Reliance Jio (link).
For The Leaflet, Torsha Sarkar and Gurshabad Grover wrote about the legal framework of blocking in India — Section 69A of the IT Act and its rules. They considered commentator opinions questioning the constitutionality of the regime, whether originators of content are entitled to a hearing, and whether Rule 16, which mandates confidentiality of content takedown requests received by intermediaries from the Government, continues to be operative (link).
In the Hindustan Times, Gurshabad Grover critically analysed the confidentiality requirement embedded within Section 69A of the IT Act and argued how this leads to internet users in India experiencing arbitrary censorship (link).
Torsha Sarkar, along with Sarvjeet Singh of the Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), spoke to Medianama delineating the procedural aspects of section 69A of the IT Act (link).
Arindrajit Basu spoke to the Times of India about the geopolitical and regulatory implications of the Indian government’s move to ban fifty-nine Chinese applications from India (link).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/mapping-web-censorship-net-neutrality-violations

Mapping the Legal and Regulatory Frameworks of the Ad-Tech Ecosystem in India

vipul — 2025-04-24T14:52:29Z

The main purpose of regulations in any sector is essentially twofold, one is to ensure that the interests of the general public or consumers are protected, and the other is to ensure that the sector itself flourishes and grows. Too much regulation may possibly stifle the commercial potential of any sector, whereas too little regulation runs the risk of leaving consumers vulnerable to harmful practices.

In this paper, we try to map the legal and regulatory framework dealing with Advertising Technology (Adtech) in India as well as a few other leading jurisdictions. Our analysis is divided into three main parts, the first being general consumer regulations, which apply to all advertising irrespective of the media – to ensure that advertisements are not false or misleading and do not violate any laws of the country. This part also covers the consumer laws which are specific to malpractices in the technology sector such as Dark Patterns, Influencer based advertising, etc.

The second part of the paper covers data protection laws in India and how they are relevant for the Adtech industry. The Adtech industry requires and is based on the collection and processing of large amounts of data from the users. It is therefore important to discuss the data protection and consent requirements that have been laid out in the spate of recent data protection regulations, which have the potential to severely impact the Adtech industry.

The last part of the paper covers the competition angle of the Adtech industry. Like with social media intermediaries, the Adtech industry in the world is also dominated by two or three players and such a scenario always lends itself easily to anti-competitive practices. It is therefore imperative to examine the competition law framework to see whether the laws as they exist are robust enough to deal with any possible anti competitive practices that may be prevalent in the Adtech sector.

The research was reviewed by Pallavi Bedi, it can be accessed here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/mapping-the-legal-and-regulatory-frameworks-of-the-ad-tech-ecosystem-in-india

Mapping of Sections in India’s MLAT Agreements

Leilah Elmokadem and Saumyaa Naidu — 2016-12-31T06:52:46Z

This set of infographics by Leilah Elmokadem and Saumyaa Naidu maps out and compares the various sections that exist in the 39 MLATs (mutual legal assistance treaty) between India and other countries. An MLAT is an agreement between two or more countries, drafted for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws.

Download: Infographic (PDF) and data (XLSX)

We have found that India’s 39 MLAT documents are worded, formatted and sectioned differently. At the same time, many of the same sections exist across several MLATs. This diagram lists the sections found in the MLAT documents and indicates the treaties in which they were included or not included. To keep the list of sections concise and to more easily pinpoint the key differences between the agreements, we have merged sections that are synonymous in meaning but were worded slightly differently. For example: we would combine “Entry into force and termination” with “Ratification and termination” or “Expenses” with “Costs”.

At the same time, some sections that seemed quite similar and possible to merge were kept separate due to potential key differences that could be overlooked as a result. For example: “Limitation on use” vs. “Limitation on compliance” or “Serving of documents” vs. “Provision of (publicly available) documents/records/objects” remained separate for further analysis and comparison.

These differences in sectioning can be analysed to facilitate a thorough comparison between the effectiveness, efficiency, applicability and enforceability of the various provisions across the MLATs. The purpose of this initial mapping is to provide an overall picture of which sections exist in which MLAT documents. There will be further analysis of these sections to produce a more holistic content-based comparison of the MLATs.

Aggregated Analysis of Sections of MLAT Agreements

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-mlat-agreements-sections-map-dec-2016

Mapping of India’s Cyber Security-Related Bilateral Agreements

Leilah Elmokadem and Saumyaa Naidu — 2017-04-27T15:14:55Z

With the rapid spread of cloud computing and the growth of cyber spaces, large masses of information are now easily transmittable transnationally, necessitating the ratification of new agreements and cooperation efforts amongst states in order to secure cyber spaces and regulate exchanges of information. In an attempt to understand the nature and extent of current international collaborative efforts in cyber security, we have compiled the following data regarding India’s cyber security-related bilateral agreements. The intention of this exercise is to offer a dynamic visualization that demonstrates which countries India has collaborated with on cyber security efforts and initiatives. This is an ongoing map that we will be updating as our research continues.

Download: Infographic (PDF) and data (XLSX)

The data used for the info-graphic consists of India’s MLATs, cyber security-related MoUs and Joint Statements, and Cyber Frameworks. An MLAT is an agreement between two or more countries, drafted for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws. A MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) is a nonbinding agreement between two or more states outlining the terms and details of an understanding, including each party’s requirements and responsibility; it is often the first stage in the formation of a formal contract. For the purpose of this research, we have grouped Joint Statements with MoUs, as they both generally entail the informal agreement between two states to strengthen cooperation on certain issues. Lastly, a Cyber Framework consists of standards, guidelines and practices to promote protection of critical infrastructure. The data accounts for agreements centered on cyber security as well as any agreements mentioning cooperation efforts in Cyber Security, information security or cybercrime.

The Mapping of India’s Cybersecurity-related bilateral agreement has been updated on April 12, 2017 with the following changes:

A new MoU was signed between Australia and India in April 2017, focusing on combating terrorism and civil aviation security. Cybersecurity cooperation is mentioned in the MoU[1].
A new MoU was signed between Bangladesh and India in April 2017. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the ICT Division of Bangladesh are the signing parties of the MoU. The agreement focuses on Cooperation in the area of Cyber Security[2].
A preexisting MoU between France and India was added to the mapping, signed in January of 2016. Officials of both countries agreed to intensify cooperation between the Indian and French security forces in the fields of homeland security, cyber security, Special Forces and intelligence sharing to fight against criminal networks and tackle the common threat of terrorism[3].
A new MoU was signed between Indonesia and India in March 2017. It focuses on enhancing cooperation in cyber security and intelligence sharing[4].
A new MoU was signed between Kenya and India in January 2017, with “cyber security” mentioned as one of the key areas of cooperation[5].
A preexisting MoU between Malaysia and India was added to the mapping, signed in November of 2015. Both sides agreed to promote cooperation and the exchange of information regarding cyber security incident management, technology cooperation and cyber attacks, prevalent policies and best practices and mutual response to cyber security incidents[6].
A preexisting MoU between Mauritius and India, signed July 2016, was added to the mapping. This is a non-governmental MoU. Leading bourse BSE signed an agreement with Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) for collaboration in areas including cyber security[7].
A new joint statement between India and Portugal was signed in March 2017. The two countries agreed to set up an institutional mechanism to collaborate in the areas of electronic manufacturing, ITeS, startups, cyber security and e-governance.[8]
A preexisting MoU, signed between Qatar and India in December of 2016, was added to the mapping. The agreement was regarding a protocol on technical cooperation in cyberspace and combatting cybercrime[9].
A new MoU was signed between Serbia and India in January 2017, focusing on cooperation in the field of IT, Electronics. The MoU itself does not explicitly mention cybersecurity. However, the MoU calls for cooperation and exchanges in capacity building institutions, which should entail cyber security strengthening[10].
A preexisting MoU between Singapore and India was added to the mapping. The MoU was signed in January 2016, focusing on the establishment of a formal framework for professional dialogue, CERT-CERT related cooperation for operational readiness and response, collaboration on cyber security technology and research related to smart technologies, exchange of best practices, and professional exchanges of human resource development[11].
A new joint statement was signed between UAE and India in January 2017, following up on their previous Technical Cooperation MoU signed in February 2016. To further deepen cooperation in this area, they agreed to set up joint Research & Development Centres of Excellence[12].
A preexisting MoU has been included in the mapping, signed in May of 2016. CERT-In agreed with the UK Ministry of Cabinet Office to promote close cooperation between both countries in the exchange in knowledge and experience in detection, resolution and prevention of security related incidents[13].
A new MoU between India and the US was signed in March 2017. CERT-In and CERT-US signed a MoU agreeing to promote closer co-operation and exchange of information pertaining to cyber security in accordance with relevant laws, rules and regulations and on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit[14].
A new MoU was signed between Vietnam and India in January 2017, agreeing to promote closer cooperation for exchange of knowledge and experience in detection, resolution and prevention of cyber security incidents between both countries[15].

NOTE: Some preexisting MoUs were added as we were initially only including the most recent agreements in the mapping. Upon adding newly signed MoUs, we decided to also keep the preexisting ones and revisit the other entries to include any preexisting MoUs that were initially excluded due to not being the most-recent. In this respect, the visualization will be adjusted to indicate the number of MoUs per country.

[1]http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-australia-sign-mous-on-combating-terrorism-civil-aviation-security-2393843

[2]http://www.theindependentbd.com/arcprint/details/89237/2017-04-09

[3]http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/Full-text-of-Joint-Statement-issued-by-India-France/article14019524.ece

[4]http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indianhome-ministry-indonesian-ministry-of-security-and-coordination/

[5]https://telanganatoday.news/india-kenya-focus-defence-security-cooperation-pm

[6]http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-and-malaysia-sign-3-mous-including-cyber-security/articleshow/49891897.cms

[7]http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/bse-mauritius-stock-exchange-tie-up-to-promote-financial-mkts/1/723635.html

[8]http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/business/india-portugal-to-collaborate-in-ites-cyber-security/373666.html

[9]http://naradanews.com/2016/12/india-qatar-sign-agreements-on-visa-cybersecurity-investments/

[10]http://ehub.newsforce.in/cabinet-approves-mou-india-serbia-cooperation-field-electronics/

[11]http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-and-india-strengthen-cooperation-on-cyber-security

[12]http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27969/India++UAE+Joint+Statement+during+State+visit+of+Crown+Prince+of+Abu+Dhabi+to+India+January+2426+2017

[13]http://www.bestcurrentaffairs.com/india-uk-mou-cyber-security/

[14]http://www.dqindia.com/india-cert-signs-an-mou-with-us-cert/

[15]http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=157458

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-cyber-security-bilateral-agreements-map-dec-2016

Mapping MAG: A study in Institutional Isomorphism

jyoti — 2017-03-03T00:59:48Z

The paper is an update to a shorter piece of MAG analysis that had been conducted in July 2015. At that time our analysis was limited by the MAG membership data that was made available by the Secretariat. Subsequently we wrote to the Secretariat and this paper is based on the data shared by them including for the years for which membership details were previously not available.

This paper that delves into the history of the formation of the Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) including the lessons from the past that should be applied in strengthening its present structure. The paper covers three broad areas:

History of the formation of the MAG, its role within the IGF structure, influences that have impinged on its scope of work, manner in which its evolution has deviated from conceptualization
Analysis of MAG membership (2006-2015): Trends in the selection and rotation of the MAG membership
Recommendations to reform MAG/IGF

Jyoti Panday^[1]

The recent renewal of the Internet Governance Forum^[2] (IGF) mandate at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)+10 High-Level Meeting^[3] was something of a missed opportunity. The discussions unerringly focused on the periphery of the problem - the renewal of the mandate, leaving aside questions of vital importance such as strengthening and improving the structures and processes associated with the IGF. The creation of the IGF as a forum for governments and other stakeholders to discuss policy and governance issues related to Internet was a watershed moment in the history of the Internet.

