We are anonymous, we are legion

DoT Reportedly Orders Blocking of 32 Websites Including GitHub, Archive.org, SourceForge

praskrishna — 2015-01-02T14:51:39Z

Many users on Twitter are claiming that several websites, including many software development resources such as GitHub and SourceForge, along with research resources like the Internet Archive have all been blocked on order of the Department of Telecom.

The story was published in NDTV on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

A letter circulating online shows a list of 32 URLs that ISPs have reportedly been ordered to block, with most of these URLs being entire websites, instead of specific webpages that's usually been the case with such blocks in the past.

We tried to verify the users' claims, but on both our office broadband network, and also on Airtel and Vodafone 3G networks, all the sites were opening properly at the time of writing. Interestingly, many of the sites failed the load at the first try, but simply hitting refresh once solved the problem.

This does not mean that blocking is not happening - it is possible that the order has been sent recently, and will take some time to be fully implemented. Here is the email which purportedly shows the list of the 32 blocked URLs, as posted by Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director of the Center for Inernet and Society:

No information is available at present to confirm if blocking is truly happening, or why, but we are trying to ascertain the exact details and will update this story with the information as soon as possible.

However, there is some partial confirmation because both Pastebin and the Internet Archive have tweeted about blocking from India.

Such blocks in the past have been due to John Doe orders but the fact it is targeting software development sites like Github and Sourceforge is strange - the John Doe orders have specifically been used to block piracy of films, and blocking off sites that have no connection to movies makes no sense.

Arvind Gupta, the National Head of the BJP IT cell also took to Twitter, stating that these websites were being blocked for security reasons, based on the advice of the Anti-Terrorism Squad. According to Gupta's Tweets, the sites were being unblocked as soon as they removed "objectionable materials", allegedly related to ISIS.

It's extremely unusual that a government decision is being communicated by a political party official - if the Department of Telecom is blocking sites, then it should be the one to communicate and clarify these events. However, so far, it has not issued any statements, and neither has the IT Ministry.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ndtv-december-31-2014-dot-reportedly-orders-blocking-of-32-websites-including-github-archiveorg-sourceforge

Government blocks over 60 websites including github & sourceforge on anti-terror advisory

praskrishna — 2015-01-02T14:22:58Z

Over 60 websites and links, including popular online tools like Github and Sourceforge used by thousands of programmers have been blocked in India, triggering angry protests by Internet users.

The article by P.K. Jayadevan and Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The websites were blocked for hosting content that is pro terrorist group ISIS and not cooperating with government investigations, officials said.

Arvind Gupta, the head of IT Cell, BJP Tweeted: "The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by Anti Terrorism Squad, and were carrying Anti India content from ISIS. The sites that have removed objectionable content and/or cooperated with the on going investigations, are being unblocked."

Based on an order issued by the country's telecom department, in a letter dated December 17 and a subsequent letter on December 19, over 60 websites have been blocked by various internet service providers in the country.

While some internet service providers are yet to block these websites, many users have been reporting frequent outages in these web services over the last two weeks.

Websites like Pastebin don't host any content but are a platform for users to paste text. Popular video networks like Vimeo and Dailymotion are among the websites that have been blocked.

Officials from the department of Information Technology and the department of telecom were not available for comment. "These are all providing very dangerous kind of cut and paste services..You can take code, cut it, paste it, remove it, delete it," said one government official who requested anonymity.

The government has invoked section 69A of the Information technology Act (2000) and Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules ("Blocking Rules") to ban these websites.

Many websites have been blocked in India from time to time on various grounds. In September, following the Muzaffarnagar riots, over 80 websites and links on social media were blocked.

However, the inclusion of services like Github and Sourceforge that host code for open source software are causing much anger among the developer community. "Sometimes they might need to block specific URLs, but blocking the entire website is wrong or they haven't thought through it," said Thejesh GN, the co-founder of Datameet and an open source developer.

"There is also a lack of transparency where people don't get to know why their sites were blocked," he added.

"We're aware of reports of connectivity issues in India. We're looking into it, and will update with more information when we have it," a Github spokesperson said.

In June 2014, the Delhi High Court ordered a block of 472 file sharing websites including Google Docs and Pirate Bay following a complaint filed by Sony Entertainment. The entertainment company was hacked and contents from its servers were shared by hackers on various file sharing websites. In earlier instances, many websites have been blocked for copyright infringement as well.

"Courts unfortunately are not exercising restraint and are indulging ignorant copyright lawyers," said Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at the Centre for Internet and Society. Prakash said that most of the sites on the list don't host copyrighted material themselves and a case can not be made against them.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-december-31-2014-jayadevan-neha-alawadhi-december-31-2014-govt-blocks-over-60-websites

Centre blocks 32 websites for security reasons, restores some later

praskrishna — 2015-01-02T14:13:03Z

The Centre on Wednesday asked Internet Service Providers (ISP) to block 32 websites citing national security concerns, especially from terror group ISIS.

The article by S. Ronendra Singh was published in the Hindu Businessline on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The move created a flutter on social networking sites, as most of the Web sites, such as archive.org, vimeo.com, github.com, pastebin.com, codepad.org and paste2.org, were being used by global communities like application developers for free movies and books, coders and text sharing.

By late evening, some sites were restored.

Sources in the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology confirmed the development and told BusinessLine: “It was based on some national security issues, and we cannot compromise with our nation’s security….”

A senior official from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) said the directive had come from a Mumbai court after the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had approached it to block some Web sites carrying anti-India content.

The matter came to light after a circular, purportedly sent by DoT to ISPs, showed up on social networking sites, listing the sites, along with some screen shots. Incidentally, the said circular had edited out the letter head, date and the signature below. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s IT cell head, Arvind Gupta, tweeted saying ‘the Web sites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by the Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS’.

However, later in the evening, Gupta, in his tweet said, some of the Web sites such as vimeo.com have been restored because they have removed ‘objectionable content and/or cooperated with the on going investigations’.

However, the blocked Web sites raised a furore in the social media wherein people said the Government should amend the laws than do such things.

“The problem isn’t just about the specific sites that are blocked; the problem is always about the bad law + process relating to #GoIBlocks,” Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at Centre for Internet and Society tweeted. He said the 69A Rules (of the IT Act 2000) does not allow for transparency, accountability and time-limits on blocks, so it is easily misused by the Government, the courts and individuals.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-businessline-december-31-2015-s-ronendra-singh-

Internet users fume as govt blocks 32 sites

praskrishna — 2015-01-02T13:46:25Z

The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has ordered Internet service providers to block 32 websites, in cluding popular video-sharing plat forms such as Dailymotion and Vimeo, reportedly over concerns that they are being misused by Islamic State jihadists.

The article by Jaison Lewis was published in Mumbai Mirror on January 1, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The ban has angered free-speech proponents who allege that the Narendra Modi government is using national security as a pretext to censor online content. On Wednesday, tweets criticising the restrictions were trending on #GOIBlocks. Senior lawyer Karuna Nandy said that she would challenge the DoT order in the Supreme Court.

Apart from Dailymotion and Vimeo, Internet service providers have also been ordered to block Github and Pastebin, which are popular among programmers; Weebly, a free website creator; and Archive.org, a non-profit digital library.

Some Internet users, however, were able to access some of the sites. This could be because their Internet service providers have not yet implemented the DoT order or because the government has lifted restrictions on some web addresses, according to activists monitoring the blockage of the websites.

The order was issued under Section 69A (procedure for blocking public access) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The section allows authorities to block websites without giving any formal reason or making any public announcement.

However, Arvind Gupta, BJP's national head for information and technology, tweeted that the sites had been blocked over security concerns. "The Web sites have been blocked based on an advisory by Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying Anti India content from ISIS.The sites that have removed objectionable content andor cooperated with the ongoing investigations, are being unblocked," he wrote.

Gupta, however, did not explain how the sites were being misused by terrorists. Some of the sites are mostly frequented by programmers looking for open-source software and codes.

Nandy, a Supreme Court lawyer who specialises in human rights litigations, criticised the ban. "I will challenge the order in the Su preme Court this week. I will seek directions to lift the secrecy surrounding such bans and also request for a right to appeal," she said.

She added that censoring the Internet was against the idea of free expression guaranteed under the Constitution. "Such steps are not good for a healthy society," she said.

Pranesh Prakash, a policy director with the Centre for Internet and Society and one of the most vocal opponents of the blockage, said that the people had the right to know why the websites had been blocked.

"We still don't know why these blocks were issued: was it an overzealous copyright lawyer who found an indulgent judge to issue an overbroad and baseless order? Or was it a public servant who wrongly directed the Department of Electronics and IT to block the sites under the IT Act? We have no idea," said Prakash, who tweeted a picture of the DoT order on Wednesday.

He added that websites were frequently blocked without clear evidence of wrongdoing. "These laws must be changed," Prakash said.

Internet users also voiced their anger over the DoT order. "This only proves ATS is an idiot. If terrorists use buses, phones & Whatspp, you'll block whole system? #GOIBlocks," Poonam Sharma tweeted.

Some users retweeted a Modi post from August 2012: "As a common man, I join the protest against crackdown on freedom of speech!"

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/mumbai-mirror-jaison-lewis-jan-1-2015-internet-users-fume-as-govt-blocks-32-sites

Government blocks 32 websites to check ISIS propaganda

praskrishna — 2015-01-02T13:37:39Z

The Centre has blocked 32 websites, including vimeo.com, dailymotion.com, pastebin.com and github.com, in an effort to curb ISIS propaganda, prompting a wave of online protests.

The article by Kim Arora was published in the Times of India on January 1, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

An Indian "hacktivist" group, Anonymous India, has threatened reprisal. By Wednesday evening, however, websites that had complied with the government order to remove objectionable content had been unblocked, sources said.

A confidential department of telecom order, dated December 17, instructing all internet service licensees to block the websites appeared online on Wednesday. When contacted to verify the news, Dr Gulshan Rai, director of the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), told TOI the directions had been issued to internet service providers following a Mumbai additional chief metropolitan magistrate's November order directing the government's Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) to implement the same.

He added that Mumbai's Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had approached the judiciary after interrogating Arif Majeed, a 23-year-old ISIS recruit from Kalyan. More recently, Bengaluru professional Mehdi Biswas was arrested for allegedly spreading ISIS propaganda on Twitter. "These websites were being used to invite youths to join ISIS. We had contacted the websites sometime back and asked for the removal of the objectionable content. At that time, our communications were ignored. Some of them have now agreed to work with the government. The websites that have complied are being unblocked," Rai told TOI.

The move met with opposition from the online community. While the tech community opposed the Github ban, others were upset about video-sharing websites like dailymotion.com and vimeo.com being taken down. "By blocking vimeo and dailymotion along with other websites, India is walking in the footsteps of Pakistan," tweeted @baawraman.

The list of websites in the DoT document was heavy on large text-sharing and collaboration websites, like Github and Pastebin, popular with coders and software developers. Many objected to the blocking of entire websites instead of specific URLs hosting problematic content. However, Rai explained that individual URLs could not be blocked because of the "high mobility of content" on the websites. "It can just be removed and pasted elsewhere. There are no checks and balances," he said.

Hacktivist group Anonymous India tweeted, "One fine morning, Indian government decided to block sites like Github. Now now, it is time to wake-up. Government of India, Expect Us," a tweet from their handle @opindia_revenge said.

As questions began to be raised on social networks, BJP IT cell head Arvind Gupta tweeted, "The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by the Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS. The sites that have removed objectionable content and/or cooperated with the ongoing investigations, are being unblocked."

The sustainability of counter-measures like blanket blocking to contain threats is being questioned. Prasanth Sugathan, counsel at Software Freedom and Law Center, said such a move is short-sighted. "If you block one website, terrorists can always use another one. Or they will move to using encrypted channels, peer-to-peer communication or even telephones. One can't block everything. In my opinion, such a move only inconveniences the daily users and doesn't solve the long-term purpose," said Sugathan. The sentiment was echoed by common Twitter users as well.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's tweet from August 2012 condemning blanket blocking of websites was pulled out for recirculation. "As a common man, I join the protest against crackdown on freedom of speech! Have changed my DP. 'Sabko Sanmati De Bhagwan.' #GOIBlocks," Modi had tweeted on August 24, 2012.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Bengaluru-based Center for Internet and Society, questioned the lack of transparency around the practice of blocking websites under the Indian law. "Qn for govt: Why does the law require secrecy of web blocking orders when it doesn't allow such secrecy for books, films? #GoIBlocks," he tweeted, adding, "The 69A Rules don't allow for transparency, accountability, time-limits on blocks, etc. So easily misused by govt. + courts + individuals." The websites were blocked under section 69 A of the IT Act, 2000 and the IT (Procedure and sdafeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) rules, 2009.

