We are anonymous, we are legion

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text – II: What India’s ITU Proposal May Mean for Internet Governance

geetha — 2014-11-03T07:07:16Z

The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.

Disclaimer and update (2 November 2014): India's Draft Resolution was discussed during the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Internet-related Resolutions at the ITU Plenipot on the evening of November 1, 2014 (KST). After the discussion, India revised the text of the resolution, seeking to address concerns raised by ITU member states. The revised resolution may be found here. However, this blog post was written with reference to the original text of India's Draft Resolution.

***

As I mentioned in my last post, India’s Draft Resolution on ‘ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society’ raises security and equity concerns. The Draft Resolution has 3 security concerns: (i) security weaknesses in the network architecture that permit “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication” and make “tracing of communication difficult”; (ii) non-systematic, non-contiguous allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, which makes it difficult to identify both the users and what states the IP addresses are located in; (iii) non-local routing and address resolution relating to traffic originating and terminating in the same country. Op. §§1, 3-7 seek to address these. It also identifies the present system of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources as inequitable, unfair, unjust and undemocratic (Op. §2 of the Draft Resolution offers a solution). I discussed some human rights implications of India’s Draft Resolution in my last post.

In this post, I explore the implications of the Draft Resolution for Internet governance and multi-stakeholder approaches (most notably, an equal footing model).[1] Given the uncertainties around defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance, this is rather ambitious. So I will try to point to concerns with certain textual interpretations of the Draft Resolution, map that against the positions India’s representatives have taken on Internet governance in the past, and the motivations/concerns that underlie the tabling of the Draft Resolution. This Resolution may not be the best way to allay India's concerns, for there are technical and rights implications. But the concerns it raises are worth discussion and knowledge, and at forums where concerns are heard, acknowledged and discussed collectively. The text of the Draft Resolution and its attendant implications are not, then, the sole subjects of this post.

The Draft Resolution and Internet governance:

The text of the Draft Resolution is problematic. Many of its clauses may be seen as taking positions against multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance. Introducing such a resolution at the ITU may itself bring back memories of the controversies surrounding Resolution 3 of the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), 2012.[2] In 3 ways, the text of the Draft Resolution has indications for multi-stakeholder approaches.

First, the Draft Resolution frames issues primarily from the perspective security. In its preamble, the Draft Resolution makes several references to security threats posed by and on the Internet. For instance, it points to the ability of the network to “camouflage the identity of the originator of the communication” (Pream. §(e) [recognizing]), as well as national security concerns in the present-day system of routing Internet traffic through multiple countries (Pream. §§(f) and (g), [recognizing]). The apparent difficulty in tracing IP addresses, due to their random allocation, is another concern (Pream. §(h), [recognizing]). Among the “significant public policy issues” identified in telecom/ICT management, “security and safety of the Telecom/ICTs” is specifically noted (Pream. §(i) [considering]). In the Context note to the Draft Resolution and in several places in the Preamble, there are references to ITU Resolution 130 (‘Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in the use of information and communication technologies’) and ITU’s Cyber-security Agenda. Given the (legitimate or otherwise) disproportionate involvement of governments and not other stakeholders in matters of cyber-security, the framing of issues from a security perspective may lend itself to worries for multi-stakeholderism. Specifically, the Draft Resolution notes: “ensuring security of ICT networks is sovereign right of Member States” (Pream. §(b) [recognizing]).

Second, the Draft Resolution emphasizes the sovereign right of states to regulate and control telecom/ICT. It says, for instance, “it is the sovereign right of each state to regulate its telecommunication” (Pream. §(b) [considering]). With regard to the Internet, the Context note to the Draft Resolution (page 1) considers the Internet to be synonymous with telecom/ICTs: “the Telecom/ICTs, which in common lexicon is used interchangeably many times as Internet…”. Public telecom networks managed by telecom service providers, interconnected with other networks, are necessary for “proper functioning of a telecom network resources namely, among others, naming, numbering and addressing” (Pream. §(k) [considering]). It is worth noting that the sovereign authority of states over Internet public policy issues is settled text from §35 of the Tunis Agenda, though expressing it as synonymous with telecom may lead to possibilities of licensing and registration, which Bulgaria, for instance, does not do.

Third, the Draft Resolution identifies issues of equity and fairness in the allocation of Internet resources such as naming, numbering and addressing (Pream. §(g) [consdering], Op. §2). It states that to correct this inequity, “facilitation and collaboration among international, inter-governmental organizations and individual member states to ensure planning, implementation, monitoring and cooperation in its policies” is required (Pream. §(g) [considering]). In operative paragaphs, our Draft Resolution calls for collaboration with “all the concerned stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations to develop policies for allocation, assignment and management of IP resources including naming, numbering and addressing which is systematic, equitable, fair, just, democratic and transparent” (Op. §2). One may pay attention to the oversight over implementation and the necessity of inter-governmental involvement in planning and monitoring as problematic to iterations of multi-stakeholderism.

These concerns are valid and legitimate, and it is desirable that the text of the resolution be altered to address them. The text should also be altered to address the human rights concerns I point out in my previous post. But human rights enforcement or implementation is within the domain of states, though civil society may be a careful watchdog. The Draft Resolution's text, most certainly, will face certain oppositions: for instance, that it is outside the scope and mandate of the ITU. That the ITU does not deal with content regulation – and this issue touches upon content – will be mentioned. That Internet governance is already being discussed and performed in multiple other multi-stakeholder fora, such as ICANN, the NRO and RIRs, IGF and WSIS, will be emphasized. That the Draft Resolution implicates national security concerns will be mentioned as well. But as an aside, on national security: under international law, states always mention their prerogative over national security, and so as a matter of international custom, national security is outside the scope of agreements unless expressly surrendered.

At the same time, debates around the role of ITU in Internet governance are not new, and those familiar will remember the ITU’s views right before the creation of ICANN (also see Mueller, Ruling the Root 145-48 (2002)), Resolution 3 of the WCIT, and the constant tug-of-war since then. The new Secretary-General of the ITU, Mr. Houlin Zhao, wrote a note in October 2004, before the Tunis phase of the WSIS, justifying ITU’s involvement in Internet governance, advocating that IPv6 address blocks be allocated to countries. Mr. Zhao describes, with specific examples, ITU's role in the development and widespread growth of the Internet. He takes the examples of standards developed within the ITU and ITU's policy role in liberalisation and spread of telecommunications (such as Articles 4 & 9 of the 1988 ITRs).

Mr. Zhao’s concrete proposals are rendered inapplicable by the creation of the NRO and RIRs, and the growth and entrenchment of ICANN. But it may be argued that his principled justifications for ITU involvement remain. It is these that India hopes to highlight, I was told, along with the inequities in resource allocation (IPv4 was spoken of), and the disproportionate weight some states enjoy in Internet governance. Her concerns are, I am told, also shared by some other states. Given that the text exhibits a less-than-friendly approach to multi-stakeholderism, India's previous positions on the issue are of interest. While this would not correct the snags in the Draft Resolution's text, allaying these concerns may be ideal to craft an inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder model for Internet governance.

India and Multi-stakeholderism in Internet Governance:

India’s position on multi-stakeholder models for Internet governance is a matter of some obscurity. Statements at various forums exhibit a certain disagreement – or at the least, lack of engagement – among India’s ministries on our position on multi-stakeholder approaches, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) and the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), both within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). While both the MEA and DOT have been cautious supporters of a diluted form of multi-stakeholderism (they have repeatedly emphasized §35 of the Tunis Agenda), DeitY has been more open in entertaining multi-stakeholder approaches for Internet governance.

At the 66^th session of UN General Assembly, Mr. Dushyant Singh, Member of India’s Parliament from the Bharatiya Janata Party, presented our proposal for a Committee on Internet-related Policies. The proposal sought the establishment of a UN committee comprising 50 member-states, with advisory groups including the private sector and civil society, to deal with Internet-related matters.[3] Though India was not opposed to multi-stakeholder advisories in its CIRP proposal, it was less than inviting in this regard.

At NETmundial (April 2014), the Indian government’s contribution document highlighted §35 of the Tunis Agenda, which delineates ‘roles and responsibilities’ of ‘respective stakeholders’ – i.e., governments (with whom reside “sovereign policy authority”), the private sector (technical and economic development of the Internet) and civil society (grassroots participation). At NETmundial, Mr. Vinay Kwatra of the MEA echoed this, also noting the lack of consensus on what multi-stakeholderism means for Internet governance (page 64).

Admittedly, this is a legitimate concern. Internet governance at various fora does not seem to have a clear answer on what multi-stakeholderism means. The debate was/is alive, for instance, at NETmundial 2014, the ICANN-convened IANA transition process, the World Economic Forum’s new NETmundial Initiative, and in the many calls and suggestions (pages 38-46) made over the years on strengthening the IGF (see also, Malcolm, Multi-stakeholder Governance and the IGF (2008), chapter 6). It is hardly surprising then, that India and other states raise this as a concern.

With regard to multi-stakeholderism, the DeitY in India has been the outlier. Speaking at the 2014 IGF in Istanbul, Mr. R.S. Sharma, Secretary (DeitY), expressed “no doubt that Internet Governance mechanism require the involvement of all the stakeholders, since the evolution of Internet has been a product of many different diverse groups working together in a loosely coordinated manner”, advocating strengthening of the IGF and pointing to India’s proposed India-IGF as an example of multi-stakeholderism at home. Most interestingly, Mr. Sharma did not focus on international Internet-related policies being the “sovereign policy authority of states”. Also in the transcripts of the four meetings of the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation under the Committee for Science, Technology and Development (CSTD), I have been unable to find outright rejections of multi-stakeholder approaches, though India has not advocated multi-stakeholderism unequivocally either.

