We are anonymous, we are legion

Killing the Internet Softly with Its Rules

pranesh — 2011-08-20T12:51:42Z

While regulation of the Internet is a necessity, the Department of IT, through recent Rules under the IT Act, is guilty of over-regulation. This over-regulation is not only a bad idea, but is unconstitutional, and gravely endangers freedom of speech and privacy online.

A slightly modified version of this blog entry was published as an op-ed in the Indian Express on May 9, 2011.

Over-regulation of the Internet

Regulation of the Internet, as with regulation of any medium of speech and commerce, is a balancing act. Too little regulation and you ensure that criminal activities are carried on with impunity; too much regulation and you curb the utility of the medium. This is especially so with the Internet, as it has managed to be the impressively vibrant space it is due to a careful choice in most countries of eschewing over-regulation. India, however, seems to be taking a different turn with a three sets of new rules under the Information Technology Act.

These rules deal with the liability of intermediaries (i.e., a large, inclusive, group of entities and individuals, that transmit and allow access to third-party content), the safeguards that cybercafes need to follow if they are not to be held liable for their users' activities, and the practices that intermediaries need to follow to ensure security and privacy of customer data.

Effect of not following the rules

By not observing any of the provisions of these Rules, the intermediary opens itself up for liability for actions of its users. Thus, if a third-party defames someone, then the intermediary can be held liable if he/she/it does not follow the stringent requirements of the Rules.

The problem, however is that, many of the provisions of the Rules have no rational nexus with the due diligence to be observed by the intermediary to absolve itself from liability.

What does the Act require?

Section 79 of the IT Act states that intermediaries are generally not liable for third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted. It qualifies that by stating that they are not liable if they follow certain precautions (basically, to show that they are real intermediaries). They observe 'due diligence' and don't exercise an editorial role; they don't help or induce commission of the unlawful act; and upon receiving 'actual knowledge', or on being duly notified by the appropriate authority, the intermediary takes steps towards some kind of action.

So, rules were needed to clarify what 'due diligence' involves (i.e., to state that no active monitoring is required of ISPs), what 'actual knowledge' means, and to clarify what happens in happens in case of conflicts between this provision and other parts of IT Act and other Acts.

Impact on freedom of speech and privacy

However, that is not what the rules do. The rules instead propose standard terms of service to be notified by all intermediaries. This means everyone from Airtel to Hotmail to Facebook to Rediff Blogs to Youtube to organizations and people that allow others to post comments on their website. What kinds of terms of service? It will require intermediaries to bar users from engaging in speech that is disparaging', It doesn't cover only intermediaries that are public-facing. So this means that your forwarding a joke via e-mail, which "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right" will be deemed to be in violation of the new rules. While gambling (such as betting on horses) isn’t banned in India and casino gambling is legal in Goa, for example, under these Rules, all speech ‘promoting gambling’ is prohibited.

The rules are very onerous on intermediaries, since they require them to act within 36 hours to disable access to any information that they receive a complaint about. Any 'affected person' can complain. Intermediaries will now play the role that judges have traditionally played. Any affected person can bring forth a complaint about issues as diverse as defamation, blasphemy, trademark infringement, threatening of integrity of India, 'disparaging speech', or the blanket 'in violation of any law'. It is not made mandatory to give the actual violator an opportunity to be heard, thus violating the cardinal principle of natural justice of 'hearing the other party' before denying them a fundamental right. Many parts of the Internet are in fact public spaces and constitute an online public sphere. A law requiring private parties to curb speech in such a public sphere is unconstitutional insofar as it doesn't fall within Art.19(2) of the Constitution.

Since intermediaries would lose protection from the law if they don't take down content, they have no incentives to uphold freedom of speech of their users. They instead have been provided incentives to take down all content about which they receive complaints without bothering to apply their minds and coming to an actual conclusion that the content violates the rules.

Cybercafe rules

The cybercafe rules require all cybercafe customers be identified with supporting documents, their photographs taken, all their website visit history logged, and these logs maintained for a year. Compare this to the usage of public pay-phones. Anyone can use a pay-phone without their details being logged. Indeed, such logging allows for cybercafe owners to blackmail their users if they find some embarrassing websites in the history logs—which could be anything from medical diseases to sexual orientation to the fact that you're a whistleblower.

The cybercafe rules also require that all of them install "commercially available safety or filtering software" to prevent access to pornography. In two cases along these lines in the Madras High Court (Karthikeyan R. v. Union of India) and the Bombay High Court (Janhit Manch v. Union of India), the High Courts refused to direct the government to take proactive steps to curb access to Internet pornography stating that such matters require case-by-case analysis to be constitutionally valid under Art.19(1)(a) [Right to freedom of speech and expression].

Such software tends to be very ineffective—non-pornographic websites also get wrongly filtered, and not all pornographic websites get filtered—and the High Courts were right in being wary of any blanket ban. They preferred for individual cases to be registered. If the worry is that our children are getting corrupted, it is up to parents to provide supervision, and not for the government to insist that software do the parenting instead.

Given that all of these were pointed out by both civil society organizations, news media, and industry bodies, when the draft rules were released, it smacks of governmental high-handedness that almost none of the changes suggested by the public have been incorporated in the final rules.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/killing-the-internet-oped

Panel Discussion on UID – Its Feasibility, Utility and Legality

praskrishna — 2011-05-25T04:11:48Z

A panel discussion on "UID, its feasibility, utility and legality" is being organised by Citizen’s Action Forum, Grahak Shakti and the Centre for Internet and Society. It would be held at The Energy and Resources Institute (at TERI auditorium) in Domlur, Bangalore (near Domlur Club) on Thursday, May 26, 2011. The program commences with lunch at 1 p.m. and ends at 5.30 p.m. You are cordially invited to attend this program.

The panel members would include Mr. Rama Jois (former Chief Justice of Chattisgarh High Court and present Member of Parliament), Mr. Moinul Hassan (Member of Parliament), Mr. Narendra Babu (Member, Legislative Assembly, Karnataka), Mr. V P Sudarshan (former Chairman, Legislative Council of Karnataka and present speaker of Congress party) and Mr. Venkatesh Baberjung, Advocate, High Court of Karnataka.

The National Identity Authority of India Bill, 2010 has been placed before the Parliament by the Government. This Bill has been referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance. Mr. Moinul Hassan is a member of this committee. The committee has held one sitting where the Chairman, UIDAI, Mr. Nandan Nilenkani was asked for certain clarifications on the Bill.

The UID project is now under implementation at Mysore. It is scheduled to be launched in Bangalore in June 2011. The Central Government has decided to include caste and religious data in the census. The linkages between UID and the census could come up for discussion among panel members.

UIDAI officials and government officials from the Department of E-Governance, Government of Karnataka have been invited as panel members.

The subject of the discussion is thus topical and of high public interest and importance. We cordially invite you to the lunch and to cover the event so that the public could become aware of issues concerning the same.

The programme schedule is as follows:

1.00 p.m. to 2.00 p.m. - Lunch
2.00 p.m. to 2. 15 p.m. - Welcome and introduction by sponsoring organisations and moderator
2.15 p.m. to 3.00 p.m. - Opening statements by panel members
3.00 p.m. to 4 p.m. - Panel discussions
4.00 p.m. to 4.15 p.m. - Tea
4.15 p.m. to 4.45 p.m. - Panel discussions and questions to panel from audience
4.45 p.m. to 5.15 p.m. - Open House for Audience views
5.15 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. - Concluding remarks by panel members

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/uid-panel-discussion

Sunil Abraham, CIS : "Avec l’e-G8, Nicolas Sarkozy veut promouvoir de nouvelles restrictions à la liberté d’expression"

praskrishna — 2011-05-25T11:54:51Z

Le débat continue de faire rage en Inde au sujet d’une nouvelle législation posant des limites floues et, selon certains, potentiellement dangereuses, à la liberté d’expression sur Internet. Et alors que s’ouvre à Paris l’e-G8, sur fond de polémiques autour des intentions de son principal supporteur, le président de la République Française, Nicolas Sarkozy, Sunil Abraham, directeur exécutif de l’ONG Center for Internet & Societies, a accepté de partager son regard sur l’événement, depuis Bangalore. This news was published in LE MAG IT on May 24, 2011.

LeMagIT: L’Inde vient de se doter d’une nouvelle législation relative aux technologies de l’information et de la communication. Que dénoncez-vous dans cette législation ?

Sunil Abraham: Il y a trois principales préoccupations, pour la société civile. Tout d’abord, cette nouvelle législation va au-delà de son périmètre légitime et définit des limites vagues et inconstitutionnelles à la liberté d’expression sur Internet. Par exemple, un discours dénigrant, relevant du harcèlement, blasphématoire ou haineux n’a jamais été criminel ou considéré comme tel par la justice indienne. Mais du fait de cette nouvelle législation, cela peut être puni de 3 ans de prison. Ensuite, ces règles introduisent un biais contre la participation citoyenne à toute forme de publication en ligne, en particulier dans les médias sociaux ou la production de contenus collective. Ainsi, une fois qu’un ordre de retrait a été notifié, le contenu contestable visé doit être supprimé dans un délai de 36 heures. Ou c’est l’intermédiaire concerné qui est susceptible de voir engagée sa responsabilité. De grandes entreprises telles que Google seront en mesure de gérer de telles injections et d’engager des procédures en justice mais de simples individus seront écrasés par la censure privée sans application équitable de la loi. En outre, les individus ne seront pas notifiés de l’application d’une telle censure et aucune pénalité n’est prévue pour ceux qui abuseraient du système en émettant des ordres de retrait de contenu en masse de manière automatisée. Enfin, l’État a créé un système de surveillance à plusieurs niveaux impliquant cyber-cafés, FAI et fournisseurs de services en ligne. Les garde-fous sur les réquisitions judiciaires émises par les agences de renseignement ont été dilués. La rétention de logs redondante à plusieurs niveaux fournit en outre des cibles multiples avec des vulnérabilités multiples aux criminels à la fois au sein et en dehors de ces institutions. Les violations de la vie privée vont se multiplier et ne feront que distraire les agents du renseignement de leurs missions de fond pour lutter contre la criminalité et le terrorisme.

En clair, nous pensons que ces nouvelles règles vont réfréner la liberté d’expression sur Internet en Inde en stimulant l’auto-censure, la censure privée et la surveillance. Cela va nuire à l’exercice démocratique, à la liberté des médias, et à la transparence des institutions publiques, à la culture et à la créativité, à la recherche et au développement, et enfin - mais ce n’est pas rien - à l’entrepreneuriat.

LeMagIT: Dans un contexte de suspicion sur les objectifs du forum e-G8, et avec la perspective de la nouvelle législation indienne, quel regard portez-vous sur le sommet international qui s’ouvre ce mardi 24 mai en France ?

Sunil Abraham: Nicolas Sarkozy et les nations développées de l’Ouest ont complètement perdu leur légitimité morale dans le débat sur la liberté sur Internet. Leur duplicité et leur double-langage ont été mis en lumière - d’un côté, ils critiquent la Birmanie, l’Arabie Saoudite et la Chine mais, dans le même temps, à l’intérieur de leurs frontières, ces nations ont courbé l’échine pour satisfaire aux demandes des ayants-droits. Rétention de données, exigence de justification d’identité dans les cyber-cafés, riposte graduée, investigations transnationales, etc... sont en train de devenir la norme. Nicolas Sarkozy semble avoir oublié que l’accès au savoir est le prérequis de la liberté d’expression. Le partage de l’information est une composante essentielle des activités quotidiennes des citoyens du Net. Criminaliser ces actes afin de soutenir les modèles économiques moribonds des éditeurs de logiciels et des sociétés de production de médias ne fera que réduire Internet à une télévision interactive.

En tant que personne mariée à un ayant-droit en quête de rente, Nicolas Sarkozy n’a naturellement que peu de sympathie pour l’accès [libre] à la connaissance et peut ainsi se faire le champion vocal des régimes de riposte graduée. Il serait bien capable d’interdire à quelqu’un de lire sous un livre prétexte que cette personne aurait partagé les photocopies de ce livre avec trois de ses amis. Il n’y a aucune proportionnalité entre le préjudice et la punition.

Avec l’e-G8, Nicolas Sarkozy essaie de pousser d’autres restrictions à la liberté d’expression avec son concept “d’Internet civilisé” - les régimes répressifs du monde entier ont de quoi se réjouir. Leur régulation draconienne a été importée par le pays de “liberté, égalité, fraternité.” J’espère que le peuple français se joindra aux sociétés civiles du monde entier pour rejeter les propositions de Nicolas Sarkozy.

Sunil's original response in English

What is wrong with the latest IT Rules 2011 [Intermediary Due Diligence, Cyber Cafe and Reasonable Security Measures) under the IT Act [Amendment 2008]

There are 3 broad concerns that civil society has with the latest IT rules. One, they go beyond the the scope of the IT Act and place unconstitutional and vague limits on freedom of expression online. For example speech that is harmful, harassing, disparaging, blasphemous or hateful has never been criminal or defined by Indian courts. But thanks to the latest rules, they are punishable with 3 years of imprisonment. Two, the rules are biased against citizen participation in online publication especially in the form of social media and commons based peer production. Once a take down notice is received the objectionable content has to be deleted within 36 hour otherwise the intermediary looses immunity. Large corporations like Google will be able to manage due diligence and also fight court battles but individual users will becrushed by private censorship sans due process of law. This individuals will not be notified when such censorship occurs and there is no penalty for those who abuse the system by sending bulk machine generated take-downs. Three, the state has mandated a multi-tier blanket surveillance regime - by cyber-cafes, ISPs and application service providers. Safeguards for information requests by intelligence agencies have been diluted. Redundant multi-level retention of logs provides multiple targets with multiple vulnerabilities to criminals both inside and outside these institutions. Privacy violations will multiply only serving a big distraction from the real intelligence work required to stop criminals and terrorists.