Currently, the Supreme Court is in the middle of hearing a clutch of petitions challenging several IT Act provisions, including blocking and takedown of websites.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-jan-1-2015-kim-arora-government-blocks-32-websites-to-check-isis-propaganda

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS

pranesh — 2014-12-31T14:36:01Z

On December 17, 2014, the Dept. of Telecommunications blocked 32 URLs (as it was ordered to do so by the by Dept. of Electronics & IT — specifically the Designated Officer under section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and under the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009), those being: 01) https://justpaste.it/ 02) http://hastebin.com 03) http://codepad.org 04) http://pastie.org 05) https://pasteeorg 06) http://paste2.org 07) http://slexy.org 08) http://paste4btc.com/ 09) http://0bin.net 10) http://www.heypasteit.com 11) http://sourceforge.net/projects/phorkie 12) http://atnsoft.com/textpaster 13) https://archive.org 14) http://www.hpage.com 15) http://www.ipage.com/ 16) http://www.webs.com/ 17) http://www.weebly.com/ 18) http://www.000webhost.com/ 19) https://www.freehosting.com 20) https://vimeo.com/ 21) http://www.dailymotion.com/ 22) http://pastebin.com 23) https://gist.github.com 24) http://www.ipaste.eu 25) https://thesnippetapp.com 26) https://snipt.net 27) http://tny.ct (Tinypaste) 28) https://github.com (gist-it) 29) http://snipplr.com/ 30) http://termbin.com 31) http://www.snippetsource.net 32) https://cryptbin.com

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.pdf

December 2014 Bulletin

praskrishna — 2015-01-12T16:56:54Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) wishes you a very happy new year and welcomes you to the twelfth issue of the newsletter (December 2014).

Highlights

CIS prepared a policy brief that identifies the problem areas with the current work flow being used to publish documents and proposes suitable modifications to make them easy to locate, authentic and accessible.
NVDA team conducted two workshops. The first one was held at the Hyderabad Central University for reading and writing in Telugu. The second one was held at the Blind Empowerment Foundation in Kolkata for reading and writing in Bangla.

Nehaa Chaudhari participated in the 29^th WIPO-SCCR held in Geneva from December 8 to 12, 2014 and on behalf of CIS gave statements on the Proposed Treaty for the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations , Limitations and Exceptions for Education, Teaching, Research Institutions and Persons with Disabilities , made a brief pointed intervention on the Broadcast Treaty , and briefly interviewed Prof. Crews on his Updated Study on Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives .
Nehaa Chaudhari analyses the broadening of definitions/concepts in the Proposed Broadcast Treaty versus those in pre-existing international instruments.
Maggie Huang, an intern at CIS as part of the Pervasive Technologies projects conducted interviews with fabless semiconductor industry professionals in Taiwan. The findings are highlighted in two separate blog entries. The first one explores some of their views on the current intellectual property system and the second explores the tension between market forces and governmental intervention in providing access to mobile technology .
Tejaswini Niranjana, a distinguished fellow at CIS wrote an op-ed in the Hindu telling readers to see the ongoing Sanskrit versus German controversy as a welcome opportunity to discuss the real and persistent problems of our education system.
Vidushi Marda and Bhairav Acharya have co-authored a white paper that seeks to identify aspects of privacy in Islamic Law and demonstrate that the notion of privacy was recognized and protected in traditional Islamic law.
Ashna Ashesh and Bhairav Acharya have produced a white paper seeks to locate privacy in Classical Hindu Law, and by doing so, displace the notion that privacy is an inherently 'Western' concept that is the product of a modernist legal system.
Vipul Kharbanda authored a white paper establishing the relationship between privacy and confidentiality.
Geetha Hariharan in a blog entry examines the constitutional validity of Section 69A and the Blocking Rules.
Shyam Ponappa in an article published by the Business Standard writes that India's current policies for telecommunications don't serve our interests and tells readers what must change.

Accessibility and Inclusion

Under a grant from the Hans Foundation we are doing two projects. The first project is on creating a national resource kit of state-wise laws, policies and programmes on issues relating to persons with disabilities in India. CIS in partnership with CLPR (Centre for Law and Policy Research) compiled the National Compendium of Policies, Programmes and Schemes for Persons with Disabilities (29 states and 6 union territories). The publication has been finalised and is being printed. The draft chapters and the quarterly reports can be accessed on the project page. The second project is on developing text-to-speech software for 15 Indian languages. The progress made so far in the project can be accessed here.

►NVDA and eSpeak

Monthly Update

December 2014 Report (Suman Dogra; December 30, 2014).

Events Organized

Telugu eSpeak Training with NVDA (Organized by NVDA team; Hyderabad Central University, Hyderabad; December 1-2, 2014).
Bangla eSpeak training with NVDA (Organized by NVDA team; Blind Empowerment Foundation, Kolkata; December 19-20, 2014).

Upcoming Event

Training in Use of eSpeak with Malayalam (Co-organized by CIS, DAISY Forum of India and Chakshumathi Assistive Technology Centre; Trivandrum; January 24 - 25, 2015, Trivandrum).

►Other

Blog Entry

Availability and Accessibility of Government Information in Public Domain (Sunil Abraham, Nirmita Narasimhan, Beliappa, and Anandhi Viswanathan; December 9, 2014).

Participation in Event

First meeting of the high level committee on National Policy on Universal Electronic Accessibility (Organized by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology; December 30, 2014; New Delhi). Sunil Abraham participated in this meeting.

Media Coverage

When technology is able but the mindset is not (Governance Now; December 1-15 issue). Sunil Abraham and Nirmita Narasimhan gave their inputs.

Access to Knowledge

As part of the Access to Knowledge programme we are doing two projects. The first one (Pervasive Technologies) under a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is for research on the complex interplay between pervasive technologies and intellectual property to support intellectual property norms that encourage the proliferation and development of such technologies as a social good. The second one (Wikipedia) under a grant from the Wikimedia Foundation is for the growth of Indic language communities and projects by designing community collaborations and partnerships that recruit and cultivate new editors and explore innovative approaches to building projects.

►Pervasive Technologies

As part of the Pervasive Technologies project, Maggie Huang conducted interviews with fabless semiconductor industry professionals in Taiwan. The findings from the samples are highlighted in four part series. The third and fourth parts have been published:

Blog Entries

[Open] Innovation and Expertise > Patent Protection & Trolls in a Broken Patent Regime (Maggie Huang; December 26, 2014).
"Copyright Management in the Age of Mobile Music" - Living Methodology Document (Maggie Huang; December 26, 2014).

►Other

Blog Entries

Nehaa Chaudhari attended the 29^th WIPO-SCCR held in Geneva from December 8 to 12. The following are the outputs:

29th Session of the WIPO SCCR: CIS Intervention on the Proposed Treaty for the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations (Nehaa Chaudhari; December 9, 2014).
29th Session of the WIPO SCCR: CIS- 2nd (brief) Intervention on the Broadcast Treaty (Nehaa Chaudhari; December 11, 2014).
The Broadening of Definitions in the Proposed Broadcast Treaty Compared to Other International Conventions (Nehaa Chaudhari; December 11, 2014).
29th Session of the WIPO SCCR: CIS Intervention: Questions to Prof. Kenneth Crews on his Updated Study on Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives (Nehaa Chaudhari; December 14, 2014).
29th Session of the WIPO SCCR: Statement on the Limitations and Exceptions for Education, Teaching, Research Institutions and Persons with Disabilities (Nehaa Chaudhari; December 20, 2014).
Protection of Broadcasting Organisations under the Proposed Treaty as Compared to Other International Conventions (Nehaa Chaudhari; December 21, 2014).

Participation in Event

Save the Date - 10 December 2014: The Broadcasting Treaty: A Solution in Search of a Problem? (Organized at WIPO; December 10, 2014). Nehaa Chaudhari was a speaker at this side event. The details were originally published by Knowledge Ecology International.

Media Coverage

SCCR 29: Public Interest Organizations Statements regarding the Broadcasting Treaty (Knowledge Ecology International; December 9, 2014).
SCCR 29 Libraries, Archives and Public Interest NGOs in Q&A with Dr. Crews (Knowledge Ecology International; December 11, 2014).
At WIPO, Study On Copyright Exceptions Stimulates Broad Discussion With Author (Catherine Saez; December 18, 2014).
WIPO Delegates Hear Concerns of NGOs on Exceptions for Libraries (Catherine Saez; IP Watch ; December 19, 2014).

►Wikipedia

As part of the project grant from the Wikimedia Foundation we have reached out to more than 3500 people across India by organizing more than 100 outreach events and catalysed the release of encyclopaedic and other content under the Creative Commons (CC-BY-3.0) license in four Indian languages (21 books in Telugu, 13 in Odia, 4 volumes of encyclopaedia in Konkani and 6 volumes in Kannada, and 1 book on Odia language history in English).

Newspaper Article

Beyond the Language Tussle (Tejaswini Niranjana; The Samaja, November 17, 2014).

Blog Entries

Odia Wikisource campus project at Kalinga Institute of Social Sciences (Subhashish Panigrahi; December 3, 2014).
Several Publications Now Available under Creative Commons License (Subhashish Panigrahi; December 28, 2014).
Odia Wikisource workshop at New Delhi (Subhashish Panigrahi; December 30, 2014). The event was organized by CIS in collaboration with "The Intellects" on December 14.

News and Media Coverage

CIS-A2K team gave its inputs to the following media coverage:

Odia Wikipedia (Dhatri; December 1, 2014).
Odia Wikipedia (Odiapua; December 1, 2014).
Access to Rare Books Made Easy (Diana Sahu; Indian Express; December 5, 2014).
Tulu Wikipedia gets some push (Hindu Businessline; December 13, 2014).
Tulu Wikipedia (Kannada Prabha; December 14, 2014).
Tulu Wikipedia (Vijaya Karnataka; December 15, 2014).
Tulu Wikipedia (VijayaVani; December 27, 2014).
Works of Veerasalingam Pantulu on web (Hans India; December 31, 2014).
Wiki Winter Camp - Coverage in Sakshi (Sakshi; December 31, 2014).
Wiki Winter Camp - Coverage in Eenadu (Eenadu; December 31, 2014).

Event Co-organized

Odia Wikisource Sabha 2014 (Co-organized by CIS-A2K and Odia Wikimedia Community; November 28, 2014). Subhashish Panigrahi participated in the event.

Participation in Events

ICT for Development (Organized by Christ University; December 3, 2014). Dr. U.B. Pavanaja was a speaker at this event.
Swatantra 2014: Fifth International Free Software Conference, Kerala (Organized by ICFOSS, Govt. of Kerala; Hotel Hycinth by Sparsa, Trivandrum; December 18 - 20, 2014). T. Vishnu Vardhan chaired a session on Wikimedia and Access to Knowledge in India and Rahimanuddin Shaik co-presented on Making DLI Accessible.

►Openness

Blog Entry

Department of Science and Technology & Department of Biotechnology adopt Open Access Policy (Anubha Sinha; December 29, 2014).

Participation in Events

Tech for Citizen Engagement 2014 (Organized by Omidyar Network; New Delhi; December 11, 2014). Sunil Abraham was a speaker in the session "Rules of Engagement: Emerging Trends in Citizen Outreach".
Swatantra 2014: Fifth International Free Software Conference, Kerala (Organized by ICFOSS, Govt. of Kerala; Hotel Hycinth by Sparsa, Trivandrum; December 18 - 20, 2014). Prof. Subbiah Arunachalam was a speaker and made a presentation on Open Science.