In the first decade of its existence the IGF has proven to be a valuable platform for policy debates, a space that fosters cooperation by allowing stakeholders to self-organise to address common areas of concern. But the IGF rests at being a platform for multistakeholder dialogue and is yet to realise its potential as per its mandate to “find solutions to the issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet” as well as “identify emerging issues […] and, where appropriate, make recommendations”.^[4]

From the information available in the public domain, it is evident that the IGF is not crafting solutions and recommendations or setting the agenda on emerging issues. Even if unintended, this raises the disturbing possibility that alternative processes and forums are filling the vacuum created by the unrealised IGF mandate and helming policy development and agenda setting on Internet use and access worldwide. This sits uneasily with the fact that currently there is no global arrangement that serves or could be developed as an institutional home for global internet governance issues.

Moreover, the economic importance of the internet as well as its impact on national security, human rights and global politics has created a wide range of actors who seek to exert their influence over its governance. Given the lack of a global centralized body with authority to enforce norms and standards across political and functional boundaries, control of internet is an important challenge for both developed and emerging economies. As the infrastructure over which the internet runs is governed by nation states and their laws, national governments continue to seek to exert their influence on global issues.

Divergence of approaches to regulation and differences in capacity to engage in processes, has led to fragmentation of approaches to common challenges.^[5] Importantly, not all governments are democratic and may exert restrictions on content and access that conflict with the open and global nature of the internet. Alongside national governments, transnational private corporations play a critical role in security and stability of the internet. Much like the state, they too raise the niggling question of how to guard against the guardians.

Corporations control of sensitive information, their institutional identity, secrecy of operations: all are essential to their functioning but could also erode the practice of democratic governance, and the rights and liberties of users online. Additionally, as issues of human rights, access and local content have become interlinked with public policy issues civil society and academia have become relevant to traditionally closed policy spaces. Considering the variety of stakeholders and their competing interests, concerns about ensuring stability and security of the Internet have led the international community to pursue a range of governance initiatives.

Implementing a Multistakeholder Approach

At the broadest level debates about the appropriate way forward has evolved as a contestation between the choice of two models. On the one hand is the state-centric ‘multilateral’ model of participation, and on the other a ‘multistakeholder’ approach that aims for bottom up participation by all affected stakeholders. The multistakeholder approach sees resonance across several quarters^[6] including a high level endorsement from the Indian government last year.^[7] An innovative concept, a multistakeholder approach fits well within the wider debate about rethinking governance in a globalized world.

Proponents of the multistakeholder approach see it as a democratic process that allows for a variety of views to be included in decision making.^[8] Nevertheless, the intertwining of the Internet and society pitches actors and interests at opposing ends. While a multistakeholder approach broadens the scope for participation, it also raises serious issues of representation and accountability. Since multistakeholder processes fall outside the traditional paradigm of governance, establishing legitimacy of processes and structures becomes all the more important.

The multistakeholder concept is only beginning to be critically studied or evaluated. There have been growing concerns, particularly, from emerging economies^[9] of a lack of representation in policy development bodies and that issues affecting marginalised communities being overlooked in policy development process. From this view, the multistakeholder model has created ‘transnational and semi privatized’ structures and ‘transnational elites’.^[10] Such critics define emerging and existing platforms derived from the multistakeholder concept as ‘an embryonic form of transnational democracy’ that are occupied by elite actors.^[11]

Elite actors may include the state, private and civil society organisations, technical and academic communities and intergovernmental institutions. In the context thus sketched out, the key question that the WSIS+10 Review should have addressed is whether the IGF provides the space for the development of institutions and solutions that are capable of responding to the challenges of applying the multistakeholder concept to internet governance. The existing body of work on the role of the IGF has yet to identify, let alone come to terms with, this problem.

Applying critical perspectives examining essential structures and processes associated with the IGF becomes even more relevant given its recently renewed mandate. However, already the forum’s first planning meeting scheduled to take place in Geneva this week is already mired in controversy^[12] after a new Chair was named by the UN Secretary General.

The decision for appointing a new Chair was made without any form of public process, or any indication on the selection criteria. Moreover, the "multistakeholder advisory group" (MAG), which decides the content and substance of the forum, membership was also renewed recently. Problematically most of the nominations put forth by different constituent groups to represent them were rejected and individuals were appointed through a parallel top-down and secretive UN process. Of the 55 MAG members, 21 are new but only eight were officially selected by their respective groups.^[13]

This paper focuses on the role of the MAG structure and functioning and highlights issues and challenges in its working so as to pave the way for strategic thinking on its improvement. A tentative beginning towards identifying what the levers for change can be made by sifting through the eddies of history to uncover how the MAG has evolved and become politicised.

The paper makes two separate, but interrelated claims: first, it argues that as the de-facto bureau essential to the functioning of the IGF, there is an urgent need to introduce transparency and accountability in the selection procedure of the MAG members. Striking an optimum balance between expertise and legitimacy in the MAG composition is essential to ensure that workshops and sessions are not dominated by certain groups or interests and that the IGF remains an open, well-functioning circuit of information and robust debate.

Second, it argues for immediate evaluation of MAG’s operations given the calls for the production of tangible outcomes. There has been on-going discussion within the broader community about the role of the IGF with divisions between those who prefer a narrow interpretation of its mandate, while others who want to broaden its scope to provide policy recommendations and solutions.^[14]

The interpretation of the IGF mandate and whether the IGF should make recommendations has been a sticking point and is closely linked to the question of IGF’s legitimacy and relevance. Be that as it may, the intersessional work, best practices forum and dynamic coalitions over the last ten years have led to the creation of a vast repository of information that should feed into the pursuit of policy options and identification of best practices.

The true test of the multistakeholder model is not only to bring together wide range of views but to also ensure that accumulated knowledge is applied to address common problems. Implementing a multistakeholder approach and developing solutions necessitates enhanced coordination amongst stakeholder groups and in the context of the IGF, is contingent on the strength and stability of the MAG to be able to facilitate such cooperation.

The paper is organised in three parts: in the first section I delve into the history of the formation of the MAG. To understand the MAG’s role within the IGF structure it is essential to revisit the influences that shaped its conceptualisation and subsequent evolution over the decade. A critical historical perspective provides the context of the multiple considerations that have impinged on MAG’s scope of work, of the manner in which MAG’s evolution has deviated from intentions, and the lessons from the past that should be applied in strengthening its present structure.

The second section analyses trends in the selection and rotation of the MAG membership and traces out the elite elements in the composition of the MAG. The analysis reveals two distinct stages in the evolution of the MAG membership which has remained significantly homogeneous across stakeholder representation. The final section of the paper focuses on a set of recommendations to ensure that the MAG is strengthened, becomes sustainable and provides the impetus for IGF reform in the future.

Origins of the IGF

The WSIS process was divided in two phases, the Geneva phase focused on principles of internet governance. The outcome documents of the first phase included a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action being adopted by 175 countries. Throughout the process, developing countries such as China, Brazil and Pakistan opposed the prevailing regime that allowed US dominance and control of ‘critical infrastructure’. As the first phase of the WSIS could not resolve these differences the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was set up by the UN Secretary General to deliberate and report on the issues.

The establishment of the WGIG is an important development in the WSIS process not only because of the recommendations it developed to feed into the second phase of the negotiations, but also because of the procedural legitimacy the WGIG established through its working. The WGIG embodied the multistakeholder principle in its membership and open consultation processes. WGIG members were selected and appointed in their personal capacity through an open and consultative process. As a result the membership demonstrated diversity in the geography, stakeholder groups represented and gender demographics.

The consultations were open, transparent and allowed for a diverse range of views in the form of oral and written submissions from the public to feed into the policy process. At its final meeting the WGIG membership divided into smaller working groups to focus on specific issues, and reassembled at the plenary to review, discuss and consolidate sections which were then approved in a public forum. As the WGIG background paper notes “The WGIG agreed that transparency was another key ingredient to ensure ownership of the process among all stakeholders.”^[15]

The WGIG final report^[16] identified a vacuum within the context of existing structures and called for the establishment of a forum linked to the UN. The forum was to be modelled on the best practices and open format of the WGIG consultative processes allowing for the participation of diverse stakeholders to engage on an equal footing. It was in this context that the IGF was first conceptualised as a space for global multistakeholder ‘dialogue’ which would interface with intergovernmental bodies and other institutions on matters relevant to Internet governance.

The forum was conceived as a body that would connect different stakeholders involved in the management of the internet, as well as contribute to capacity-building for governance for developing countries drawing on local sources of knowledge and expertise. Importantly, the forum was to promote and assess on an ongoing basis the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet governance processes and make recommendations’ and ‘proposals for action’ addressing emerging and existing issues not being dealt with elsewhere. However, as things turned out the exercises of power between states and institutional arrangements ultimately led to the development of a subtly altered version of the original IGF mandate.

Aftermath of the WGIG Report

The WGIG report garnered much attention and was welcomed by most stakeholders with the exception of the US government which along with private sector representatives such as Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI) disagreed with the recommendations.^[17] Pre-empting the publication of the report, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) issued a statement in June 2005 affirming its resolve to “maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone file.”^[18]

The statement reiterated US government’s intention to fight for the preservation of the status quo, effectively ruling out the four alternative models for internet governance put forward in the WGIG report. The statement even referenced the WGIG report stating, “Dialogue related to Internet governance should continue in relevant multiple fora. Given the breadth of topics potentially encompassed under the rubric of Internet governance there is no one venue to appropriately address the subject in its entirety.”^[19]

The final report was presented to PrepCom 3 of the second phase in July 2005 and the subsequent negotiations were by far, the most significant in the context of the role and structure that the IGF would take in the future. US stance on its role with regard to the root zone garnered pushback from both civil society and other governments including Russia, Brazil, Iran and China. However the most significant reaction to US stance came from the European Union issuing a statement after the commencement of PrepCom 3 in September.

EU’s position recognised that adjustments were needed in institutional arrangements for internet governance and called for a new model for international cooperation which would include “the development and application of globally applicable public policy principles.”^[20] the US had not preempted this “shocking and profound change” and now isolated in its position on international governance of the internet, and it sent forth a strongly worded letter^[21] invoking its long-standing relationship and urging the EU to reconsider its stance.

The pressure worked since the US was in a strong position to stymie the achievement of a resolution from WSIS process. Moreover, introducing reforms to the internet naming and numbering arrangements was not possible without US cooperation. The letter resulted in EU going back on its aggressive stance and with it, the push for the establishment of global policy oversight over the domain names and numbers lost its momentum.

The letter significantly impacted the WSIS negotiations and shaped the role of the IGF. By creating a deadlock and by applying pressure US was able to negotiate a favourable outcomes for itself. The last minute negotiations led to the status quo continuing and in exchange the US provided an undertaking that it would not interfere with other countries’ ccTLDs. The weakened mandate meant that even though creation of the IGF under the WSIS process moved forward the direction changed from its conceptualisation and origins from the WGIG report.

Institutionalizing the IGF

In 2006, the UN Secretary General appointed Markus Kummer to assist with the establishment of the IGF. The newly formed IGF Secretariat initiated an open consultation to be held in Geneva in and issued an open call to stakeholders seeking written submissions as inputs into the consultation.^[22] Notably neither the US government nor the EU sent in a response to the consultation and submissions made by other stakeholders were largely a repetition of the views expressed at WSIS.