In brief - we believe the latest rules have a chilling effect on online freedom of expression in India via self-censorship, private censorship and blanket surveillance. This will undermine - democratic governance, free media, transparency and accountability in public institutions, culture and creativity, research and development and last but not least entrepreneurship.

What is wrong with Sarkozy's agenda at the e-G8

Sarkozy and developed western nations have completely lost their higher moral ground on net freedom. Their duplicity and double-speak has been exposed - on the one hand they criticise Burma, Saudi Arabia and China. But simultaneously at home these nations have bent backwards to please rights-holders. Blanket data retention, real ID requirements at cyber-cafes, three strikes regime, cross-border searches, etc are becoming the norm. Sarkozy appears to have forgotten that access to knowledge is the precondition for freedom of expression. Sharing of information is an essential component of the everyday Internet use of ordinary netizens. Criminalising these acts in order to prop up extinct business models of media houses and software companies will only reduce the Internet to interactive television.

Read the original published by LeMagIT here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/avec-i-e-g-8

Take charge of Facebook

praskrishna — 2011-06-06T08:16:19Z

Want to take control of your data and the way you use your Facebook account? Then try these tricks, writes Shweta Taneja.

When Tejas Pande, a 23-year-old Bangalore-based information technology professional, heard about a workshop called Facebook Resistances at the Centre for Internet and Society (www.cis-india.org) in the city, he signed up without thinking twice. "I spend almost 10 hours every day logged in to my Facebook account. Its fixed rituals were getting to me. So I wanted to find out how I can take more control of my account and make it more personal."

The workshop, which was conducted by Marc Stumpel, a new media researcher and privacy advocate from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, had the same concerns. Stumpel’s workshop, which has travelled across the world from Barcelona and Berlin to Bangalore, is a research initiative that looks at changing the rules and functionality of Facebook. "We want to change your experience of the site and make it more personal," he says, adding, “We also want you to safeguard your privacy in the Facebook world." All this, he says, is possible through add-ons to your Internet browser. “People just need to know what these cracks are."

With more than 600 million active users, Facebook has become prone to attacks from hackers. Problems such as identity theft and malicious bot messages or status update worms are becoming common. Other than that, privacy concerns which have wracked Facebook since its inception continue to be controversial despite the "controls" it now offers.

The main reason for this is that the social networking mammoth keeps on pushing new features or changes constantly and rapidly, even before we can understand the ones that already exist. "Most often we don’t get a chance to opt in to new features, and can only opt out if they get our attention," explains Stumpel. This leads to a loss of control over personal data and what Facebook can do with it.

To prevent this, it’s necessary to keep going back to those account settings and make full use of whatever control Facebook offers at any point. Here are some of the latest ways you can protect your online identity.

Log out of multiple sessions

How many times have you logged into Facebook from an Internet café or a friend’s mobile phone and forgotten to log out? Every time you do that, even though you close the browsing window or application at the end, Facebook keeps your session open, making you vulnerable to mischief. Now you can log into your account and see a list of active sessions with their details, which include the login time, device name, the approximate location of the login based on IP address, and browser and operating system. If some of them are unauthorized or you are unaware of these activities, shut them immediately and reset your password.

Take control now: In your Facebook account, go to Account > Account Settings > Account Security > Account Activity > Also Active. Facebook lists all your active, open browsers in the Also Active list. Click on End Activity on the unwanted ones. You can also take control of which gadgets you log on from with the Login Approvals feature that comes under Account Security. This feature lets you put a code alert, which can then be SMSed to your mobile phone as soon as you log in from an unrecognized computer. This will alert you in case there’s been a login from a source you don’t know about.

Avoid the unwanted photo tag

Did a friend just put your drunk as hell photograph, wearing a "I hate my boss" T-shirt and making an obscene gesture, online? And did your boss and wife see it and blast you for irresponsibility? Other than the embarrassment, you may get into trouble at home or at work because of friends tagging inane photographs they clicked somewhere you don’t remember.If it’s not photographs, it’s minor irritants such as social or festive messages that you unexpectedly get tagged in. Avoid such irritants with a simple click.

Take control now: Go to Account > Privacy Settings > Sharing on Facebook. Click on ‘Customize settings’. In the page that pops up, choose in each option who can see and comment on things you share, things on your Wall and things you’re tagged in.

Secure your account

Hacking is increasingly a problem on Facebook. The reason is that on most of the networks, Facebook (unlike email clients) works on an unsecured connection (http) and not a secure one (https). Now the social networking site gives you an option to choose a secure site for logging and browsing. You can also choose one-time passwords when logging into Facebook from a public connection.

Take control now: Go to Account > Account Settings> Account Security > Secure Browsing. Tick on Browse Facebook on a Secure Connection (https) whenever possible. In case you are using a public computer, take the option of Facebook One-time Passwords. Text "OTP" to 32665 on your mobile phone and you will get a new one-time password which expires within 20 minutes.

Stop Facebook from haunting you online

Baffled when your Facebook profile image pops up every time you are reading a news site or a travel website online asking you to "Like" a news or review since another friend from Facebook does? Or surprised when you are browsing a travel website and your friends’ photographs pop up suddenly, saying they have been there and "Recommend" a hotel or site? Facebook has partnered with some websites to, as it delicately puts it, "provide you with great, personalized experiences the moment you arrive, such as immediately playing the music you like or displaying friends’ reviews”. Basically if you are logged in to Facebook, these sites can take information from your account and display it and also tell you which of your friends have visited that particular city earlier. If you wish to stop Facebook from haunting you everywhere you go online on your browser, act now.

Take control now: To block a third party, go to Account > Privacy Settings > Apps and Websites> Instant Personalization. Deselect Enable Instant Personalization to stop getting these subtle suggestions from Facebook.

Cut off the ads

A Facebook friend, Mr-I-Like-Everything, "Likes" yet another page and it pops up as a suggestion on the right side of your profile. If you have been on Facebook long enough, chances are one of the "Sponsored" pages has been shoved under your nose at least once. These little ad blurbs which keep popping up on the right-hand side corner, or underneath your apps on the left side of your page, are a mix of advertisements as well as Facebook’s way of further profiling you. Facebook calls them “Suggestions” that add to your social personality, but they are just ads. The good news is that you can now block these permanently.

Take control now: What you need is an ad-blocking add-on for your browser. The best in the market is GreaseMonkey, which works as an add-on for Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Opera and Internet Explorer. Run it and you will be able to customize the way your Facebook page is displayed or behaves by using small bits of JavaScript. On your browser, go to Tools > Add-ons > GreaseMonkey. Click install. Once the basic add-on is installed, it will direct you to http://userscripts.org, which is an open-source, online space for free scripts that can be installed into GreaseMonkey. Find Remove All Facebook Ads in the list and install it. Google Chrome has a basic extension which is called Hide Facebook Ads, which effectively blocks the ads on your Facebook page.

Customize your Facebook page

Bored to death with the classic Facebook blue and white? There’s help at hand to see your Facebook page in a new, stylized version.

Take control now: Download and install an add-on called Stylish in Mozilla Firefox. Then go to Userstyles.org and choose a theme you want to install. Click on Load Into Stylish. Once the theme is successfully loaded, choose it from a small icon on the right corner and activate the theme. Refresh and enjoy the new look.

Block unwanted applications

How does an application you haven’t given access to know your birth date? The answer is your friends. Even though your settings might be sealed and set, you are vulnerable if your friends don’t care who’s accessing their information—and most of them don’t. Applications on Facebook can harvest not only a person’s birth of date or city of residence, but also that of their friends. As Facebook writes, the applications "may access any information you have made visible to Everyone as well as your publicly available information". Publicly available information "includes your Name, Profile Picture, Gender, Current City, Networks, Friend List, and Pages". Facebook offers a way for you to control what your friends can share about you with these applications. It’s a well-hidden section under Accounts called Facebook Ads.

Take control now: To check which applications are using what from your profile, go to Account > Privacy Settings > Apps and Websites. Block any of the apps you haven’t used for a couple of months and don’t remember when you gave access to. Cut down the information accessible to other applications through your friends by unmarking under "Info accessible through your friends". If you don’t want the "suggestions" that Facebook makes about the pages that your friends "Like", go to Account > Account Settings > Facebook Ads. Choose "No one" for both “Ads shown by third Parties" as well as "Ads and friends".

Remove yourself from Facebook & Google Search

Now you can avoid unwanted attention from generic Google and Facebook name searches with a simple privacy setting to turn off your public visibility.

Take control now: Go to Account > Privacy Settings > Connecting on Facebook. Click on View Settings and under it, and in the options under "Search for you on Facebook", select Friends or Friends of Friends.

Add a dislike button

Tired of no option but to "Like" comments, links and silly photos on Facebook? Now you can install a Dislike button to show your hatred of everything inane that people put on your wall.

Take control now: The Dislike button comes with an add-on called Facebook Dislike 1.2.3 by Thomas Moquet. It works on both Google Chrome and Firefox. Remember that you are the only one who will see that button. For your friends to see what you dislike, they need to install it too.

Illustration by Raajan/Mint

Write to us at businessoflife@livemint.com

This article first appeared in the Business of Life, Mint. The copyright of this article rests with Mint and no part of can be reproduced without prior permission. Please log on to http://www.livemint.com/articles/2011/05/24210434/Take-charge-of-Facebook.html.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/take-charge-of-facebook

As Simple as a Tweet

praskrishna — 2011-05-24T07:17:50Z

Got caught in traffic, need to let your folks know you’ll be late, Twitter to your rescue. This article by Nidhi R Daiya appeared in the Deccan Chronicle on May 24, 2011.

When you can you use the micro-blogging site, do you think celebrities would be left far behind?

With stars clearing the air on the site, be it the beautiful Shilpa Shetty denying the rumours about her pregnancy or the Kidnap actress Minisha Lamba claiming to be innocent, Twitter is many celebrities’ rescue route or way to stay in ‘direct’ touch with their fans.

The Nadunisi Naaygal actress Sameera Reddy might not be tech-savvy but sure connects to her fans when she finds the time. "I am not tech-savvy but whenever I have the time I make sure I tweet about my happening so my fans know about me."

Ask Sameera if she thinks this micro-blogging site is the ultimate platform to get in touch with her fans. "It’s the best way to be in touch with your fans directly," she says.

While some might use the site to stay in touch with their fans others use this powerful medium to clear the air. Soundtrack composer and singer Yuvan Shankar Raja denied the rumours about his and Gautham Menon’s tiff through his tweets.

"Not only can one get in touch with your fans directly but also get the opportunity to clear doubts about any rumours surrounding you. Earlier, media used to play the catalyst now it’s all direct and a lot easier," says Yuvan.

Well, if Dhanush can confirm on Twitter that the superstar is fine and Bipasha Basu can confirm her status, do you think other stars will be left behind?

Srinivasan, an active blogger, explains why some celebrities who have a blog prefer tweeting to writing pages full of stuff. "Having only 140 characters to convey your message — it’s short, sweet and personal. So obviously Twitter is a hit."

But he goes on to explain why blogs still have that personal touch to them.

"Twitter might be quick but elements like pictures cannot be shared in it, so those who are ardent followers will still follow celebrity blogs."

Sandeep Verma, a social media analyst, seconds the thought. "Those active bloggers have now turned to Twitter because it’s easy and direct. The reaction speed is fast and it’s a good medium. Stars like Shah Rukh Khan and Amitabh Bachchan too have stayed in touch with their fans and responded to tweets that have been misinterpreted. The fans may be left confused because reports may tell a different story but celebs tell a different story too," adds Sandeep.

However, Nishant Shah, director of Research, Centre for Internet and Society, says Twitter is another extension of the media itself, "Even though Twitter is on a public space and gives one 140 characters to emote, the information is grabbing attention. A tweet can be called as a body of many tweets as you can add links, tag or re-tweet."

What They Tweeted

Tweets about stars that have cleared the rumours or apologised publicly.

Dhanush tweeted "Guys superstar is absolutely fine! He is taking complete rest. After 35 years of hard work he deserves it too. Ve a good day. God bless!"
Amitabh tweeted: "When Graham Bell discovered the telephone, he found two missed calls from Rajinikanth."

Later Amitabh responded to the accusations that he was making fun of Rajini by tweeting "I was not criticizing Rajinikanth…actually it’s praising him...praising his status and greatness...and not making fun of him...he is a noble successful humble person."
Ranvir shorey to apologise on twitter for a comment posted by (@swathipradeep2) on-simple! since @ranvirshorey career is doomed, he is bootlicking barkha didi to use her influence & get him movies" (sic)."
Shilpa Shetty: 'I Am sick and tired of all the congratulatory messages and calls. For the last time I am saying, I am not pregnant, all this is so annoying.'
Bipasha Basu tweeted: "Hi all! Speculation is a part of r business! I knw d warmth n love tht I get frm u all!
Anurag Kashyup on the Dabangg controversy apologised saying 'Dost fati toh meri dawood se nahi jab black friday banai thi, na halaat se jab film release nahi hoti thi…maafi maangi kyonki galat news pe react kiya tha.. galti maanne main bhi nahi phati…tum log bas thodey badey ho jaao.'