Internet Governance

►Privacy

As part of our Surveillance and Freedom: Global Understandings and Rights Development (SAFEGUARD) project with Privacy International we are engaged in enhancing respect for the right to privacy in developing countries. During the month we published the following blog entries:

White Papers

Locating Constructs of Privacy within Classical Hindu Law (Ashna Ashesh and Bhairav Acharya; December 29, 2014).
Relationship between Privacy and Confidentiality (Vipul Kharbanda; December 30, 2014).

Blog Entry

Identifying Aspects of Privacy in Islamic Law (Vidushi Marda and Bhairav Acharya; December 14, 2014).

Upcoming Events

Security, Governments, and Data: Technology and Policy (Co-organized by CIS and the Observer Research Foundation; January 8, 2015; New Delhi).
CPDP 2015 : The eighth international conference on computers, privacy and data protection will be held in Brussels from January 21 to 23, 2015. CIS is a moral supporter of CPDP.

Event Organized

Security and Surveillance: A public discussion on Optimizing Security while Safeguarding Human Rights (CIS; December 19, 2014).

►Free Speech

Under a grant from the MacArthur Foundation, CIS is doing research on the restrictions placed on freedom of expression online by the Indian government and contribute studies, reports and policy briefs to feed into the ongoing debates at the national as well as international level. As part of the project we bring you the following outputs:

Blog Entries

ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues (Geetha Hariharan; December 8, 2014).
Revolving Door Analysis: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (Lakshmi Venkataraman; December 10, 2014).
Is India's website-blocking law constitutional? - I. Law & procedure (Geetha Hariharan; December 11, 2014).

►Other

Participation in Event

National Seminar on Cyber Security & Cyber Laws - Issues and Concerns (Organized by the Advanced Centre for Research, Development & Training in Cyber Laws & Forensics; National Law School of India University, Bangalore; December 27 - 28, 2014). Sharath Chandra Ram was part of a plenary session on "Multi-Disciplinary Challenges in Ensuring Cyber Security".

Blog Entries

Overview of the Constitutional Challenges to the IT Act (Pranesh Prakash; December 15, 2014).
Reply to RTI filed with BSNL regarding Network Neutrality and Throttling (Tarun Krishnakumar; December 22, 2014).

---------------------------------
News & Media Coverage
---------------------------------
CIS gave its inputs to the following media coverage:

India sees biggest improvement in Internet freedom, says report (Moulishree Srivastava; Livemint; December 5, 2014).
Are Cab Apps safe? (IBN Live; December 8, 2014).
FrndiNeed; an app for passengers' safety (Athira A. Nair; Economic Times; December 10, 2014).
Thank You To Our 2014 Sponsors (Medianama; December 22, 2014).
Why did India fail to discover the ISIS Twitter handle? (Anita Babu; Business Standard; December 26, 2014).
Targeting surveillance (Ajai Sreevatsan; The Hindu; December 28, 2014).
Centre blocks 32 websites for security reasons, restores some later (S. Ronendra Singh; Hindu Businessline; December 31, 2014).
DoT Reportedly Orders Blocking of 32 Websites Including GitHub, Archive.org, SourceForge (NDTV; December 31, 2014).
Govt blocks 32 websites, including Vimeo and Github (Moulishree Srivastava; Livemint; December 31, 2014).
Vimeo, DailyMotion, Pastebin Among Sites Blocked In India For 'Anti-India' Content From ISIS (Jeff Stone; IB Times; December 31, 2014).
Pastebin, Dailymotion, Github blocked after DoT order: Report (Anupam Saxena; The Times of India; December 31, 2014).

Telecom

CIS is involved in promoting access and accessibility to telecommunications services and resources and has provided inputs to ongoing policy discussions and consultation papers published by TRAI. It has prepared reports on unlicensed spectrum and accessibility of mobile phones for persons with disabilities and also works with the USOF to include funding projects for persons with disabilities in its mandate:

Newspaper Column

A Road Map for Digital India (Shyam Ponappa; Business Standard; December 3, 2014 and Organizing India Blogspot; December 4, 2014).

Digital Humanities

CIS is building research clusters in the field of Digital Humanities. The Digital will be used as a way of unpacking the debates in humanities and social sciences and look at the new frameworks, concepts and ideas that emerge in our engagement with the digital. The clusters aim to produce and document new conversations and debates that shape the contours of Digital Humanities in Asia:

Blog Entry

The Spaces of Digital (P.P.Sneha; December 30, 2014).

About CIS

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness (including open government, FOSS, open standards, etc.), and engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities.

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E-mail: a2k@cis-india.org

► Support Us

Please help us defend consumer / citizen rights on the Internet! Write a cheque in favour of 'The Centre for Internet and Society' and mail it to us at No. 194, 2nd 'C' Cross, Domlur, 2nd Stage, Bengaluru - 5600 71.

► Request for Collaboration:

We invite researchers, practitioners, and theoreticians, both organisationally and as individuals, to collaboratively engage with Internet and society and improve our understanding of this new field. To discuss the research collaborations, write to Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, at sunil@cis-india.org. To discuss collaborations on Indic language Wikipedia, write to T. Vishnu Vardhan, Programme Director, A2K, at vishnu@cis-india.org.

CIS is grateful to its primary donor the Kusuma Trust founded by Anurag Dikshit and Soma Pujari, philanthropists of Indian origin for its core funding and support for most of its projects. CIS is also grateful to its other donors, Wikimedia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Privacy International, UK, Hans Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and IDRC for funding its various projects.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/december-2014-bulletin

National Seminar on Cyber Security & Cyber Laws - Issues and Concerns

praskrishna — 2014-12-31T02:04:37Z

Sharath Chandra Ram was a panelist at this seminar organized by the Advanced Centre for Research, Development & Training in Cyber Laws & Forensics on December 27 and 28, 2014 at the National Law School of India University in Bangalore.

Sharath was part of a plenary session on "Multi-Disciplinary Challenges in Ensuring Cyber Security". He spoke about 'multi-stakeholderim in cyber security and CERT programs of nations'.

PROGRAMME SCHEDULE

Day 1 - 27^th December 2014
09:00- 10:00	REGISTRATION
10:00- 11:00 INAUGURAL SESSION AT SHRI. KRISHNAPPA MEMORIAL HALL [ACADEMIC BLOCK]	Welcome & Introduction: Dr. Nagarathna. A., Seminar Director Inaugural Address: Shri. Pratap Reddy, IPS, IGP, Internal Security Division, Karnataka Police, Bangalore Key Note Address: Dr. R. Venkata Rao, Vice Chancellor, NLSIU Vote of Thanks: Dr. T. V. Subba Rao, Senior Professor, NLSIU
11:00-11:45	GROUP PHOTO & TEA BREAK
11:45-01:00 PLENARY SESSION AT SHRI. KRISHNAPPA MEMORIAL HALL [ACADEMIC BLOCK]	THEME: "MULTI-DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES IN ENSURING CYBER SECURITY" Members of the Panel: 1. Mr. Subrahmanya Boda, CISO, GMR 2. Mr. Sunil Varkey, CISO, WIPRO 3. Mr. Ramesh Kauta , CISO, GE [India] 4. Mr. T T Thomas, CTO Synergia Technologies, 5. Mr. Rahul Matthan, Partner, Trilegal. 6. Sharath Chandra Ram (Sharathchandra Ramakrishnan), Researcher at Centre for Internet & Society 7. Mr. Srinivas P, CISO, Infosys & Anchor, DSCI Bangalore Chapter [Moderator of the session]
01:00-02:00	LUNCH BREAK
venue	Shri Krishnappa Memorial Hall (Academic Block)		International Training Centre
02:00-03:30	Technical Session 1		Technical Session 2
03:30-04:00	TEA BREAK
04:00-05:30	Technical Session 3		Technical Session 4
6:00 to 7. 00	CULTURAL EVENING Venue: Quad, Academic Block
Day 2 - 28^th December 2014
08:00-09:00	BREAK FAST
venue	Shri Krishnappa Memorial Hall (Academic Block)	International Training Centre		MPP Class Room (Academic Block)
09:30- 11:00	Technical Session 5	Technical Session 6		Technical Session 7
11:00- 11:30	TEA BREAK
	Shri Krishnappa Memorial Hall (Academic Block)	International Training Centre		MPP Class Room (Academic Block)
11:30-1:30	Technical Session 8	Technical Session 9		Technical Session 10
01:30-02:30	LUNCH BREAK
02:30-03. 45 PLENARY SESSION AT SHRI. KRISHNAPPA MEMORIAL HALL [ACADEMIC BLOCK]	THEME: "SECURING CYBER SPACE THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT" Members of the Panel: 1. Dr. Kamble, Director, Computer Emergency Response Team [CERT] India, Dept of Electronics & IT, Ministry of IT, Government of India 2. Dr. S.B.N. Prakash, Senior Professor of Law, NLSIU 3. Mr. Naa Vijay Shankar, Cyber Law Consultant, Bangalore 4. Mr. Balasubramanya, Vice President, Tata Consultancy Services, Bangalore 5. Mr. Ranganath, Delivery Project Executive, IBM, Bangalore 6. Mr. Venkatesh Murthy, Senior Manager, Cyber Forensics, Data Security Council of India [DSCI], Bangalore. 7. Mr. M. D. Sharath, Dy. S. P., Cyber Police, Bangalore 8. Dr. Nagarathna. A., Senior Assistant Prof of Law, NLSIU [Moderator]
3. 45 to 4. 00	TEA BREAK
04:00-05:00 AT SHRI. KRISHNAPPA MEMORIAL HALL [ACADEMIC BLOCK]	VALEDICTORY SESSION Seminar Resolutions: Dr. T. V. Subba Rao, Senior Professor, NLSIU Valedictory Address & Distribution of Certificates: : Dr. R. Venkata Rao, Vice Chancellor, NLSIU Vote of thanks: Dr. Nagarathna. A., Seminar Director

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/national-seminar-cyber-security-and-cyber-laws

Indians Plead for #NetNeutrality as Airtel Raises Data Charges

subha — 2015-02-11T15:10:44Z

Click to read the article published in the Global Voices on December 30, 2014.

After Indian mobile data service provider Airtel announced plans to introduce data charges for VoIP usage, it received a rash of criticism from customers and open web advocates alike.

With 192.22 million users (as of August 2013), Airtel is India's largest mobile telephony provider and Asia-Pacific's second largest mobile operator. Although plans are now on hold due to regulatory restrictions, advocates worry that the company may yet find a way impose the fee increase.

On December 26, company proposed to raise costs for mobile phone users who rely on services like WhatsApp, Skype, and Viber to communicate with their contacts, requiring them to pay Rs.0.04/10KB (0.063 USD, based on current conversion rate) for 3G and Rs. 0.10/10KB (0.158 USD) for 2G service where a local or national call will cost one third of this amount or less.

If you pay a fixed amount for internet data pack, Airtel will charge you extra for internet calls on Skype, Viber or any free calling app. How much? 4 paise for every 10 Kilo Bytes on 3G and 10 paise for every 10 Kilo Bytes on 2G.

- Netneutrality.in

The new plan to charge Rs. 75 for 75 MB of data usage over VoIP calls was heavily criticized on social media:

So let me get this straight. Airtel is worried about people using a mere 75 MB out of their data allowance? WTF? #BoycottAirtel

— Madhu Menon (@madmanweb) December 26, 2014

Messages against Airtel on Twitter and Facebook included hashtags such as #BoycottAirtel and #NetNeutrality.

In protest of Airtel India's violation of net neutrality principles, I disabled all data packs in my mobile number .

I am not using skype or viber usually . My usual video requirements arechatb.org and Google hangout. But a carrier breaking net neutrality is a very serious development . Raise your voice against this .

Read More about Airtel Breaking Net Neutrality here http://netneutrality.in/

I would like to port to some other services without gate keeping after a few weeks If airtel continues same path.

‪#‎netneutrality‬ ‪#‎india‬ ‪#‎airtel‬ ‪#‎fail‬

- Anivar Joshina (on Facebook)

In an op-ed, Indian online news portal Niti Central's CEO Shashi Shekhar said the move could put Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's “Digital India” initiative in jeopardy.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of a Digital India will be in jeopardy unless the larger mess in Telecom is fixed urgently on priority and “Net Neutrality” does not make that priority list.