The division on the mandate of IGF was evident in this very first consultation. Private sector representatives such as the CCBI and ICC-Basis, government representatives from OECD countries like Canada and the technical community represented by likes of Nominet and ISOC^[23] opposed the development of the IGF as platform for policy development. On the other hand, civil society representatives such as APC called for the IGF to produce specific recommendations on issues where there is sufficient consensus.^[24]

With reference to the MAG structure, again there was division on whether the “effective and cost-efficient bureau” referred to in the Tunis Agenda should have a narrow mandate limited to setting the agenda for plenary meetings or if it should have a more substantial role. Civil society stakeholders envisioned assigning the bureau a more substantial role and notably the Internet Governance Project (IGP) discussion paper released in advance of the February 2006 Geneva consultations.^[25]

The paper offered design criteria for the Forum including specific organizational structures and processes proposing “a small, quasi-representational decision making structure” for the IGF Bureau.^[26] The paper recommended formation of twelve member bureau with five representatives from governments (from each UN geographic region) and two each from private sector civil society academic and technical communities. The bureau would set the agenda for the plenary meeting not arbitrarily through private discussions, but driven by working group proposals and it would also have the power to approve or reject applications for forming working groups.

The proposed structure in the IGP paper had it been implemented would have developed the bureau along the lines of the IETF where the working groups would develop recommendations which would feed into the deliberation process. However, there was a clear divide on the proposed structure with many stakeholders opposing the establishment of sub-groups or committees under the IGF.^[27]

Following the written submissions the first open consultations on the establishment of the IGF were held in Geneva on 16 and 17 February 2006, and were chaired by Nitin Desai.^[28] The consultation was well attended with more than 300 participants including 40 representatives from governments and the proceedings were webcast. Further, the two-day consultation was structured as a moderated roundtable event at which most interventions were read from prepared statements, many of which were also tabled as documents and later made available from the IGF Web site. This ofcourse meant that there was a repetition of the views expressed in response to the questionnaire or the WGIG report and as a consequence, there was little opportunity for consensus-building.

Once again there was conflict on whether the IGF should be conceptualised as annual ‘event’ that would provide space for policy dialogue or a ‘process’ of engaging with policy issues which would culminate in an annual event. The CCBI reiterated that “[t]he Tunis Agenda is clear that the IGF does not have decision-making or policy-making authority,” and the NRO emphasised that the “IGF must be a multi-stakeholder forum without decision-making attributions.”^[29]

William Drake argued for the IGF “as a process, not as a series of one-off meetings, but as a process that would promote collective dialogue, learning, and mutual understanding on an ongoing basis.”^[30] Government representatives were split for example see El Salvador statement “that the Internet Governance Forum will come up with recommendations built on consensus on specific issues,” and Brazil even characterised the first meeting as “an excellent opportunity to initiate negotiations on a framework treaty to deal with international Internet public policy issues.”^[31]

Although a broad consensus was declared on need for a lightweight multi-stakeholder bureau there was no consensus on its size, composition and the mandate of this bureau. Nitin Desai held the issue for further written input and the subsequent consultation received twelve submissions with most respondents recommended a body of ten and twenty five members. The notable exceptions were submissions from the Group of 77 and China that sought a combined total of forty members half of which would be governmental representatives.

The discussions during the February consultations and the input received from the written submissions paved the way for what eventually became the MAG. The IGF Secretariat announced the formation of a bureau with forty members and while not expressly stated, half of these would be governmental representatives. It has been speculated that the large membership decision was a result of political wrangling among governments, especially the G77 governments insisting on large group that would accommodate all the political and regional differences among its members.^[32]

IGF Secretariat - Set to Fail?

The unwieldy size of the MAG meant that it would have to rely on the newly constituted Secretariat for organization, agenda-setting, and results. This structure empowered the Secretariat while limiting the scope of the MAG, a group that was already divided in its interests and agenda. However, the Secretariat was restrained in its services to stakeholders as it had limited resources since it was not funded by the United Nations and relied upon voluntary donations to a trust fund.^[33]

Early donors included the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SWADC), ICANN and Nominet.^[34] Due to disjointed sources of funding, the Secretariat was vulnerable to the influence of its donors. For example, the decision to to base the Secretariat in Geneva was to meet the condition set by SWADC contribution. Distressingly, of the 20 non-governmental positions in the MAG, most were directly associated with the ICANN regime.

The over-representation of ICANN representatives in MAG selection was problematic since the IGF was conceptualised to address the lack of acceptance of ICANN’s legitimacy in the WSIS process. The lack of independent funding led to a deficit of accountability demonstrated in instances where it was possible for one of the MAG members to quietly insinuate that private sector support for the IGF and its Secretariat would be withdrawn if reforms unacceptable to that stakeholder group went ahead.^[35]

As might perhaps be expected from a Secretariat with such limited resources, its services to stakeholders were confined to maintaining a rudimentary website and responding to queries and requests. The transparency of the Secretariat’s activities was also very limited, most clearly exemplified by the process by which the Advisory Group was appointed.

Constituting the MAG

Following the announcement of the establishment of the MAG, a call for membership to the advisory group was made in March 2006. From the beginning the nomination process was riddled with lack of transparency and the nominations received from stakeholders were not acknowledged by the IGF Secretariat, nor was the selection criteria of made available. The legitimacy of the exercise was also marred by a top-down approach where first that nominees heard of the outcomes was the Secretariat's announcement of selected nominees. Lack of transparency and accountability resulted in the selection and appointment procedure being driven by patronage and lobbying.

The political wrangling was evident in the composition of the first MAG which was expanded to accommodate six regional coordinators personally appointed by Chair Nitin Desai to the Special Advisory Group (SAG). Of the twenty non-governmental positions, most were associated with the naming and numbering regime including sitting and former Board members and ICANN staff.^[36] Participation from civil society was limited as the composition did not recognise^[37] technical community as a distinct group, including it along with academic community and as part of civil society.

The political struggles at play was visible in the appointment of Michael D. Gallagher, the former head of the US Commerce Department's NTIA. This appointment was all the more relevant since it was Gallagher who had had only a few months back stated that the US government owns the DNS root and has no intention of giving it up. His presence signalled that the US government took the forum seriously enough to ensure its interests were voiced and received attention on the MAG.

Beyond issues of representation the working of the MAG suffered from a serious lack of transparency as meetings of the Advisory Group were closed, and no reports or minutes were released. The Advisory Group met in May and September in Geneva before the inaugural IGF meeting in Athens. Coordination between members for the preparations for Athens was done utilising a closed mailing list that was not publicly archived. Consequently, the detail of the operations of the Advisory Group ahead of the first IGF meeting were known only to its members.

Whatever little has been reported suggests that the Advisory Group possessed little formal authority, operating like a forum where members expressed views and debated issues without the object of taking formal decisions. Decisions were settled upon by rough consensus as declared by the Chair, and on all matters where there was no agreement the issues were summarised by the Chair in a report to the UN Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would take the report summary in consideration however retained the ultimate authority to make a formal decision.^[38]

The UN’s clear deciding role was not so obvious in the early years of the MAG’s existence because of the relatively novel nature of the IGF. Moreover Nitin Desai Chair, MAG and Markus Kummer, IGF Secretariat were appointed by the UN Secretary General and were on good terms with the then-Secretary General Kofi Annan and working together they acted as de facto selectors of the members of the MAG. Most of the MAG’s core membership in the first five years of its existence was made up of leaders from across the different stakeholder groups and self-selection within those groups was encouraged to lend broader stability.

Over the last decade, changes in institutional arrangements led the IGF to be moved as a ‘project’ under the UNDESA umbrella, where it is not a core mission, but simply one of many conferences that it handles across the world every year. The core personnel that shepherded the MAG and the IGF from its early days retired allowing for the creation a new core membership. The new group of leaders in the MAG membership have emerged partly as the result of selection and rotation process instituted by the UNDESA in appointing a ‘program committee’.

The history presented above is to help understand how the MAG was established under the UN umbrella and to highlight the key developments that shaped its scope and working. Importantly the weakened IGF mandate created divergences on the scope of the MAG to function as a ‘program committee’ limited to selecting proposals and planning the IGF or as an ‘advisory committee’ with a more substantial role in developing the forum as an innovative governance mechanism. In its conception the IGF was a novel idea and by empowering MAG and introducing transparency in the selection procedures of members and their workings could have perhaps led to a more democratic and accountable IGF. However, the possibility of this was stemmed early on.

The opacity in the appointment processes meant that patronage and lobbying became key to being selected as a member of the MAG. It established the worrying trend of ensuring diversity and representation taking precedent over the necessity of ensuring that representatives were appointed through a bottom-up multistakeholder process. Further, distributing the composition to ensure geographic representation severely limited participation of technical, academic and civil society. In the next section, I focus on the rotation of members of the MAG over the last ten years to identify and highlight trends that have emerged in its composition.

Analysis of MAG Composition (2006 - 2015)

This primary data for the analysis of the MAG membership has been collected from the membership list from 2010-2015 available on the I website. The membership list for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 have been provided by the UN IGF Secretariat during the course of this research. To the best of my knowledge, this data is yet to be made publicly available and may be accessed here.^[39] The Secretariat notes that the MAG membership did not change in 2008 and 2009 and the confirmation is the only account of the list of members for both years, as the records were poorly maintained and are therefore unavailable in the public domain.

It is also worth noting that to the best of my knowledge, no data has been made available by the IGF Secretariat regarding the nomination process and the criteria on which a particular member has been re-elected to the MAG. The stakeholder groups identified for this analysis include government, civil society, industry, technical community and academia. Any overlap between two or more of these groups or movements of individuals between stakeholder groups and affiliations has been taken into account.

Over the decade of its existence, the MAG has had 196 unique members from various stakeholder groups. As per the Terms of Reference^[40] (ToR) of the MAG, it is the prerogative of the UN Secretary General to select MAG members. There also exists a policy of rotating one-third members of MAG every year for diversity and taking new viewpoints in consideration. Diversity within the UN is an ingrained process where every group is expected to be evenly balanced in geographic and gender representation. However, ensuring a diverse membership often comes at the cost of legitimate expertise. Further it may often lead to top-down decision making where individuals are appointed based on their characteristics rather than qualifications.

The complexity of the selection process is further compounded by the fact that the IGF Secretariat provides an initial set of recommendations identifying which members should be appointed to the MAG, but the selection and appointment is undertaken by UNDESA civil servants based in New York. Notably, while the IGF Secretariat staff is familiar with and interacts with stakeholder representatives at internet governance meetings and forums that are regularly held in Geneva, the New York UN based officials do not share such relationships with constituent groups.

Consequently, they end up selecting members who meet all their diversity requirements and have put themselves forward through the standard UN open nomination process. The practice of ensuring that UN diversity criteria is met, creates tension within the MAG membership as representatives nominated by different stakeholder and who have more legitimacy within their respective constituencies are not appointed to the MAG.

The stress on maintaining diversity is evident in the MAG membership’s gradual expansion from an initial group of 46 members in 2006 to include a total of 56 members as of 2015. However the increase in membership has not impacted representation of the technical, academic and civil society constituencies with only 56 members having been appointed from the three groups over the last decade.

This is problematic considering that at the time of its constitution of the MAG the composition did not recognise^[41] technical community as a distinct group, including it along with academic community as part of civil society. Consequently the three stakeholder groups have been represented collectively in the MAG and yet account for only 24.77% of the total membership compared to the government’s share of 39.3% and industry’s share of 35.7% respectively. At the regional level too membership across the three groups has ranged between 20-25% of the total membership.