Read the original published in the Deccan Chronicle here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/simple-as-a-tweet%20

A Network of Chains

praskrishna — 2011-05-23T06:50:28Z

New infotech rules infringe on freedom of expression, make net use near-impossible, writes Arindam Mukherjee. The article was published in the latest issue (May 30, 2011) of Outlook Magazine.

If all goes according to plan, internet users may not be able to put up a strong message or comment about, say, the Congress on the BJP’s website. A simple complaint from a Congress worker or, for that matter, any Indian citizen, can get the comment removed—it could even lead to the website being blocked by the host. Similarly, forceful comments on networking sites like Twitter and Facebook about individuals and on issues of national interest could soon also be history. If anyone wants, a simple complaint can get the comments—or even a user—removed from that network without informing him or her about it.

The new set of rules gives any citizen the right to complain against any content on any website that they consider objectionable. The new guidelines redefine the rules of the game for online intermediaries—Internet Service Providers, a website, a blog or a blog host, or the online edition of a media company with space for letters to the editor. These intermediaries, who are protected by the government against harmful content generated by third parties, stand to lose their protection if they do not comply and take off the objectionable comments within 36 hours.

As expected, there is a huge outcry in the online community and in civil society on the implications. Pranesh Prakash, programme manager, Centre for Internet and Society, says, "We are concerned about the overreach of the IT Act. These rules are unconstitutional and violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is harmful to freedom of speech and does not go by the basic principles of natural justice because only the complainant is heard and not the user."

"These rules violate the Constitution, harm freedom of speech, go against the principles of natural justice."
Pranesh Prakash
Manager, CIS

The new rules provide that anyone can complain against any online content if he thinks it is objectionable and breaches any of the keywords provided under the rules (see graphic). Chakshu Roy of prs Legislative Research, an independent group, says, "The keywords provided under the rules are rather too open to interpretation. This might lead to potential legal complications for internet companies who derive value by allowing people to interact online."

The tricky part is that the government has said that all disputes over interpretation of the keywords can only be adjudicated by a court of law and that the government or its agencies cannot interpret it. So if your website or content is blocked, the only recourse before you is to knock at the court’s doors. In sum, under the new rules, it would be absolutely impossible for any online entity to carry any comment without getting into some infringement under the new rules. "If internet platforms are held liable for third-party content, it would lead to self-censorship and reduce the free flow of information," says a spokesperson for Google.

Despite the government arguing otherwise, this is being construed as an indirect way to control the internet and online activity. The new laws will suppress public opinion at a time when the internet is developing into a primary medium to mould as well as express public opinion. Nikhil Pahwa, an avid blogger and editor of Medianama, says, "National security is one thing, but what about civil liberty? Isn’t that being violated here? This is a veiled move to block all public opinion."

In recent times, 11 websites and search results have been blocked on the government’s order, apart from over 1,400 requests to Google for removal or blocking of content. Soon, many more websites and portals could be in the firing line and face a block, censure or even closure under the new set of rules.

Online protagonists also feel that enough thinking has not gone into the framing of the rules. Subho Ray, president, Internet and Mobile Association of India (iamai), says, "The new rules are arbitrary as it is protecting the interest of one set of citizens while compromising upon that of others." Also, there is ambiguity in the rules on bulk sms carriers and telecom-based content, which should technically fall under user-generated content reaching the masses.

Perhaps the most bizarre are the rules regarding cyber cafes, which seek to define not just how the cafes conduct their business but also how a cyber cafe should look and even arrange its furniture. The new guidelines mandate that cyber cafes keep a photo ID record of all users apart from maintaining usage data of individuals—including logs of all websites surfed by them—for one year. The rules even go on to define the physical layout of the cyber cafes.

"Today a third of India’s internet usage comes from cyber cafes. If you are putting requirements of photo ID and maintenance of logs of usage of every user, the crowd going to these cafes will move away," says Ray. He also feels that cyber cafes, which are already subject to harassment by local authorities, may find it even more difficult to survive under the new rules. Also, there are serious online security concerns over the functioning of cyber cafes under the new rules. "If you require all cyber cafes to maintain history of all websites visited by a user, including bank accounts and credit card transactions, it will be naive to think that such information will not be misused," says Prakash.

Significantly, the new rules also allow the government to access personal data and intercept any conversation or communication without judicial intervention. This, at a time when telephone intercepts by government agencies are being questioned, could lead to further complications. The government asserts that the new rules have been put in place looking at the “best practices" from across the world. But looking at the discontent—and the real danger of misuse—it needs to rethink these strategies.

Read the original published in the Outlook here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/network-of-chains

Sony site flaw puts focus on Internet security

praskrishna — 2011-05-30T13:15:07Z

INTERNET security has once again come into sharp focus with Sony discovering a loophole in their website set up to reset passwords for its users affected by the hacking of the PlayStation network. Shayan Ghosh's article was published by Mail Today on Friday,May 20, 2011.

Sony on Thursday announced that it has found a security flaw on its website that could have allowed a hacker access to private details of its gaming buffs.

"We are in the process of continuous restoration of the website loopholes that have been identified and it will be healed pretty soon," said Atindriya Bose, country manager at Sony Computer Entertainment.

Last month, Sony’s PlayStation network was hacked and user data such as email ids and credit card details were possibly stolen in huge numbers, affecting users worldwide.

"Some users could say botnets (a collection of infected computers or those taken over by hackers) are the largest threat today because they have the potential of shutting down websites, online stores and even Governmental websites and critical resources," Costin Raiu, director of the global research and analysis team, Kaspersky Lab, said, explaining the present online threat scenario.

"Others say that a much more serious threat can come from mobile malware, because there are a lot more mobile phones than computer systems," he noted.

"Even though hacking is going on we are prompt to enhance our security measures. But only these won’t help. The Indian users also need to be conscious; they also need to be vigilant about private details such as credit cards when they are on the web," Bose explained.

"A lot of companies are successful in e-commerce and have been in the industry for quite long. But regarding such flaws, it depends on how fast the company reacts to the situation," he said.

Hacking is like an arms race, according to Sunil Abraham executive director, Centre for Internet and Society. "It is going side by side with the security measures that people are taking," he said.

Abraham said there are many reasons behind the recent rise in hacking with data being stolen very often.

Firstly, the information system nowadays is more complex though not mature enough to handle such threats. Secondly, the social networking sites are a key player when it comes to damage undergone due to hacking. The level of data loss is huge when one hacks a social networking site which, was not the case before. Thirdly, new updates of these networking and gaming sites are released very frequently, which leaves little time to check the security flaws in the website.

"New features are more prone to attacks," Abraham said.

"As attackers become more sophisticated and targeted, hacking continues to be a serious threat. In fact, Symantec’s Internet Security Threat Report 16 revealed that an average of 260,000 identities were exposed per data breach caused by hacking in 2010, nearly quadruple that of any other cause," Abhijit Limaye, director, security response, Symantec, said.

However, there are ethical hackers who feel the need for security and also think that hacking will be a major issue worldwide, in a couple of years.

Download the original article published by Mail Today here [PDF, 2.08 MB]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/sony-site-flaw

Bangalore-based NGO files RTI query asking list of websites blocked by Indian govt

praskrishna — 2011-05-23T08:39:58Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), a Bangalore-based NGO, recently filed an RTI query with the Department of Information Technology (DIT), asking for a list of websites blocked by the Indian government under the IT Act. This article by R Krishna was published in the Daily News & Analysis on May 18, 2011.

The department handed them a list of 11 websites. It was just one department’s list, but this was the first time such a list was being made public. "The information given was not comprehensive. For instance, we still don’t know who ordered these blocks," says Sunil Abraham, executive director, CIS, "We will file another RTI application to get those details out."

As of now, Indians enjoy considerably free access to information online, and the right to freedom of expression is protected by the Constitution. But you run into a veil of secrecy when trying to find out what sort of information is being blocked online, who is doing it, and for what reason. The list of 11 revealed by the DIT is only representative — no one can even guess the real number because, well, there is no way of knowing when a website gets blocked.

What is more disturbing is that the government has formulated a set of rules that can block content considered "disparaging", "harassing", or "blasphemous", besides a whole range of other labels that are vague and hence open to interpretation. The rules put the onus of removing such material on intermediaries such as ISPs (Internet service providers) and websites that host the content — within 36 hours of a complaint being filed. And just about anyone can request that the content be taken down — all they have to do is write a letter or an email with an electronic signature. There is no provision for the intermediary to challenge the complainant’s assessment of the content in question.

Users will be afraid

In other words, censorship will now be a free-for-all exercise. Protests, such as the one we saw during the Jan Lokpal agitation, can be nipped in the bud since anyone, including politicians, can claim that they are being "harassed". Information revealed by websites like WikiLeaks can be blocked because they may "threaten friendly relations with foreign states".

There is a sense of shock among the handful of netizens who are aware of these rules and the potential for their misuse. "What are we, Saudi Arabia? We don’t expect this from India. This is something very serious," Pushkar Raj, general secretary of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, has been quoted as saying. MediaNama, a website reporting on the media industry, points out, "Who defines 'blasphemous'?... India doesn’t even have a blasphemy law, so who interprets what is blasphemous or not?" Media watchdog The Hoot’s Geeta Seshu says, "This is chilling. Websites will be wary of putting up content. How can one appeal? How can one have a free discussion on anything at all online?"

Vishal Anand, product manager at Burrp, an online startup that hosts user-generated reviews of restaurants, is worried about the impact it will have on the discussions happening on the website. "I hope the ecosystem is not impacted. Users may be more afraid to respond, and businesses will be afraid about the content they host."

Guilty until proven innocent

The fundamental issue is that the onus is on the carrier or host to prove that the content is inoffensive, if any objection is raised. "The regulation is placing the burden on the intermediary so that there is no need to go to court (to get content blocked). This is going to lead to a lot of private intervention. You will have to go to court to get the content back up online, rather than the other way around," says Delhi-based lawyer Apar Gupta.

In fact, intermediary liability is a contentious topic globally, and this is not the first time it has caused a controversy in India. Back in 2004, eBay India’s CEO Avinash Bajaj was arrested because a user tried to sell a pornographic CD on its website. This set off a furious debate on the issue, with the government finally agreeing to amend the IT Act. Gupta notes on his blog, "Even after the IT Act was amended, the government failed to make any rules… In the absence of rules, intermediaries continued to be dragged to court and to the police station. This includes a recent incident where an FIR was registered against Facebook."

Checks and balances exist

These developments lend credence to a recent report on Internet freedom released by US-based NGO Freedom House, which ranks India 14th out of the 37 countries surveyed. Stating that the Internet in India is only "partly free", the report notes, “Pressure on private intermediaries to remove certain information in compliance with administrative censorship orders has increased since late 2009, with the implementation of the amended IT Act.

The revised law grants (the government) the authority to block Internet material that is perceived to endanger public order or national security… and assigns up to seven years’ imprisonment for representatives of a wide range of private service providers… if they fail to comply with government blocking requests." What is even more troubling is that the current rules weren’t even in place when this report was being prepared.

The new rules could worsen India’s Internet freedom rankings. Responding to DNA, Sarah Cook, Asia research analyst and assistant editor, Freedom House, said, "We would have concerns over some of the rules and how they came about. This includes broad and vaguely worded censorship criteria, apparent initiation of the regulations "quietly" without significant consultation with key stakeholders, and absence of an appeals process for those who might disagree with censorship decisions."

Legal experts in India too are puzzled by the new restrictions when there are already reasonable restrictions on freedom of expression that the Constitution defines. "There are anti-defamation provisions in the law. Then why include 'disparaging' in the new rules? Why is impersonating being made illegal? For example, on online dating websites for gays, users may not feel comfortable revealing their identities straightaway. And if somebody is impersonating to commit fraud, there are laws that already exist that deal with it. Instead of incorporating existing offences, the scope of what may be considered illegal is being broadened," says CIS’s Abraham.

The new rules are so broad-based that anyone can claim they are offended and demand that content be taken down, even out of business rivalry.

For example, Zone-H.org, run by Italy-based Roberto Preatoni, was one of the 11 websites blocked by the Department of Information Technology. This was done after the Delhi High Court passed an ex-parte interim order (where the other party is not present) in the E2 Labs versus Zone-H case to block the website. "This seems unnecessary since it is some kind of private business battle between E2 Labs and Zone H. Where was the need for the Indian government to get involved?" asks Abraham.

Bangalore-based cyber law expert N Vijayashankar agrees. "Websites are being blocked using interim orders. There is no national interest involved in some of these cases. Plus, there is no need to block the entire website, just a particular page could be blocked."

In fact, one of the webpages blocked was an opinion piece Vijayashankar had written about the Zone-H case on BloggerNews.net. "I had no intimation that the webpage was being blocked," says Vijayashankar, who got to know about the blockage only after CIS published the DIT’s response.