- Shashi Shekhar, CEO, Niti Central

Airtel has not released any further response on the issue of net neutrality since their initial announcement, which read as follows:

All Internet/data packs or plans (through which customer can avail discounted rate) shall only be valid for internet browsing and will exclude VoIP (Both incoming/ Outgoing). VoIP over data connectivity would be charged at standard data rates of 4p / 10 KB (3G service) and 10p / 10 KB (2G service).

- Published on Telecomtalk.info

Reacting to the public outcry against Airtel, India's Union Minister of Communications Ravi Shankar Prasad pledged to look into matter. According to news portal First Post, telecom operators voiced opposition to “over-the-top” VoIP services like WhatsApp, Skype, and Viber for some time, but the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has thus far stood in the way of a price increase.

Airtel has started on plans to charge OTT users particularly using VOIP services like viber and skype. TRAI had earlier this year rejected such demands from Indian operators. Even after this Airtel has gone ahead and kickstarted this practice.

- Sandip Pillai (on Change.org)

Airtel has pushed for a policy level change to legitimize exceptional data charges and many other over-the-top services. But these were declined by TRAI who contended that Airtel's plans were “illegal and violation of net neutrality,” forcing Airtel to drop the plan — for now.

In view of the news reports that a consultation paper will be issued shortly by TRAI on issues relating to services offered by OTT players including VOIP, we have decided not to implement our proposed launch of VoIP packs.

We have no doubt that as a result of the consultation process a balanced outcome would emerge that would not only protect the interests of all stakeholders and viability of this important sector but would also encourage much needed investments in spectrum and roll out of data networks to fulfill the objective of digital India.

- Reported on MediaNama by Nikhil Pahwa

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/global-voices-december-30-2014-indians-plead-for-net-neutrality-as-aitel-raises-data-charges

Relationship Between Privacy and Confidentiality

vipul — 2014-12-30T14:27:02Z

The laws of breach of confidentiality and breach of privacy at first glance seem very similar to each other. If a doctor releases health information relating to a patient that s/he is treating then such an act would give rise to a claim both under the law of privacy as well as under the law of confidentiality.

Similar is the case with financial information released by a bank, etc. This makes one wonder exactly where and how it is that the law of breach of privacy intersects with that of the law of confidentiality. An enquiry into such a complex question of law requires a deeper appreciation of the relationship between these two different principles of law which require a better understanding of the origins and evolutions of these principles.

In this paper we shall try to explore the origins of both the law of privacy as well as confidentiality as they have evolved in the field of tort law in India. Although our primary focus is Indian law, however in order to understand the evolution of these principles it is necessary to discuss their evolution in three common law jurisdictions, viz. the United States of America, the United Kingdom and India. The reason for an analysis of these three jurisdictions will become clear as the reader goes further into this paper, however for ease of reference it would be better if the reason is clarified here itself. The concept of a right against breach of confidentiality has existed in English common law for a very long time, however the concept of a claim for breach of privacy originated only in American law, other than some statutory protection granted in the last couple of decades, has still not been granted recognition in English common law.

After a discussion of the evolution of these principles in both American and English law, we will then discuss these principles as they exist in Indian law. This discussion will (or should) at once become easier to understand and digest because of the deeper understanding of the interplay between these two principles gained from a reading of the first two chapters.

Privacy Torts: American Origins

Looking at the origins of privacy law it has been argued by many academics that the law of privacy in common law has its origins in an article published by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandies in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.[1] Warren and Brandeis suggested that one could generalise certain cases on defamation, breach of copyright in unpublished letters, trade secrets and breach of confidence as all based upon the protection of a common value which they called privacy.[2] The authors relied upon the existing body of cases relating to the law of confidentiality and interpreted it in a way so as to create a "right to privacy" which has evolved into a right quite different from the common understanding of confidentiality.

Although there are certain criticisms of the article by Warren and Brandeis, the background in which the article was written and the lacuna that these two scholars were trying to fill in the law of confidentiality as it existed at that time gives some context to the reasons why they felt the need to move away from the existing principles and propose a new principle of law. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandies were both worried about the invasion of personal space by the advent of the news and print media which was experiencing a boom during the late 19^th century. [3] Warren and Brandeis were worried that although the existing body of law on confidentiality would protect a person from having their picture put on a postcard by their photographer without their consent,[4] however if there was no relationship between the two persons there would be no remedy available to the aggrieved party. [5]

One of the criticisms of Warren and Brandeis' article is that to propose the existence of a right to privacy they relied heavily on the English case of Prince Albert v. Strange[6]. It has been proposed by some academics that this was a case which dealt with confidentiality and literary property which was characterized by Warren and Brandeis as a privacy case. [7] In this case Prince Albert sought to restrain publication of otherwise unpublished private etchings and lists of works which were made by Queen Victoria. The etchings appeared to have been removed surreptitiously from the private printer to whom these etchings were given and came into the possession of one Mr. Strange who wanted to print and sell the etchings. The case specifically rejected the existence of a right to privacy in the following words:

"The case is not put by the Plaintiff on any principle of trust or contract, but on property; there is nothing to show contract or confidence. It cannot be maintained that privacy constitutes property, or that the Court will interfere to protect the owner in the enjoyment of it; Chadler v. Thompson (3 Camp. 80). In William Aldred's case (9 Rep. 58 b.), Wray C. J. said, "The law does not give an action for such things of delight"."

Infact the case mentioned the term "privacy" only once, but that statement was made in the context of whether a delay in granting an injunction in such cases would defeat the entire purpose of the suit and was not preceeded or followed by any discussion on a distinct right to privacy:

"In the present case, where privacy is the right invaded, postponing the injunction would be equivalent to denying it altogether. The interposition of this Court in these cases does not depend upon any legal right, and to be effectual, it must be immediate."

However, Warren and Brandeis interpreted this case in a different manner and came to the conclusion that the "principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality".[8]

The article further incorporated the language of Judge Cooley's treatise (Cooley on Torts)[9] which used the phrase "the right to be let alone". They said that identifying this common element should enable the courts to declare the existence of a general principle which protected a person's appearance, sayings, acts and personal relations from being exposed in public. [10] However it has been argued by some scholars that this phrase was not used by Judge Cooley with as much import as has been given by Warren and Brandeis in their article. The phrase was used by Judge Cooley in mere passing while discussing why tort law protected against not only batteries but also assaults with no physical contact, and had no connection with privacy rights. [11]

Warren and Brandeis' article started getting almost immediate attention and some amount of recognition from various quarters,[12] though it cannot be said that it was universally well received. [13] However over time this tort of privacy slowly started getting recognized by various Courts throughout the United States and got a huge boost when it was recognized in a brief section in the First Restatement of Torts published in 1939. The right to privacy in American jurisprudence got another boost and became fully entrenched later on specially with the endorsement of Dr. William Prosser who discussed privacy in his treatise on the law of torts, the subsequent editions of which had a more and more elaborate discussion of the tort of privacy. This development of the law was further enhanced by Dr. Prosser's position as a reporter of the Second Restatement of Torts, which imported a four part taxonomy of the privacy tort which had been suggested by Dr. Prosser in his previous works.[14]

Thus we see how, beginning with the article by Warren and Brandeis in 1890, the privacy tort in American jurisprudence developed over the years and became further entrenched due to the influence of William Prosser and his works on the tort of privacy.

Privacy Torts in England: An Elaborate Principle of Confidentiality

The law of confidentiality in English law, as applied in certain specific contexts such as attorney client privileges, [15] doctor patient confidentiality,[16] etc. has been applied since hundreds and even though cases relating to the breach of confidentiality had already existed, however the case of Prince Albert v. Strange,[17] be it due to the interesting facts or the fame of the parties involved, is still considered as the clearest and most well established precedent for the tort of breach of confidence.[18] Similar cases relying upon this tort kept being decided by the English Courts but the tort of confidentiality was further cemented in English common law by the case of Saltman Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co.,[19] which expanded the application of the principle by holding that the obligation to respect confidence is not limited to only instances where parties have a contractual relationship.

The seminal case on the tort of breach of confidentiality in English law was that of Coco v. A.N Clark (Engineers) Ltd., [20] where an inventor enjoined a moped manufacturer from using design ideas communicated by the inventor during failed contractual negotiations with the manufacturer.[21] In this case Megarry J., held that a case of breach of confidence normally requires three elements to succeed, apart from contract, (i) the information itself must have the necessary quality of confidence about it, (ii) that information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and (iii) there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it.

Relying on the principles enunciated in the above cases and developed by subsequent decisions, English law relating to the tort of breach of confidentiality developed into a robust and flexible body of law protecting personal and commercial information from disclosure. Infact by the late 1990s, English law was very broad and gradually expanding in its scope of the tort of breach of confidentiality and Courts had stretched the idea of an obligation of confidence so as to include cases where there was not even any communication between the parties, such as secret photography and wiretapping. Further since third parties had already been reposed with an obligation of confidence when they knowingly received confidential material even if they did not have any relationship with the plaintiff, therefore the law of confidence could be extended to parties outside the relationship in which the confidence was initially made. This, although was not as broad and overarching as the American privacy tort, still had the ability to cover a wide range of cases. [22]

While English Courts on the one hand kept trying to expand the scope of the confidentiality tort, they also categorically rejected the existence of a privacy tort on the lines developed under American jurisprudence. The suggestion of the existence of such a privacy tort in English law was most recently rejected by the House of Lords in the case of Wainwright v. Home Office,[23] by Lord Bingham in the following words:

"What the courts have so far refused to do is to formulate a general principle of "invasion of privacy" (I use the quotation marks to signify doubt about what in such a context the expression would mean) from which the conditions of liability in the particular case can be deduced."

In this case the plaintiffs made a claim against the prison authorities for strip searching them before they went to meet an inmate and since the incident occurred before the coming into force of the Human Rights Act, 1998 of the UK had not yet come into force, so the plaintiffs also argued that there was an existing tortuous remedy based on a breach of privacy in common law. While discussing whether English Courts were amenable to or had ever recognized such a common law tort of privacy, the House of Lords cited decisions such as Malone v Metropolitan Police Comr, [24] and R v Khan (Sultan),[25] in both of which the courts refused to recognize a general right to privacy in the context of tapping of telephones.

The absence of any general cause of action for invasion of privacy was also acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in the context of a newspaper reporter and photographer invading into a patient's hospital bedroom in an effort to purportedly interview him and taking photographs, in the case of Kaye v Robertson.[26]

Thus relying on the above line of cases the House of Lords concluded that a general right to privacy does not exist in English common law:

"All three judgments are flat against a judicial power to declare the existence of a high-level right to privacy and I do not think that they suggest that the courts should do so. The members of the Court of Appeal certainly thought that it would be desirable if there was legislation to confer a right to protect the privacy of a person in the position of Mr Kaye against the kind of intrusion which he suffered, but they did not advocate any wider principle."

Thus it is clear that English Courts have time and again denied the existence of an American style right to privacy as emanating from common law. The Courts have instead tried to expand and widen the scope of the tort of confidentiality so as to cover various situations which may arise due to the pervasiveness of technology and which the traditional interpretation of the law of confidentiality was not equipped to deal with.

Therefore it is now a little clearer that the reason for the existence of the confusion between the torts of privacy and confidentiality is that the right to privacy had its origins in the common law precedents but the right to privacy developed as a distinct and separate right in America, primarily due to the influence of Warren and Brandeis's article as well as the works of William Prosser, whereas the Courts in England did not adopt this principle of privacy and instead favored a much more elaborate right to confidentiality. In the Indian context, this has led to some amount of confusion because, Indian case laws, as will be seen in the following chapter, borrowed heavily from American jurisprudence when discussing the right to privacy and not all cases have been able to clearly bring out the difference between the principles of privacy and confidentiality.