But this – the emphasis on “sovereign policy authority of states” in Internet governance – has been a consistent position for India, especially the MEA and DOT. Here at the ITU PP-14 as well, members of the Indian delegation also emphasized states’ sovereign monopoly over policy matters. “Why not take this to the ITU”, I was asked, as “many governments are uncomfortable” with the way Internet governance is being conducted at other fora. There are grave concerns, I was told, about the possibility of excessive control some governments have over both user and government data of other states (government-speak, of course, for the Snowden revelations).

These are, of course, concerns similar to those of authoritarian governments, or those reluctant to open up to multi-stakeholderism and looking for excuses to retain/increase government control. But it is equally possible that these concerns need not be limited only to such states. Perhaps for developing countries as well, these are real concerns. In conversation with members of the Indian delegation at the ITU Plenipot, I was able to discern 3 broad concerns. First, the definition of multi-stakeholderism in Internet governance. India has not shown herself comfortable with an all-out endorsement of multi-stakeholderism. This is troubling. Civil society and the private sector in India will attest to the difficulties in engaging with our government at all levels. For instance, seeking a place on India's delegation for the Plenipot proved a disheartening exercise for some members of India's civil society.

But there are also conflicting indications. India is in the process of instituting an India-IGF, and CIS' Executive Director, Sunil Abraham, is on the MAG. India expressed agreement, at least in informal conversation, to opening up ITU documents to the public on grounds of public interest. The Law Commission of India recently conducted a multi-stakeholder consultation on media laws in India, and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) regularly conducts consultations, though the private sector is more active there. What is lacking in India, however, is a set of clear procedures and processes for multi-stakeholder engagement, particularly on Internet issues. Clear, public, accessible, foreseeable and predictable set of rules or processes on participation from civil society, private sector and academia would make a world of difference to multi-stakeholderism within India. But this lack should not blind states or other stakeholders to the genuineness of privacy/security or equity concerns - for instance, of the protection of our information from mass surveillance or the feasibility and actual participation of developing countries at many Internet governance fora.

Second, members of the delegation expressed concern over inequalities in the allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources. While I am uncertain how IPv6 allocation falls within this concern, the inequalities of IPv4 allocations are well documented. To gather a sense of this, it would be useful to read chapter 5 of Professor DeNardis’ Protocol Politics, and to glance at Figure 5.7 (page 173). Africa controls, for instance, a mere 1% of all available IPv4 addresses, while North America and Europe control about 63%. A study on engagement from the Asia-Pacific in Internet standards organisations shows, for instance, greater participation from Western countries and from some states like Japan.[4] India and other states from Asia and Africa have lesser participation. Even at ICANN, with efforts to increase participation, meaningful engagement is still from a majority of Western countries. Perhaps states and other stakeholders on the other side of the table can address these concerns through clear, inclusive, non-discriminatory commitments and implementation.

Third, India emphasized how the Draft Resolution does not propose that ITU be involved in content management or resources control, but only seeks to systematize allocation by asking the ITU Secretary General to collaborate and coordinate with other Internet governance organisations to create a set of principles for fair, equitable, transparent and democratic - as well as secure - allocation of resources. ITU Resolution 101 already instructs the Secretary General to collaborate with relevant Internet governance organisations, and the Draft Resolution merely seeks to spell out his tasks. However, as I pointed out in my previous post, the text of the Draft Resolution is at odds with this intention of India's. By dint of its drafting, it gravely implicates human rights, as well as touching upon resource allocation oversight ("needs to be adhere to" in Op. §2). To reflect the above stated intention, the Draft Resolution would need to be redrafted.

Finally, the text of the Draft Resolution exhibits, unfortunately, a certain disregard for existing network architecture and efficiency within the Internet, and to the principles of a free, open and inter-operable and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop a network architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing. An argument may, of course, be made in favour of efficiency and costs, including reduced latency. But it is clear that this has the potential to increase domestic surveillance capabilities and government censorship of content. In any case, traffic localization (if not local address resolution) can be achieved without ITU coordination: through Internet Exchange Points, and through more efficient and better-negotiated peering and transit arrangements (pages 14-17). Internationally coordinated rules for localized traffic routing is not necessary; you just need to have a more efficient Internet Exchange Point. How to get more ISPs to interconnect through India’s National Internet Exchange (NIXI) is one of the very questions that India’s Telecom Regulatory Authority has taken up in its recent consultation on expanding broadband access (page 49). So it is possible that India's concerns could be addressed without ITU involvement, though I am unsure of its impact on the global Internet.

The Draft Resolution will be discussed at the ITU Plenipot today. The discussion will allow India and sympathetic countries to raise several of their concerns relating to the present system of Internet governance, and the direction of its progress. I will report on these discussions upon their completion.

A Note on Limitations:

The aim of this post is to clarify. I would caution against its being the last word on anything, much less India’s positions on Internet governance. An issue as important as this needs far greater access to and confirmation from India’s government – and a more in-depth understanding of the politics – than I do, at the moment.

At the same time, India has not been a model for civil society engagement, as illustratively, the Narmada Bachao Andolan and/or P. Sainath’s evaluation of government policies in Everybody Loves a Good Drought reveal. It has been harder to effectively engage with India’s government than in many states in North America, Latin America and Europe. But I believe the complex dynamics of that is not unique to India. The NSA and GCHQ revelations (as an example of governmental trust deficit of unmatched proportions) have shown that where governments want to keep everyone out and oblivious, they do it well.

I am not in favour of a purely multilateral approach to Internet governance. But at the same time, I share concerns over definition and the evolution of processes as well, as I am sure others in civil society also do. Particularly on the issue of Internet governance and multi-stakeholderism, evidence reveals inconsistency among India’s various ministries. Until this is addressed by our government (hopefully in consultation with all concerned stakeholders), an open mind would probably be the best thing we - including states - could keep.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash, Rishabh Dara, Arun Sukumar, Anja Kovacs and Parminder Jeet Singh for the freedom to bounce ideas, feedback and the many discussions about multi-stakeholder approaches and Internet governance. I also wish to acknowledge Samir Saran’s article in CFR, which offers an interesting perspective on India’s Draft Resolution.

[1] For this post, I will use ‘multi-stakeholder approaches’ as an umbrella term, but would urge readers to keep in mind the many uncertainties and disagreements about defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance. These disagreements exist among and within all stakeholders, including government and civil society. In addition to various iterations of the ‘equal footing model’, the model proposed in §35 of the Tunis Agenda is also multi-stakeholder, albeit in a different – and for many in civil society, less desirable – sense.

[2] For those unacquainted with WCIT, see Mueller, ITU Phobia: Why WCIT was derailed, Internet Governance Blog (18 December 2012), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobia-why-wcit-was-derailed/; Kleinwächter, WCIT and Internet governance: Harmless resolution or Trojan horse?, CircleID Blog (17 December 2012), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20121217_wcit_and_internet_governance_harmless_resolution_or_trojan_horse/.

[3] For a commentary, see Mueller, A United Nations Committee for Internet-related Policies? A Fair Assessment, Internet Governance Blog (29 October 2011), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2011/10/29/a-united-nations-committee-for-internet-related-policies-a-fair-assessment/.

[4] Contreras, Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan, Korea and China. I am unable to find this paper online. Please email me for information.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-recalcitrant-text-2013-ii-what-india2019s-itu-proposal-may-mean-for-internet-governance

DNA Database for Missing Persons and Unidentified Dead Bodies

vipul — 2014-11-04T15:46:29Z

This blog discusses the possible implications of the public interest litigation that has been placed before the Supreme Court petitioning for the establishment of a DNA database in respect to unidentified bodies.

In the year 2012 Lokniti, a Non Governmental Organization filed a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court of India asking the government to establish a DNA database in respect of unidentified dead bodies as well as for those individuals for whom missing persons reports have been filed so that DNA of unidentified dead bodies can be matched against missing persons - arguing that the right to be identified is a part of the right to dignity, and that such systems have been adopted across the globe. The case has come up a few times since 2012 and parties have been given time to file their replies in these instances. Prior to the 2012 Public Interest Litigation filed by Lokniti, in 2009 a Public Interest Litigation was filed by a Haryana based doctor. The PIL petitioned for the DNA profiling of unidentified bodies to be made mandatory - arguing that thousands of individuals die with their identity being unknown. During the hearing the Bench asked a number of questions including why the Ministry of Health was not brought into the case, given the fact that a number of labs that conduct DNA profiling function under the ministry.

While the case is still pending, the Supreme Court on 22^nd September 2014 gave another interim order which was a little more detailed. On this date the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Government of India, through the Department of Biotechnology stated that they are piloting a DNA profiling Bill that would establish a DNA Profiling Board and a National DNA Data Bank. The National DNA Data Bank is envisaged to maintain the following indices for various categories of data:

I. a crime scene index;

II. a suspects' index;

III. an offenders' index;

IV. a missing persons' index;

V. unknown deceased persons' index

VI. a volunteers' index; and

VII. such other DNA indices as may be specified by regulations made by the Board.

One of the Ministry's plans under this Bill is to create DNA profiles of individuals whose relatives have gone missing, on a voluntary basis to help the relatives identify missing persons and unidentified dead bodies. They also stated that cross-matching of DNA profiling data in the database would require specialized software and the CDFB, Hyderabad is in the process of acquiring the same from the Federal Bureau of investigation, USA.

The advocate for Lokniti responded to this saying that the DNA profiling Bill has been pending for a long time and has not seen the light of day for the last seven years. To this the response of the government was that it was a complex Bill involving a number of issues which take a long time to resolve.