Learn from the world

Globally, excessive regulation of online discussions, particularly those related to political and social issues, can kill the open exchange of information. "In many countries, we saw that new laws, prosecutions, or proactive government censorship contributed to greater self-censorship among users. This is particularly pernicious when it affects discussions that relate to public interest or that affect people’s well-being — such as an Indonesian housewife facing high fines for circulating critical comments about a local hospital, the Chinese authorities censoring content on torture in police custody, or the Korean government prosecuting a blogger who posted pessimistic predictions about the country’s economy," says Cook. Cook acknowledges that balancing the right to freedom of expression against security threats, hate speech or child pornography is quite difficult — even for nations that rank high in their study. But there are a few best practices that India could learn from.

"Examples of good practices would include no criminal defamation provisions (though criminal penalties for inciting violence would be appropriate), immunity for online content providers from being held liable for the information posted by their users (there is such a law in the United States), and multi-stakeholder consultations prior to the passing of regulations related to the Internet/digital media."

The new rules India has come up with fly in the face of such best practices. Authorities and netizens alike should be on the guard, lest we go the China way.

Read the original published by DNA here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/rti-query-filed

Power to the People

nishant — 2012-03-21T09:35:54Z

The digital revolution has helped make NGOs and civil society more influential, independent and transparent, writes Nishant Shah in this article published in the Indian Express on Sunday, May 15, 2011.

The rise and spread of internet and digital technologies has invigorated the voluntary sector in the country, granting them better mobility, access to resources and wider visibility through digital networks. With the rise of the internet, augmented by easy access, civil society needs to claim its stake in the World Wide Web. Visibility and presence have become the buzzwords. There is a concentrated effort to become a Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsible and Transparent (SMART) organisation that doesn’t operate in remote silos but reaches out to an audience and a resource base.

While NGOs in the more developed countries have taken to digital technologies more easily, there is no doubt that the digital revolution has finally come to the civil society in India and it is offering unprecedented opportunities for social change and political participation. From the Bell Bajao campaign, which brought to the fore domestic violence in the urban middle class, to the recent demonstrations for Anna Hazare, we see many examples of the ways in which civil society and NGOs can still mobilise support from the public.

What has also been interesting is how collectives rather than registered organisations have played an important role in the public delivery of such campaigns.

Here is a look at three ways in which engagement with digital technologies, has led to new models of making public interventions and processes of initiating change for civil society collectives and NGOs.

Birds of a Feather

With the networked effect of the digital technologies, something as simple as building a Facebook page puts out the concerns and draws the attention and resources of a larger population. NGOs need no longer confine themselves to finding people in immediate environments and are extending their support base to large online networks. The Bangalore-based Blank Noise Project that started off as a public art intervention by Jasmeen Patheja has now emerged as a large volunteer-based network that harnesses the power of peer-to-peer networks to mobilise young urban dwellers, to talk about gender, safety and urban space. Not yet a formal NGO, it uses blogs, Twitter, Facebook, mailing lists etc. in order to bring people together for public interventions as well as digital dissemination. With more than 4,000 volunteers running the project in different cities, BNP proves the power of the Web to find “people like us” for a common cause.

Beyond Patronage

With the kind of outreach and visibility afforded by the internet, NGOs are turning to public support and individual contributions to carry out their work. Take Kickstarter, for example — a site where any NGO wanting to launch a creative project, can put up a project description and a budget. They can then invite people from around the world to “pledge” money by swiping credit cards, beginning with a contribution of $5. If, within a given time-span, enough people pledge enough money to cover the project’s budget, the organisation receives the money through electronic transfers. They become, thus, accountable not to individual donors or private development agencies. Instead, they become transparent and responsible towards the larger public who, as stakeholders and supporters can now endorse, amplify and track the activities of the organisation.

Transparency Unlimited

With the rise of information technologies, citizens have started asking for more details about organisations that seek to represent them in different sectors. It has become necessary for NGOs to become accountable at two levels — one is at the level of financial integrity and the second is at the level of public responsibility. The consortium Credibility Alliance is one example by which the voluntary sector can disclose certain minimum information to its public in order to build transparent governance structures. NGOs have also become more sensitive to the politics of representation and how to involve communities they work with, in their processes rather than becoming self-appointed vanguards. The field of collaboration has opened up and we see the rise of networks rather than individual players in the field.

Digital and internet technologies amplify, augment and enhance the existing processes. In the voluntary sector, like almost any other walk of life, many of these practices already exist. What these systems of the digital age have done is provide new ways by which the everyday citizen can participate and contribute to the processes of change.

Read the original published by the Indian Express here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/power-to-people

Point By Point Rebuttal Of Indian Government’s Statement On Internet Control Rules

praskrishna — 2011-05-25T12:46:48Z

The Centre for Internet and Society has published a point-by-point rebuttal of the statement issued by India’s Department of Information Technology on India’s Internet Control Rules. The text below is reproduced from CIS India’s website, under a CC-BY license (which means anyone can re-publish it, with attribution. You can, too). We’ve highlighted (in bold) certain statements in the rebuttal. This article by Nikhil Pahwa was published in Medianama on May 13, 2011.

The press statement issued on May 11 by the Department of Information Technology (DIT) on the furore over the newly-issued rules on ‘intermediary due diligence’ is misleading and is, in places, plainly false. We are presenting a point-by-point rebuttal of the DIT’s claims.

In its press release on Wednesday, May 11, 2011 , the DIT stated:

The attention of Government has been drawn to news items in a section of media on certain aspects of the Rules notified under Section 79 pertaining to liability of intermediaries under the Information Technology Act, 2000. These items have raised two broad issues. One is that words used in Rules for objectionable content are broad and could be interpreted subjectively. Secondly, there is an apprehension that the Rules enable the Government to regulate content in a highly subjective and possibly arbitrary manner.

There are actually more issues than merely "subjective interpretation" and "arbitrary governmental regulation".

The Indian Constitution limits how much the government can regulate citizens’ fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Any measure afoul of the constitution is invalid.
Several portions of the rules are beyond the limited powers that Parliament had granted the Department of IT to create interpretive rules under the Information Technology Act. Parliament directed the Government to merely define what “due diligence” requirements an intermediary would have to follow in order to claim the qualified protection against liability that Section 79 of the Information Technology Act provides; these current rules have gone dangerously far beyond that, by framing rules that insist that intermediaries, without investigation, has to remove content within 36-hours of receipt of a complaint, keep records of a users’ details and provide them to law enforcement officials.

The Department of Information Technology (DIT), Ministry of Communications & IT has clarified that the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011 prescribe that due diligence need to be observed by the Intermediaries to enjoy exemption from liability for hosting any third party information under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. These due diligence practices are the best practices followed internationally by well-known mega corporations operating on the Internet. The terms specified in the Rules are in accordance with the terms used by most of the Intermediaries as part of their existing practices, policies and terms of service which they have published on their website.

We are not aware of any country that actually goes to the extent of deciding what Internet-wide ‘best practices’ are and actually converting those ‘best practices’ into law by prescribing a universal terms of service that all Internet services, websites, and products should enforce.

The Rules require all intermediaries to include the government-prescribed terms in an agreement, no matter what services they provide. It is one thing for a company to choose the terms of its terms of service agreement, and completely another for the government to dictate those terms of service. As long as the terms of service of an intermediary are not unlawful or bring up issues of users’ rights (such as the right to privacy), there is no reason for the government to jump in and dictate what the terms of service should or should not be.

The DIT has not offered any proof to back up its assertion that ‘most’ intermediaries already have such terms. Google, a ‘mega corporation’ which is an intermediary, does not have such an overarching policy. Indiatimes, another ‘mega corporation’ intermediary, does not either. Just because a company like Rediff and Blizzard’s World of Warcraft have some of those terms does not mean a) that they should have all of those terms, nor that b) everyone else should as well.

In attempting to take different terms of service from different Internet services and products—the very fact of which indicate the differing needs felt across varying online communities—the Department has put in place a one-size-fits-all approach. How can this be possible on the Internet, when we wouldn’t regulate the post-office and a book publisher under the same rules of liability for, say, defamatory speech.

There is also a significant difference between the effect of those terms of service and that of these Rules. An intermediary-framed terms of service suggest that the intermediary may investigate and boot someone off a service for violation, while the Rules insist that the intermediary simply has to mandatorily remove content, keep records of users’ details and provide them to law enforcement officials, else be subject to crippling legal liability.

So to equate the effect of these Rules to merely following ‘existing practices’ is plainly wrong. An intermediary—like the CIS website—should have the freedom to choose not to have terms of service agreements. We now don’t.

"In case any issue arises concerning the interpretation of the terms used by the Intermediary, which is not agreed to by the user or affected person, the same can only be adjudicated by a Court of Law. The Government or any of its agencies have no power to intervene or even interpret. DIT has reiterated that there is no intention of the Government to acquire regulatory jurisdiction over content under these Rules. It has categorically said that these rules do not provide for any regulation or control of content by the Government."

The Rules are based on the presumption that all complaints (and resultant mandatory taking down of the content) are correct, and that the incorrectness of the take-downs can be disputed in court. Why not just invert that, and presume that all complaints need to be proven first?

Indeed, the courts have insisted that presumption of validity is the only constitutional way of dealing with speech. (See, for instance, Karthikeyan R. v. Union of India, a 2010 Madras High Court judgment.)

Further, only constitutional courts (namely High Courts and the Supreme Court) can go into the question of the validity of a law. Other courts have to apply the law, even if it the judge believes it is constitutionally invalid. So, most courts will be forced to apply this law of highly questionable constitutionality until a High Court or the Supreme Court strikes it down.

What the Department has in fact done is to explicitly open up the floodgates for increased liability claims and litigation – which runs exactly counter to the purpose behind the amendment of Section 79 by Parliament in 2008.

"The Government adopted a very transparent process for formulation of the Rules under the Information Technology Act. The draft Rules were published on the Department of Information Technology website for comments and were widely covered by the media. None of the Industry Associations and other stakeholders objected to the formulation which is now being cited in some section of media."

This is a blatant lie.

Civil society voices, including CIS, Software Freedom Law Centre, and individual experts (such as the lawyer and published author Apar Gupta) sent in comments. Companies such as Google and others had apparently raised concerns as well. We at CIS even received a ‘read notification’ from the email account of the Group Coordinator of the DIT’s Cyber Laws Division—Dr. Gulshan Rai—on Thursday, March 3, 2011 at 12:04 PM (we had sent the mail to Dr. Rai on Monday, February 28, 2011). We never received any acknowledgement, though, not even after we made an express request for acknowledgement (and an offer to meet them in person to explain our concerns) on Tuesday, April 5, 2011 in an e-mail sent to Mr. Prafulla Kumar and Dr. Gulshan Rai of DIT.

The process can hardly be called ‘transparent’ when the replies received from ‘industry associations and other stakeholders’ have not been made public by the DIT. Those comments which are public all indicate that serious concerns were raised as to the constitutionality of the Rules.

The Government has been forward looking to create a conducive environment for the Internet medium to catapult itself onto a different plane with the evolution of the Internet. The Government remains fully committed to freedom of speech and expression and the citizen’s rights in this regard.

The DIT has limited this statement to the rules on intermediary due diligence, and has not spoken about the controversial new rules that stifle cybercafes, and restrict users’ privacy and freedom to receive information.

If the government is serious about creating a conducive environment for innovation, privacy and free expression on the Internet, then it wouldn’t be passing Rules that curb down on them, and it definitely will not be doing so in such a non-transparent fashion.

Read the original published in Medianama here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/point-by-point-rebuttal

The Second IJLT-CIS Lecture Series at National Law School, Bangalore

praskrishna — 2011-05-13T11:03:04Z

The Indian Journal of Law and Technology and the Centre for Internet and Society, present the second IJLT- CIS Lecture Series, an event comprised of an intensive series of lectures by luminaries with expertise in law and technology to give students, professionals and anyone interested in a comprehensive idea about the theme, "Emerging Issues in Privacy law".

The focus will be on contemporary sub-issues of critical relevance such as:

The Unique Identification Project and Challenges to Privacy
Cloud Computing and Behavioural Tracking
The State and Privacy: Electronic Surveillance

Speakers

The following delegates would be speaking at the conference:

Usha Ramanathan
Malavika Jayaram
Vivek Durai
Prof. Sudhir Krishnaswamy

Profiles of the Speakers

Usha Ramanathan

Dr. Usha Ramanathan is an internationally recognized expert on law and poverty. She studied law at Madras University, the University of Nagpur and Delhi University. She is a frequent adviser to non-governmental organisations and international organizations. She is a member of Amnesty International's Advisory Panel on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and has been called upon by the World Health Organisation as a expert on mental health on various occasions. Her research interests include human rights, displacement, torts and environment. She has published extensively in India and abroad.

Malavika Jayaram

Malavika Jaya has an experience of more than 15 years as a lawyer with a specialization in information technology and intellectual property. She is a partner in Jayaram & Jayaram, Bangalore managing a portfolio of work that has a strong focus on IT/IP and commercial work, especially with an international angle and is a fellow of the Centre for Internet and Society. She works with CIS in its efforts to explore, understand, and affect the shape and form of the Internet, and its relationship with the cultural and social milieu of our time.

More info on Malavika Jayaram can be found here

Vivek Durai

Vivek G Durai is co-founder and managing partner at Atman Law Partners. He represents Indian and overseas clients in connection with their India entry strategies, venture capital and private equity investments, infrastructure projects, technology contracts, procurement and supply agreements and real estate investments.