Indian Law

Tort of Breach of Privacy

Any analysis of the right to privacy in India, be it in the realm of constitutional law or tort law almost always includes within its ambit a discussion of the two celebrated cases of Kharak Singh v. Union of India[27] and Govind v. State of M.P.,[28] which elevated the right to privacy to the pedestal of a fundamental right under Indian law. However, an unintended consequence of this has been that pretty much every commentator on Indian law includes a discussion of these two cases when discussing the right to privacy, be it under constitutional law or under tort law. However, there is one problem with such an analysis of the right to privacy, viz. these two cases were dealing with a pure constitutional law question and relied upon American case laws to read into Article 21 an inbuilt right to privacy. However from a strictly tort law perspective, these cases are not relevant at all, and the seminal case for the tort of breach of privacy would have to be the Apex Court decision in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, [29] which specifically recognized this distinction and stated that the right to privacy has two different aspects, (i) the constitutional right to privacy, and (ii) the common law right to privacy.

The facts of the R. Rajagopal case revolve around the publishing of the autobiography written by the prisoner Auto Shankar, who had been placed in jail for committing multiple murders. The autobiography contained proof of involvement of many IAS, IPS officers in his crimes. Although Shankar had initially requested that the magazine print his autobiography, he later requested that his story not be published. The publishers held that it was their right to publish the autobiography while the IPS and IAS officers on the other hand claimed that Auto Shankar was trying to defame them and wanted to ban its publication. The Supreme Court in this case, implicitly accepts the existence of a right to privacy under Indian tort law when

"21.The question is how far the principles emerging from the United States and English decisions are relevant under our constitutional system. So far as the freedom of press is concerned, it flows from the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). But the said right is subject to reasonable restrictions placed thereon by an existing law or a law made after the commencement of the Constitution in the interests of or in relation to the several matters set out therein. Decency and defamation are two of the grounds mentioned in clause (2). Law of torts providing for damages for invasion of the right to privacy and defamation and Sections 499/500 IPC are the existing laws saved under clause (2). "

Discussing the distinction between the two aspects of the right to privacy, the Court held:

"The right to privacy as an independent and distinctive concept originated in the field of Tort law, under which a new cause of action for damages resulting from unlawful invasion of privacy was recognized. This right has two aspects which are but two faces of the same coin (1) the general law of privacy which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy and (2) the constitutional recognition given to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental invasion. The first aspect of this right must be said to have been violated where, for example, a person's name or likeness is used, without his consent, for advertising or non-advertising purposes or for that matter, his life story is written whether laudatory or otherwise and published without his consent as explained hereinafter. In recent times, however, this right has acquired a constitutional status."

After a discussion of the various arguments presented by the parties (a number of which are not relevant for the purposes of this paper), the Supreme Court laid down the following principles regarding freedom of the press and the right to privacy:

(1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.

(2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.

(3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) above - indeed, this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt of court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule."

The above principles have ruled the roost on the issue of privacy and freedom of the press under Indian law, with certain minimal additions. It has been held by the Delhi High Court that even though a claim for damages may be made under tort law for breach of privacy, the Court may even grant a pre-publication injunction to prevent a breach of privacy.[30] The principles laid down inR. Rajagopal were further clarified in the case of Indu Jain v. Forbes Incorporated, [31] where a case was filed by Indu Jain in the Delhi High Court to stop Forbes magazine from featuring her family in the Forbes List of Indian Billionaires. After a discussion of the various authorities and cases on the issue the Court summarized the principles relating to privacy and freedom of the press and applying those principles rejected the claim of the plaintiff. However for the purposes of our discussion these principles are extremely useful, and have been listed below:

"(V) Public or general interest in the matter published has to be more than mere idle curiosity.

(VI) Public figures like public officials play an influential role in ordering society. They have access to mass media communication both to influence the policy and to counter-criticism of their views and activities. The citizen has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons and the freedom of press extends to engaging in uninhibited debate about the involvement of public figures in public issues and events. (Ref. (1994) 6 SCC 632 R. Rajagopal & Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Others Para 18).

(VII) Right to privacy that rests in an individual may be waived by him by express or implied consent or lost by a course of conduct which estops its assertions. Such implication may be deduced from the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances.

(VIII) A public person or personage is one who by his standing, accomplishment, fame, mode of life or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs and character has so become a public figure and thereby relinquishes at least a part of his privacy.

(IX) The standard to be adopted for assessing as to whether the published material infracts the right to privacy of any individual is that of an ordinary man of common sense and prudence and not an out of ordinary or hyper-sensitive man. (Ref. (2007) 1 SCC 143 Ajay Goswami v. UOI & Ors.).

(X) Even though in this country, the freedom of press does not have presumptive priority as in some other jurisdictions including the United States of America, however the importance of a free media of communication to a healthy democracy has to receive sufficient importance and emphasis.

(XI) In evaluating a relief to be granted in respect of a complaint against infraction of the right to privacy, the court has to balance the rights of the persons complaining of infraction of right to privacy against freedom of press and the right of public to disclosure of newsworthy information. Such consideration may entail the interest of the community and the court has to balance the proportionality of interfering with one right against the proportionality of impact by infraction of the other.

(XII) The publication has to be judged as a whole and news items, advertisements and published matter cannot be read without the accompanying message that is purported to be conveyed to public. Pre-publication censorship may not be countenanced in the scheme of the constitutional framework unless it is established that the publication has been made with reckless disregard for truth, publication shall not be normally prohibited. (Ref.: (2007) 1 SCC 143 Ajay Goswami Vs. UOI & Ors.; (1994) 6 SCC 632 R. Rajagopal & Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Others and AIR 2002 Delhi 58 Khushwant Singh & Anr. Vs. Maneka Gandhi)."

Thus we see that the right to privacy in Indian law, even in the realm of tort law has had an inextricable connection with constitutional principles and constitutional cases have had a very huge impact on the development of this right in India. However a perusal of these cases shows that the right to privacy is available only insofar as information which is personal in nature, however in situations where the information is non-personal in nature the right to privacy may not be as useful and this is where, as we shall see below, the tort of breach of confidentiality comes in to fill the void.

Tort of Breach of Confidentiality

While there have been a number of landmark cases in India on the issue of breach of confidence in a contractual or a statutory setting, these cases are not very relevant for a discussion on the tort of breach of confidentiality. This is not to say that the tort of breach of confidentiality is non-existent in Indian law, the Courts here have time and again accepted that there does exist such a tortuous remedy in certain situations. We shall now try to examine the contours of this principle of torts by discussing some of the landmark cases on the topic.

In the case of Petronet LNG Ltd. v. Indian Petro Group and Another, ^{^[32]} the Delhi High Court considered a claim by a corporation seeking to prevent a news and media group from reporting its confidential negotiations and contracts with counterparties. The claim was based upon both the right to privacy as well as the right to confidentiality but in this case the court, looking at the fact that the plaintiff was a corporation and also the type of information involved denied the claim on the right to privacy. However, it did allow the injunction claimed by the corporation based on the right to confidentiality. Summarizing its discussion of the right to confidentiality, the Court stated thus:

"49. It may be seen from the above discussion, that originally, the law recognized relationships- either through status (marriage) or arising from contract (such as employment, contract for services etc) as imposing duties of confidentiality. The decision in Coco (1969) marked a shift, though imperceptibly, to a possibly wider area or zone. Douglas noted the paradigm shift in the perception, with the enactment of the Human Rights Act; even before that, in Attorney General (2) (also called the Spycatcher case, or the Guardian case) the Court acknowledged that there could be situations -where a third party (likened to a passerby, coming across sensitive information, wafting from the top of a building, below) being obliged to maintain confidentiality, having regard to the nature and sensitivity of the information….."

While discussing the factors that the Court would have to consider while deciding a claim based on the breach of confidentiality, the Delhi High Court relied upon and quoted from English judgments as follows:

"50. Even while recognizing the wider nature of duty - in the light of the Human Rights Act, 1998, and Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention, it was cautioned that the court, in each case, where breach of confidentiality, is complained, and even found- has to engage in a balancing process; the factors to be weighed while doing so, were reflected in A v. B Plc [2003] QB 195; the latest judgment in H.R.H. Prince of Wales indicates that the court would look at the kind of information, the nature of relationship, etc, and also consider proportionality, while weighing whether relief could be given:

"The court will need to consider whether, having regard to the nature of the information and all the relevant circumstances, it is legitimate for the owner of the information to seek to keep it confidential or whether it is in the public interest that the information should be made public….

..In applying the test of proportionality, the nature of the relationship that gives rise to the duty of confidentiality may be important."

Holding that the principles discussed in the English cases given in the context of individual rights of confidentiality would also hold good in the case of corporations, the Court held that:

"51. Though the reported cases, discussed above, all dealt with individual right, to confidentiality of private information (Duchess of Argyll;Frazer; Douglas; Campbell and H.R.H. Prince of Wales) yet, the formulations consciously approved in the Guardian, and Campbell, embrace a wider zone of confidentiality, that can possibly be asserted. For instance, professional records of doctors regarding treatment of patients, ailments of individuals, particulars, statements of witnesses deposing in investigations into certain types of crimes, particulars of even accused who are facing investigative processes, details victims of heinous assaults and crimes, etc, may, be construed as confidential information, which, if revealed, may have untoward consequences, casting a corresponding duty on the person who gets such information - either through effort, or unwittingly, not to reveal it. Similarly, in the cases of corporations and businesses, there could be legitimate concerns about its internal processes and trade secrets, marketing strategies which are in their nascent stages, pricing policies and so on, which, if prematurely made public, could result in irreversible, and unknown commercial consequences. However, what should be the approach of the court when the aggrieved party approaches it for relief, would depend on the facts of each case, the nature of the information, the corresponding content of the duty, and the balancing exercise to be carried out. It is held, therefore, that even though the plaintiff cannot rely on privacy, its suit is maintainable, as it can assert confidentiality in its information."

Apart from privacy, the law of confidentiality has been used in cases where there has been a definite harm to one side but none of the other laws provide for any relief. This was the situation in the case of Zee Telefilms Limited v. Sundial Communications Pvt Ltd, [33] where a company which developed television and media programming had discussed their concept of a new show with a network during negotiations which could not be finalized. The network however subsequently tried to start a new show which was based on the same concept and idea as the one presented by the plaintiff company. The plaintiff sued the network, inter alia on a claim for breach of confidential information and asked that the network be prevented from airing its show. In this case the plaintiff's claim based on copyright was rejected because copyright only subsists on the expression of an idea and not the idea itself, therefore the tort of breach of confidentiality had to be resorted to in order to give relief to the plaintiffs. Discussing the difference between confidentiality and copyright, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held:

"10. The law of the confidence is different from law of copyright. In paragraph 21.2 (page 721), [of Copinger and Skone-James on Copyright (13th Edn.)] the learned author has pointed out that right to restrain publication of work upon the grounds, that to do so would be breach of trust of confidence, is a broader right than proprietary right of copyright. There can be no copyright of ideas or information and it is not infringement of copyright to adopt or appropriate ideas of another or to publish information received from another, provided there is no substantial copying of the form in which those ideas have, or that information has, been previously embodied. But if the ideas or information have been acquired by a person under such circumstances that it would be a breach of good faith to publish them and he has no just case or excuses for doing so, the court may grant injunction against him. The distinction between the copyright and confidence may be of considerable importance with regard to unpublished manuscripts / works submitted, and not accepted, for publication or use. Whereas copyright protects material that has been reduced to permanent form, the general law of confidence may protect either written or oral confidential communication. Copyright is good against the world generally while confidence operates against those who receive information or ideas in confidence. Copyright has a fixed statutory time limit which does not apply to confidential information, though in practice application of confidence usually ceases when the information or ideas becomes public knowledge. Further the obligation of confidence rests not only on the original recipient, but also on any person who received the information with knowledge acquired at the time or subsequently that it was originally given in confidence."