At this point the Supreme Court, without going into the details of the Bill asked the advocate for the Union of India to obtain instructions regarding the following two aspects:

(1) Whether pending the Bill coming into force the concerned Department can constitute a Data Bank in respect of dead persons who are not identifiable; and

(2) when there are missing reports in respect of persons to collect the DNA from the permissible sources like siblings or others so that in case any unidentified dead body is found to match the DNA to arrive at the conclusion about the missing persons who are dead; or as an ancillary the missing person who is a victim of the crime of kidnapping or where any child, who is not able to find out his parents, can be in a position to find out through the DNA.

Thus it seems that the Supreme Court, recognizing its limitations in directing the legislature to pass a law and the fact that the passing of the DNA profiling Bill may take a long time to become law, has tried to find a way out in which the concerns of the petitioner regarding a DNA Databank for missing persons and unidentified dead bodies could be addressed without the passage of the DNA profiling Bill. However since the case is still pending in the Supreme Court no final directions have been given in this regard. Thus, the Court has left the government with the responsibility to address the question of whether a DNA Databank can be established without the passing of a legislation providing legal basis for the collection, profiling, databasing, and use of DNA samples.

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/sc-wants-centre-to-create-dna-data-bank/#sthash.7zqU0Ill.dpuf

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/sc-seeks-govt-response-on-making-dna-profiling-mandatory/

The order dated September 22, 2014 can be found at http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/wc%2049112p.txt

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/dna-database-for-missing-persons-and-unidentified-dead-bodies

October 2014 Bulletin

praskrishna — 2014-11-23T16:40:23Z

Welcome to the tenth issue of the newsletter (October 2014).

We at the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) welcome you to the tenth issue of the newsletter (October 2014). Archives of our newsletters can be accessed at: http://cis-india.org/about/newsletters

Highlights

CIS sent its comments and recommendations on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2014. It was submitted to the Parliamentary Standing Committee in October 2014.
CIS has published the Central Guidelines and Schemes.
CIS was one of the signatories of a letter sent to the Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi sharing its concerns on India's position on intellectual property, particularly in the context of bilateral relations between the United States of America and India. The letter was sent on October 22, 2014.

In 2013, the Indian Patent Office released Draft Guidelines for the Examination of Computer Related Inventions, in an effort to clarify some of the ambiguity. Shashank Singh analyses the various responses by the stakeholders to these Guidelines and highlights the various issues put forth in the responses.

Subhashish Panigrahi wrote an op-ed in the Samaja (Odia daily) on the hurdles that the Odia language has been facing and the potential aspects of the language including it being used massively on the Internet, Wikipedia and other media platforms.

International Telecommunications Union is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference this year in South Korea. India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan analyses this.

Vipul Kharbanda analyses the possible implications of the public interest litigation that has been placed before the Supreme Court petitioning for the establishment of a DNA database in respect to unidentified bodies in his latest blog entry.
In a blog post published in Lila Interactions P.P.Sneha explores the possibilities of redefining the idea of access through the channels of education and learning.

►Job

Programme Officer (Access to Knowledge - Institutional Partnerships): CIS is seeking applications for the post of Programme Officer for its Access to Knowledge (A2K) Programme. The position will be based in its Bangalore office. Programme Officer will collaboratively work with the A2K Team and would report to the Programme Director, Access to Knowledge at CIS.

Accessibility and Inclusion

Under a grant from the Hans Foundation we are doing two projects. The first project is on creating a national resource kit of state-wise laws, policies and programmes on issues relating to persons with disabilities in India. CIS in partnership with CLPR (Centre for Law and Policy Research) compiled the National Compendium of Policies, Programmes and Schemes for Persons with Disabilities (29 states and 6 union territories). The updated draft is being reviewed by the Office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities. The draft chapters and the quarterly reports can be accessed on the project page. The second project is on developing text-to-speech software for 15 Indian languages. The progress made so far in the project can be accessed here.

►NVDA and eSpeak

Monthly Update

October 2014 Report (Suman Dogra; October 31, 2014).

►Other

Submission

Comments to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill , 2014 (Nirmita Narasimhan and Anandhi Viswanathan; October 30, 2014).

Blog Entries

Central Guidelines and Schemes (Anandhi Viswanathan, October 14, 2014).
The Legal Framework for Enforcement of Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CLPR; October 14, 2014).

Media Coverage

Communication technology opens 'doors' for everyone, not only people with disabilities (John D. Kemp and Brandon M. Macsata, The Hill, October 13, 2014).

Access to Knowledge

As part of the Access to Knowledge programme we are doing two projects. The first one (Pervasive Technologies) under a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is for research on the complex interplay between pervasive technologies and intellectual property to support intellectual property norms that encourage the proliferation and development of such technologies as a social good. The second one (Wikipedia) under a grant from the Wikimedia Foundation is for the growth of Indic language communities and projects by designing community collaborations and partnerships that recruit and cultivate new editors and explore innovative approaches to building projects.

Blog Entries

Letter to the Prime Minister on Indo-US Bilateral Relations on Intellectual Property (Nehaa Chaudhari; October 22, 2014).
Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions: Mapping the Stakeholders' Response (Shashank Singh; October 29, 2014).

►Wikipedia

As part of the project grant from the Wikimedia Foundation we have reached out to more than 3500 people across India by organizing more than 100 outreach events and catalysed the release of encyclopaedic and other content under the Creative Commons (CC-BY-3.0) license in four Indian languages (21 books in Telugu, 13 in Odia, 4 volumes of encyclopaedia in Konkani and 6 volumes in Kannada, and 1 book on Odia language history in English).

Blog Entries

ଓଡ଼ିଆ ଭାଷା ବିକାଶରେ ପ୍ରତିବନ୍ଧକ ଓ ସମ୍ଭାବନା (Subhashish Panigrahi, Samaja; October 13, 2014).
Bharat Majhi Writings Now Available Under a Creative Commons License (Subhashish Panigrahi; October 14, 2014).
More Than 40 Million People Await the Launch of Odia Wikisource (Subhashish Panigrahi, Global Voices and Wikimedia Blog; October 21, 2014).
Odia Littérateur Ramakrushna Nanda's 4 Books Now Available Under a Creative Commons License (Subhashish Panigrahi; October 22, 2014).
Open Access Platform to Save the Odia Indian Language (Subhashish Panigrahi, Opensource.com; October 22, 2014).
Odia Wikisource Goes Live! (Subhashish Panigrahi; October 26, 2014).
Samskrita Vaibhavam (Sanskrit Wiki Outreach Program) (Shubha and Sayant Mahato; October 30, 2014).
Tulu Wikipedia Workshop cum Editathon at Udupi (Dr. U.B.Pavanaja, October 31, 2014). The event was covered by V4News.com and Mangalore Today.
Converting from nonUnicode (Nudi, Baraha, ...) font encoding to Unicode Kannada (Dr. U.B.Pavanaja; October 31, 2014).

Events Co-organized

Sangeet Baithak: A Hindustani Music Resource Donation Event in Mumbai (Organized by CIS-A2K and Khayal Trust; Shivaji Park, Dadar, Mumbai; October 7, 2014).
Indian Women in Science Wiki edit-a-thon (Organized by IndoBioScience and CIS-A2K; Centre for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore; October 11, 2014).
Ada Lovelace Edit-a-thon 2014 (Organized by IndoBioScience and CIS-A2K; Urban Solace; October 14, 2014).

News and Media Coverage

CIS-A2K team gave its inputs to the following media coverage:

Enliven the Tulu Viki Fidia first and then add Tulu to the 8th Schedule : Dr.UG Pavanaja, Bangalore Rep. in Udupi (V4News.com; October 15, 2014).
Wikipedia can establish Tulu in a wider way (Mangalore Today; October 17, 2014).
Pushing women scientists (Renuka Phadnis; Hindu; October 19, 2014).
Wiki Media Foundation keen on developing Urdu Wikipedia (Nisar Ahmed Syed; October 22, 2014).
Wiki Media Foundation keen on developing Urdu Wikipedia (Siasat Daily; October 24, 2014).

Participation in Event

Barcamp Bangalore (Organized by SAP Labs; Bangalore; October 12, 2014). Dr. U.B.Pavanaja and Rahmanuddin Shaik took part in the event.

Internet Governance

►Privacy

As part of our Surveillance and Freedom: Global Understandings and Rights Development (SAFEGUARD) project with Privacy International we are engaged in enhancing respect for the right to privacy in developing countries. We have produced the following outputs during the month although these may not be part of the SAFEGUARD project:

Blog Entries

The Gujarat High Court Judgment on the Snoopgate Issue (Vipul Kharbanda; October 27, 2014).
DNA Database for Missing Persons and Unidentified Dead Bodies (Vipul Kharbanda; October 31, 2014).

Upcoming Event

CPDP 2015 : The eighth international conference on computers, privacy and data protection will be held in Brussels from January 21 to 23, 2015. CIS is a moral supporter of CPDP.

Participation in Events

Training for Internet Governance Activists (Organized by Global Partners Digital, UK; Cambridge; September 23 - 24, 2014). Geetha Hariharan attended the event. The event was held in September and the details published in October.
The India Conference on Cyber Security and Cyber Governance (Organized by FICCI and CYFY; October 15 - 17, 2014; New Delhi). CIS was a knowledge partner. Sunil Abraham was a panelist in the session "Privacy is Dead".
Expert Consultation on Cyber Security, Justice and Governance (Organized by Hague Institute for Global Justice, Observer Research Foundation and STIMSON; October 18, 2014). Sunil Abraham was a speaker in the session "Internet Access, Freedom Online, and Development in the Global South".