More info on Vivek Durai can be found here

Professor (Dr.) Sudhir Krishnaswamy

Prof. Sudhir Krishnaswamy graduated from National Law School Bangalore with a BA LLB (Hons) degree. He then went onto finish a BCL and DPhil in Law from the University of Oxford on a Rhodes Scholarship. He has taught at National Law School, Bangalore and Pembroke College, University of Oxford among other places. His research interests include constitutional law, administrative law, intellectual property law, legal profession and reform of the legal system.

More info on Prof. Krishnaswamy can be found here

Admission will not charged but in order to enable us to ensure adequate seating, do register without fail by the 18th of May by email at editorialboard@ijlt.in.

Updates regarding the conference will be posted here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/ijlt-cis-lecture-series

New rules to ensure due diligence: IT dept

praskrishna — 2011-05-23T06:12:39Z

Facing widespread criticism over new IT rules that put certain amount of liability on intermediaries like Google and Facebook for user-generated content, the government clarified that the rules are simply seeking "due diligence" on the part of websites and web hosts. This news was published in the Times of India on May 11, 2011.

The new rules were notified on April 11. Activists and Internet companies say that the rules are archaic and loosely worded and may lead to harassment of web users and website owners. The Times of India was first to report on the issue on April 27.

The ministry of information and technology said, "The terms specified in the rules are in accordance with the terms used by most of the intermediaries as part of their existing practices, policies and terms of service which they have published on their website."

It also clarified the "department of telecommunication has reiterated that there is no intention of the government to acquire regulatory jurisdiction over content under these rules".

The government has claimed that before it made the rules final, it had sought public comments over the draft. "None of the industry associations and other stakeholders objected to the formulation which is now being cited in some section of media," it claimed.

However, sources told TOI that companies like Google had objected to loose wordings of the documents and asked government not to put any liability on intermediary for user-generated content on the web. "We too approached the government with our concerns. For our communication, we never received any acknowledgment," said Sunil Abraham, executive director at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS).

"Given the fact that final rules are more or less similar to the draft rules, I can say that nobody in the government took into account the objections raised by CIS and many other organizations," he added.

Google had earlier told TOI that new rules would adversely affect businesses that depend upon online collaboration to prosper. "We believe that a free and open Internet is essential for the growth of digital economy and safeguarding freedom of expression.

If Internet platforms are held liable for third party content, it would lead to self-censorship and reduce the free flow of information," a Google spokesperson said.

Read the original published by the Times of India here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/new-rules-for-due-diligence

India Chills Online Speech

praskrishna — 2011-05-05T03:19:50Z

While most governments try to control online freedom of speech in a somewhat restrictive manner, either as a collaborator or as a regulator, rarely do they formulate a law to curb online speech. Rarer still does a government provide sweeping powers to intermediaries like an ISP and administrators of Internet sites to control content based on a long list of criteria. This news was published in 'digital communities' on May 3, 2011.

In a quiet move early last month, India passed a new set of rules called Information Technology Rules Act 2011, that curtail freedom of Internet speech by not only empowering the Department of Information Technology to block any site that displays disparaging content based on a list of criteria defined by the Department. But it also empowered any official or private citizen to demand the removal of content that they consider objectionable.

For the first time, it also made intermediaries like an ISP or an Internet site that facilitates user-generated content -- like Google, Facebook, and blogs -- responsible for censoring the Internet.

“The intermediary shall not knowingly host or publish any information or shall not initiate the transmission, select the receiver of transmission, and select or modify the information contained in the transmission, [of content specified by the Act]” it says.

For that matter Internet censorship is not new in India. "This country practices censorship in various forms," says Apar Gupta, a Cyberlaw expert at New Delhi-based Accendo Law Partners. "However it is usually done by a government body or a court order after balancing the interests of free speech and individual or societal harm. Hence, we have film certification and provisions under the Criminal Procedure Code under which a book or any other publication may be banned by a state government by issuing a detailed order in the official gazette. In cases where parties approach courts, courts finely balance competing interests as well.

”But the new rules have for the first time brought censorship, with regard to online content, with a force of law. The new rules even incentivize intermediaries or private parties to censor the Internet,” he added.

The new law is sweeping. For instance, it says that any statement that threatens the unity, integrity; defense, security or sovereignty of India or friendly relations with foreign states or public order, must be removed from Web content.

Moreover, besides banning content that is “harassing, blasphemous, defamatory, obscene, pornographic, pedophilic, libelous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever,” it also forbids publication of content that is “grossly harmful."

“These rules are not only unfair and blatantly clamp down on freedom of expression, they also put vague limits to freedom of expression and are thus debatable in terms of being constitutionally valid,” says Sunil Abraham, the executive director for the Center for Internet and Society.

As an instance, Gupta points to a clause in the rules prohibiting content that “harm[s] minors in any way.”

Gupta says there is no set definition under the existing civil and criminal law as to what could be considered "harming minors in any way."

“In the absence of any definable legal standards, what then could form the basis of whether content is harming minors or not?” he asks.

The rules threaten to damage entrepreneurship in a big way as well, allege critics.

“Under the new law anyone can lodge a complaint -- say against an amateur mobile software application developer whose product competes with an application of say Apple or Google. While large companies can afford legal expenses of challenging an IPR violation claim, a small-time developer has no option but to succumb to such challenges.”says Abraham adding, “Online anonymity is vital for creativity and entrepreneurship on the Web.”

Read the original news here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/online-speech

Limits to Privacy

Prashant Iyengar — 2012-12-14T10:28:55Z

In his research article, Prashant Iyengar examines the limits to privacy for individuals in light of the provisions of the Constitution of India, public interest, security of state and maintenance of law and order. The article attempts to build a catalogue of all these justifications and arrive at a classification of all such frequently used terms invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

Introduction

In 1965, the Supreme Court of India heard and decided State of UP v. Kaushaliya[1], a case which involved the question of whether women who are engaged in prostitution can be forcibly removed from their residences and places of occupation, or whether they were entitled, along with other citizens of India, to the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India, and to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India [under Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of India]. In other words, did these women possess an absolute right of privacy over their decisions in respect to their occupation and place of residence? In its decision, the Supreme Court denied them this right holding that "the activities of a prostitute in a particular area... are so subversive of public morals and so destructive of public health that it is necessary in public interest to deport her from that place." In view of their 'subversiveness', the statutory restrictions imposed by the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act on prostitutes, were upheld by the court as constitutionally-permissible “reasonable restrictions” on their movements.

The legal alibis that the State employs to justify its infringement of our privacy are numerous, and range from ‘public interest’ to 'security of the state' to the 'maintenance of law and order'. In this chapter we attempt to build a catalogue of these various justifications, without attempting to be exhaustive, with the objective of arriving at a rough taxonomy of such frequently invoked terms. In addition we also examine some the more important justifications such as 'public interest' and 'security of the state' that have been invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

The statutory venues of deprivation of privacy by the state being many – strictly, any statute that imposes any restriction on movement, or authorizes the search or examination of any residence or book, or the interception of communication may be read as a violation of a privacy right — tracking each of these down would not only be an impossible exercise, but also contribute little to the analytical exercise we are attempting here. Instead, in this chapter we only list provisions from a few statutes that are the familiar instruments by which the state impinges on our privacy. This is done with the limited object of arriving at a rough inventory of the common technologies which the state employs to impinge on our privacy.

Even if intrusions into our privacy are statutorily authorised, these statutes must withstand constitutional scrutiny. We therefore, begin this chapter with a discussion of the constitutional framework within which these statutes operate, and against which the severity of their incursions must be measured.

Constitutional Jurisprudence on Privacy

The 'right to privacy' has been canvassed by litigants before the higher judiciary in India by including it within the fold of two fundamental rights: the right to freedom under Article 19 and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.

It would be instructive to provide a brief background to each of these Articles before delving deeper into the privacy jurisprudence expounded by the courts under them.

Part III of the Constitution of India (Articles 12 through 35) is titled ‘fundamental rights’ and lists out several rights which are regarded as fundamental to all citizens of India (some apply all persons in India whether citizens or not). Article 13 forbids the State from making “any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part”.

Thus, Article 19(1) (a) stipulates that "all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression". However this is qualified by Article 19(2) which states that this will not "affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right … in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence".

Thus, the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) is not absolute, but a qualified right that is susceptible, under the Constitutional scheme, to being curtailed under specified conditions.

The other important fundamental right from the perspective of privacy jurisprudence is Article 21 which reads "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

Where Article 19 contains a detailed list of conditions under which freedom of expression may be curtailed, by contrast Article 21 is thinly-worded and only requires a "procedure established by law" as a pre-condition for the deprivation of life and liberty. However, the Supreme Court has held in a celebrated case Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India [2] that any procedure "which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejection of a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus, understood, 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre."

Four decisions by the Supreme Court have established the right to privacy in India as flowing from Articles 19 and 21.

The first was a seven-judge bench judgment in Kharak Singh vs The State of U.P.[3] The question for consideration before this court was whether 'surveillance' under Chapter XX of the U.P. Police Regulations constituted an infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Regulation 236(b) which permitted surveillance by 'domiciliary visits at night' was held to be violative of Article 21.The word ‘life’ and the expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 were elaborately considered by this court in Kharak Singh`s case. Although the majority found that the Constitution contained no explicit guarantee of a ‘right to privacy’, it read the right to personal liberty expansively to include a right to dignity. It held that "an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man —an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilization."

In a minority judgment in this case, Justice Subba Rao held that "the right to personal liberty takes is not only a right to be free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person's house, where he lives with his family, is his 'castle' it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty." This case, especially Justice Subba Rao’s observations, paved the way for later elaborations on the right to privacy using Article 21.

In 1972, the Supreme Court decided a case — one of the first of its kind — on wiretapping. In R. M. Malkani vs State of Maharashtra [4] the petitioner’s voice had been recorded in the course of a telephonic conversation where he was attempting blackmail. He asserted in his defence that his right to privacy under Article 21 had been violated. The Supreme Court declined his plea holding that “the telephonic conversation of an innocent citizen will be protected by courts against wrongful or high handed interference by tapping the conversation. The protection is not for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the police to vindicate the law and prevent corruption of public servants.”

The third case, Govind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [5] , by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court is regarded as being a setback to the right to privacy jurisprudence. Here, the court was evaluating the constitutional validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation which provided for police surveillance of habitual offenders including domiciliary visits and picketing. The Supreme Court desisted from striking down these invasive provisions holding that "It cannot be said that surveillance by domiciliary visit, would always be an unreasonable restriction upon the right of privacy. It is only persons who are suspected to be habitual criminals and those who are determined to lead criminal lives that are subjected to surveillance."

The court went on to make some observations on the right to privacy under the Constitution:

"Too broad a definition of privacy will raise serious questions about the propriety of judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. The right to privacy will, therefore, necessarily, have to go through a process of case by case development. Hence, assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout India and the freedom of speech create an independent fundamental right of privacy as an emanation from them it could not he absolute. It must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest. But the law infringing it must satisfy the compelling state interest test. It could not be that under these freedoms that the Constitution-makers intended to protect or protected mere personal sensitiveness."

The next case in the series was R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu [6] which involved a balancing of the right of privacy of citizens against the right of the press to criticize and comment on acts and conduct of public officials. The case related to the alleged autobiography of Auto Shankar who was convicted and sentenced to death for committing six murders. In the autobiography, he had commented on his contact and relations with various police officials. The right of privacy of citizens was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the following terms: -

The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, childbearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.
The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.

Elsewhere in the same decision, the court took a cautionary stance and held that "the right to privacy...will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development."

The final case that makes up the 'privacy quintet' in India was the case of PUCL v. Union of India [7] in which the court was called upon to consider whether wiretapping was an unconstitutional infringement of a citizen’s right to privacy. The court held:

The right privacy — by itself — has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as a ‘right to privacy’. Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man's life. It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone-conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.

The court also read this right to privacy as simultaneously deriving from Article 19. "When a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech and expression", the court observed, and therefore "telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of restrictions under Article 19(2) would infract Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution."

However, the court in this case made two observations which would have a lasting impact on privacy jurisprudence in India –firstly, it rejected the contention that 'prior judicial scrutiny' should be mandated before any wiretapping could take place and accepted the contention that administrative safeguards would be sufficient.

Thus, to conclude this section of this chapter, it may be observed that the right to privacy in India is, at its foundations a limited right rather than an absolute one. In the sections that follow, it will become apparent that this limited nature of the right provides a somewhat unstable assurance of privacy since it is frequently made to yield to all manners of competing interests which happen to have a more pronounced legal standing.

Vocabularies of Privacy Limitation

Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) defines privacy in the following terms:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

Similarly, Article 17 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (to which India is a party) declares that:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home and correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation."

In this section, we look briefly at sections in some statutes that authorize the deprivation of privacy. These statutes have been classified under three headings, following the aforementioned international covenants, each dealing with a) our communications, b) our homes and c) bodily privacy.

Privacy of Communications

Communications laws

All laws dealing with mediums of inter-personal communication — post, telegraph and telephony and email – contain similarly worded provisions permitting interception under specified conditions.