A similar view, in a similar fact situation Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court had also came to a similar conclusion in the case of Anil Gupta v. Kunal Das Gupta.[34]

The law of confidentiality has also come to the rescue of employers in attempting to prevent important business and client information from being taken or copied by the employees for their personal gain. In the case of Mr. Diljeet Titus, Advocate v. Mr. Alfred A. Adebare, [35] the Delhi High Court had to decide a claim based on breach of confidentiality when some ex-employees of a law firm tried to take away client lists and drafts of legal agreements and opinions from their earlier employer-law firm. Discussing the importance of preventing employees or former employees from away which such actions, the Court held as follows:

"81. I am in full agreement with the views expressed in Margaret, Duchess of Argyll (Feme Sole) v. Duke of Argyll and Ors. (1965) 1 All ER 611, that a Court must step in to restrain a breach of confidence independent of any right under law. Such an obligation need not be expressed but be implied and the breach of such confidence is independent of any other right as stated above. The obligation of confidence between an advocate and the client can hardly be re-emphasised. Section 16 of the Copyright Act itself emphasizes the aspect of confidentiality de hors even the rights under the Copyright Act. If the defendants are permitted to do what they have done it would shake the very confidence of relationship between the advocates and the trust imposed by clients in their advocates. The actions of the defendants cause injury to the plaintiff and as observed by Aristotle: 'It makes no difference whether a good man defrauds a bad one, nor whether a man who commits an adultery be a good or a bad man; the law looks only to the difference created by the injury."

The Court allowed the claim of the law firm holding that the relationship between a law firm and its attorneys is of a nature where information passed between them would be covered by the law of confidence and would not be allowed to be copied or used by the attorneys for their individual gain.

Recently, in 2009, the principles relating to breach of confidentiality under Indian law were very succinctly summarized by the Bombay High Court in the case of Urmi Juvekar Chiang v. Global Broadcasting News Limited,[36] where in a fact situation similar to the ones in Zee Telefilms case and the Anil Gupta case, the Court discussed a number of previous cases on breach of confidentiality and laid down the following principles:

"8. The principles on which the action of breach of confidence can succeed, have been culled out as

(i) he (Plaintiff) had to identify clearly what was the information he was relying on;

(ii) he (Plaintiff) had to show that it was handed over in the circumstances of confidence;

(iii) he (Plaintiff) had to show that it was information of the type which could be treated as

confidential; and

(iv) he (Plaintiff) had to show that it was used without licence or there was threat to use it…… It is further noted that at interlocutory stage, the Plaintiff does not have to prove (iii) and (iv) referred to above, as he will at the trial. But the Plaintiff must address them and show that he has atleast seriously arguable case in relation to each of them."

From the above discussion on Indian law it is clear that the Courts in India have tried to incorporate the best of both worlds, in the sense that it has taken and adopted the principle of a right to privacy, a breach of which would give rise to an action in torts, from American jurisprudence while rejecting the stand taken by English Courts in rejecting such a right to privacy. However, Indian Courts have often referred to the decisions given by English Courts as well as American Courts in interpreting the principle of the right to confidentiality. Therefore on an overall examination it would appear that insofar as the rights to privacy and confidentiality are concerned, Indian jurisprudence has more in common with American law rather than English law.

Conclusion

The law of privacy does not seem to have existed as a recognizable principle of law before it was propounded in the article by Warren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. It slowly gained traction in American jurisprudence over the twentieth century but was rejected outright by the Courts in England, which preferred to follow the principle of confidentiality rather than privacy and tried to expand that old principle to fit newer and newer situations. Since Indian law borrows heavily from English law and to a smaller extent also from American law, the Courts in India have accepted both, the principle of a right to privacy as well as a right to confidentiality. This is not to say that the Courts in America do not recognize a right to confidentiality and only accept a right to privacy. Infact American Courts, just like their Indian counterparts, recognize both a right to confidentiality as well as a right to privacy.

Since Indian courts accept both the concept of breach of privacy as well as breach of confidentiality, one should not try to figure out if a particular circumstance is more appropriate for the one over the other, but actually use both principles to supplement one another for achieving the same objective. For example in situations where the conditions required for the application of the law of confidentiality do not exist such as disclosure of personal information by a person who did not receive it in a confidential capacity, one could apply the principle of privacy to prevent such information being disclosed or claim a remedy after disclosure. On the other hand if the information to be disclosed is not of a personal nature then one could try to utilize the law of confidentiality to prevent disclosure or claim damages.

[1] Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, "31 Law & Contemp. Problems". 326, 327 (1966). Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REV. 37 (1905).

[2] Wainwright v. Home Office, 2003 UKHL 53.

[3] Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, "96 Georgetown Law Journal", 123 at 128 and 132 (2007).

[4] Pollard v. Photographic Co., (1888) 40 Ch. D. 345.

[5] It is also said that this concern arose out of the personal experience of Samuel Warren, whose wedding announcement as well as the report on his sister-in-law's death in the newspapers did not go down well with him. http://www.english.illinois.edu/-people-/faculty/debaron/380/380powerpoint/privacy.pdf

[6] (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch.).

[7] Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, "96 Georgetown Law Journal", 123 (2007).

[8] Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, "4 Harvard Law Review", 193 at 207 (1890).

[9] Thomas M. Cooley, The Law Of Torts, 2^nd Ed., 1888, p. 29.

[10] Wainwright v. Home Office, 2003 UKHL 53.

[11] Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, "96 Georgetown Law Journal", 123 (2007).

[12] As early as in 1891, the case of Schuyler v. Curtis, 45 NYS 787 (Sup. Ct., 1891) involving the erection of a statue of a dead person, recognized the principle proposed in Warren and Brandeis' article.

[13] Most famously the case of Robertson v. Rochester folding Box Co., 64 NE 442 (NY 1902) where the New York Court of appeals specifically rejected a the existence of a right to privacy as proposed by Warren and Brandeis.

[14] Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, "96 Georgetown Law Journal", 123 (2007).

[15] Bredd v. Lovelace, (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch.)

[16] For doctor patient confidentiality we need look no further than the Hippocratic Oath itself which states "Whatever, in connection with my professional service, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret".

[17] (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch.).

[18] Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, 123 (2007).

[19] [1948] 65 RPC 203.

[20] [1969] RPC 41 (UK).

[21] Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, 123 (2007).

[22] Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, 123 (2007).

[23] 2003 UKHL 53.

[24] [1979] Ch 344.

[25] [1997] AC 558.

[26] [1991] FSR 62

[27] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=3641 .

[28] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=6014 .

[29] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=11212 .

[30] Phoolan Devi v. Shekhar Kapoor and others, http://indiankanoon.org/doc/793946/.

[31] http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/GM/judgement/25-01-2010/GM12102007S21722006.pdf

[32] http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SRB/judgement/25-04-2009/SRB13042009S11022006.pdf

[33] http://indiankanoon.org/doc/603848/ .

[34] http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1709727/ .

[35] http://delhicourts.nic.in/may06/DILJEET%20TITUS%20VS.%20ALFED%20A.%20ADEBARE.htm .

[36] http://indiankanoon.org/doc/582634/ .

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/relationship-between-privacy-and-confidentiality

Targeting surveillance

praskrishna — 2014-12-30T14:10:58Z

In the fall of 2005, Scotland Yard raided a flat in west London and arrested a suspected al-Qaeda militant known by a teasing Arabic nickname, Irhabi (“Terrorist”) 007.

The article by Ajai Sreevatsan was published in the Hindu on December 28, 2014. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

The similarities between Irhabi 007, later identified as Younis Tsouli, and India’s Mehdi Masoor Biswas are uncanny.

Neither participated in any terror attack. Their reputation stems from an alleged involvement as cyber propagandists for proto-terror groups — Irhabi was distributing manuals and teaching online seminars on behalf of the emerging al-Qaeda faction in Iraq, while Mehdi is alleged to be an IS sympathiser. Both in their early 20s with cover identities during the day, and separated by a decade in technological evolution.

Such expertise within terror groups is hardly surprising, says Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society. “Any organisation engaged in a war for hearts and minds and oil fields will exploit contemporary technology to its fullest potential,” he says.

Irhabi currently serves a 16-year jail term, while Mehdi awaits his trial. What their cases highlight is that the phenomenon of young, tech-savvy armchair radicals is nothing new.

Research done at Israel’s Haifa University, which tracks the proliferation of terrorist websites, shows that the number of such sites went up from fewer than 100 in the late-1990s to more than 4,800 in just a decade. There is also credible evidence that an al-Qaeda website posted a sketched-out proposal for the 2004 Madrid bombings three months before the attack. Another macabre example is the crowd-sourcing effort launched in 2005 by the Victorious Army Group to build its website. By the competition’s rules, the winner would get to fire a rocket at an American base.

As Indian agencies gear up to respond to similar online threats in this part of the world, Mr. Abraham says India should not repeat the mistakes made by the West over the previous decade. “We should not get caught up in big data surveillance,” he says.

“Surveillance is like salt. It could be counter-productive even if slightly in excess. Ideally, surveillance must be targeted. Indiscriminate surveillance just increases the size of the haystack, making it difficult to find the needles,” Mr. Abraham says.

“Even in the case of Mehdi, his identity was uncovered not by online spying but by Channel 4 which did some old-fashioned detective work,” he says.

In any case, recent events show that the threat of online terror propaganda might be overblown. Much like online activism, it is subject to the law of diminishing returns.

A set of letters sent by newly recruited volunteers of IS was leaked to the French newspaper Le Figaro earlier this month and it shows youngsters complaining about being made to do the dishes or the Iraqi winter. One of them wrote: “I’m fed up to the back teeth. My iPod no longer works out here. I have got to come home.” Of the estimated 1,100 young French who are believed to have joined the IS, more than 100 have already returned.

The IS may have Twitter on its side. But the harsh realities of Iraq and the gruesome ideology behind the slick doctrinal videos are a lot harder to sell.

Mr. Abraham says there is no such thing as a Twitter revolution or a social media terror group. “Such statements underestimate the role of ideology and human beings,” he says.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-december-28-2014-ajai-sreevatsan-targeting-surveillance

Locating Constructs of Privacy within Classical Hindu Law

Ashna Ashesh and Bhairav Acharya — 2015-01-01T13:56:04Z

This white paper seeks to locate privacy in Classical Hindu Law, and by doing so, displace the notion that privacy is an inherently ‘Western’ concept that is the product of a modernist legal system.

Introduction: Conceptions of Privacy

Because of the variance exhibited by the various legal, social, and cultural aspects of privacy, it cannot be easily defined. As a legal concept, privacy may form a constitutional claim, a statutory entitlement, a tortious action or an equitable remedy. As a constitutional claim, privacy is either an explicitly recognised right that is capable of independent enforcement, read into a pre-existing right , or located within the penumbra of a larger right. Statutory recognition of privacy may be afforded by both criminal and civil statutes. The offence of criminal defamation for instance, is perceived as an act of violating an individual's privacy by tarnishing his or her reputation. Similarly the provision of in camera trials for divorce proceedings is an illustration of a civil statute implicitly recognising privacy. As a tortious claim the notion of privacy is commonly understood in terms of the right against trespass of property. Equity, co-terminus with a statutory mandate or in isolation, may also be a source of privacy.

Most legal conceptions of privacy in everyday use in India originated from the English common law. Other constitutional and statutory constructions of privacy, even when not found in the common law, arise within a broader modernist system of law and justice that originated in Europe. During the European colonisation of India, the British (and, in a different manner, the French ) attempted to recreate the common law in India through the establishment of a new legal and courts system, and the wholesale importation of the European idea of law. The very notion of privacy, as well as its legal conception, is a product of this legal modernity. In post-colonial societies, the argument against the right to privacy is usually premised on its perceived alien-ness - as a foreign idea brought by colonisers and imposed on a traditionalist society that favoured communitarian living over individual rights - in an effort to discredit it.

The fallacy of this argument lies in its ignorance of the cultural plurality of privacy. To begin with, the idea that is connoted by the modernist notion of privacy pre-dated the introduction of common law in India. By the time of the Enlightenment, Hindu law and Islamic law were established legal systems with rich histories of jurisprudence and diverse schools of law within them, each with their own juristic techniques and rules of interpretation. While neither Hindu law nor Islamic law use a term that readily translates to "privacy", thereby precluding a neat transposition of meanings between them, the notion of privacy existed and can be located in both the legal traditions. In this paper, the term 'privacy' is used to describe both the modernist notion that arises from the principle of personal autonomy as well as the diverse pre-modern concepts in Hindu and Islamic jurisprudence that resemble or relate to this notion. These pre-modern concepts are diverse, and do not permit an easy analysis. For instance, the Manusmriti, which is a source of classical Hindu law, prohibits bathing in tanks that belong to other men. Additionally it prohibits the use of wells, gardens, carriages, beds, seats and houses without the owner's permission. These prohibitions are not driven by the imperatives of privacy alone. The rationale is that in using others' belongings one appropriates a portion of their sins. Hence, these privacy protections are linked to an ideal of purity. Islamic law also restricts the use or misappropriation of another's property. However, this prohibition is designed to protect private property; it has no ideological link to purity.