►Free Speech

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India's Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms (Geeta Hariharan; October 28, 2014).
Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - II: What India's ITU Proposal May Mean for Internet Governance (Geeta Hariharan; November 1, 2014).

News & Media Coverage

CIS gave its inputs to the following media coverage:

Is India the next frontier for Facebook? (Rama Lakshmi; Washington Post; October 9, 2014).
If MNCs make early inroads, they will keep market share: Sunil Abraham, CIS (J.Anand; Financial Express; October 23, 2014).

Digital Humanities

CIS is building research clusters in the field of Digital Humanities. The Digital will be used as a way of unpacking the debates in humanities and social sciences and look at the new frameworks, concepts and ideas that emerge in our engagement with the digital. The clusters aim to produce and document new conversations and debates that shape the contours of Digital Humanities in Asia:

Blog Entry

Rethinking Conditions of Access (P.P.Sneha, Lilainteractions; October 15, 2014).

About CIS

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness (including open government, FOSS, open standards, etc.), and engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities.

► Follow us elsewhere

Twitter: https://twitter.com/CISA2K
Facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/cisa2k
Visit us at: https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/India_Access_To_Knowledge
E-mail: a2k@cis-india.org

► Support Us

Please help us defend consumer / citizen rights on the Internet! Write a cheque in favour of 'The Centre for Internet and Society' and mail it to us at No. 194, 2nd 'C' Cross, Domlur, 2nd Stage, Bengaluru - 5600 71.

► Request for Collaboration:

We invite researchers, practitioners, and theoreticians, both organisationally and as individuals, to collaboratively engage with Internet and society and improve our understanding of this new field. To discuss the research collaborations, write to Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, atsunil@cis-india.org or Nishant Shah, Director - Research, at nishant@cis-india.org. To discuss collaborations on Indic language Wikipedia, write to T. Vishnu Vardhan, Programme Director, A2K, at vishnu@cis-india.org.

CIS is grateful to its primary donor the Kusuma Trust founded by Anurag Dikshit and Soma Pujari, philanthropists of Indian origin for its core funding and support for most of its projects. CIS is also grateful to its other donors, Wikimedia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Privacy International, UK, Hans Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and IDRC for funding its various projects.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/october-2014-bulletin

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms

geetha — 2014-11-02T15:13:45Z

At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled a draft proposal on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“Draft Resolution”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.

Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:

First, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “security weaknesses” such as “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication”;[1] random IP address distribution also makes “tracing of communication difficult”;[2]
Second, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;[3]
Third, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;[4] similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.[5]

In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:

First, to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “effectively ensure the traceability of communication”;[6]
Second, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an “IP address plan” which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;[7]
Third, to develop and recommend “a public telecom network architecture” that localizes both routing[8] as well as address resolution[9] for local/domestic traffic to “within the country”.

Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “systematic, fair and equitable allocation” of, inter alia, naming, numbering and addressing resources,[10] keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.[11] In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “concentration of control over Internet resources”, though “certain governments” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “roadmap for the systematization” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the Geneva Plan of Action, 2003.

Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. First, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s NSA files and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,[12] either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. Second, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and finally, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.

In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.

Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:

India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:

Pream. §(e): “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;
Pream. §(h): “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. Snowden used Tor while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is reported to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were coerced into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the NSA and GCHQ have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has offered a reward to anyone who can.

Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports suggesting that Tor is being used by offenders, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after Snowden’s revelations, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been recognized by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…”.

Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to dismantle the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].[13] Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, wrote Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).

So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and prima facie violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.

To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in Weber & Saravia v. Germany [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that enables surveillance without sufficient safeguards is prima facie unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in Delfi AS v. Estonia [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.

The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for all IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been arbitrary, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.

In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of WHOIS records and registries with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a licence to operate and offer services.

If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as traceroute or IP look-up that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.

If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.

[1] Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.

[2] Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

[3] Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.

[4] Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.

[5] Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.

[6] Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.

[7] Op. §1, Draft Resolution; see note 3.

[8] Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.

[9] Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.

[10] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”

[11] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.

[12] See, for instance, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf. See esp. note 30 of the Report, ¶35.

[13] Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; ex. see Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms

The Gujarat High Court Judgment on the Snoopgate Issue

vipul — 2014-10-27T04:40:17Z

Pranlal N. Soni v. State of Gujarat, C/SCA/14389/2014

In the year 2013 the media widely reported that a female civil services officer was regularly spied upon in 2009 due to her acquaintance with the then Chief Minister of Gujarat (and current Prime Minister of India) Mr. Narendra Modi. It was reported that the surveillance was being supervised by the current president of the BJP, Mr. Amit Shah at the behest of Mr. Modi. The case took another twist when the officer and her father said that they had no problems with such surveillance, and had repeatedly conveyed to various statutory authorities including the National Commission for Women, the State Commission for Women, as also before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, that they never felt that their privacy was being interfered with by any of the actions of the State Authorities. Infact, para 3.5 of the petition indicated that it was at the behest of the father of the female officer that the State government had carried out the surveillance on his daughter as a security measure.

Inspite of the repeated claims of the subject of surveillance and her father, the Gujarat Government passed a Notification under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 appointing a two member Commission of Inquiry to enquire into this incident without jeopardizing the identity or interest of the female officer. This Notification was challenged in the Gujarat High Court by the very same female officer and her father on the ground that it violated their fundamental right to life and liberty. The petitioners claimed that they had to change their residential accommodation four times in the preceding few months due to the constant media glare. The print, electronic and social media, so called social workers and other busybodies constantly intruded into the private life of the petitioners and their family members. The petitioner's email accounts were hacked and scores of indecent calls were received from all over. Under the guise of protecting the petitioner's privacy, every action undertaken by the so called custodians for and on behalf of the petitioners resulted into a breach of privacy of the petitioners, making life impossible for them on a day to day basis.

After hearing the arguments of the petitioners, including arguments on technical points the Court struck down the Notification issued by the State government to enquire into the issue of the alleged illegal surveillance. However the Court also briefly touched upon the issue of violation of the privacy of the female officer in this whole episode. However, instead of enquiring into whether there was any breach of privacy in the facts of the case, the Court relied upon the statement made by the female officer that whatever surveillance was done did not cause any invasion into her privacy, rather it was the unwelcome media glare that followed the revelations regarding the surveillance which had caused an invasion of her privacy.

Thus we see that even though the whole snoopgate episode started out as one of “alleged” unwarranted and illegal surveillance this particular judgment is limited only to challenging the validity of the Inquiry Commission appointed by the State Government. In order to challenge the Notification in a PIL the female officer had to show that some fundamental right of hers was violated and in such circumstances privacy is the most obvious fundamental right which was violated.

Although this judgment talks about privacy, it does not have enough legal analysis of the right to privacy to have any significant ramifications for how privacy is interpreted in the Indian context. The only issue that could possibly be of some importance is that the we could interpret the Court’s reliance on the statement of the female officer that there was no breach of privacy rather than its own examination of facts to mean that in cases of breach of privacy, if the person whose privacy has been breached did not feel his or her privacy to have been invaded then the Courts would rely on the person’s statements rather than the facts. However this is only an interpretation from the facts and it does not seem that the Court has spent any significant amount of time to examine this issue, therefore it may not be prudent to consider this as establishing any legal principle.

Note: The details of the case as well as the judgment can be found at http://gujarathc-casestatus.nic.in/gujarathc/tabhome.jsp

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gujarat-high-court-judgment-on-snoopgate-issue

If MNCs make early inroads, they will keep market share: Sunil Abraham, CIS

praskrishna — 2014-10-24T15:03:03Z

The article by J. Anand was published in the Financial Express on October 23, 2014. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

The recent visits of the high-profile CEOs of internet/technology companies have made it clear that India, with its 200-million internet users, is increasingly becoming important for the multinational corporations (MNCs). Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a bit skeptical and feels some of these companies are trying to influence the internet policy-making of the country. Sunil Abraham, executive director of CIS, talks to FE’s Anand J regarding the government’s use of social media, the regulations and the plan for a Digital India. Edited excerpts:

We see a heightened interest in India from technology/internet companies, with their top CEOs visiting the country. What do you think is the reason?

In India, with little domestic competition, if these companies make early inroads, they will be able to keep the market share. The other reason is, the Indian government has made several proposals such as data localisation, mandatory data routing and so on, which have been demonised by the West as something that will balkanise the internet. Because India represents a big market, companies might be indulging in some amount of tokenism in the form of data centres. This is to show the government that they are willing to listen and lead the conversation to an agenda item that they are comfortable with and block some of the more dramatic proposals. The third reason could be that internet penetration might grow dramatically in the country and if the policy levers are moved appropriately, it will grow even more.

What is your stand on the government proposals?

In some ways, I agree with MNCs that some of the government proposals could break the architecture of internet. But then there are other proposals that are completely kosher. The domestic routing of an email if it travels within India is good as it will be difficult for the NSA to intercept then. From an internet design perspective, more fibre is good.

Data localisation though will result in balkanisation and might not yield desirable results. For instance, if you are watching a YouTube video, all the information about the user is stored by Google and all of that is stored outside the country. They might store some of this information as cache in a Google server temporarily. From a surveillance perspective, this user data called metadata is what the NSA might want. Even when it is collected in a local server, it might still be sent upstream.

What about the Indian government doing surveillance then?

There are different views on the surveillance capabilities of the Indian government. Some think that today the Indian government has the capability of engaging in mass surveillance. Others like me think that it can only do targeted surveillance and not mass surveillance. It does not have the infrastructure to pull that off and if it is doing targeted surveillance, it is mostly in compliance with the local laws.

Is the increasing use of social media by the government for its communication with citizens a concern?