The technical community is the least represented constituency accounting for only 5% of the total membership with only 10 members having been appointed over ten years. Of the 10, 6 were appointed from the WEOG region and there were no representatives appointed from the GRULAC region. Representatives from academia accounted for only 6% of the total membership with 13 representatives from the group having been appointed on the MAG. The technical community representation too was low from the US with only two members being appointed to the MAG and with each serving for a period of three years.

Civil society accounted for only 17% of the total membership with a total of 33 members and representation from the constituency was abysmally low across all regions. Civil society representation from the US included a total of five members, of which one served for one year, three served for two years each and only one representative continued for more than three years. Notably, there have been no academics from the US which is surprising given that most of the scholarship on internet governance is dominated by US scholars.

Industry was second largest represented group with a total of 64 members appointed to the MAG of which a whopping 30 members were appointed from the WEOG region. Representation was the highest across WEOG countries with 39.47% of the total membership and the group accounted for 32.4% and 32.5% of the total members from Africa and Asia Pacific respectively. Across Eastern European and GRULAC countries industry representation was very low accounting for merely 11.53% and 18.18% of the total membership respectively. Industry representative from the US Included two members serving one year each, five members who served two years each, two members who continued for three years each, one member was appointed for five years, one member who completed the maximum MAG term of eight years.

It is also interesting to note that the industry membership base expanded steadily, spiking in 2012 with a total of 40 representatives from the industry on the MAG. When assessed against the trend of the core leadership trickling out in 2012, the sudden increase in industry representation may point to attempts at capture from the stakeholder group in 2012. Industry representation from US in the MAG was by far the most consistent over the years and had the most evenly distributed appointment terms for members within a group.

Government has been the most dominant group within the MAG averaging a consistent 40% of the total membership over the last 10 years. At a regional level representation on the MAG was highest from Eastern Europe with more than 61% of its total membership comprising of individuals from the government constituency. GRULAC countries appointments to the MAG also demonstrate a preference for government representation with almost 58% of the total members appointed from within this group. The share of government representation in the total membership from Asia Pacific was 47.5% and 32.43% across Africa.

Another general policy followed in the selection procedure is that members are appointed for a period of one year, which is automatically extendable for two more years consecutively depending on their engagement in MAG activities. Members serving for one year term is inevitable due to the rotation policy, as new members replace existing members and often it may be the case of filling slots to ensure stakeholder group, geographic and gender diversity. Due to the limited resources made available for coordination between MAG members, one year appointments may not allow sufficient time for integrating new members into the procedures and workings of UN institutions.

Over the last decade 24.36% of the total appointed MAG members have been limited to serving a term of one year. Of the total 55 one year appointments 26 individuals served their first term in 2015 alone. This includes all nine representatives of civil society and it could be argued that for a stakeholder group with only 11% of the total membership share, such a rehaul weakens the ability of members to develop linkages severely limiting their ability to exert influence on decision making within the MAG.

Interestingly, the analysis reveals that one year term was a trend in the early years of the MAG where a core group took on the leadership role and continued guiding activities for newcomers including negotiating often conflicting agendas. The pattern of one year appointments was hardly visible from 2008-2012 but picked up again in 2013 and has continued ever since. The trend is perhaps indicative of the movement in the core MAG leadership as many of the original members retired or moved on to other engagements from 2010.

Importantly, the MAG ToR note that in case there is a lack of candidates fitting the desired area or under exceptional circumstances a member may continue beyond three years. However in the formative years the MAG this exception was the norm with most members continuing for more than three years. An analysis of the membership reveals that between 2006-2012 an elite core emerges which guided and was responsible for shaping the MAG and the IGF in its present day format. No doubt some of these members were exceptional talents and difficult to replace, however the lack of transparency in the nomination system makes it difficult to determine the basis on which these people continued beyond the stipulated one year term.

The analysis also suggests a shift in the leadership core over the last three years and points that a new leadership group is emerging which is distinguishable in that most members have served on the MAG for three or four years. Members serving for one, two or three years makes up more than 75% of the total membership and 111 individual members have served more than 2 years on the MAG. This could be the result of the depletion in membership of those familiar with internal workings and power structures within the UN, and the selection and rotation criteria and procedures that have weakened the original composition over the last decade.

Rotating membership might be necessary to prevent capture from any particular constituency or group, on the other hand more than half of the total members have spent less than three years on the MAG which makes the composition a shifting structure that limits long term engagement. Regular rotation of members can also lead to power struggles as continuing members exercise their influence to ensure that more members from within their constituency groups are appointed. Only seven individuals have completed the maximum term of eight years on the MAG while 23 individuals have completed five years or more on the MAG.

Finally, in terms of gender diversity, the ratio of male to female members is approximately 13:7 in the total membership with the approximate value in percentage being 65% and 35% respectively. Female representatives from WEOG countries dominate with a total of 29 women having been appointed from the region. Participation of women was the lowest across Asia Pacific and Eastern Europe with only nine and five representatives having been appointed respectively. There was a better balance of gender ratios across countries from Africa and GRULAC with 12 and 14 females having been appointed from the region.

Further analysis and visualisations derived from the MAG composition and identifying trends in appointment of individual members are available on the CIS website. The visualizations include MAG membership distribution across region^[42] and stakeholder groups^[43], evolution of stakeholder groups over the years^[44], stakeholder group distribution across countries^[45] and the timeline of total number of years served by individual members^[46]. The valuation also include a comparison of stakeholder group representatives appointed across India and the USA.^[47]

Recommendations: Reforming MAG & the IGF

Between April 4-6, 2016 the MAG convened in Geneva towards the IGF’s first planning meeting for the year^[48]. The meeting marks the beginning of MAG’s work in planning and delivering the forum, the first in its recently renewed and now extended mandate. This report is a much needed documentation of its working and processes and has been undertaken as an attempt to scrutinize if the MAG is truly a multi-stakeholder institution or if it is has evolved as a closed group of elite members cloaked in a multi-stakeholder name.

There is very little literature on the evolution of, or critiquing the MAG structure partly due to it being a relatively new structure and partly due its workings being shrouded in secrecy. The above analysis has been conducted with the aim of trying to understand MAG’s functioning of the selection of its membership. The paper explores the history of the formation of IGF and the MAG to identify the geo-political influences that have contributed to the MAG’s evolution and role in shaping the IGF over the last decade.

In this section I apply the theory of institutional isomorphism developed by DiMaggio and Powell in their seminal paper^[49] on organizational theory and social change. The paper posits that as organisations emerge as a field, a paradox arises where rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. A focus on institutional isomorphism can add a much needed perspective on the political struggle for organizational power and survival that is missing from much of discourse and literature around the IGF and the MAG.

A consideration of isomorphic processes also leads to a bifocal view of power and its application in modern politics. I believe that there is much to be gained by attending to similarity as well as to variation between organisations within the same field and, in particular, to change in the degree of homogeneity or variation over time. In this paper I have attempted to study the incremental change in the IGF mandate as well as in the selection of the MAG members.

Applying the theoretical framework proposed by DiMaggio and Powell I identify possible areas of concern and offer recommendations for improvement of the IGF and reform of the MAG. I detail these recommendations through the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity, professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. There is variability in the extent to and rate at which organizations in a field change to become more like their peers. Some organizations respond to external pressures quickly; others change only after a long period of resistance.

DiMaggio and Powell hypothesize that the greater the extent to which an organizational field is dependent upon a single (or several similar) source of support for vital resources, the higher the level of isomorphism. Their organisational theory also posits that the greater the extent to which the organizations in a field transact with agencies of the state, the greater the extent of isomorphism in the field as a whole. As my analysis reveals both hypotheses hold true for the IGF which is currently defined as a ‘project’ of the UNDESA. Since the IGF and the MAG are dependent on the UN for their existence, it is not surprising that both structures emulate the UN principles for diversity and governmental representation.

It is also worth noting that UN projects are normally not permanent and require regular renewal of mandate, reallocation of resources and budgets. When budget cuts take place as was the case during the global economic crisis, project funding is jeopardized as was the case when the IGF was left without an executive coordinator or a secretariat due to UN budget cuts.

This led to constituent groups coming together to directly fund the IGF secretariat through a special IGF Trust Fund created under an an agreement with the United Nations and to be administered by the UNDESA.^[50] The fund was drawn up to expire on 31 December 2015 and efforts to renew contribution to the fund for 2016 is being opposed and questions on the legality of the arrangement are being raised.^[51]

It is widely rumoured that the third party opposing the contribution is UNDESA itself. Securing guaranteed, stable and predictable funding for the IGF, including through a broadened donor base, is essential for the forum’s long term stability and ability to realize its underutilized potential. There have been several suggestions from the community in this regard including IT for Change’s suggestion that part of domain names tax collected by ICANN should to be dedicated to IGF funding through statutory/ constitutional arrangements. Centralisation of resources may lead to power structures being created and therefore any attempts at IGF and MAG reform in the future must consider the choice between incorporating the IGF as a permanent body with institutional funding under the UN and the implications of that on the forum’s structure.

There are four other hypotheses in DiMaggio and Powell’s framework that may be helpful in identifying levers for improvement of the IGF and the MAG. The first states that, the greater the extent to which goals are ambiguous within afield, the greater the rate of isomorphic change. As my analysis suggests, there is an urgent need to address the decade long debate on the MAG’s scope as a programme committee limited to planning an annual forum.

The question is linked to the broader need to clarify if the IGF will continue to evolve as an annual policy-dialogue forum or if it can take on a more substantive role that includes offering recommendations and assisting with development of policy on critical issues related to internet governance. Even the MAG is divided in its interpretation of its roles and responsibilities. A resurgence of the IGF necessitates that the global community reassess the need of the forum not only on the mandate assigned to it at the time of its conceptualisation but also in light of the newer and more complex challenges that have emerged over the decade.

The second hypothesis holds that the greater the extent of professionalization in a field greater the amount of institutional isomorphic change. DiMaggio and Powell measure professionalization by the universality of credential requirements, the robustness of training programs, or the vitality of professional associations. As the MAG composition analysis reveals the structure has evolved in a manner that gives preference to participation from the government and industry over participation from civil society, technical and academic communities.

Since the effect of institutional isomorphism is homogenization, the best indicator of isomorphic change is a decrease in variation and diversity, which could be measured by lower standard deviations of the values of selected indicators in a set of organizations. Such professionalization is evident in the functioning of the MAG that has taken on bureaucratic structure akin to other UN bodies where governmental approval weighs down an otherwise light-weight structure. Further the high level of industry representation creates distrust amongst other stakeholders and may be a reason the forum lacks legitimacy as a mechanism for governance as it could be perceived as being susceptible to capture.

The third hypothesis states that fewer the number of visible alternative organizational models in a field, the faster the rate of isomorphism in that field. The IGF occupies a special place in the UN pantheon of semi-autonomous groups and is often held up as a shining example of the ‘multistakeholder model’, where all groups have an equal say in decisions. Currently, there is no global definition of the multistakeholder model which at best remains a consensus framework for legitimizing Internet institutions.

It is worth noting that the system of sovereignty where authority is imposed is at odds with the earned authority within Internet institutions. Given the various interpretations of the approach, if multistakeholderism is to survive as a concept then it needs to be understood as a legitimizing principle that is strictly at odds with state sovereignty-based conceptions of legitimacy.^[52] Under a true multistakeholder system, states can have roles in Internet governance but they cannot unilaterally declare authority, or collectively assert it without the consent of the rest of the Internet.