Thus, section 26 of the India Post Office Act 1898 confers powers of interception of postal articles for the 'public good'. According to this section, this power may be invoked "On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety or tranquillity". The section further clarifies that “a certificate from the State or Central Government” would be conclusive proof as to the existence of a public emergency or interest of public safety or tranquillity.

Similarly, section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act authorizes the interception of any message

on the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety; and
if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence,

Thus, the events that trigger an action of interception are the occurrence of any ‘public emergency’ or in the interests of ‘public safety’.

Most recently, section 69 of the Information Technology Act 2008 contains a more expanded power of interception which may be exercised "when they [the authorised officers] are satisfied that it is necessary or expedient" to do so in the interest of:

sovereignty or integrity of India,
defence of India,
security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States or
public order or
preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or
for investigation of any offence,

[More details of the occasions and the mandatory procedural safeguards before these powers may be exercised are contained in our briefing notes on Privacy and Telecommunications and Privacy and the IT Act]

From a plain reading of these sections, there appears to be a gradual loosening of standards from the Post Office Act to the latest Information Technology Act. The Post Office Act requires the existence of a ‘state of public emergency’ or a ‘threat to public safety and tranquillity’ as a precursor to the exercise of the power of interception. This requirement is continued in the Telegraph Act with the addition of a few more conditions, such as expediency in the interests of sovereignty, etc. Under the most recent IT Act, the requirement of a public emergency or a threat to public safety is dispensed with entirely – here, the government may intercept merely if it feels it ‘necessary or expedient’.

How much of a difference does it make?

In Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India and ors [8] , the Supreme Court was required to interpret the meaning of ‘public emergency’. Here, the court was required to consider whether disconnection of a telephone could be ordered due to an ‘economic emergency’. The Government of Delhi had ordered the disconnection of the petitioner’s telephones due to their alleged involvement, through the use of telephones, in (then forbidden) forward trading in agricultural commodities. According to the government, this constituted an ‘economic emergency’ due to the escalating prices of food. Declining this contention, the Supreme Court held that:

a 'public emergency' within the contemplation of this section is one which raises problems concerning the interest of the public safety, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or the prevention of incitement to the commission of an offence.

Economic emergency is not one of those matters expressly mentioned in the statute. Mere 'economic emergency'— as the high court calls it—may not necessarily amount to a 'public emergency' and justify action under this section unless it raises problems relating to the matters indicated in the section.

In addition the other qualifying term, 'public safety' was interpreted in an early case by the Supreme Court to mean "security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as securing public safety. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the context."[9]

Thus, the words ‘public emergency’ and 'public safety' does provide some legal buffer before the government may impinge on our privacy in the case of post and telecommunications. In a sense, they operate both as limits on our privacy as well as limits on the government’s ability to impinge on our privacy — since the government must demonstrate their existence to the satisfaction of the court, failing which their actions would be illegal.

However, as mentioned, even these requirements have been dispensed with in the case of electronic communications falling under the purview of the Information Technology Act where sweeping powers of interception have been provided extending from matters affecting the sovereignty of the nation, to the more mundane 'investigation of any offence'.

Privileged Communications

In addition to laying down procedural safeguards which restrict the conditions under which our communication may be intercepted, the law also safeguards our privacy in certain contexts by taking away the evidentiary value of certain communications.

Thus, for instance, under the Evidence Act, communications between spouses and communications with legal advisors are accorded a special privilege.

Section 122 of the Evidence Act forbids married couples from disclosing any communications made between them during marriage without the consent of the person who made it. This however, does not apply in suits “between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”

This rule was applied in a case before the Kerala High Court, T.J. Ponnen vs M.C. Varghese [10] where a man sued his son-in-law for defamation based on statements about him written in a letter addressed to his daughter. The trial court held that the prosecution was invalid since it was based on privileged communications between the couple. This was upheld by the high court. The petitioner had attempted to argue that it was immaterial how he gained possession of the letter. The high court disagreed with this contention holding that this would defeat the purpose of section 122.

Similarly section 126 forbids “barristers, attorneys, pleaders or vakils” from disclosing, without their client’s express consent “any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil... or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment.”

As with section 122, this privilege also comes with exceptions. Thus, the following kinds of communications are exempted from the privilege:

any communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose,
any fact observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, in the course of his employment as such showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment.

Section 127 extends the scope attorney-client privilege to include any interpreters, clerks and servants of the attorney or barrister. They are also not permitted to disclose the contents of any communication between the attorney and her client.

Section 129 enacts a reciprocal protection and provides that clients shall not be compelled to disclose to the court any "confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional adviser."

Section 131 of the Evidence Act further cements the legal protection afforded to married couples, attorneys and their clients by providing that "No one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession" unless that person consents to the production of such documents.

Note that these privileges do not limit the ability of the state to intercept communications – they merely negate the evidentiary value of any communications so intercepted.

Privacy of the Home: Search and Seizure Provisions

Under what circumstances may the State invade the privacy of our homes? What are the limits of these powers? Technically, any law that authorizes “search and seizure” can be said to authorize an invasion of our privacy. Many laws permit searches, for various grounds — ranging from the Income Tax Act which authorizes searches to recover undisclosed income, to the Narcotics Act which prescribes a procedure to search and sieze drugs, to the Excise Act and the Customs Act which do so in order to discover goods that are manufactured or imported in violation of those respective statutes. In this section we deal only with the general provisions for search and seizure under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) provides that a house or premises may be searched either under a search warrant issued by a court, or, in the absence of a court-issued-warrant, by a police officer in the course of investigation of offences.

Thus, a court may issue a search warrant where

it has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons has been, or might be, addressed, will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons; or
where such document or thing is not known to the court to be in the possession of any person, or
where the court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served by a general search or inspection,

Similarly, section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits for searches to be conducted by “police officers in charge of police station or a police officer making an investigation” without first obtaining a warrant. Such a search may be conducted if he has “reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the police station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached”, and if, in his opinion, such thing cannot “be otherwise obtained without undue delay”.

Such officer must record in writing the grounds of his belief and specify “so far as possible” the thing for which search is to be made.

In both cases, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the search to conform to procedures including the presence of "two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality”. The preparation, in their presence, of “a list of all things seized in the course of such search, and of the places in which they are respectively found", the delivery of this list to the occupant of the place being searched.

However, in reality, these requirements are observed more in the breach. Courts have consistently held that not following these provisions would not make evidence obtained inadmissible — it would make the search irregular, not unlawful. Thus, in State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni [11], where a search was conducted under the Customs Act to recover smuggled gold, the Supreme Court held that

Assuming that the search was illegal it would not affect either the validity of the seizure and further investigation by the customs authorities or the validity of the trial which followed on the complaint of the Assistant Collector of Customs.

In a different case, Radhakrishan v. State of U.P. [12] which involved an illegal search in contravention of the Code of Criminal Procedure , the Supreme Court held that:

"So far as the alleged illegality of the search is concerned, it is sufficient to say that even assuming that the search was illegal the seizure of the Articles is not vitiated. It may be that where the provisions of ... Code of Criminal Procedure, are contravened the search could be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues."

India inherits the common law notion that a man’s house is his castle. In the light of the cases discussed above, this claim certainly appears to be lofty. However, there is still hope. In a recent case, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of a legislation on grounds that it was too intrusive of citizens’ right to privacy. The case involved an evaluation of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act which authorized the collector to delegate “any person” to enter any premises in order to search for and impound any document that was found to be improperly stamped. Thus, for instance, banks could be compelled to cede all documents in their custody, including clients documents, for inspection on the mere chance that some of them may be improperly stamped. These banks were then compelled under law to pay the deficit stamp duty on the documents, even if they themselves were not party to the transactions recorded in the documents.

After an exhaustive analysis of privacy laws across the world, and in India, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any safeguards as to probable or reasonable cause or reasonable basis, this provision was violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy, both of the house and of the person. [13]

The case marks a welcome redrawing of the boundaries of the right to privacy against state intrusion.

Privacy of the Body

To what extent do we have a right to privacy that protects what we may do with our own bodies and may be done to them? This section deals with this question in the context of four issues that have arisen before courts:

the ability of the state to order persons to undergo medical-examination,
to undergo a range of 'truth technologies' including narco analysis, brain mapping, etc.,
to submit to DNA testing and d) to abortion. In most cases, as we shall see, the right to privacy cedes ground to any available competing interest.

Court-ordered Medical Examinations

Can courts compel persons to undergo medical examinations against their will? In the case of Sharda v. Dharmpal[14], decided in 2003, the Supreme Court held that they could. Here a man filed for divorce on that grounds that his wife suffered from a mental illness. In order to establish his case, he requested the court to direct his wife to submit herself to a medical examination. The trial court and the high court both granted his application. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the woman contested the order on grounds firstly, that compelling a person to undergo a medical examination by an order of the court would be violative of her right to 'personal liberty' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, in absence of a specific empowering provision, a court dealing with matrimonial cases cannot subject a party to undergo medical examination against his her volition. The court could merely draw an adverse inference.

The Supreme Court rejected these contentions holding that the right to privacy in India was not absolute. If the "respondent avoids such medical examination on the ground that it violates his/her right to privacy or for a matter right to personal liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then it may in most of such cases become impossible to arrive at a conclusion. It may render the very grounds on which divorce is permissible nugatory."

The court upheld the rights of matrimonial courts to order a person to undergo medical test. Such an order, the court held, would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, this power could only be exercised if the applicant had a strong prima facie case, and there was sufficient material before the court. Crucially, the court held that if, despite the order of the court, the respondent refused to submit herself to medical examination, the court would be entitled to draw an adverse inference against him.

Thus, oddly, one limitation on the right to privacy appears to be the statutory rights of others. One is entitled to the privacy of one’s body, to the extent that another person is not, thereby, deprived of a statutory right – as in this case, to divorce.

Reproductive Rights

Ahmedabad: A 13-year-old girl, who conceived after being repeatedly raped, has moved the Gujarat High Court and sought permission to medically terminate her pregnancy after a sessions court rejected her plea.

Express India(April 2010) [15]

To what extent do pregnant women enjoy a right to privacy over their bodies and their reproductive decisions? Are there circumstances when the State can intervene and either order or forbid an abortion?

According to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 a pregnancy may be terminated before the twentieth week if:

the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health; or
there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities to be seriously handicapped.
where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape,
where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children.

Consent for termination needs to be obtained from the guardian in cases of minors or women who are mentally ill. In all other cases, the woman herself must consent.

Beyond the period of 20 weeks, the pregnancy may only be terminated if there is immediate danger to the life of the woman.

In August 2009, the Supreme Court heard an expedited appeal that was filed on behalf of a destitute mentally retarded woman who had become pregnant consequent to having been raped at a government run shelter. The government had approached the high court seeking permission to terminate her pregnancy, which had been granted by that court despite the finding by an ‘expert body’ of medical practitioners that she was keen on continuing the pregnancy. On appeal the Supreme Court held, very curiously, that the woman was not ‘mentally ill’, but ‘mentally retarded’, and consequently her consent was imperative under the Act. [16] However, not content to stop there, the court made several puzzling and contradictory observations:

Firstly, the court took the opportunity to affirm, generally, women’s rights to make reproductive choices as a dimension of their `personal liberty' as guaranteed by Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) of the Constitution of India. The court observed:

“It is important to recognise that reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial consideration is that a woman's right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity should be respected. This means that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the exercise of reproductive choices such as a woman's right to refuse participation in sexual activity or alternatively the insistence on use of contraceptive methods. Furthermore, women are also free to choose birth-control methods such as undergoing sterilisation procedures. Taken to their logical conclusion, reproductive rights include a woman's entitlement to carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to subsequently raise children. (emphasis mine) [17]

However, the court went on to affirm, in language that curiously imitates Roe v Wade,[18] that there was “a `compelling state interest' in protecting the life of the prospective child.[19]

Secondly, the Supreme Court upheld the woman’s consent as determinative and in doing so, categorically rejected the high court approach. The court held that since she suffered from `mild mental retardation' this did not render her "incapable of making decisions for herself". Simultaneously, however, the Supreme Court proceeded gratuitously to apply the common law doctrine of `parens patriae' to resume jurisdiction over the woman in her “best interests”. According to a court-appointed expert committee, her mental age was “close to that of a nine-year old child” and she was capable of “learning through rote memorisation and imitation” and of performing “basic bodily functions”.[20] In this light, the court deemed in her ‘best interests’, as defined by an expert committee, to defer to her wishes.

The findings recorded by the expert body indicate that her mental age is close to that of a nine-year old child and that she is capable of learning through rote-memorisation and imitation. Even the preliminary medical opinion indicated that she had learnt to perform basic bodily functions and was capable of simple communications. In light of these findings, it is the `best interests' test alone which should govern the inquiry in the present case and not the `substituted judgment' test. [21]

If one disregards the liberalism of its outcome, there are various problems with this decision. Chiefly, the Supreme Court relied on the woman’s expressed consent to deny the legitimacy of the high court’s decision in favour of abortion. Inexplicably, however, in the same move, the Supreme Court reserved to itself the right to adjudicate the ‘best interests’ of the woman. Thus, in relation to abortion, mentally retarded women are more autonomous than minor girls (since their own consent is determinative, rather than their guardians) but they are still less autonomous than ‘normal’ women (since their decisions are subject to adjudication based on what the court thinks is in their best interests)!