If the government uses this private infrastructure to communicate with its citizens, there could be a variety of challenges and complications. First, all of these government communications must be mirrored on the government infrastructure as well. Otherwise, there is a concern around data retention. The government needs to have a copy in case a person goes to RTI for all the government communications to citizens. Secondly, the government is unwittingly becoming the salesperson for these global corporations.

Mark Zuckerberg has said that internet is a human right. Do you agree?

Internet is not a human right according to the UN. TV and Radio were never rights. All the basic human rights are to be protected irrespective of the communication medium of choice and will be legitimate even 100 years from now. The success of telecommunication and internet is market generated. If it becomes a human right, the companies are not delivering a service, but a human right and this complicates the issue. There will be new demands from citizens and litigations by citizens. If everybody demands 1GB every month, state does not have those resources.

India is a phone internet market. Indian internet is tied to Google now. Does the Android dominance — with a market share of around 90% — concern you?

It is hugely worrisome and yet another monopoly. It is not “free” software. From a privacy and national security perspective, it is a terrible development. Considering that it is based on Linux, there should have been several national and international competitors.

Has the era of hetergeneous internet with a million websites passed?

Internet is no longer decentralised; 80% of users’ time is now spent on a few products. And anywhere on internet, ad networks are tracking you. We ended up with the world’s biggest surveillance machine and surveillance is the business model of internet. It is very difficult to change this as we face the inertia of user behaviour.

What do you think of the government’s Digital India plan?

The government can use the billions from the Universal Service Obligation fund for broadband connectivity. The markets cannot handle back haul infrastructure and in most countries, some amount of state investment is necessary. Some of the open access details have to be worked out. The government seems to have a monopoly position in execution. We agree with the vision that every Indian should have a smartphone by 2019 and have a broadband connection too.

What are the regulations you want to see in place in India?

Internet users are currently overregulated with restrictions on what you can say. Let what is illegal offline be illegal online too. And government needs to think of enforceability.

The regulatory infrastructure for the government is limited. We want powerful companies to be regulated and follow global norms. The regulatory best practices are emerging from Europe in terms of competition, privacy, data protection, etc, and we need to follow them.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-express-october-23-2014-j-anand-if-mncs-make-early-inroads-they-will-keep-market-share

The India Conference on Cyber Security and Cyber Governance

praskrishna — 2014-10-13T07:10:19Z

Following the success of CYFY 2013 the CYFY 2014 will be held from October 15 to 17, 2014 in New Delhi. The Centre for Internet and Society is a knowledge partner for this event and Sunil Abraham is participating as a panelist in the session "Privacy is Dead".

Click to download the event details. The event brochure can be downloaded here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/india-conference-cyber-security-and-cyber-governance

Is India the next frontier for Facebook?

praskrishna — 2014-11-05T00:43:00Z

Pushing to bring hundreds of millions of Indians into the online world, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg on Thursday called for expanding his pet project to provide free mobile Internet for developing countries into India.

The article by Rama Lakshmi was published in Washington Post on October 9, 2014. Sunil Abraham was one of the signatories.

Zuckerberg, 30, the billionaire founder of the Facebook empire, arrives in India at a time when Facebook is losing its luster among American teens, but India’s vast market has yet to be fully tapped. A democratic country with a growing economy like India’s, with 1.2 billion people, two-thirds of whom are under the age of 35, is a market the company cannot afford to ignore.

India has the third-largest population of Internet users in the world at 205 million now, ranking after the United States and China. Yet the majority of its rural poor don’t have Internet access, and less than a tenth of its people, about 100 million, are on Facebook.

“Connectivity can’t be restricted to just the rich and powerful,” Zuckerberg said at a conference on connectivity in New Delhi. Rather, he said, it’s a basic “human right.”

Zuckerberg hopes to use his Internet.org connectivity initiative, which he started with a handful of other tech companies in 2013, to expand Indians’ online footprint and promote Facebook. He said the program will set aside $1 million to help develop local language apps for farmers, women and students in developing countries, including India.

In the past year, Zuckerberg said, Internet.org helped nearly 3 million people around the world gain access to the Internet and Facebook by working with cellphone operators in Indonesia, the Philippines, Paraguay, Tanzania and Zambia. In those countries, cellphone users signed up for data plans that included free but limited access to health and job information, Wikipedia, Google — and, of course, Facebook.

About 4.4 billion people in the world have no access to the Internet, and “the offline population is . . . disproportionately rural, low income, elderly, illiterate, and female,” said a report by McKinsey and Facebook. Countries such as Egypt, India and Indonesia face the greatest challenges with respect to incentives and infrastructure, the report said.

“It took 10 years for India to touch 100 million Internet users, but it grew to 200 million in just the last two years,” said Subho Roy, president of the Internet and Mobile Association of India. There are 930 million cellphone users in India today. “Cellphones have acted as the primary driver pushing Internet usage in the last two years,” Roy said.

Researchers note that new users’ first experience on the Internet is often on Facebook.

The free basic services that Facebook has promoted in different countries help cellphone users “to experience the Internet, use some things, to understand why it would be valuable for them and get exposure to other services that they might over time want to pay for,” Zuckerberg said.

But many critics say that commerce is driving Zuckerberg’s push for connectivity rather than philanthropy. They say many new users may not pay for wider Web access and that can create entrenched monopolies for companies like Facebook and Google.

“You are allowing people to roam the walled garden of Internet for free. But if they don’t pay to use unlimited Web access, you are also creating monopolies and blocking competition in the Internet space,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Center for Internet and Society in Bangalore. “But in India, we are so hungry for Internet access that we cannot afford to look a gift horse in the mouth. Until India builds physical Internet infrastructure, this will help us in the short term to get connected.”

Zuckerberg said cellphone operators are free to choose which services they want to include in the package: “There is no rule that says that Facebook or any other company has to be included in this. All we are saying is that this is a model that works to get more people on the Internet.”

And Facebook’s India push is not all about chasing numbers, Zuckerberg said.

“The sheer numbers are obviously a very important part of it,” he said. “If you can do it in a country like India, you are improving hundreds of millions, or maybe a billion, people’s lives, whereas doing it in almost any other country, you wouldn’t be able to have that impact.”

India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, a user of social media, has set an ambitious target of building a broadband highway connecting 250,000 village councils across the country in the next three years. Zuckerberg said he will meet Modi on Friday to “see how Facebook can help” in India’s new connectivity drive.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/washington-post-october-9-2014-rama-lakshmi-is-india-the-next-frontier-for-facebook

Training for Internet Governance Activists

praskrishna — 2014-11-07T00:38:55Z

Geetha Hariharan attended a training session for Internet rights activists in Cambridge, organised by Global Partners Digital, UK on September 23 and 24, 2014.

Day 1. Final session was on privacy, surveillance and data protection by Mike Rispoli and Alexandrine Pirlot de Corbion from PI. Got caught up in the discussion, so no notes from that. Of interest is session on communication by Mike - a nine-step process he's outlined (in bold at the very end), and the problem tree and stakeholder mapping approach that Alex spoke of.

Day 2. Great session on the ITU and on lobbying by lobbyist Matthew McDermott of Access Partners. The ITU is a complex beast with activity at multiple levels and different levels of effectiveness at different levels. From conversations, I gathered that any effective strategy for any policy change in Internet governance at the ITU will involve lobbying national governments, and then at sub-regional, regional and global levels.

Day 3. Tim Maurer's session on cyber security. Issues of terminology and politicisation discussed. Also info on in what forums cyber security debate is taking place. The Netherlands is hosting the Global Conference on Cyber Space in April 2015.

Resources

Unedited notes from the meeting can be downloaded here (Zip File, 739 Kb)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/training-for-internet-governance-activists

Big Data and Positive Social Change in the Developing World: A White Paper for Practitioners and Researchers

nishant — 2014-10-01T03:52:35Z

I was a part of a working group writing a white paper on big data and social change, over the last six months. This white paper was produced by a group of activists, researchers and data experts who met at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Centre to discuss the question of whether, and how, big data is becoming a resource for positive social change in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).

Bellagio Big Data Workshop Participants. (2014). “Big data and positive social change in the developing world: A white paper for practitioners and researchers.” Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute. Available online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2491555.

Summary

Our working definition of big data includes, but is not limited to, sources such as social media, mobile phone use, digitally mediated transactions, the online news media, and administrative records. It can be categorised as data that is provided explicitly (e.g. social media feedback); data that is observed (e.g. mobile phone call records); and data that is inferred and derived by algorithms (for example social network structure or inflation rates). We defined four main areas where big data has potential for those interested in promoting positive social change: advocating and facilitating; describing and predicting; facilitating information exchange and promoting accountability and transparency.

In terms of advocating and facilitating, we discussed ways in which volunteered data may help organisations to open up new public spaces for discussion and awareness-building; how both aggregating data and working across different databases can be tools for building awareness, and howthe digital data commons can also configure new communities and actions (sometimes serendipitously) through data science and aggregation. Finally, we also looked at the problem of overexposure and howactivists and organisations can protect themselves and hide their digital footprints. The challenges we identified in this area were how to interpret data correctly when supplementary information may be lacking; organisational capacity constraints around processing and storing data, and issues around data dissemination, i.e. the possible negative consequences of inadvertently identifying groups or individuals.

Next, we looked at the way big data can help describe and predict, functions which are particularly important in the academic, development and humanitarian areas of work where researchers can combine data into new dynamic, high-resolution datasets to detect new correlations and surface new questions. With data such as mobile phone data and Twitter analytics, understanding the data’s comprehensiveness, meaning and bias are the main challenges, accompanied by the problem of developing new and more comprehensive ethical systems to protect data subjects where data is observed rather than volunteered.