Unfortunately as the MAG membership reveals the composition is dominated by governmental representatives who seek to enforce territorial authority over issues of global significance. Further, while alternative approaches to its application exist within the ecosystem they are context specific and have evolved within unique environments.^[53] As critics note emerging and existing platforms derived from the multistakeholder concept create ‘an embryonic form of transnational democracy’. Therefore it is important to recognise that the IGF is a physical manifestation of a much larger ideal, one where individuals and organizations have the ability to help shape the Internet and the information society to which it is intrinsically connected. This points to the need to study and develop alternative models to multistakeholder governance while continuing to strengthen existing practices and platforms.

As such, the IGF and its related local, national and regional initiatives represent a critical channel for expression especially for countries where such conversation is not pursued adequately and keeps discussions of the internet in the public space as opposed to building from regional/national initiatives. However, interaction between the global IGF and national IGFs is yet to be established. The MAG can play a critical role in developing and establishing mechanism to improve the national IGFs coordination with regional and national initiatives. A strengthened IGF could better serve national initiatives by providing formal backing and support to develop as platforms for engaging with long standing and emerging issues and identifying possible ways to address them.

DiMaggio and Powell’s final hypothesis holds that the greater the extent of structuration of a field, the greater the degree of isomorphism. As calls for creating structures to govern cyberspace pick up pace and given the extension of the IGF mandate its structure and working are in need of a rehaul. More research and analysis is needed to understand if there is a preferred approach for multistakeholder participation and engagement is emerging within both the IGF and MAG.

For example, if a portion or category of stakeholder group, countries and regions are not engaging in common dialogue, does the MAG have the mandate to promote and encourage participation? Has a process been established for ensuring a right balance when engaging different stakeholders and if yes, how is such a process initiated and promoted? The data shared by the IGF Secretariat confirmed that there were no records of the nomination procedure, that the membership list was missing for a year and that there was confusion in some cases who the nominees were are actually representing.

This opens up glaring questions on the legitimacy of the MAG such as on what criteria were MAG members selected and rotated? Was this evaluation undertaken by objective criteria or were representative handpicked by the UN? Moreover, it is important to asses of selection took place following an open call for nominations; or if members were handpicked by UN. Such analysis will help determine if there is scope within the current selection procedure to reach out to the wider multistakeholder community or if all MAG activities and discussions are restricted to its constituent membership. Clarifying the role of the IGF in the internet governance and policy space is inextricably linked to reforms in the MAG structure and processes and the questions raised above need urgent attention.

While these issues have been well known and documented for a number of years, yet there has been no progress on resolving them. Currently there is no website or document that lists the activities conducted by MAG in furtherance of ToR, nor does it produce annual report or maintain a publicly archived mailing list. Important recommendations for strengthening the IGF were made by the UN CSTD working group on IGF improvements.

The group took two years to produce its report identifying problems and offering recommendations that were to be implemented by end of 2015 and yet many of the problems identified within it have yet to be addressed. Worryingly, an internal MAG proposal to set up a working group to dig into the delays is being bogged down with discussions over scope and membership and a similar effort six months ago was also shot down.^[54]

The ineffectiveness of the MAG to institute reform have led to calls for a new oversight body with established bylaws as the MAG in its present form does not seem up to the task. Further the opaque decision making process and lack of clarity on the scope of the MAG means that each time it undertakes efforts for improvements these are thwarted as being outside of its mandate. There remains a lot of work to be done in strengthening the MAG structure as the group that undertakes the day-to-day work of the IGF and the many issues that plague the role and function of the IGF. A tentative beginning can be made by introducing transparency and accountability in MAG member selection.

^[1] This paper has been authored as part of a series on internet governance and has been made possible through a grant from the MacArthur Foundation.

^[2] The Internet Governance Forum See: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/

^[3] World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)+10 High-Level Meeting See: https://publicadministration.un.org/wsis10/

^[4]The mandate and terms of reference of the IGF are set out in paragraphs 72 to 80 of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (the Tunis Agenda). See: http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html

^[5] Samantha Bradshaw, Laura DeNardis, Fen Osler Hampson, Eric Jardine and Mark Raymond ‘The Emergence of Contention in Global Internet Governance’, the Centre for International Governance Innovation and Chatham House, 2015 See: https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no17.pdf

^[6] Mikael Wigell, ‘Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation in Global Governance’, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. June 2008, See: https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/6827/uploads

^[7] Arun Mohan Sukumar, India’s New ‘Multistakeholder’ Line Could Be a Game Changer in Global Cyberpolitics,The Wire, 22 June 2015 See:http://thewire.in/2015/06/22/indias-new-multistakeholder-line-could-be-a-gamechanger-in-global-cyberpolitics-4585/

^[8] Background Note on Sub-Theme Principles of Multistakeholder/Enhanced Cooperation, IGF Bali 2013 See: https://www.intgovforum.org/cmsold/2013/2013%20Press%20Releases%20and%20Articles/Principles%20of%20Multistakeholder-Enhanced%20Cooperation%20-%20Background%20Note%20on%20Sub%20Theme%20-%20IGF%202013-1.pdf

^[9] Statement by Mr. Santosh Jha, Director General, Ministry of External Affairs, at the First Session of the Review by the UN General Assembly on the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on Information Society in New York on July 1, 2015 See: https://www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/74416WSIS%20stmnt%20on%20July%201,%202015.pdf

^[10] Jean-Marie Chenou, Is Internet governance a democratic process ? Multistakeholderism and transnational elites, IEPI – CRII Université de Lausanne, ECPR General Conference 2011,Section 35 Panel 4 See: http://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/1526f449-d7a7-4bed-b09a-31957971ef6b.pdf

^[11] Ibid. 9

^[12] Kieren McCarthy, ‘Critics hit out at 'black box' UN internet body’, The Register 31 March 2016 See: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/31/black_box_un_internet_body/?page=3

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] Malcolm Jeremy, ‘Multistakeholder governance and the Internet Governance Forum, Terminus Press 2008

^[15] Background Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance June 2005 See: https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/wgig/docs/wgig-background-report.pdf

^[16] Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, Château de Bossey June 2005 http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf

^[17] Compilation of Comments received on the Report of the WGIG, PrepCom-3 (Geneva, 19-30 September 2005) See: http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1818%7C2008

^[18] U.S. Principles on the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System June 30, 2005 See: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2005/us-principles-internets-domain-name-and-addressing-system

^[19] Ibid. 16.

^[20] Tom Wright, ‘EU Tries to Unblock Internet Impasse’, International Herald Tribune

Published: September 30, 2005 See: http://www.nytimes.com/iht/2005/09/30/business/IHT-30net.html

^[21] Kieren McCarthy, Read the letter that won the internet governance battle’, The Register, 2 Dec 2005 See: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/02/rice_eu_letter/

^[22] United Nations Press Release, 2 March, 2006 Preparations begin for Internet Governance Forum,

http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sgsm10366.doc.htm

^[23] The Internet Society’s contribution on the formation of the Internet Governance Forum, February 2006 See: http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ISOC_IGF_CONTRIBUTION.pdf

^[24] APC, Questionnaire on the Convening the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) See:http://igf.wgig.org/contributions/apc-questionnaire.pdf

^[25] Milton Mueller, John Mathiason, Building an Internet Governance Forum, 2 Febryary 2006, See: http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/igp-forum.pdf

^[26] Ibid.

^[27] Supra note 11.

^[28] Supra note 20.

^[29] Consultations on the convening of the Internet Governance Forum, Transcript of Morning Session 16 February 2006. See: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/igf/unpan038960.pdf

^[30] Ibid.

^[31] Ibid.

^[32]Milton Mueller, ICANN Watch, ‘The Forum MAG: Who Are These People?’ May 2006 See: http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=06/05/18/226205&mode=thread

^[33] IGF Funding, See: https://intgovforum.org/cmsold/funding

^[34] Supra note 12.

^[35] Ibid.

^[36] ICANN’s infiltration of the MAG was evident in the composition of the first advisory group which included Alejandro Pisanty and Veni Markovski who were sitting ICANN Board members, one staff member (Theresa Swineheart), two former ICANN Board members (Nii Quaynor and Masanobu Katoh); two representatives of ccTLD operators (Chris Disspain and Emily Taylor); two representatives of the Regional Internet Address Registries (RIRs) (Raul Echeberria and Adiel Akplogan). Even the "civil society" representatives appointed were all associated with either ICANN's At Large Advisory Committee or its Noncommercial Users Constituency (or both) Adam Peake of Glocom, Robin Gross of IP Justice, Jeanette Hofmann of WZ Berlin, and Erick Iriarte of Alfa-Redi.

^[37] United Nations Press Release, Secretary General establishes Advisory Group to assist him in convening Internet Governance Forum, 17 May 2006 See: http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sga1006.doc.htm

^[38] Jeremy Malcolm, Multi-Stakeholder Public Policy Governance and its Application to the Internet Governance Forum See: https://www.malcolm.id.au/thesis/x31762.html

^[39] MAG Spreadsheet CIS Website https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uZzfBz9ihj1M0QSvlnORE0nRD62TCRxhA5d1E_RKfhc/edit#gid=1912343648

^[40] Terms of Reference for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) Individual Member Responsibilities and Group Procedures See: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/175-igf-2015/2041-mag-terms-of-reference

^[41] United Nations Press Release, Secretary General establishes Advisory Group to assist him in convening Internet Governance Forum, 17 May 2006 See: http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sga1006.doc.htm

^[42] IGF MAG Membership Analysis, 2006-2015 http://cis-india.github.io/charts/2016.04_MAG-analysis/CIS_MAG-Analysis-2016_Treemap.html

^[43] IGF MAG Membership - Stakeholder Types and Regions - 2006-2015 See: http://cis-india.github.io/charts/2016.04_MAG-analysis/CIS_MAG-Analysis-2016_StakeholderTypes-Regions.html

^[44] IGF MAG Membership - Stakeholder Types across Years - 2006-2015 See: http://cis-india.github.io/charts/2016.04_MAG-analysis/CIS_MAG-Analysis-2016_StakeholderTypes-Years.html

^[45] IGF MAG Membership - Stakeholder Types and Countries - 2006-2015 See: http://cis-india.github.io/charts/2016.04_MAG-analysis/CIS_MAG-Analysis-2016_StakeholderTypes-Country.html

^[46] IGF MAG Membership Timeline, 2006-2015 See: http://cis-india.github.io/charts/2016.04_MAG-analysis/CIS_MAG-Analysis-2016_Member-Timeline.html

^[47] MAG Membership - India and USA - 2006-2015

See: http://cis-india.github.io/charts/2016.04_MAG-analysis/CIS_MAG-Analysis-2016_StakeholderTypes-India-USA.html

^[48] MAG Meetings in 2016

http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/open-consultations-and-mag-meeting

^[49] Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, Yale University, American Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48 (April: 147-160)

^[50] United Nations Funds-In-Trust Project Document Project number: GLO/11/X01 Project title: Internet Governance Forum Country/area: Global Start date: 1 April 2011 End date: 31 December 2015 Executing agency: UNDESA Funding: Multi-donor – extrabudgetary Budget: Long-term project framework – budget “A” See: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2013/TrustFund/Project%20document%20IGF.pdf

^[51] Kieren McCarthy, Critics hit out at 'black box' UN internet body, The Register 31 March 2016 See: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/31/black_box_un_internet_body/?page=2

^[52] Eli Dourado, Too Many Stakeholders Spoil the Soup, Foreign Policy, 15 May 2013 See:http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/15/too-many-stakeholders-spoil-the-soup/

^[53] IANA Transition, NetMundial are some of the other examples of multi-stakeholder engagement.

^[54] Ibid.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/mapping-mag-a-study-in-institutional-isomorphism

Mapping Digital Media: Broadcasting, Journalism and Activism in India: A Public Consultation

samantha — 2013-11-07T03:38:45Z

Lawyers, researchers, journalists and activists gathered on Sunday, October 27, 2013 at the Bangalore International Centre in response to India’s country report on Mapping Digital Media, which examines citizen’s access to quality news and information across different industries, and impacts on media freedoms as a result of digitisation. Respondents examined themes related to regulation, journalism and activism, and engaging discussions took place among attendees.