This paper attempts to locate constructs of privacy in classical Hindu law. The purpose of this exercise is not to privilege one legal system over another. Therefore, we do not intend to normatively assess the existing modernist discourse on privacy. We simply seek to establish the existence of alternate notions of privacy that pre-date modernity and the common law.

The scope of the paper is confined to locating privacy in classical Hindu law. The materials within the realm of classical Hindu law, relevant to this exercise are- the sruti, smriti, and acara. Sruti comprises of the Vedas, Brahmanas, Aranyakas and the Upanishads. It is considered to symbolise the spirit of Hindu law and is not the source of any positivist command as such. Smriti involves various interpretations of the sruti, We have however restricted ourselves to the Dharmashastras in this realm. Acara refers to the body of customary practices.

The review of the material at hand however, is not exhaustive. The reasons for this are twofold- first, given the vast expanse of Hindu jurisprudence, the literature review has been limited; second, there is a limited availability of reliable English translations of ancient legal treatises.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part of this paper deals with the interface of colonisation with Hindu law and elucidates the nature of Hindu law. With the advent of colonialism, classical Hindu law was gradually substituted by a modernist legal system. Exploring the characteristics of modernity, the factors that contributed to the displacement of classical Hindu law will be identified.

One of the factors that contributed to the displacement was the uncertainty that characterised classical Hindu law. Classical Hindu law was an amalgamation of three sources, as. In an attempt to rule out the uncertainty, and the lack of positive command, the modernisation of Hindu law was brought about. Accordingly this part shall also examine the nature of Hindu law. Furthermore it shall determine whether the application of codified modern Hindu law, is informed by the precepts of classical Hindu law.

Having explicated the nature of Hindu law, the next part will focus on identifying instances of privacy in classical Hindu law.

Before ascertaining specific instances, however, this part will lay down a general understanding of privacy as it existed then. It will be demonstrated that regardless of the absence of an equivalent term, an expectation of privacy existed.

The specific illustrations of privacy will then be mapped out.

Given the different aspects wherein an expectation of privacy exists, there is also a possibility of competing claims. In the event that such conflicts arise, this part will attempt to resolve the same.

Part 1: The Transmogrification of the Nature of Hindu Law

The evolution of Hindu jurisprudence can be charted through three phases- classical, colonial, and modern.

In the classical phase, it was embodied by the Dharmashastra which elaborated on customary practices, legal procedure, as well as punitive measures. The Dharamshastra was accompanied by the Vedas, and acara. Whether this body of jurisprudence could be called 'law' in the strict modernist sense of the term is debatable.

Modernity has multifarious aspects. However, we are concerned with modernity in the context of legal systems, for the purpose of this paper. The defining attribute of a modernist legal system is the need for positivist precepts that are codified by a legislature. The underlying rationale for formalised legislation is the need for certainty in law. Law is to be uniformly applied within the territory. The formalised legislation is to be enforced by hierarchized courts. Furthermore this codified law can be modified through provisions for amendment, if need be.

This modernist understanding is what informs the English common law. With the advent of colonialism, common law was imported to India. The modernist legal system was confronted by plural indigenous legal systems here that were starkly different in nature. In the given context, the relevant indigenous system is classical Hindu law. The classical precepts were interpreted by the British. These interpretations coupled with the sources of Classical Hindu law, constituted colonial Hindu law.

It is pertinent to note that these interpretations were undertaken through a modernist lens. The implication was the attempted modernisation of a traditional legal system.

The traditional system of Classical Hindu law did not exhibit any of the introduced features. To begin with not all of classical Hindu law was text based. The problem with the textual treatises was threefold. First, they were not codes enacted by a legislature, but written by various scholars. Second, they were not phrased as positivist precepts. Third, their multiplicity was accompanied with the lack of an established hierarchy between these texts.

Additionally classical Hindu law was the embodiment of dharma, which in itself was an amorphous concept. The constitutive elements ofdharma were law, religious rites, duties and obligations of members of a community, as well as morality. These elements do not however, exhaustively define dharma. There exist varying definitions of dharma, and in some cases even ancient texts dealing with dharma fail to articulate its definition. This is on account of the fact that the meaning of dharma, varied depending on the in which it is used Owing to the fact that classical Hindu jurisprudence was informed by dharma, the former was an amalgamation of law, religion and morality. Therefore it was categorised as jurisprudence that lacked the secularity exhibited by modern positivist law.

The co-existence of law and morality in classical Hindu law has led to various debates regarding its nature. Before explicating the nature of classical Hindu law, its sources must be elaborated on. As referred to, the sources are sruti, smriti, and acara.

Sruti is constituted by the Vedas, Brahmanas, Aranyakas, and Upanishads. Vedas are divine revelations that contain no positive precept per se. They are considered as the spirit of law, and believed to be the source of the rules of dharma. The Vedas are constituted by the Rigveda, Samveda, Yajurveda and Athravaveda. Based on the Vedic texts, treatises have been written elucidating religious practices. These texts are known as the Brahmanas. The Aranyakas and the Upanishads engage in philosophical enquiries of the revelation in the Vedas.

Interpretations of the Sruti by various scholars are embodied in the Smriti. The connotations of smriti are twofold. First, it implies knowledge transmitted through memory, as opposed to knowledge directly revealed by divinity. Additionally, it is the term used to collectively reference the Dharmasutras and Dharmashastra.

Dharmasutras were essentially interpretations of revelation in only prose form, or a mixture of prose and verse. They detailed the duties and rituals to be carried out by a person, through the four stages, of his or her life. The duties laid down also varied depending on the caste of a person. They also laid down guidelines for determining punishments.

Dharmasastras on the other hand were in the verse form. Though their subject matter coincided with the Dharmasutra in terms of domestic duties and rituals, they had a wider ambit. The Dharmasastras also dealt with subjects such as statecraft, legal procedure for adjudicating disputes. In a limited way, they marked the diversification from strictly religious precepts, from those that were legal in nature. For instance the Manusmriti was an amalgamation of law and ritual. The Yajnawalkya Samhita however, has separate parts that deal with customary practices, legal procedure, and punitive measures. The Narada Smriti, in turn deals only with legal procedure and rules of adjudication.

It is opined that in due course of time, the Aryan civilisation diversified. Their life and literature were no longer limited to sacrificial practices, but took on a more 'secular' form. The Arthashastra is evidence of such diversification. Unlike the Dharmashastra, it deals with strategies to be employed in governance, regulations with regard to urban planning, commercialisation of surrogacy, espionage, among other things.

The third source of classical Hindu law, acara refers to customary practices and their authoritativeness was determined by the people. Their prevalence over textual tradition is contentious. Some opine that acara prevails over textual traditions. However, the opposing school of thought believes that customary practices prevail only if the text is unclear or disputed.

Other sources of classical Hindu law include the itihas (epics such as the Mahabharata and Ramayana), and digests written by scholars.

Given the diversity of sources and its non-conformity to positivism, the nature of classical Hindu law is a heavily contested issue. For instance, with regard to the legal procedure in the Dharmashastra, Maynes opines that these rules qualified as law in the modernist sense. Ludo Rocher however, opines that textual treatises would not qualify as law. Classical Hindu law can admittedly not be identified as strictly legal or strictly moral. However, it does in a limited way recognise the distinction between legal procedure and morality. This is to say, it is not merely a source of rituals, but also lays down precepts that are jurisprudentially relevant.

On account of its non-conformity with characteristics of a modernist legal system, classical Hindu law was displaced by its colonial version. The British attempted to accomplish this though the process of codification. The colonial attempts to codify Hindu law were carried forward by the Indian government post-independence. The result was the Hindu Code Bill. The context in which this codification took place must be examined in order to better comprehend this transmogrification. Post-independence, the idea of a Uniform Civil Code had been debated. However it was at odds with the Nehruvian notion of secularity. The codification of Hindu personal law was an attempt at modernising it, without infringing on the religious freedom of Hindus. The idea was to confine the influence of religion to the private sphere. What emerged was the Hindu Code Bill, which served as the blueprint for the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. Colonial Hindu law was thus displaced by modern Hindu law.

As Galanter observes however, modernisation through legislations may formalise or even modify classical precepts, but cannot erase them completely. For instance, Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which prescribes the ceremonial requirements for a Hindu marriage, replicates those prescribed in Classical Hindu law. Additionally a plethora of judicial decisions have relied on or taken into consideration, precepts of ancient Hindu jurisprudence.

It is evident thus that ancient precepts still inform modern Hindu law. Given their relevance, it would be erroneous to write off classical Hindu law as completely irrelevant in a modernist context.

Part II: Precepts of Privacy in Classical Hindu Law

As referred to, we have not come across a terminological equivalent of the term 'privacy' in the course of our research. The linguistic lacuna is admittedly a hurdle in articulating the pre-modern understanding of privacy as found in Hindu jurisprudence. It is not however, an argument against the very existence of privacy. The lack of pre-modern terminology necessitates the usage of modern terms in classifying the aspects of privacy detailed in Hindu jurisprudence.

Thus, broadly speaking, the aspects of privacy we have culled out from the material at hand are those of physical space/ property, thought, bodily integrity, information, communication, and identity. As will be demonstrated these aspects overlap on occasion and are by no means an exhaustive indication. In order to contextualise these aspects within the realm of Hindu jurisprudence, they are detailed below through specific illustrations.

A. Privacy of physical Space/ property

Akin to the modern legal system that first understood privacy in proprietary terms, Hindu jurisprudence too accorded importance to privacy in terms of physical space. This is further illustrated by the similarity between the common law notion of a man's house being his castle, and the institutional primacy accorded by the Naradsmriti to the household . The common denominator here is the recognition of a claim to privacy against the sovereign. This claim operated against society at large as well. For instance, an individual caught trespassing on someone else's property was liable to be fined.

These religious precepts were supplemented by those reflected in texts such as the Arthashastra. By way of illustration the house building regulations prescribed by it are largely informed by the recognition of a need for privacy. To begin with, a person's house should be built at a suitable distance from a neighbour's house, to prevent any inconvenience. In addition the house's doors and windows should ideally not face a neighbours doors and windows directly. The occupants of the house should ensure the doors and windows are suitably covered. Furthermore in the absence of a compelling justification, interference in a neighbour's affairs is penalised.Juxtaposed to religious texts that often perceived privacy as a concept driven by the imperative of purity, the Arthashastra is reflective of a secular connotation of privacy.

Though the household was privileged as the foundational institution in Hindu jurisprudence, claims of privacy extend beyond one's house to other physical objects as well, regardless of whether they were extensions of the household or not. For instance, both the Yajnawalkya Samhita and the Manusmriti condemn the usage of another person's property without his or her permission.

What is noteworthy in the context of personal property is that in an era infamous for the denigration of women, Hindu jurisprudence recognised a woman's claim over property. This property, also known as Stridhana, had varied definitions. In the Yajnawalkya Samhita for instance, it is conceptualised as, "What has been given to a woman by the father, the mother, the husband or a brother, or received by her at the nuptial fire, or given to her on her husband's marriage with another wife, is denominated Stridhana or a woman's property". In the Manusmriti, it is defined as "What was given before the nuptial fire, what was given on the bridal procession, what was given in token of love, and what was received from her brother, mother, or father, that is called the sixfold property of a woman".

Beyond mere cognizance of proprietary rights however, these precepts were also informed by the notion of exclusivity. Consequently, a woman's husband or his family were precluded from using her Stridhana, unless they were in dire straits. Additionally it was a sin for a woman's relatives to use her wealth even if the same was done unknowingly.

B. Privacy of Thought

In addition to the aspect of physical space, a claim to privacy vis-a-vis the intangible realm of thought was afforded by Hindu jurisprudence. In the modern context the link between solitude and privacy has been recognised as early as 1850 by Warren and Brandeis. The key distinction is that in the modern era this need for solitude was seen as a function of the increasing invasion of privacy. In the pre-modern era however, solitude was considered essential for self-actualisation, and not as a response to the increasing invasion of the private realm. Meditation in solitude was perceived as enabling existence in the highest state of being. In fact a life in solitude was identified as a pre-requisite for being liberated.