The next group of activities discussed was facilitating information exchange. We looked at mobile-based information services, where it is possible for a platform created around a particular aim (e.g. agricultural knowledge-building) to incorporate multiple feedback loops which feed into both research and action. The pitfalls include the technical challenge of developing a platform which is lean yet multifaceted in terms of its uses, and particularly making it reliably available to low-income users. This kind of platform, addressed by big data analytics, also offers new insights through data discovery and allows the provider to steer service provision according to users’ revealed needs and priorities.

Our last category for big data use was accountability and transparency, where organisations are using crowdsourcing methods to aggregate and analyse information in real time to establish new spaces for critical discussion, awareness and action. Flows of digital information can be managed to prioritise participation and feedback, provide a safe space to engage with policy decisions and expose abuse. The main challenges are how to keep sensitive information (and informants) safe while also exposing data and making authorities accountable; how to make the work sustainable without selling data, and how to establish feedback loops so that users remain involved in the work beyond an initial posting. In the crowdsourcing context, new challenges are also arising in terms of how to verify and moderate real-time flows of information, and how to make this process itself transparent.

Finally, we also discussed the relationship between big and open data. Open data can be seen as a system of governance and a knowledge commons, whereas big data does not by its nature involve the idea of the commons, so we leaned toward the term ‘opening data’, i.e. processes which could apply to commercially generated as much as public-sector datasets. It is also important to understand where to prioritise opening, and where this may exclude people who are not using the ‘right’ technologies: for example, analogue methods (e.g. nailing a local authority budget to a town hall door every month) may be more open than ‘open’ digital data that’s available online.

Our discussion surfaced many questions to do with representation and meaning: must datasets be interpreted by people with local knowledge? For researchers to get access to data that is fully representative, do we need a data commons? How are data proprietors engaging with the power dynamics and inequalities in the research field, and how can civil society engage with the private sector on its own terms if data access is skewed towards elites? We also looked at issues of privacy and risk: do we need a contextual risk perspective rather than a single set of standards? What is the role of local knowledge in protecting data subjects, and what kinds of institutions and practices are necessary? We concluded that there is a case to be made for building a data commons for private/public data, and for setting up new and more appropriate ethical guidelines to deal with big data, since aggregating, linking and merging data present new kinds of privacy risk. In particular, organisations advocating for opening datasets must admit the limitations of anonymisation, which is currently being ascribed more power to protect data subjects than it merits in the era of big data.

Our analysis makes a strong case that it is time for civil society groups in particular to become part of the conversation about the power of data. These groups are the connectors between individuals and governments, corporations and governance institutions, and have the potential to promote big data analysis that is locally driven and rooted. Civil society groups are also crucially important but currently underrepresented in debates about privacy and the rights of technology users, and civil society as a whole has a responsibility for building critical awareness of the ways big data is being used to sort, categorise and intervene in LMICs by corporations, governments and other actors. Big data is shaping up to be one of the key battlefields of our era, incorporating many of the issues civil society activists worldwide have been working on for decades. We hope that this paper can inform organisations and
individuals as to where their particular interests may gain traction in the debate, and what their contribution may look like.

Click to download the full white paper here. (PDF, 1.95 Mb)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/big-data-and-positive-social-change-in-developing-world

CPDP 2015

praskrishna — 2014-09-30T09:52:52Z

The eighth international conference on computers, privacy and data protection will be held in Brussels from January 21 to 23, 2015. The Centre for Internet and Society is a moral supporter of CPDP.

CPDP is a non-profit platform originally founded in 2007 by research groups from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, the Université de Namur and Tilburg University and has grown into a platform carried by 20 academic centers of excellence from the EU, the US and beyond. As a world-leading multidisciplinary conference CPDP offers the cutting edge in legal, regulatory, academic and technological development in privacy and data protection. Within an atmosphere of independence and mutual respect, CPDP gathers academics, lawyers, practitioners, policy-makers, computer scientists and civil society from all over the world in Brussels offering them an arena to exchange ideas and discuss the latest emerging issues and trends. This unique multidisciplinary formula has served to make CPDP one of the leading data protection and privacy conferences in Europe and around the world. CPDP2014 welcomed 854 guests including 343 speakers from 43 different countries dispersed over more than 60 panels which took place during three full days. It attracted another 500 people in several public evening events including debates, a pecha kucha evening and an art exhibition. CPDP2015 aims to repeat the success of last year and will stage panels within the following main topical themes: Data Protection Reform: European and Global Developments, Mobility (mobile technologies, wearable technologies, border surveillance), EU-US developments concerning the regulation of government surveillance, Health, privacy and data protection, Love and lust in the digital age, Internet governance and privacy.

In 2015 CPDP will take place from January 21 to 23, 2015 in the Halles de Schaerbeek, Brussels, Belgium. Registrations are already open: http://www.cpdpconferences.org/Registration.html. For more details see here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cpdp-2015

Workshop on Enabling Information Systems for Local Governance

praskrishna — 2014-09-30T08:18:42Z

This event was organized by Jamia Milla Islamia at Tagore Hall in New Delhi on September 18, 2014. Sunil Abraham was a participant.

The One day workshop brings together practitioners, researchers and thinkers from the overlapping fields of IT, sociology and governance to seek mechanisms for involvement of local communities as active participants in information systems for governance. Conventional technological models are based on certain apriori assumptions on how engineers and designers expect people to use technologies as well as the social universe in which the information systems function. Social scientists and ethnographers on the other hand, concern themselves with how people use and interpret technologies and tend to have a better understanding of the role of technologies in the everyday life of users.

The first panel concerns itself with how these two diverse and possibly complementary ways of approaching technologies may synergise as a combined sociotechnical process rather than a purely technological one. Another useful way to understand the information systems as inherently socio-technical amalgamations is to examine the “informational model” – or the concepts, categories, and relationships – underlying the systems.Describing the systems in terms of their informational models enables people who understand issues of governance to speak to technologists on a common platform. Thus, the idea in the second panel is to discuss whether there is a need to rethink the mechanisms for building information models for local governance.

Some of the questions relevant to the workshop are:

What is the role of local communities in information systems for governance? How can local participation in governance be enabled/enhanced?
What are some of the existing applications and mechanisms for creating the concepts, categories, relationships, rules and constraints (the information model) used in building information systems for governance and is there a need to rethink them?

Workshop Program - 18 Sep 2014

9:30-10:00 - Registration

10:00-10:15 - Introduction to the Symposium

10:15-11:45 - Panel 1: Community Participation in IT Processes.

Information systems for governance generally involve many different kinds of users and stakeholders. The presentations in this panel are reflect how the role that these communities play at different stages of the technical process shape the conceptualization and outcomes of these diverse systems.

Atanu Garai (Fellow, Society for New Communications Research, Bubhaneshwar): Mechanisms of Community Enrollment in mHealth

Jagdish Mitra (CEO, CanvasM,A Tech Mahindra Company) – Arriving at Saral Zindagi: A suite of mobile applications to ease consumer life styles.

Chair: Dr Biswajit Das, Director, Centre for Culture Media and Governance (CCMG), Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi

Discussant: Dr. Richa Kumar (Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT-Delhi)

11:45-12:00 – Tea/Coffee break

12:00-13:30 - Panel 2: Community Representation in Information Modelling.

This panel describes the (often) implicit "Information Model" underlying IT enabled systems of governance. Making these models explicit also opens up the discussion of how social concepts and categories may be included as part of the model.

Dr Vignesh Ilavarasan P (Department of Management Studies, IIT-Delhi) – Information Models for Service Delivery in the Telecom Sector
Ravi Shukla (CCMG, JMI)–Prototyping Community Participation in Informational Models.
Chair: Dr. Arul Chib (NTU, Singapore)
Discussant: Sunil Abraham (CIS, Bangalore)

1 3:30-14:30 – Lunch

14:30 - 16:00 – Focus Group Workshop - Mechanisms for Community Participation in Information Systems.

The current research with communities around the Jamia Nagar area is taken as a case study. Participants are divided into two groups, the "process" group which is to suggest ways for community involvement in the process, and the "informational model" structure group. Each group is to suggest 5 ways in which communities can participate in IT systems.

List of People in the Second Half (there maybe more/different people):

Atanu Garai, P Vignesh, Ravi Shukla, Arul Chib, Sunil Abraham, Amit Prakash, Vibodh Parthasarathi, Pankaj Aggarwal, Biswajit Das.
Chair: Amit Prakash - I will speak to him beforehand about this.
Introducer: Ravi Shukla (5 Mins) - Q & A (10 mins)
Group Sessions (these can be in different parts of the same room) - it will require writing pads, pens , two white boards and markers/busters. Time is 20 mins.
Group 1 (Processes and Procedures to Involve Communities in Information Systems):

Facilitator: Arul Chib

Participants: Atanu Garai, Pankaj Aggarwal, Vibodh Parthasarthi

This group builds on their own experiences and comes up with 5 suggestions on how the IT process can be made more inclusive. This could mean - what are the different stages at which communities may get involved and how - as well as new ways of involvement.

Group 2 (Inclusion of Communities in Information Models)

Facilitator: Ravi Shukla
Participants: P Vignesh, Sunil Abraham

This group builds on their experiences to come up 5 suggestions on how community voices and concerns may be included in the Information Model. This could mean for instance - how to include minority voices in the model, or other factors of geography, culture, scale and temporality.

After this there are 10 minutes of presentation each by one representative from each group (this gives other people the space to wind-up/present).

This is followed by a summary by the discussant (Arul Chib) followed by discussion and winding up/ thanks giving by VP. (30 + 5 mins)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/workshop-on-enabling-information-systems-for-local-governance

National Consultation on Media Law

praskrishna — 2014-09-30T06:52:50Z

The Law Commission of India and the National University, Delhi have joined hands to organize the National Consultation on Media Law at the India Habitat Centre in New Delhi on September 27 and 28, 2014. Nehaa Chaudhari participated in this event.