On behalf of event organizers, we invite you to view the report, available online for free access here: "Mapping Digital Media: India.

Event organizers, Alternative Law Forum, The Centre for Internet & Society, and Maraa, held a public consultation at the Bangalore International Centre with the ultimate goals to inform and engage the public within key themes of the Mapping Digital Media: India report, as a new knowledge basis for better understanding India’s transitioning digital landscape. Many resulting ideas about moving forward with the report’s findings also came about, as prospective proceeding steps within the life cycle following the report’s release.

Respondents consisted of reputed media lawyers, researchers, journalists, activist and other media professionals. Each spoke before the meeting room within three panel discussions pertaining to different sections of the report: Policies, Laws and Regulators; Digital Activism; and Digital Journalism. Each speaker shed a new light on key challenges confronting our emergent digital media landscape with special focus given to broadcasting (radio and television), cable operations and newspapers (print & online) as each of these sectors undergo digitisation.

Opening

Vibodh Parthasarathi, who had anchored the country report, started off the consultation by underscoring the report's objective of mapping the different sectors and seemingly disparate aspects of India's complex media landscape. Following a brief introduction to the report was the setting of the stage by Alternative Law Forum Co-founder and Partner, Lawrence Liang, as he shared the ultimate aims of the event in speaking collectively to the report so that we may gain a better understanding of an area that is otherwise opaque by most. Lawrence also brings to the forefront the report’s debunking of the idea of the digital divide for India, and its account of a rich media landscape.

Policies, Laws and Regulators

The consultation’s first panel discussion was started by Lawrence, as he responded to the report from a perspective of legality. Lawrence examines the role of the state in India’s rich media landscape, specifically in terms of the four values at the centre of such: freedom of speech and expression, access to infrastructure, the question of development, and the question of market regulations—all of which are tied together within the country report. Lawrence argues that we must arrive at quantitative measures of accessing diversity and quantity of freedom of speech, but only after understanding the ecology in which freedom of speech operates, and attempts to do so in examining drafted policies, policing measures, and market regulatory measures taken within the context of India.

Thirty attendees including journalists, activists, academics, and lawyers, all brought forth different perspectives on digital media in India.

Following was Matthew John, Associate Professor and Executive Director of the Centre on Public law and Jurisprudence. Matthew shared his impressions on the report, while making reference to three issues the report asks us to rethink; these being: public reason, the regulatory state, and the question of distribution. Matthew gives rise to a democratic problem in the public sphere of communication and claims that how it is addressed and resolved must be paid attention to. He makes reference to the history of telecom cases in responding to the question of how we are going to think about freed up telecom, and contrasts different types of regulatory agencies in asking the question of whether or not we should separate regulation from politics.

An engaging discussion following this panel’s speakers took place. Amongst points made by event attendees includes questions of how to scale up the citizen’s stake in media within a legal paradigm, as well as points made with reference to challenges to equity in media in terms of content and challenges to such.

Digital Media and Society (Digital Activism)

The discussion had begun with panelist, Arjun Venkatraman, Co-founder of the Mojolab Foundation as well as the digital activism platform, Swara. Arjun engages within the digital media debate in speaking on behalf of members of civil society that act from within the digital divide and exposes the gaps within new modes of activism that arise out of a lack of understanding on how to engage with these new medias. He also informed attendees of how to make cheap IVR based voice portals, linking voice users to the web for under USD200 as means of leveraging users’ voices via unlicensed spectrum.

Also contributing to the discussion on digital activism was Meera K, Cofounder of Bangalore News publication, Citizen Matters. In examining examples of new spaces that digital media has provided for the exchange of pluralistic views and alternative voices, Meera critiques different types of activism that have emerged, including social activism, political activism, and middle class activism. She questions whether new media can be seen as sufficient space for free speech with reference to various challenges, such as the polarization of debates, and also compares and contrasts the positive outcomes of new media campaigns—such as tangible capitalized solutions—with corresponding pitfalls.

A debate amongst attendees followed in response to the question of assessing the value of media in terms of impact or size of public outreach, along with how content is generated and controlled.

Digital Media and Journalism

Independent journalist and media analyst, Geeta Seshu, got the conversation started regarding digital media and journalism by comparing the pitfalls of journalism in traditional media with the possibilities offered by digital journalism. Geeta argues that journalists have become devalued and are losing their footing within traditional media. She discussed the new forms of journalism and how news can be generated in an interactive and non-hierarchical manner and examined the intersections of mainstream media and journalism. She questions the possibility of digital journalism existing on its own, without the influence of or incorporation of principles of traditional media, and grapples with possibilities for providing a new model for doing so.

The day’s last speaker was Subhash Rai, Associate Editor of New Indian Express. Subhash offers a mainstream perspective and argues that we must look at traditional and mainstream forms of media as a starting point for emerging forms of journalism before we can begin to understand these journalism models better. Just as well, traditional and mainstreams means of news dissemination can learn from digital media, however we should not be quick to look away from the core of the entire picture, as traditional forms of media are still very strong in comparison.

A discussion followed surrounded questions posed by speakers and attendees, such as what digital journalism should look like, and how such a transition to new forms of media should be imagined. How information has changed with respect to its creation and consumption was debated as well.

Moving Forward

Before the conclusion of the public consultation, attendees and speakers discussed future advancements for the country report. Many recommendations and ideas were generated, including suggestions for future public consultations, advocacy windows offered by the report, and ways to produce another iteration of the report. Prospective initiatives included online working groups to dive deeper into specific themes of the report, a Hackathon where attendees will pool ideas together, and follow-up public consultations.


Participants brainstormed together on how to move forward the report’s findings. Many ideas were drafted, including a Hack-a-thon and online focus groups.

The event's agenda went as follows:

Time	Detail
10.00 a.m.	Introductory Remarks by Vibodh Parthasarathi, CCMG, Jamia
10.15 a.m. - 11.30 a.m.	Policies, Laws and Regulators Session Moderator – Ram Bhat Speakers – Lawrence Liang (ALF) and Mathew John (JGLS)
11.30 a.m. - 11.45 a.m.	Tea Break
11.45 a.m. - 1.15 p.m.	Digital Media and Society (Digital Activism) Session Moderator – Lawrence Liang Speakers – Arjun Venkatraman (Mojolab) and Meera K (Citizen Matters)
1.15 p.m. - 2.00 p.m.	Lunch Break
2.00 p.m. - 3.15 p.m.	Digital Media and Journalism Session Moderator – Vibodh Parthasarathi Speakers – Geeta Seshu (Free Speech Hub) and Subhash Rai (newindianexpress.com)
3.15 p.m. - 4.00 p.m.	The Way Ahead (Moving Forward) Moderated by Lawrence Liang

Event Participants

Rashmi Vallabhrajasyuva
Meera K, Oorvani Foundation
Samantha Cassar, CIS
Sharath Chandra Ram, CIS
Suresh Kumar, Artist
Aruna Sekhar, Amnesty India
Sriram Sharma, Part time Blogger
Ammu Joseph, Independent Researcher
Mathew John, Jindal Global Law School
Swati Mehta, The Rules
James North, The Rules
Bhairav Acharya, Lawyer
Deepa Kurup, The Hindu
Abhilash N, Independent
Deepu, Pedestrian Pictures
Rashmi M, PhD Student at NIAS
Jayanth S, LOCON Solutions Pvt Ltd.
Nehaa Chaudhari, CIS
Dinesh TB, Servelots
Snehashish Ghosh, CIS
Lawrence Liang, ALF
Vibodh Parthasarathi, CCMG, Jamia
Ram Bhat, Maraa
Ashish Sen, AMARC
Subhash Rai, New Indian Express
Geeta Seshu, Free Speech Hub, The Hoot
Arjun Venkatraman, Mojo Lab Foundation
Raajen, Centre for Education and Documentation
Ekta, Maraa
Smarika Kumar, ALF

Press Coverage

Need to increase diversity in online journalism (The New Indian Express, October 28, 2013).
Experts moot holistic approach to media laws (The Hindu, October 28, 2013).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/mapping-digital-media-broadcasting-journalism-activism-india

Mapping Digital Media: Broadcasting, Journalism and Activism in India — A Public Consultation

praskrishna — 2013-10-25T10:46:24Z

Alternative Law Forum, Maraa and the Centre for Internet and Society invite you to a public consultation on Mapping Digital Media in India, on October 27, 2013 at the Bangalore International Centre from 10 a.m. to 4.00 p.m.

Click to download the background note, press invite and press release and the poster of the event.

Here, reputed media lawyers, researchers, journalists, activists and other media professionals will be responding to a recent report that examines the progress of digitisation in India and its impact on media freedom and citizen’s access to quality news and information—the fundamental principles underpinning the Open Society Foundations’ work on media and communications.

Recently, India decided to make digitalise distribution of television signals across India in a phased manner, further contributing to the phenomenon of global digitisation, as citizens enter the fully digital broadcast world. While there may be perceived benefits of the ‘digital switchover’ in terms of freeing up spectrum, increase in quality of signals and so on, the full impact of digitalisation on plurality, diversity, ownership of media and content is yet to be comprehended fully.

Through this public consultation, hosts, Maraa, the Alternative Law Forum (ALF) and the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), hope to shed light on key challenges confronting our emergent digital landscape while incorporating the input of those directly affected by this digitisation, India’s digital consumers, in a widened discussion on the matter. Speakers will directly respond to three sections of the country report – Regulation, Digital Activism and Journalism, and discussions to focus on trends in broadcasting (radio and television), cable operations and newspapers (print & online) as each of these sectors undergo digitalisation.

We would appreciate your participation at this public consultation so that we each may become better informed with regards to India’s digital media landscape and contribute to discussion as we strive to better comprehend the multifaceted picture that is emerging as this media digitisation takes place and look forward to hearing your input.

The India report is available for free download at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/mapping-digital-media-india

Agenda

Policies, Laws and Regulators
10.00 a.m. - 10.30 a.m.	Lawrence Liang
10.30 a.m. - 11.00 a.m.	Mathew John
11.00 a.m. - 11.30 a.m.	Q & A
11.30 a.m. - 11.45 a.m.	Tea Break

Impact of Digital Media on Activism
11.45 a.m. - 12.15 p.m.	Arjun Venkatraman
12.15 p.m. - 12.45 p.m.	Meera K
12.45 p.m. - 1.15 p.m.	Q & A
1.15 p.m. - 2.00 p.m.	Lunch Break

Impact of Digital Media on Journalism
2.00 p.m. - 2.30 p.m.	Geeta Seshu
2.30 p.m. - 3.00 p.m.	Subhash Rai
3.00 p.m. - 3.30 p.m.	Q & A
Closing Remarks

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/mapping-digital-media-public-consultation-october-27-bangalore

Mapping cybersecurity in India: An infographic

Arindrajit Basu, Karan Saini, Aayush Rathi and Swaraj Barooah — 2018-12-23T16:57:24Z

This infographic maps the key stakeholder, areas of focus and threat vectors that impact cybersecurity policy in India. Broadly, policy-makers should concentrate on establishing a framework where individuals feel secure and trust the growing digital ecosystem. The infographic therefore serves as a ready reference point for the research that we have done and hope to continue through our cybersecurity work at CIS.