DNA Tests in Civil Suits

Do we have a right to privacy over the interiors of our body – our blood, our tissue, our DNA? There is, by now, a strong line of cases decided by the Supreme Court in which our right to ‘bodily integrity’ has been held to not be absolute, and may be interfered with in order to settle many terrestrial issues. In most cases, this question has arisen in the context of the determination of paternity – either in divorce or maintenance proceedings. Central in the determination of these issues is section 112 of the Evidence Act which stipulates that birth of a child during the continuance of a valid marriage (or within 280 days of its dissolution) would be conclusive proof of legitimacy of that child, “unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”

As is evident, this section creates a strong legal presumption of legitimacy that leaves no room for a scientific rebuttal. Various litigants have, nevertheless, sought the courts’ indulgence in accepting medical evidence to displace this formidable legal presumption. These efforts have yielded a measure of success, and a steady line of precedents since the early 1990s now affirms the right of courts to direct medical evidence in cases they consider fit. In these cases, the court has frequently invoked privacy rights as an important consideration to be weighed before ordering a person to submit to any test.

In one of the earliest and most frequently invoked cases, Goutam Kundu vs State of West Bengal and Anr (1993) [22] the Supreme Court laid down guidelines governing the power of courts to order blood tests. The court held:

courts in India cannot order blood test as matter of course;

wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained.

There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under section 112 of the Evidence Act.

The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman.

No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.

On the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court refused to order the respondent to submit to the test, since in its view, there was no prima facie case made out that cast doubts on the legal presumption of legitimacy.

These guidelines have been frequently invoked in subsequent cases. In a complex set of facts, in Ms. X vs Mr. Z and Anr (2001), [23] the Delhi High Court was called to consider whether a foetus had a ‘right to privacy’ – or whether the mother of the foetus could assert a right to privacy on it’s behalf. A woman had given birth to a still-born child and tissues from the foetus had been stored at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences. Her husband approached to obtain an order permitting a DNA test to be carried out to determine if he was the father. In her defence, the woman claimed that this would offend her right to privacy. The high court reaffirmed the guidelines laid down in the Gautam Kundu case (supra), and also upheld the petitioner’s right to privacy over her own body. However, the court took the stance that she did not have a right of privacy over the foetus once it had been discharged from her body:

"The petitioner indeed has a right of privacy but is being not an absolute right, therefore, when a foetus has been preserved in All India Institute of Medical Science, the petitioner, who has already discharged the same cannot claim that it affects her right of privacy.

However, if the petitioner was being compelled to subject herself to blood test or otherwise, she indeed could raise a defense that she cannot be compelled to be a witness against herself in a criminal case or compelled to give evidence against her own even in a civil case but the position herein is different. The petitioner is not being compelled to do any such act. Something that she herself has discharged, probably with her consent, is claimed to be subjected to DNA test. In that view of the matter, in the peculiar facts, it cannot be termed that the petitioner has any right of privacy."

The decision has wide-ranging implications since it virtually divests control and ownership over any material that has been discarded from the body – from nails to hair to tissue samples. In an interesting case in the US, Moore v. Regents of the University of California [24], the Supreme Court of California was faced with a suit to determine whether a man retained ownership over cells that had been removed from his body through a surgical procedure. In this case, cells from a patient’s spleen were used to conduct research which resulted in the patenting of a cell-line by the defendant. The patient sued for a share in the profits, but this was rejected by the court which held that he had no property rights to his discarded cells or any profits made from them. The court specifically rejected the argument that his spleen should be protected as property as an aspect of his privacy and dignity. The court held these interests were already protected by informed consent.

In a sense the Ms. X vs Mr. Z case arrives at identical conclusions without as much deliberation on its implications. It would be interesting to see how subsequent courts interpret and apply this precedent.

One of the most critical factors, consistently weighed by courts alongside the privacy rights implicated, is the ‘best interests’ of the child. Thus, in Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women & Anr.[25], the Supreme Court quashed a high court-mandated DNA test to determine the paternity of an unborn child in a woman’s womb. In doing so, the SC observed:

“In a matter where paternity of a child is in issue before the court, the use of DNA is an extremely delicate and sensitive aspect. One view is that when modern science gives means of ascertaining the paternity of a child, there should not be any hesitation to use those means whenever the occasion requires. The other view is that the court must be reluctant in use of such scientific advances and tools which result in invasion of right to privacy of an individual and may not only be prejudicial to the rights of the parties but may have devastating effect on the child. Sometimes the result of such scientific test may bastardise an innocent child even though his mother and her spouse were living together during the time of conception. In our view, when there is apparent conflict between the right to privacy of a person not to submit himself forcibly to medical examination and duty of the court to reach the truth, the court must exercise its discretion only after balancing the interests of the parties and on due consideration whether, for a just decision in the matter, DNA is eminently needed. (emphasis added)

A strong trend, evident in this case, is the bussing of the interests of the child (in not being declared illegitimate), along with the privacy rights of the mother. The two create a composite interest opposed to that of the putative father, which the courts have been reluctant to interfere with except for the most compelling reasons. But what happens when then the interests of the child conflict with the privacy rights of either parent?

In a high profile case in 2010, Shri Rohit Shekhar vs Shri Narayan Dutt Tiwari[26], the Delhi High was called upon to determine whether a man had a right to subject the person he named as his biological father to a DNA test. Contrary to the trend in the preceding cases, it was the biological father who pleaded his right to privacy in this case. The court relied on international covenants to affirm the “right of the child to know of her (or his) biological antecedents” irrespective of her (or his) legitimacy. The court ruled:

There is of course the vital interest of child to not be branded illegitimate; yet the conclusiveness of the presumption created by the law in this regard must not act detriment to the interests of the child. If the interests of the child are best sub-served by establishing paternity of someone who is not the husband of her (or his) mother, the court should not shut that consideration altogether.

The protective cocoon of legitimacy, in such case, should not entomb the child’s aspiration to learn the truth of her or his paternity.

The court went on to draw a distinction between legitimacy and paternity that may both "be accorded recognition under Indian law without prejudice to each other. While legitimacy may be established by a legal presumption [under section 112 of the Evidence Act], paternity has to be established by science and other reliable evidence"[27] The court, however, reaffirmed that the same considerations would apply as was laid down in previous cases – i.e., the plaintiff would have to establish a prima facie case and weigh the competing interests of privacy and justice before it could order a DNA test. In this case, the petitioner was able to produce DNA evidence that excluded the possibility that his legal father was his biological father. In addition, photographic and testimonial evidence suggested that the respondent could be his biological father. On these grounds the Delhi High Court ordered the respondent to undergo a DNA test. This was upheld in an appeal to the Supreme Court.

So from the foregoing cases, it appears that it is the ‘best interests of the child’ that undergrids the right to privacy of either parent. When the two are in conflict it is the former that will, the case law suggests, invariably prevail.

Bodily Effects — Fingerprints, handwriting samples, photographs, Irises, narco-analysis, brain maps and DNA

The human body easily betrays itself. We are incessantly dropping residues of our existence wherever we go – from shedding hair and fingernails, to fingerprints and footprints, handwriting – which, through use of modern technology, can implicate our bodies, and identify us against our will. Not even our thoughts are immune as new technologies like brain mapping pretend to be able to harvest psychic clues from our physiology.

In this section we explore occasions when the state may compel us to 'perform' our existence for instance, by submitting to photography, providing finger impressions or handwriting samples, submit to narco-analysis and truth tests, and more recently to provide iris scan data or our DNA.

Section 73 of the Evidence Act stipulates that the court "may direct any person present in the court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person."

This section was interpreted by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Babu Misra [28] where it was held that there must be “some proceeding before the court in which...it might be necessary... to compare such writings”. This specifically excludes, say, a situation where the case is still under investigation and there is no present proceeding before the court. “The language of section 73 does not permit a court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the court.”

The pre-independence Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 provides for the mandatory taking, by police officers, of 'measurements' and photograph of persons arrested or convicted for any offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year of upwards or ordered to give security for his good behaviour under section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [29] The Act also empowers a magistrate to order a person to be measured or photographed if he is satisfied that it is required for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. [30]

The Act also provides for the destruction of all photographs and records of measurements on discharge or acquittal. [31]

In addition, the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 2005 to enable the collection of a host of medical details from accused persons upon their arrest. Section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that upon arrest, an accused person may be subjected to a medical examination if there are “reasonable grounds for believing” that such examination will afford evidence as to the crime. The scope of this examination was expanded in 2005 to include “the examination of blood, blood-stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual offences, sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings by the use of modern and scientific techniques including DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered medical practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case.”

In a case in 2004, the Orissa High Court affirmed the legality of ordering a DNA test in criminal cases to ascertain the involvement of persons accused. Refusal to co-operate would result in an adverse inference drawn against the accused.

After weighing the privacy concerns involved, the court laid down the following considerations as relevant before the DNA test could be ordered:

the extent to which the accused may have participated in the commission of the crime;
the gravity of the offence and the circumstances in which it is committed;
age, physical and mental health of the accused to the extent they are known;
whether there is less intrusive and practical way of collecting evidence tending to confirm or disprove the involvement of the accused in the crime;
the reasons, if any, for the accused for refusing consent [32]

Most recently the draft DNA Profiling Bill pending before the Parliament attempts to create an ambitious centralized DNA bank that would store DNA records of virtually anyone who comes within any proximity to the criminal justice system. Specifically, records are maintained of suspects, offenders, missing persons and “volunteers”. The schedule to the Bill contains an expansive list of both civil and criminal cases where DNA data will be collected including cases of abortion, paternity suits and organ transplant. Provisions exist in the bill that limit access to and use of information contained in the records, and provide for their deletion on acquittal. These are welcome minimal guarantors of privacy.

It is evident that the utility of this mass of information – fingerprints, handwriting samples and photographs, DNA data – in solving crimes is immense. Without saying a word, it is possible for a person to be convicted based on these various bodily affects – the human body constantly bears witness and self-incriminates itself. Both handwriting and finger impressions beg the question of whether these would offend the protection against self-incrimination contained in Article 20(3) of our Constitution which provides that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This argument was considered by the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay vs Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors. [33] The petitioner contended that the obtaining of evidence through legislations such as the Identification of Prisoners Act amounted to compelling the person accused of an offence "to be a witness against himself" in contravention of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The court held that “there was no infringement of Article 20(3) of the Constitution in compelling an accused person to give his specimen handwriting or signature, or impressions of his thumb, fingers, palm or foot to the investigating officer or under orders of a court for the purposes of comparison. ...Compulsion was not inherent in the receipt of information from an accused person in the custody of a police officer; it will be a question of fact in each case to be determined by the court on the evidence before it whether compulsion had been used in obtaining the information.” [34]

Over the past two decades, forensics has shifted from trying to track down a criminal by following the trail left by her bodily traces, to attempting to apply a host of invasive technologies upon suspects in an attempt to ‘exorcise’ truth and lies directly from their body. One statement by Dr M.S. Rao, Chief Forensic Scientist, Government of India captures this shift:

Forensic psychology plays a vital role in detecting terrorist cases. Narco-analysis and brainwave fingerprinting can reveal future plans of terrorists and can be deciphered to prevent terror activities⁄ Preventive forensics will play a key role in countering terror acts. Forensic potentials must be harnessed to detect and nullify their plans. Traditional methods have proved to be a failure to handle them. Forensic facilities should be brought to the doorstep of the common man⁄ Forensic activism is the solution for better crime management. [35]

Although there are several such 'technologies' which operate on principles ranging from changes in respiration, to mapping the electrical activity in different areas of the brain, what is common to them all, in Lawrence Liang’s words is that they “maintain that there is a connection between body and mind; that physiological changes are indicative of mental states and emotions; and that information about an individual’s subjectivity and identity can be derived from these physiological and physiological measures of deception” [36]

So, how legal are these technologies, in view of the constitutional protections against self-incrimination? In a case in 2004 the Bombay High Court upheld these technologies by applying the logic of the Kathi Kalu Oghad case discussed above. The court drew a distinction between ‘statements’ and ‘testimonies’ and held that what was prohibited under Article 20(3) were only ‘statements’ that were made under compulsion by an accused. In the court’s opinion, “the tests of Brain Mapping and Lie Detector in which the map of the brain is the result, or polygraph, then either cannot be said to be a statement”. At the most, the court held, “it can be called the information received or taken out from the witness.” [37]

This position was however overturned recently by the Supreme Court in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010)[38]. In contrast with the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court expressly invoked the right of privacy to hold these technologies unconstitutional.

“Even though these are non- invasive techniques the concern is not so much with the manner in which they are conducted but the consequences for the individuals who undergo the same. The use of techniques such as 'Brain Fingerprinting' and 'FMRI-based Lie-Detection' raise numerous concerns such as those of protecting mental privacy and the harms that may arise from inferences made about the subject's truthfulness or familiarity with the facts of a crime.”

Further down, the court held that such techniques invaded the accused’s mental privacy which was an integral aspect of their personal liberty.

“There are several ways in which the involuntary administration of either of the impugned tests could be viewed as a restraint on 'personal liberty' ... the drug-induced revelations or the substantive inferences drawn from the measurement of the subject's physiological responses can be described as an intrusion into the subject's mental privacy”

Following a thorough-going examination of the issue, the Supreme Court directed that “no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty.” The court however, left open the option of voluntary submission to such techniques and endorsed the following guidelines framed by the National Human Rights Commission:

No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
The consent should be recorded before a judicial magistrate.
During the hearing before the magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a `confessional' statement to the magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
The magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
The actual recording of the lie detector test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer. 250
A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.