Click to view the:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/national-consultation-on-media-law

The Power of Communication: The Media, Public Space and Participatory Democracy

praskrishna — 2014-09-30T05:49:27Z

Bhairav Acharya will be presenting a paper at this event to be held in the Indian Institute of Advanced Study in Shimla on October 13 and 14, 2014.

For more details, see here.

Bhairav would talk about the tension in defamation law, between its deontological command (Kant's categorical imperative of truth) and its consequentialism (harm, to reputation or to public peace).

The talk would explore the utility of our present common law construction of libel; and, if it's not too bold, he hopes to make the case that Indian libel law should incorporate a new test of serious and actual harm as its primary defence to libel, and that the defence of truth should be done away with. This is because Bhairav believes that free speech law should strictly construe Mill's harm principle. In other words, lies and rumours after all, if the state can freely engage in questionable propanganda, people should be allowed to spread baseless rumours — are good for health and should not be criminalised.

Background note

The media has been a growth sector over two decades and more of liberalisation. All evidence points towards the media industry having substantially outrun the overall rate of growth of the economy. This is not surprising since advertising which has been the principal driver of media growth, tends to leave behind other sectors in times of economic buoyancy. Technology has been another powerful driver of media growth over the last two decades. From the first glimmers of satellite broadcasting over the C band which enabled local cable operators to provide a menu of untold variety in the early 1990s, to the recent spurt in the “direct to home” transmissions, the Indian TV scenario has been transformed from a tightly controlled government monopoly, to a state of unregulated proliferation.

A further enabling mechanism has been the rapid growth of internet access. The digital divide remains very much a reality and the numbers that are able to tap into the full potential of the internet, is still a rather small fraction of the total population. The proliferation of cellular telephony though, has made limited modes of access a reality for growing numbers. And the damage potential is at the same time manifest in the growth of the politics of rumour.

It has been a central dilemma of the recent phase of media growth in India that the physical infrastructure has expanded, but the rules of the game are yet to be agreed. The official response has been to put in place a doctrine of intermediary liability, which has had a special bearing on the emerging sector of the social media. This is a principle that is being fought in the court-rooms by well-endowed internet giants. But at the level of individual users, section 66A of the Information Technology Act -- enacted in 2009 – remains a source of peril for social media users.

There are worries often expressed that competition among media channels has fuelled a race to the bottom. “Sting operations” which are by definition illegal unless they serve a strong public interest, have become a common recourse. Respect for privacy and personal reputation has become a rather loosely observed component of the code of media ethics.

Incidents in the recent past when media coverage has been directly paid for by political and business entities have fuelled public concerns about spurious and inauthentic information circulating in the public domain merely to serve profit objectives.

Episodes when the media has amplified public discontent and caused severe stress within the apparatuses of the state, have led to frequent expressions of concern. Serving and retired intelligence officials have remarked on the destabilisation potential of the new social media. And current and past prime ministers have spoken of the need to be vigilant about the use of the social media, but also to ensure that the free speech right is respected and the potential of the new media in serving larger national goals is realised.

The global financial meltdown in September 2008 made deep inroads into the fortunes of the media. The months that followed sharply highlighted the vulnerability of the media industry to corporate pressures. Despite its very loud voice and its pervasive presence in the lives of several million citizens, the media industry is dwarfed by India’s major corporate players. Illustratively, the advertising budget of just one among the leading players in the “fast moving consumer goods” (FMCG) space would be of the same order of magnitude as the total revenue of India’s biggest media groups.

This has been the context in which certain very large corporate entities – possibly among a host of smaller ones – have moved into the media space. The official response to this complex of changes has been marked by fits and spurts, which finally subside into indecision and inaction.

Efforts to transform the state-owned broadcasting agencies into public service media have faltered. And with commercial motives being dominant, large numbers of citizens who are of no conceivable interest to advertisers have fallen between the cracks, losing their voice within the public sphere.
Older experiments in using the official media as a vehicle for transmitting a message of development and diversity, have fallen into obscurity and neglect. While the ambitious experiment of using satellite-enabled broadcast media for developmental objectives is yet to be evaluated, the state-owned media are seen to have not transformed their approach according to the times.

Radio, which could be the most democratic and accessible of broadcast media, remains underdeveloped in its potential because of a refusal by the government to surrender its monopoly over news and current affairs content over the media.

A broad-based and critical debate on media policy, which looks at its promise as a space for participatory democracy, has been sorely lacking. This is in part because media industry players have worked themselves into the vantage position of setting the terms of the discourse. The voices of civil society and in particular, of those who stand to gain the most from a broadening of democratic spaces, have remained unheard.

This is the context in which an event under the above title is proposed at the institute. The ground covered in the event could include:

public understanding and perceptions of the media;
media representations of the “public” – “in” and “out” groups; voices heard and unheard;
“development” as represented in the media and the public space;
the voice afforded to diverse communities in determining development priorities;
the means afforded to diverse communities in voicing their opinion;
how the technical means of getting diverse opinions into the public space have evolved: from print, to the tightly controlled broadcasting space, to the unregulated broadcast space of the 1990s onwards;
securing transparency and public accountability in the media space;
from the perception of the telephone as a luxury irrelevant to the lives of the majority in the country, to its current status as an irreplaceable accessory of everyday life across all categories;
the plus and minus side of the ledger on the new communication possibilities;
the rights to privacy and personal reputation – reconciling these with accountability and the public right to information;
the politics of rumour; the damage potential of rumour and how rumour is also a means of enforcing public accountability;
how efforts to politically manage information invariably prove self-defeating, whether it is in the 1975-77 Emergency or today;
where do we go for a free and democratic media universe.

The event would seek to look back, look at current realities and look ahead to how things could be made better within a democratic order.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-power-of-communication-media-public-space-participatory-democracy

Anvar v. Basheer and the New (Old) Law of Electronic Evidence

bhairav — 2014-12-04T15:53:01Z

The Supreme Court of India revised the law on electronic evidence. The judgment will have an impact on the manner in which wiretap tapes are brought before a court.

Read the original published by Law and Policy in India on September 25, 2014.

The case

On 18 September 2014, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment in the case of Anvar v. P. K. Basheer (Civil Appeal 4226 of 2012) to declare new law in respect of the evidentiary admissibility of the contents of electronic records. In doing so, Justice Kurian Joseph, speaking for a bench that included Chief Justice Rajendra M. Lodha and Justice Rohinton F. Nariman, overruled an earlier Supreme Court judgment in the 1995 case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru(2005) 11 SCC 600, popularly known as the Parliament Attacks case, and re-interpreted the application of sections 63, 65, and 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”). To appreciate the implications of this judgment, a little background may be required.

The hearsay rule

The Evidence Act was drafted to codify principles of evidence in the common law. Traditionally, a fundamental rule of evidence is that oral evidence may be adduced to prove all facts, except documents, provided always that the oral evidence is direct. Oral evidence that is not direct is challenged by the hearsay rule and, unless it is saved by one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, is inadmissible. In India, this principle is stated in sections 59 and 60 of the Evidence Act.

The hearsay rule is both fundamental and complex; a proper examination would require a lengthy excursus, but a simple explanation should suffice. In the landmark House of Lords decision in R v. Sharp [1988] 1 All ER 65, Lord Havers – the controversial prosecutor who went on to become the Lord Chancellor – described hearsay as “Any assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact or opinion asserted.” This definition was applied by courts across the common law world. Section 114 of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Criminal Justice Act, 2003, which modernised British criminal procedure, uses simpler language: “a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings.”

Hearsay evidence is anything said outside a court by a person absent from a trial, but which is offered by a third person during the trial as evidence. The law excludes hearsay evidence because it is difficult or impossible to determine its truth and accuracy, which is usually achieved through cross examination. Since the person who made the statement and the person to whom it was said cannot be cross examined, a third person’s account of it is excluded. There are a few exceptions to this rule which need no explanation here; they may be left to another post.

Hearsay in documents

The hearsay rule is straightforward in relation to oral evidence but a little less so in relation to documents. As mentioned earlier, oral evidence cannot prove the contents of documents. This is because it would disturb the hearsay rule (since the document is absent, the truth or accuracy of the oral evidence cannot be compared to the document). In order to prove the contents of a document, either primary or secondary evidence must be offered.

Primary evidence of the contents of a document is the document itself [section 62 of the Evidence Act]. The process of compelling the production of a document in court is called ‘discovery’. Upon discovery, a document speaks for itself. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document is, amongst other things, certified copies of that document, copies made by mechanical processes that insure accuracy, and oral accounts of the contents by someone who has seen that document. Section 63 of the Evidence Act lists the secondary evidence that may prove the contents of a document.

Secondary evidence of documentary content is an attempt at reconciling the hearsay rule with the difficulties of securing the discovery of documents. There are many situations where the original document simply cannot be produced for a variety of reasons. Section 65 of the Evidence Act lists the situations in which the original document need not be produced; instead, the secondary evidence listed in section 63 can be used to prove its content. These situations arise when the original document (i) is in hostile possession; (ii) has been stipulated to by the prejudiced party; (iii) is lost or destroyed; (iv) cannot be easily moved, i.e. physically brought to the court; (v) is a public document of the state; (vi) can be proved by certified copies when the law narrowly permits; and (vii) is a collection of several documents.