Infographic designed by Saumyaa Naidu

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-karan-saini-aayush-rathi-and-swaraj-paul-barooah-december-23-mapping-cyber-security-in-india-infographic

Many sites bypass porn ban

Admin — 2018-12-24T15:45:25Z

They use proxy and mirror sites to cater to India, now on a list of countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that block intimate content online.

The article by Rajitha Menon was published in Deccan Herald on December 6, 2018. Akriti Bopanna was quoted.

The government has got Internet service providers (ISPs) to block 827 websites with pornographic content.

The instruction was based on an order of the Uttarakhand High Court, which reinstated a government order in 2015, on the grounds that watching porn promotes sexual assault.

After a failed ban, the government had got its way, armed with a court order. A horrifying gang rape at a Dehradun school prompted the Uttarakhand court order. According to reports, four students assaulted a girl after watching porn clips.

The order cites no scientific evidence to link pornography with sexual assault. Many in Bengaluru are sceptical not just about the order but also by the assumption that porn can be effectively blocked.

The Internet has plenty of options and the number of porn websites out there is certainly more than 827, they say. It is not rocket science to figure out how to bypass the filters by using virtual private networks (VPN); the Opera browser uses this. Several porn sites have launched altered URLs so that Indian users can still access their content.

Proxy websites, such as Hidester, Hide.me, Whoer.net, and Anonymouse, easily bypass the block. Other sites like Behance.net advise their clients to download their mobile app and browse anonymously.

Even for those who are not that tech savvy, there is a massive market of offline pornography. Porn DVDs or porn on a flash drive can be found on sale everywhere.

Then, Indian law does not ban porn. Watching porn in private is not a criminal offence, say lawyers. Storing and publishing images of child sexual abuse are, however, punishable.

Mobile users are already complaining that ISPs are blocking porn sites.

Finally, what are the sociological and psychological consequences of the ban? Metrolife spoke to some experts to find out.

Deepika Nambiar,Â Clinical psychologist ,Â Abhayahasta Multispeciality Hospital

Banning porn is not the answer. Watching porn is a personal choice. Porn can affect people but it does not override their values. People with aggressive tendencies or with personality issues might get affected though. When it comes to adverse consequences on children, parents should have control. When we ban something, the curiosity increases. And there are many sources for this kind of thing on the Internet. Children are curious or under peer pressure to watch such videos. This can result in addiction later on, if there is no one to tell them where to draw the line. Parents should keep a watch on kids isolating themselves and spending too much time alone.

Amba Salelkar,Â Lawyer, Equals Centre for Promotion of Social Justice

There is ample evidence to show there is no correlation between access to pornographic material and incidents of sexual assault. Also, it is not that all pornographic material is shot non-consensually or is exploitative in nature. In fact, there is an emerging area of feminist pornography. If the question is of prevention, you might as well strengthen sex education in the country. People have to resort to videos on the Internet to clarify their doubts and that is not a good thing. Sex-positive education should be included in school curriculums. We need to strengthen mechanisms to tackle cases of revenge porn and videos that promote violence against women. We also need to engage with website providers instead of banning them.

Raj Armani, CEO, Imbesharam.com, Adult store

I think it is illogical to connect the rising cases of rape with porn consumption. India cannot be truly democratic if the government decides to moral police people. It has to eventually accept that the new generation is ready and able to balance their traditions as well as their freedom of choice and expression. In one way, we are opening the doors by decriminalising gay sex and on the other side, we are closing windows. Associating rape to watching porn is as illogical as associating a murder with a Bollywood or Hollywood crime thriller. The boundaries of law, humanity and decency always override any content consumption. On the contrary, the lack of porn may lead to a build-up of unhealthy energy and cause it to go haywire.

Akriti Bopanna, Programme Office, Centre for Internet and Society

Viewing porn is not illegal but publishing obscene content, which pornography can be construed as, is illegal under sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act. Section 69 (A) of the Act allows the government to order blocking of public access to websites. Moreover, under Section 79 (3) (b) of the Act, governments can get away with making ISPs ban porn since it mandates intermediaries to comply with government orders in the case of unlawful acts. Otherwise they lose their safe harbour provisions.

The Supreme Court in 2015 stated you canâ??t stop citizens from watching porn within their own homes. This was prior to the Puttaswamy judgment, and now that the right to privacy has been declared a right, banning porn websites can be argued as a violation of it.

There is a high risk of a ban being counterproductive in that it will compel individuals to access websites with lax security or shoddy VPNs. These then put people in danger because their information can be logged by such entities, giving access to tracking for advertising and creating malware problems. Not all VPNs are sound, so the individual will still be legally unsafe since information could be potentially traceable.

Dr Rizwana Begum, Psychotherapist, Aviva Psychological Clinic

Porn does encourage abusive sex. The acts shown in pornographic videos are more like fantasy, not really achievable in reality. When one wants to fulfil the fantasy, the other partner might not be okay with it. This affects a lot of relationships as shame and guilt are induced. It leads to aggression, disgust and rejection. There is a rise in the number of cases of pornography addiction, especially among single men. Also, the concept of multiple partners in a sexual act was introduced through pornographic videos and is leading to disorder and violence in real life.

How it started

In 2013, Indore-based advocate Kamlesh Vaswani filed a public interest case in the Supreme Court seeking a ban on porn. He came up with a list of 857 websites which he wanted the court to ban. He argued that most of the porn online is exploitative and increases violent sexual behaviour in the real world.

The court asked the government to find ways to block porn. The government formed the Cyber Regulation Advisory Committee, chaired by then telecom and IT minister Ravi Shankar Prasad.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-rajitha-menon-december-6-2018-many-sites-bypass-porn-ban

Mandatory Aadhaar card for govt scholarships violates SC order

praskrishna — 2016-07-30T15:55:38Z

There seems to be no end to the government’s legal troubles.

The article by Neelam Pandey and Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on July 15, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The human resource development (HRD) ministry has made Aadhaar mandatory for government scholarship and fellowship from this academic year, a move that violates the Supreme Court’s order.

Under this decision, the government will transfer the funds to the students’ bank accounts only after they submit their Aadhaar number.

The court had last August barred the government from using Aadhaar for any purpose other than distributing food grain and cooking fuel such as kerosene and LPG. The SC had gone further to rule that production of Aadhaar would not be condition for obtaining any benefits due to a citizen.

It was this SC order that prompted the government to push the Aadhaar law through Parliament to ensure that the court’s restriction did not come in the way of expanding the direct benefit transfer project.

The law – that was passed by Parliament – gave the government powers to make Aadhaar mandatory for receiving any benefit, facility or service that involved any expenditure from the public exchequer.

But most provisions of the Aadhaar law have not come into force yet.

This week, it notified provisions that enabled it to appoint the chairperson of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) that issues the 12-digit unique number and set up offices in cities outside Delhi.

“This appears to be contempt of court,” said Sunil Abraham, head of the Bengaluru-headquartered advocacy group, Centre for Internet and Society.

Thomas Mathew, one of the petitioners in the case pending before the Supreme Court, agreed. “I am going to move a contempt petition against the HRD ministry and UGC,” Mathew said, pointing that oil companies were also forcing people to get Aadhaar.

The UGC directive to central universities sets July-end as the deadline for scholars at central universities to get their Aadhaar number. Many scholars who did not have an Aadhaar number said the fellowship were an important source of income for them to get by.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-neelam-pandey-aloke-tikku-july-15-2016-mandatory-aadhaar-card-for-govt-scholarships-violates-sc-order

Managing Spectrum

radha — 2011-08-18T04:54:56Z

The Empowered Group of Ministers' goal should be nothing short of a broadband revolution - Shyam Ponappa / New Delhi, November 5, 2009 (Business Standard)

In communications services, the high demand for spectrum compared with limited supply is well established. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) estimates demand in five years at 580 MHz, with current assignment to commercial operators at about 160 MHz. In this limited amount, fragmented spectrum holdings reduce efficiency, and broadband
growth and availability have been abysmal. Therefore, the policy alternatives evaluated should include ways to maximise utility through conserving resources and facilitating broadband Internet. The Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) needs this analysis to make informed decisions. The related issue of maximising utility from facilities, i.e., sharing networks for maximum benefit while conserving capital, thereby resulting in lower prices, likewise deserves serious consideration. For this, they need inputs on the benefits and costs of coordinated policy reform to promote broadband through incentives and penalties.

Having said that, it is for the officials providing support to the EGoM to structure, analyse and prioritise issues and provide the requisite information to facilitate informed decisions on complex choices. This requires appropriate inputs on technology as well. Efforts on all these aspects seem inadequate, with the EGoM being simply not adequately informed.

Trai recently began a consultation process, addressing a host of issues relating to 3G, Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) and licensing. A major deficiency is that no purposive goals and objectives are indicated, nor is there a facilitating logic to the structuring of issues (57 wide-ranging questions, with roughly three weeks for comments).

This is because Trai has posed issues built up over the years in one burst, resulting in the equivalent of a “flash flood”. Instead, structured consultations on discrete sets of questions, as in the indicative example below, are likely to yield better results. However, given where we are — the usual how-far-to-go-in-how-little-time — an organised, logical presentation with relevant inputs would improve the chances of good decisions and outcomes. Here is a suggested road map.

GOALS & OBJECTIVES
The first requirement for the consultation process is clear objectives based on needs. As Trai has not provided this, here are indicative constructs:

Our policies for infrastructure should be in public interest. In communications, these are:

Ready access anywhere in the country to: (a) good services and (b) at reasonable prices.
The services can be thought of as “Broadband Internet” and “Voice and SMS”.

(Note: There are very different objectives for broadcasting, which is outside the scope of these comments.)

DECISION TREES & ISSUE MAPS

A decision tree is an alternative to wading through a welter of unstructured questions, starting with fundamental objectives, using a logical decision map/issue map as a framework (see graphic). This requires judgment in selecting, organising and prioritising issues. The example assumes that the least capital and operating costs (while maintaining high quality) are appropriate criteria for services in public interest.

These decisions will determine how issues of licensing and consolidation/acquisitions pan out. Questions on pricing remain, e.g., per cent of revenues for licences and spectrum charges, and the timing of fees (i.e., cash flow from a fiscal perspective). If the decision is to pool spectrum, there are critical questions on Administered Incentive Pricing. The same principles of concessions and incentives (i.e., subsidies) as for sectors like power and highways need to be applied. Finally, there needs to be rationalisation in non-commercial uses, e.g., governance and defence.

SPECTRUM & NETWORK EFFICIENCY=LOWER COSTS

Given our fragmented spectrum holdings, perceived scarcity and economic efficiencies of limited competition in networks, there is reason to explore an approach to conserving spectrum and consolidating facilities. Spectrum can either be given or licensed for exclusive use in bands to separate operators as is done now, or be made available in large (at least 20 MHz) blocks to all operators for common use. Alternatively, operators can be given incentives to pool licensed spectrum to create a common capacity. The same approach can be explored for networks (facilities that use spectrum); these too can be pooled and shared if individually owned. Operators do this in a limited way, e.g., sharing towers, but pooling can be organised and extended much further.

Ill-considered policies that increase competition for its own sake because of the predominance of doctrinaire “free-market” notions have displaced more appropriate market structures. In India, this has resulted in 12-14 operators per service area, compared with the global average of three-five. The economics of networks favour limits to competition, because networks lend themselves to a limited-player (monopolistic or oligopolistic) market.*

Interestingly, an economist at the US Federal Communications Commission has this to say: “…For what should competition be promoted? Promoting competition for particular services can have major implications for the evolution of regulation and the long-term competitive structure of the industry. Unfortunately, the ‘competition for what?’ question has not received adequate consideration.”**

The benefit of using contiguous bands of spectrum is that costs could be significantly lower for equivalent voice and data capacity because of less advanced technology and less density of towers and equipment. Likewise for shared networks. With competition and good regulation, the likely result is lower costs, both for Broadband Internet and for Voice and SMS.