Although the right against self-incrimination and the inherent fallaciousness of the technologies were the main ground on which decision ultimately rested, this case is valuable for the court’s articulation of a right of ‘mental privacy’ grounded on the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. It remains to be seen whether this articulation will find resonance in other determinations in domains such as, say, communications.

Privacy of Records

Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, we have been living in what Nicholas Dirks has termed an 'ethnographic state' — engaged relentlessly and fetishistically in the production and accumulation of facts about us. From records of birth and death, to our academic records, most of our important transactions, our income tax filings, our food entitlements and our citizenship, most of us have assuredly been documented and lead a shadow existence somewhere on the files. Not only does the government keep records about us, but a host of private service providers including banks, hospitals, insurance and telecommunications companies maintain volumes of records about us. In this last section of this paper, we look at the privacy expectation of records both maintained by the government and the private sector.

Various statutes require records to be maintained of activities conducted under their authority and entire bureaucracies exist solely in service of these documents. Thus, for instance, the Registration Act requires various registers to be kept which record documents which have been registered under the Act. [39]; Once registered under this Act, all documents become public documents and State Rules typically contain provisions enabling the public to obtain copies of all documents for a fee. Similarly, a number of legislation – typically dealing with land records at the state level contain enabling provisions that allow the public to access them upon payment of a fee.

Where no provisions are provided within the statute itself that enable the public to obtain records, two recourses are still available.

Firstly, the Evidence Act enables courts to access records maintained by any government body. Secondly, private citizens may access records kept in public offices through the Right to Information Act. Each of these avenues is described in some details below:

Section 74 of the Evidence Act defines 'public documents' as including the following

Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts

Of the sovereign authority,
Of Official bodies and the Tribunals, and
Of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country.

Public records kept in any state of private documents

It is clear from this definition that most records maintained by any government body are regarded as public documents. Section 76 mandates that every public officer "having custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof".

Since there is no legislative guidance within the Evidence Act to indicate who may be said to possess "a right to inspect", this has been interpreted to mean that where the right to inspect and take a copy is not expressly conferred by a statute (as in the Registration Act mentioned above), “the extent of such right depends on the interest which the applicant has in what he wants to copy, and what is reasonably necessary for the protection of such interest". So it isn’t any officious meddler who may access such records – only persons with genuine interests in the matter, either personal or pecuniary, may obtain copies through this route.

In addition to the Evidence Act, copies of documents may also be obtained under the Right to Information Act 2005 which confers on citizens the right to inspect and take copies of any information held by or under the control of any public authority. Information is defined widely to include "any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force".

Section 8 (j) of the Act exempts "disclosure of personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual” unless the relevant authority “is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information".

In an interesting case Mr. Ansari Masud A.K vs Ministry of External Affairs (2008)[40] , the Central Information Commission has held that “details of a passport are readily made available by any individual in a number of instances, example to travel agents, at airline counters, and whenever proof of residence for telephone connections etc. is required. For this reason, disclosure of details of a passport cannot be considered as causing unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual and, therefore, is not exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.” This is despite the fact that nothing in the Passport Act itself authorizes disclosure of any documents under any circumstances.

However, the Right to Information Act isn’t as convenient a vehicle for privacy abuse as this case may suggest. The RTI adjudicatory apparatus has on several occasions upheld the denial of information on grounds of privacy violation – most famously in a case where an applicant sought information from the Census Department on the ‘religion and faith’ of Sonia Gandhi – the President of the largest party currently in power in India. Both the Central Information Commission – the apex body adjudicating RTI appeals as well as the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the denial of information as it would otherwise lead to an unwarranted incursion into her privacy.[41]

A similar concept of 'public interest' would seem to apply when private companies disclose personal information without a person’s consent. Without delving into the issue in too much detail, it would suffice here to mention one of the most important cases to have come up on the issue. In Mr. X vs Hospital Z[42] , a person sued a hospital for having disclosed his HIV status to his fiancé without his knowledge resulting in their wedding being called off. The Supreme Court held that the hospital was not guilty of a violation of privacy since the disclosure was made to protect the public interest. While affirming the duty of confidentiality owed to patients, the court ruled that the right to privacy was not absolute and was "subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others."

Conclusion

Reflecting on the volume of case law that we have in India on privacy, one is struck at once, both by the elasticity of the concept of privacy — spanning, as it does, diverse fields from criminal law to paternity suits to wiretapping —as well as its fragility — the flag of privacy is constantly being raised only to be ultimately overridden on pretexts that range from security of state, to a competing private interest.

On the one hand, one marvels at the success of the concept, only a few decades old in Indian law, in insinuating itself into legal arguments across diverse contexts. On the other hand, one is dismayed by the fact that rarely does the concept seem to score a victory. There is an almost ritual quality to the way in which the “right to privacy” is invoked in these cases - always named as a relevant factor; it never seems to substantially influence the outcome of the case at hand.

The right to privacy in India was an Oops baby, born on the ventilator of a minority decision of the Supreme Court, and nourished in the decades that followed by sympathetic judges, who never failed to point out that this right was contingent — not absolute, not meant to be under the Constitution, but carved out anyway. Some five decades after its first invocation by the Supreme Court, one gets the feeling that the right to privacy, conceptually, hasn’t moved, and is still what it was then. We don’t, today, for the many times it has been invoked by courts, have a thicker, more robust concept of privacy than we started out with. So the question, that one is stuck with is, what work does this concept of privacy do?

One of the failings of the concept of privacy in India is that it doesn’t exist as a positive right, but is merely a resistive right against targeted intrusion. So for instance, the right to privacy would be useless as a concept to resist something like generalized street video surveillance – as long as a citizen is not singled out for a disadvantage, this right would be of no use. So this right to privacy is a negative right to not be interfered with. Under it one does not have the right to be as private as one wishes, but only no less than the next person. Still, even this limited concept could be useful, if it were applied more rigorously.

Unfortunately, as the case law indicates, the right to privacy cedes too quickly to competing interests. An incomplete rough catalog of these competing rights, drawn from the case law surveyed in this paper include:

public emergency and public safety (communications)
criminal investigation (search and seizure/communications)
competing private interests (divorce proceedings)
best interests of the child (paternity suits)
public interest (Right to Information)
competing fundamental rights (HIV status)

One may perhaps add judicial inactivity as one of the limiting factors on privacy. By holding that violations of procedure by investigating agencies would not vitiate trials, the judiciary has been complicit in perhaps some of the more damaging incursions into privacy. Once a person is implicated in any manner in the criminal justice system – either as a victim, a witness or an offender, investigating agencies are immediately invested with plenary powers. They can search his house without warrant. They can place him arrest. Subject him to ‘medical examinations’, take his fingerprints and DNA and hold it in a bank and there is nothing you can do. In this context, perhaps the strongest privacy safeguard can come from a reform in criminal procedure alone.

Notes

[1].The State of Uttar Pradesh V. Kaushaliya and Others AIR 1964 SC 416

[2].(1978) 2 SCR 621

[3]. 1 SCR 332

[4].AIR 1973 SC 157, 1973 SCR (2) 417

[5].(1975) 2 SCC 148

[6].(1994) 6 S.C.C. 632

[7].AIR 1997 SC 568

[8].AIR 1976 SC 789,1976 SCR (2)1060, (1976) 2 SCC 128

[9].Romesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 , 1950 SCR 594

[10].1966 AIR 1967 Ker 228, 1967 CriLJ 1511

[11].AIR 1980 SC 593 , 1980 SCR (2) 340

[12].[1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 408

[13].Distt. Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara bank etc. AIR 2005 SC 186

[14].(2003) 4 SCC 493

[15].13-yr-old rape victim to HC: let me abort -, EXPRESS INDIA, April 21, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/13yrindian (last visited May 2, 2010).

[16].Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1. http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/dc%201798509p.txt (last visited May 2, 2010).

[17].Ibid

[18].410 U.S. 113 (1973)

[19].Article 21 does not limit the abridgement of the right to life by the state to only cases where the state has compelling state interest. The Article reads “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal librty except according to procedure established by law”

[20].Ibid

[21].Ibid

[22].AIR 1993 SC 2295, 1993 SCR (3) 917 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1259126/>

[23].AIR 2002 Delhi 217 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/627683/>

[24].51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479

[25].AIR 2010 SC 2851 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/486945/>

[26].23 December, 2010 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/504408/>

[27].Ibid

[28].AIR 1980 SC 791 , 1980 SCR (2)1067 , (1980) 2 SCC 343

[29].Sections 3 & 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920

[30].Ibid, Section 5

[31].Section 7

[32].Thogorani Alias K. Damayanti vs State Of Orissa And Ors 2004 Cri L J 4003 (Ori) < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/860378/>

[33].AIR 1961 SC 1808 < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1626264/>

[34].Ibid

[35].Keynote address given to the 93rd Indian Science Congress. See http://mindjustice.org/india2-06.htm, cited in Liang, L., 2007. And nothing but the truth, so help me science. In Sarai Reader 07 - Frontiers. Delhi: CSDS, Delhi, pp. 100-110. Available at: http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/07-frontiers/100-110_lawrence.pdf [Accessed April 11, 2011].

[36].Ibid

[37].Ramchandra Ram Reddy v. State of Maharashtra [1 (2205) CCR 355 (DB)

[38].(2010) 7 SCC 263 http://indiankanoon.org/doc/338008/

[39].See Section 52 of the Registration Act 1908

[40].CIC/OK/A/2008/987/AD dated December 22, 2008 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1479476/>

[41].Anon, 2010. High Court dismisses appeal seeking information on Sonia Gandhi’s religion. NDTV Online. Available at: http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/high-court-dismisses-appeal-seeking-information-on-sonia-gandhi-s-religion-69356 [Accessed April 12, 2011].

[42].(2003) 1 SCC 500 40

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For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/limits-to-privacy

Digerati See Censorship in New Web Rules

praskrishna — 2011-05-05T02:21:27Z

Attention Indian bloggers and social media fiends: the next time you’re composing a witty tweet or posting an edgy item on Facebook, please take care that what you’re writing isn’t “grossly harmful” or “harassing” or “ethnically objectionable” or – oh, the humanity! – “disparaging.” This news was published in the Wall Street Journal on May 2, 2011.

Those are among the types of content that are banned under Internet regulations the Indian government recently put into effect to enforce sections of an information technology law passed in 2008. It’s up to “intermediaries” – Internet service providers, social networking sites, etc. – to police the Web and remove content that goes out of bounds.

As word of the new rules spreads, digital media barons and commoners alike are freaking out. Is the world’s largest democracy ever-so-quietly trampling on free speech by enacting a censorship regime for the Web? How exactly will these rules affect day-to-day activity online?

On the MediaNama digital media blog, Nikhil Pahwa offers a bleak analysis: “These rules give the Indian government the ability to gag free speech, and block any website it deems fit, without publicly disclosing why sites have been blocked,” he writes.

Concerns are also pouring out on Twitter, with user posts like “Looks like we will become China soon” and “Moving to a more draconian state” and “When the hell did this happen?”

To shed some light on that last question: These rules merely advance what has been a quiet effort for several years by the Indian government to get a grip on the Web without the kind of blanket censorship or Website-blocking practiced in countries like Iran, China and Saudi Arabia.

In a front-page story last year, The Wall Street Journal showed how Indian police and government authorities, acting on complaints from Web users, have successfully pressured Google Inc. and other companies to make inaccessible to Indian users Web content that offends figures ranging from Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi to Hindu nationalist leader Balasaheb Thackeray.

The IT law was in effect then but as the government issues more specific rules to enforce it, its powers appear to be broadening–or at least coming into much sharper focus. The cumulative impact of the government’s Web regulation regime, says Sunil Abraham of the Center for Internet and Society in Bangalore, is to foster a culture of self-censorship not just by Web users but also Internet companies that will likely err on the side of caution by removing anything that seems edgy or potentially offensive.

Mr. Abraham cited as an example of overreach in the rules a provision that bans information that “impersonates another person,” which he said would outlaw everything from parody writing in which the author pretends to be in the shoes of a celebrity to Twitter accounts such as Dr.YumYumSingh, whose tweets are a running send-up of the honorable Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. “There are many occasions when people take on a pseudonym, or pretend to be someone else. If it isn’t done with the intention of financial fraud, there’s no need to clamp down on it,” he said.

Mr. Abraham also lamented that people whose content is taken down appear to have no recourse under the law to protest to ISPs or the government. It’s up to the ISPs to offer such recourse in their terms-of-use, if they are so generous.

To put this in its proper perspective, Indian authorities have never tried to disable Web access for large segments of the population or block very large numbers of sites, so far as we know. CIS revealed through a Right-to-Information request that 11 sites are currently being blocked, including a Facebook page that disparages constitutional framer and low-caste champion B.R. Ambedkar. There are certainly countries practicing a much, much higher degree of outright Web censorship.

But is fostering self-censorship–if that’s what’s happening here–just as bad as censorship itself?

Let us know what you think of the new rules in the Comments.

Read the article originally published in the Wall Street Journal here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/censorship-in-new-web-rules