Electronic documents

As documents came to be digitised, the hearsay rule faced several new challenges. While the law had mostly anticipated primary evidence (i.e. the original document itself) and had created special conditions for secondary evidence, increasing digitisation meant that more and more documents were electronically stored. As a result, the adduction of secondary evidence of documents increased. In the Anvar case, the Supreme Court noted that “there is a revolution in the way that evidence is produced before the court”.

In India before 2000, electronically stored information was treated as a document and secondary evidence of these electronic ‘documents’ was adduced through printed reproductions or transcripts, the authenticity of which was certified by a competent signatory. The signatory would identify her signature in court and be open to cross examination. This simple procedure met the conditions of both sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act. In this manner, Indian courts simply adapted a law drafted over one century earlier in Victorian England. However, as the pace and proliferation of technology expanded, and as the creation and storage of electronic information grew more complex, the law had to change more substantially.

New provisions for electronic records

To bridge the widening gap between law and technology, Parliament enacted the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) [official pdf here] that, amongst other things, created new definitions of “data”, “electronic record”, and “computer”. According to section 2(1)(t) of the IT Act, an electronic record is “data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche” (sic).

The IT Act amended section 59 of the Evidence Act to exclude electronic records from the probative force of oral evidence in the same manner as it excluded documents. This is the re-application of the documentary hearsay rule to electronic records. But, instead of submitting electronic records to the test of secondary evidence – which, for documents, is contained in sections 63 and 65, it inserted two new evidentiary rules for electronic records in the Evidence Act: section 65A and section 65B.

Section 65A of the Evidence Act creates special law for electronic evidence:

65A. Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record. – The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B.

Section 65A of the Evidence Act performs the same function for electronic records that section 61 does for documentary evidence: it creates a separate procedure, distinct from the simple procedure for oral evidence, to ensure that the adduction of electronic records obeys the hearsay rule. It also secures other interests, such as the authenticity of the technology and the sanctity of the information retrieval procedure. But section 65A is further distinguished because it is a special law that stands apart from the documentary evidence procedure in sections 63 and 65.

Section 65B of the Evidence Act details this special procedure for adducing electronic records in evidence. Sub-section (2) lists the technological conditions upon which a duplicate copy (including a print-out) of an original electronic record may be used: (i) at the time of the creation of the electronic record, the computer that produced it must have been in regular use; (ii) the kind of information contained in the electronic record must have been regularly and ordinarily fed in to the computer; (iii) the computer was operating properly; and, (iv) the duplicate copy must be a reproduction of the original electronic record.

Sub-section (4) of section 65B of the Evidence Act lists additional non-technical qualifying conditions to establish the authenticity of electronic evidence. This provision requires the production of a certificate by a senior person who was responsible for the computer on which the electronic record was created, or is stored. The certificate must uniquely identify the original electronic record, describe the manner of its creation, describe the device that created it, and certify compliance with the technological conditions of sub-section (2) of section 65B.

Non-use of the special provisions

However, the special law and procedure created by sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act for electronic evidence were not used. Disappointingly, the cause of this non-use does not involve the law at all. India’s lower judiciary – the third tier of courts, where trials are undertaken – is vastly inept and technologically unsound. With exceptions, trial judges simply do not know the technology the IT Act comprehends. It is easier to carry on treating electronically stored information as documentary evidence. The reasons for this are systemic in India and, I suspect, endemic to poor developing countries. India’s justice system is decrepit and poorly funded. As long as the judicial system is not modernised, India’s trial judges will remain clueless about electronic evidence and the means of ensuring its authenticity.

By bypassing the special law on electronic records, Indian courts have continued to apply the provisions of sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act, which pertain to documents, to electronically stored information. Simply put, the courts have basically ignored sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. Curiously, this state of affairs was blessed by the Supreme Court in Navjot Sandhu (the Parliament Attacks case), which was a particularly high-profile appeal from an emotive terrorism trial. On the question of the defence’s challenge to the authenticity and accuracy of certain call data records (CDRs) that the prosecution relied on, which were purported to be reproductions of the original electronically stored records, a Division Bench of Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi and Justice P. P. Naolekar held:

According to Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, among other things, “copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies”. Section 65 enables secondary evidence of the contents of a document to be adduced if the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be easily moved and produced in the court. That is what the High Court has also observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official of the service-providing company can be led into evidence through a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or otherwise speak to the facts based on his personal knowledge.

Flawed justice and political expediency in wiretap cases

The Supreme Court’s finding in Navjot Sandhu (quoted above) raised uncomfortable questions about the integrity of prosecution evidence, especially in trials related to national security or in high-profile cases of political importance. The state’s investigation of the Parliament Attacks was shoddy with respect to the interception of telephone calls. The Supreme Court’s judgment notes in prs. 148, 153, and 154 that the law and procedure of wiretaps was violated in several ways.

The Evidence Act mandates a special procedure for electronic records precisely because printed copies of such information are vulnerable to manipulation and abuse. This is what the veteran defence counsel, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, pointed out in Navjot Sandhu [see pr. 148] where there were discrepancies in the CDRs led in evidence by the prosecution. Despite these infirmities, which should have disqualified the evidence until the state demonstrated the absence of mala fide conduct, the Supreme Court stepped in to certify the secondary evidence itself, even though it is not competent to do so. The court did not compare the printed CDRs to the original electronic record. Essentially, the court allowed hearsay evidence. This is exactly the sort of situation that section 65B of the Evidence Act intended to avoid by requiring an impartial certificate under sub-section (4) that also speaks to compliance with the technical requirements of sub-section (2).

When the lack of a proper certificate regarding the authenticity and integrity of the evidence was pointed out, this is what the Supreme Court said in pr. 150:

Irrespective of the compliance of the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.

In the years that followed, printed versions of CDRs were admitted in evidence if they were certified by an officer of the telephone company under sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act. The special procedure of section 65B was ignored. This has led to confusion and counter-claims. For instance, the 2011 case of Amar Singh v. Union of India (2011) 7 SCC 69 saw all the parties, including the state and the telephone company, dispute the authenticity of the printed transcripts of the CDRs, as well as the authorisation itself. Currently, in the case of Ratan Tata v. Union of India Writ Petition (Civil) 398 of 2010, a compact disc (CD) containing intercepted telephone calls was introduced in the Supreme Court without following any of the procedure contained in the Evidence Act.

Returning sanity to electronic record evidence, but at a price

In 2007, the United States District Court for Maryland handed down a landmark decision in Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company241 FRD 534 (D. Md. 2007) that clarified the rules regarding the discovery of electronically stored information. In American federal courts, the law of evidence is set out in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Lorraine held when electronically stored information is offered as evidence, the following tests need to be affirmed for it to be admissible: (i) is the information relevant; (ii) is it authentic; (iii) is it hearsay; (iv) is it original or, if it is a duplicate, is there admissible secondary evidence to support it; and (v) does its probative value survive the test of unfair prejudice?

In a small way, Anvar does for India what Lorraine did for US federal courts. In Anvar, the Supreme Court unequivocally returned Indian electronic evidence law to the special procedure created under section 65B of the Evidence Act. It did this by applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant (“the general does not detract from the specific”), which is a restatement of the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali (“special law repeals general law”). The Supreme Court held that the provisions of sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act created special law that overrides the general law of documentary evidence [see pr. 19]:

Proof of electronic record is a special provision introduced by the IT Act amending various provisions under the Evidence Act. The very caption of Section 65Aof the Evidence Act, read with Sections 59 and 65B is sufficient to hold that the special provisions on evidence relating to electronic record shall be governed by the procedure prescribed under Section 65B ofthe Evidence Act. That is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.

By doing so, it disqualified oral evidence offered to attest secondary documentary evidence [see pr. 17]:

The Evidence Act does not contemplate or permit the proof of an electronic record by oral evidence if requirements under Section 65B of the Evidence Act are not complied with, as the law now stands in India.

The scope for oral evidence is offered later. Once electronic evidence is properly adduced according to section 65B of the Evidence Act, along with the certificate of sub-section (4), the other party may challenge the genuineness of the original electronic record. If the original electronic record is challenged, section 22A of the Evidence Act permits oral evidence as to its genuineness only. Note that section 22A disqualifies oral evidence as to the contents of the electronic record, only the genuineness of the record may be discussed. In this regard, relevant oral evidence as to the genuineness of the record can be offered by the Examiner of Electronic Evidence, an expert witness under section 45A of the Evidence Act who is appointed under section 79A of the IT Act.

While Anvar is welcome for straightening out the messy evidentiary practice regarding electronically stored information that Navjot Sandhuhad endorsed, it will extract a price from transparency and open government. The portion of Navjot Sandhu that was overruled dealt with wiretaps. In India, the wiretap empowerment is contained in section 5(2)of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (“Telegraph Act”). The Telegraph Act is an inherited colonial law. Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act was almost exactly duplicated thirteen years later by section 26 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. When the latter was referred to a Select Committee, P. Ananda Charlu – a prominent lawyer, Indian nationalist leader, and one of the original founders of the Indian National Congress in 1885 – criticised its lack of transparency, saying: “a strong and just government must not shrink from daylight”.

Wiretap leaks have become an important means of discovering governmental abuse of power, corruption, and illegality. For instance, the massive fraud enacted by under-selling 2G spectrum by A. Raja, the former telecom minister, supposedly India’s most expensive corruption scandal, caught the public’s imagination only after taped wiretapped conversations were leaked. Some of these conversations were recorded on to a CD and brought to the Supreme Court’s attention. There is no way that a whistle blower, or a person in possession of electronic evidence, can obtain the certification required by section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act without the state coming to know about it and, presumably, attempting to stop its publication.

Anvar neatly ties up electronic evidence, but it will probably discourage public interest disclosure of inquity.

Video

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/anvar-v-basheer-new-old-law-of-electronic-evidence