CONCLUSION

An inter-disciplinary consultation with stakeholders and specialists is essential to consider spectrum and sharing of facilities. Companies like Ericsson, Nokia, Motorola and Qualcomm as well as Google, Intel and possibly cable companies (Liberty Global?) should be invited. The EGoM’s goal should be nothing short of a broadband revolution. We need this for
education and vocational training, health care, governance and economic productivity across the board.

shyamponappa@gmail.com

*A rational spectrum allocation policy, BS, July 2, 2009

** Douglas A Galbi, Senior Economist, US FCC

Link to original article

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/managing-spectrum

Making Voices Heard

shweta — 2022-06-27T16:18:36Z

We are happy to announce the launch of our final report on the study ‘Making Voices Heard: Privacy, Inclusivity, and Accessibility of Voice Interfaces in India. The study was undertaken with support from the Mozilla Corporation.

We believe that voice interfaces have the potential to democratise the use of the internet by addressing limitations related to reading and writing on digital text-only platforms and devices. This report examines the current landscape of voice interfaces in India, with a focus on concerns related to privacy and data protection, linguistic barriers, and accessibility for persons with disabilities (PwDs).

The report features a visual mapping of 23 voice interfaces and technologies publicly available in India, along with a literature survey, a policy brief towards development and use of voice interfaces and a design brief documenting best practices and users’ needs, both with a focus on privacy, languages, and accessibility considerations, and a set of case studies on three voice technology platforms. Read and download the full report here

Credits

Research: Shweta Mohandas, Saumyaa Naidu, Deepika Nandagudi Srinivasa, Divya Pinheiro, and Sweta Bisht.

Conceptualisation, Planning, and Research Inputs: Sumandro Chattapadhyay, and Puthiya Purayil Sneha.

Illustration: Kruthika NS (Instagram @theworkplacedoodler). Website Design Saumyaa Naidu. Website Development Sumandro Chattapadhyay, and Pranav M Bidare.

Review and Editing: Puthiya Purayil Sneha, Divyank Katira, Pranav M Bidare, Torsha Sarkar, Pallavi Bedi, and Divya Pinheiro.

Copy Editing: The Clean Copy

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/making-voices-heard

Making the Powerful Accountable

chinmayi — 2014-01-30T06:43:41Z

If powerful figures are not subjected to transparent court proceedings, the opacity in the face of a critical issue is likely to undermine public faith in the judiciary.

Chinmayi Arun's Op-ed was published in the Hindu on January 29, 2014.

It is odd indeed that the Delhi High Court seems to believe that sensational media coverage can sway the Supreme Court into prejudice against one of its own retired judges. Justice Manmohan Singh of the Delhi High Court has said in Swatanter Kumar v. Indian Express and others that the pervasive sensational media coverage of the sexual harassment allegations against the retired Supreme Court judge 'may also result in creating an atmosphere in the form of public opinion wherein a person may not be able to put forward his defence properly and his likelihood of getting fair trial would be seriously impaired.' This Delhi High court judgment has drawn upon the controversial 2011 Supreme Court judgment in Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd v. SEBI (referred to as the Gag Order case here) to prohibit the media from publishing headlines connecting retired Justice Swatanter Kumar with the intern's allegations, and from publishing his photograph in connection with the allegations.

Although the Gag Order judgment was criticised at the time that it was delivered Swatanter Kumar v. Indian Express illustrates its detractors' argument more vividly that anyone could have imagined.

Sukumar Muralidharan wrote of Gag Order case that the postponement (of media coverage) order remedy that it created, could become an "instrument in the hands of wealthy and influential litigants, to subvert the course of open justice".

Here we find that although a former Supreme Court judge is pitted against a very young former intern within a system over which he once presided, Justice Manmohan Singh seems to think that it is the judge who is danger of being victimised.

The Swatanter Kumar judgment was enabled by both the Gag Order case as well as the 1966 Supreme Court judgment in Naresh Sridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, which in combination created a process for veiling court proceedings. Naresh Mirajkar stated that courts' inherent powers extend to barring media reports and comments on ongoing trials in the interests of justice, and that such powers do not violate the right to freedom of speech; and the Gag Order case created an instrument - the 'postponement order' - for litigants, such that they can have media reports of a pending case restricted. The manner in which this is used in the Swatanter Kumar judgment raises very worrying questions about how the judiciary views the boundaries of the right to freedom of expression, particularly in the context of reporting court proceedings.

Broad power to restrict reporting

The Gag Order case was problematic: it used arguments for legitimate restraints on media reporting in exceptional circumstances, to permit restrictions on media reporting of court proceedings under circumstances 'where there is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to proper administration of justice'. The Supreme Court refused to narrow this or clarify what publications would fall within this category. It merely stated that this would depend on the content and context of the offending publication, and that no 'straightjacket formula' could be created to enumerate these categories. This leaves higher judiciary with a broad discretionary power to decide what amounts to
legitimate restraints on media reporting, using an ambiguous standard. Exercise of this power to veil proceedings involving powerful public figures whose actions have public implications, imperils openness and transparency when they are most critical.

Court proceedings are usually open to the public. This openness serves as a check on the judiciary, and ensures public faith in the judiciary. In countries as large as ours, media coverage of important cases ensures actual openness of court proceedings - we are able to follow the arguments made by petitioners who ask that homosexuality be decriminalised, the trial of suspected terrorists and alleged murderers, and the manner in which our legal system handles sexual harassment complaints filed by young women.

When court proceedings are closed to the public (known as 'in-camera' trials) or when media dissemination of information about them is restricted, the openness and transparency of court proceedings is compromised. Such compromise of transparency does take place in many countries, to protect the rights of the parties involved, or prevent miscarriage of justice. For example, child-participants are protected by holding trials in-camera; names of parties to court proceedings are withheld to protect their privacy sometimes; and in countries where juries determine guilt, news coverage that may prejudice the jury is also restricted.

The damage done

Although the Supreme Court stated in principle that the openness of court proceedings should only be restricted where strictly necessary, this appears to lend itself to very varied interpretation. For example, it is very difficult for some of us to understand why it was strictly necessary to restrict media coverage of sexual harassment proceedings in the Swatanter Kumar case. J. Manmohan Singh on the other hand seems to believe that the adverse public opinion will affect the retired judge's chance of getting a fair trial. His judgment also seems to indicate his concern that the sensational headlines will impact the public confidence in the Supreme Court.

The Delhi High Court's apprehension about the effects of the newspaper coverage on the reputation of the judge did not need to translate into a prior restraint on media coverage. They may better have been addressed later, by evaluating a defamation claim pertaining to published material. The larger concerns about the reputation of the judiciary are better addressed by openness: if powerful public figures, especially those with as much influence as a former Supreme Court judge are not subjected to transparent court proceedings, the opacity in the face of such a critical issue is likely to undermine public faith in the judiciary as an institution.Such opacity undermines the purpose of open courts. It is much worse for the reputation of the judiciary than publicised complaints about individual judges.

Since the Delhi High Court ruling, there has been little media coverage of the sexual harassment case. Suppression of media coverage leaves the young woman comparatively isolated. Wide coverage of the harassment complaint involving Justice Ganguly, helped the intern in that case find support. The circulation of information enabled other former interns as well as a larger network of lawyers and activists, reach out to her. This is apart from the general pressure to be fair that arises when a case is being followed closely by the public. Media coverage is often critical to whether someone relatively powerless is able to assert her rights against a very powerful person. This is why media freedom is sacred to democracies.

If the Supreme Court was confident that the high courts in India would use their broad discretionary power under the Gag Order case sparingly and only in the interests of justice, the Swatanter Kumar case should offer it grounds to reconsider. Openness and freedom of expression are not meant to be diluted to protect the powerful - they exist precisely to ensure that even the powerful are held accountable by state systems that they might otherwise be able to sway.

(Chinmayi Arun is research director, Centre for Communication Governance, National Law University, Delhi, and fellow, Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore.)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-january-29-2014-chinmayi-arun-making-the-powerful-accountable

Making Aadhaar Mandatory: Gamechanger For Governance?

praskrishna — 2016-03-24T06:50:10Z

Why a programme that both the Congress and the BJP have hailed as transformational has divided Parliament this week? The Aadhaar Bill which was passed this week aims at facilitating government benefits and subsidies to citizens said Finance Minister Arun Jaitley.

Yet it became a reason for the Rajya Sabha to raise key questions. On the panel - Chandan Mitra, Rajya Sabha MP, BJP; Ajoy Kumar, Spokesperson, Congress; Tathagat Sathapathy, Lok Sabha MP, Biju Janata Dal; Rajeev Chandrashekhar, Rajya Sabha MP; Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet & Society; and Shekhar Gupta, Senior Journalist.

Video

Link to NDTV website

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ndtv-march-20-2016-making-aadhaar-mandatory-gamechanger-for-governance

Make our digital backyard safe

Nilanjana Bhowmick — 2019-02-18T14:37:25Z

India has been patting itself on the back for being at the forefront of the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ driven by digitisation. Reports have gushed about the speed and scale of digitisation. But this speed and scale have come at a cost to our privacy.

The article by Nilanjana Bhowmick was published in Economic Times on February 13, 2019.

According to GoI, this digital push has led to 99% of adult Indians having an Aadhaar number in 2017. GoI has also integrated personal information through the Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile phone trinity (JAM).

A July 2018 IBM report stated that the probability of data breach went up by 8.7% in India over the last four years based on past experiences. The study also stated that malicious or criminal attacks were the root cause for 42% of data breaches, followed by system glitch at 30% and human error at 28%. This 28% has the potential to cause incalculable havoc, which includes the leak of personal information by anyone — from a call centre executive to a bank manager — who has access to it.

The prime reason for our lackadaisical attitude is that most Indians don’t value privacy. We are yet to register the value of personal information — the actual monetary, marketable value. My personal data, for instance, costs roughly $2. If I take that as an average, then at least $2 billion worth of data belonging to 1.3 billion Indians are at stake here. Which is why, when this data is taken without consent, it is a financial crime.

What is perhaps more frightening is that when this data is taken without consent by an untrusted source, it may also land you, victim of a data breach, in jail.

Last month, I had noticed a suspicious movement of money in my account. A large sum of money was deposited in my account in two instalments, withinthe space of 12 hours. And while I am waiting for the issue to be addressed by the authorities — RBI ombudsman, bank customer service, enforcement directorate — the person who wired the money to my account had got hold of my personal information, including my address and phone number.

He kept calling me on my phone and ‘requested’ I give the money ‘back’ to his brother, ‘in cash or cheque’. Then his brother started calling me, demanding I ‘return’ the money to him.

The movement of funds in my account could well have been a money-laundering operation, and if I made the payment to the ‘sender’ as demanded, the money trail would have implicated me. But what’s most alarming is that if I was dealing with criminals, someone from my bank had made them privy to my private information. And this is a top bank with supposedly top-notch security.

Unfortunately, security is woefully lagging behind India’s speedy digitisation. Neither are we investing enough on fortifying the system, nor are we spending enough on postbreach responses. India spends a mere $20,000 in notification costs, compared to the US’ $740,000.

The US also spends $1.76 million in post-data breach response activities, including help desk activities, special investigations and remediation. US and Canadian firms spend $258 and $213 per record respectively to resolve amalicious or criminal attacks. Indian ones, on an average, spend $76 per record.

Yes, digitisation is the future. But let’s first plug the social, institutional and systemic weaknesses in our systems.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-nilanjana-bhowmick-february-13-2019-make-our-digital-backyard-safe