Though solitude itself is intangible, engaging in meditation would require a tangible solitary space. This is where the privacy of thought overlapped with the aspect of privacy of space. Accordingly, the Arthashastra prescribed that forest areas be set aside for meditation and introspection. It also recognised the need for ascetics to live within these spaces harmoniously, without disturbing each other.

It is evident, that as far as the aspects of privacy were concerned, there were no watertight compartments.

C. Privacy with respect to bodily integrity

A claim to privacy of thought can only be substantively realised when complemented by the notion of privacy with respect to bodily integrity, as corporeal existence serves as a precursor to mental well-being. The inference drawn from the relevant precepts concerning this aspect is that they were largely women-centric. Arguably they were governed by a misplaced patriarchal notion that women's modesty needed to be protected. At best they could be considered as implicit references to an expectation of privacy.

The Manusmriti states, "But she who…goes to public spectacles or assemblies, shall be fined six krishnalas". Restrictions operating during a woman's menstruation were twofold. Her family was prohibited from seeing her. Additionally cohabitation with such a woman was also forbidden. It should be pointed out that that these constructs had little to do with a woman's expectation of privacy. They were forbidden due to the attached implications of impurity that would vest in the defaulter. A woman's autonomy with regard to her body was not regarded as a factor meriting consideration.

However, there were constructs, albeit limited, which were more egalitarian in their approach and did recognise her autonomy. They established that women do have an expectation of privacy in terms of bodily integrity. Sexual assault was considered as an offence. Evidence of this is found in the Yajnawalkya Samhita which states, "If many persons know a woman against her will, each of them should be made to pay a fine of twenty four panas". In addition, the Arthashastra vested in commercial sex workers the right to not be held against their will. Further it expressly states that even a commercial sex worker cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse.

Women could make a claim to privacy not only against society at large, but also against their husbands. Ironically, while our contemporary legal system (i.e., the Indian legal system) fails to criminalise marital rape, the Manusmriti considered it an offence. Additionally, husbands were also prohibited from looking at their wives when the latter were in a state of relaxation.

D. Privacy of Information and Communication

While the three aspects explicated above were by and large restricted to the individual, the privacy of information and communication has been largely confined by Hindu jurisprudence to the realm of the sovereign. Both the Manusmriti and the Arthashastra acknowledge the importance of a secret council that aids the king in deliberations. These deliberations are to be carried on in a solitary place that was well-guarded. The decisions made in these deliberations are to be revealed on a need to know basis. That is to say, only persons concerned with the implementation of these decisions are to be informed. The Manusmriti also provides for private deliberation by the king on matters not involving governance. It provides, "At midday or midnight , when his mental and bodily fatigues are over, let him deliberate, either with himself alone or with his ministers on virtue, pleasure, and wealth".

Apart from governance, privacy of information also pertained to certain types of documents that were considered private in nature. These are documents that involve transactions such as partition, giving of a gift, purchase, pledge and debt. What is interesting about this precept is the resemblance it bears to the common law notion of privity. The common characteristic of the documents referred to, is that they concerned transactions undertaken between two or more persons. The rights or obligations arising from these transactions were confined to the signatories of these documents. It could be possible that the privatisation of these documents was aimed at guarding against disruption of transactions via third party intrusions.

The limited reference to private communications is found within the realm of governance, within the context of privacy of information. The only illustration of this that we have come across is the precept in the Arthashastra that requires intelligence to be communicated in code.

E. Privacy of Identity

The final aspect that warrants detailing is the privacy of identity. The notion of privacy of identity can be understood in two ways. The first deals with protection of personal information that could be traced back to someone, thus revealing his or her identity. The second recognises the component of reputation. It seeks to prevent the misappropriation or maligning of a person's identity and thus reputation. In ancient Hindu jurisprudence there is evidence of recognition of the latter. An illustration of the same is offered by the precept which states "For making known the real defects of a maiden, one should pay a fine of a hundred panas". Another precept prescribes that false accusations against anyone in general are punishable by a fine. Additionally, there is also a restriction operating against destroying or robbing a person of his or her virtue. In the modern context, the above would be understood under the rubric of defamation. These precepts are indicative of the fact that defamation was recognised as an offence way before the modern legal system afforded cognizance to the same.

Conclusion

The dominant narrative surrounding the privacy debate in India is that of the alien-ness of privacy. This paper has attempted to displace the notion that privacy is an inherently 'Western' concept that is the product of a modernist legal system. No doubt the common understanding of the legal conception of privacy is informed by modernity. In fact, the research conducted in support of this paper has been synthesised from privacy information through a modernist lens. The fact still remains however, that privacy is an amorphous context, and its conceptions vary across cultures.

To better appreciate the relevance of Classical Hindu law in a modernist context, the nature of Hindu law must be examined first. While Hindu jurisprudence might not qualify as law in the positivist sense of the term, its precepts continue to inform India's statues and judicial pronouncements.

Privacy is subjective and eludes a straitjacketed definition. On occasion this elusiveness is a function of its overlapping and varying aspects. At other times it stems from a terminological lacuna that complicates the explication of privacy. These impediments notwithstanding, it is abundantly clear that the essence of privacy is reflected in Hindu culture and jurisprudence. This may give pause to thought to those who seek to argue that 'collectivist' cultures do not value privacy or exhibit the need for it.

Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 154(3), January 2006.

Id.

Upendra Baxi, Who Bothers About the Supreme Court: The Problem of Impact of Judicial Decisions, available at http://clpr.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/whobothersabouttheSupremeCourt.pdf (Last visited on December 23, 2014) (The enforceability of rights often sets their individual enjoyment apart from their jurisprudential value); In India, the reading of privacy into Article 21 has not resulted in a mechanism to enforce a standalone right to privacy, See R.H. Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, available at http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2046&context=vlr (Last visited on December 23, 2014) (In the United States, the right to privacy was located in the penumbra of the right to personal autonomy).

See PUCL v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 568.

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

See The Indian Penal Code, 1850, Section 499.

See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 22; The Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 33.

Bhairav Acharya & Vidushi Marda, Identifying Aspects of Privacy in Islamic Law, available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/identifying-aspects-of-privacy-in-islamic-law (Last visited on December 23, 2014).

See Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India (1973).

Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (2010) (This importation must be viewed against the backdrop of the characteristics of the era of Enlightenment wherein primacy was accorded to secular reason and the positivist conception of law. Davis observes "One cannot deny the increasing global acceptance of a once parochial notion of law as rules backed by sanctions enforced by the state. This very modern, very European notion of law is not natural, not a given; it was produced at a specific moment in history and promulgated systematically and often forcibly through the institutions of what we now call the nation-state, especially those nations that were also colonial powers.)"; But see Alan Gledhill, The Influence of Common Law and Equity on Hindu Law Since 1800, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/755588 (Last visited on December 23, 2014); Werner Menski, Sanskrit Law: Excavating Vedic Legal Pluralism, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1621384 (Last visited on December 23, 2014) (However, this replacement of traditional legal systems did not extend to personal laws. Personal laws in India continue to be community-based, sometimes un-codified, draw from a diverse set of simultaneously applicable sources and traditional schools of jurisprudence.).

Supra note 8, Acharya & Marda.

Privacy International, A New Dawn: Privacy in Asia, available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/a-new-dawn-privacy-in-asia/background (Last visited on December 28, 2013) ("It is only recently that the debate around privacy was stuck in this "collectivist" vs. "individualistic" cultural discourse…we discovered that privacy concerns and the need for safeguards were often embedded deeply in a nation, and not just as a response to a modern phenomenon.").

Privacy International, A New Dawn: Privacy in Asia, available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/a-new-dawn-privacy-in-asia/background (Last visited on December 28, 2013)

J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Administration of Hindu Law by the British, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/177940 (Last visited on December 23, 2014).

Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 201.

Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 202.

Id.

Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law 31 (2009).

Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (2010).

Marc Galanter, The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1968.

Id.

Supra note 20, Galanter.

Supra note 10, Menski.

Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (2003).

Id.

Ashcroft as cited in Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (2003).

Supra note 20, Galanter.

Id.

Id .

Supra note 19, Davis.

Id.

Id .

J. Duncan M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (1963); Supra note 19, Davis.

Supra note 9, Lingat.

Id.

John D. Mayne, Hindu Law (1875).

Id.

Supra note 49, Mayne.

Id.

Supra note 19, Davis.

Id.

Supra note 49, Mayne.

Ludo Rocher, Studies in Hindu Law and Dharamasastra (2012).

For instance the Yajnawalkya Samhita has clear delineations in its chapters, segregating customary practices, legal procedure and punitive measures.

Madhu Kishwar, Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/4401625 (Last visited on December 23, 2014).

Id .

Supra note 59.

Id.

Supra note 20, Galanter.

See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 7.

Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadda, AIR 1984 SC 1562 (reflected the importance accorded by classical Hindu law to marital stability); M Govindaraju v. K Munisami Goundu 1996 SCALE (6) 13(The Supreme Court looked to ancient Shudra custom to adjudicate on a matter of adoption); Rajkumar Patni v. Manorama Patni, II (2000) DMC 702 (The Madhya Pradesh High Court, relied on the definition of Stridhan by Manu.).

Supra note 8, Acharya & Marda.

Semayne v. Gresham, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91, 195 (K.B. 1604).

As cited in Julius Jolly, The Minor Law Books 164 (1889), ("A householder's house and field are considered as the two fundamentals of his existence. Therefore let not the king upset either of them; for that is the root of the householders").

Manmath Nath Dutt, The Dharamshastra - Hindu Religious Codes, Volume 1, 103 (1978) (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II 235-236: "He…who opens the doors of a closed house [without the permission of the master]…should be punished with fifty panas. Such is the law.").

L.N. Rangarajan, Kautalya: The Arthashastra 371 (1992) ("O be built at a suitable distance from the neighbours property so as not to cause inconvenience to the neighbour").

Id ., ("…doors and windows shall be made so as not to cause annoyance by facing a neighbour's door or window directly").

Supra note 72, Rangarajan, ("when the house is occupied the doors and windows shall be suitably covered").

Id., 376.

See Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 201-202.

Supra note 71, Dutt, 27 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter I , 160: "One should avoid the bed, seat, garden-house and the conveyance belonging to another person.").

Supra note 71, Dutt, 89 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 146).

Manusmriti, Chapter IX, 194.

Supra note 71, Dutt Volume 2, 276 (Angiras Samhita, Chapter I, 71).

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, December 15, 1890, No.5.

Id.

Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 258; Supra note 71, Dutt, 134 (Yajnawalkya Samhita Chapter III, 111: "Having withdrawn the mind, understanding, retentive faculty and the senses from all their objects, the soul, the lord…should be meditated upon.").

Manu Chapter VI, 44.

Supra note 71, Dutt, 186 (Harita Chapter VII, 6: "Situated in a solitary place with a concentrated mind, he should, till death mediate on the atman, that is situated both in the mind and the external world… ").

Supra note 72, Rangarajan, (Arthashastra, 2.2.2).

Supra note72, Rangarajan, (Arthashastra 3.16.33-36).

Manusmriti IX, 84

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 2, 350 (Samvarta Samhita,163).

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 1, 112 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 291).

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 1, 113 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 294).

Supra note 72, Ranjarajan (Arthashastra 2.27.14).

Supra note 72, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 4.13.38).

Manusmriti, X, 62

Manusmriti Part VII, Supra note 101, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 1.15.2-5, 1.15.13-17).

Supra note 72, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 1.15.2-5 : The scrutiny of governance related affairs was take place in a secluded and well-guarded spot, where it could not be overheard. No unauthorised person was allowed to approach these meetings.).

Supra note 72, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 1.15.13-17: "…Only those who have to implement it should know when the work is begun or when it has been completed.").

Supra note 72, Rangarajan.

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 1, 112 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 292).

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 4, 919 (Vishnu Samhita, Chapter LII, 16).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/loading-constructs-of-privacy-within-classical-hindu-law

Why did India fail to discover the ISIS Twitter handle?

praskrishna — 2014-12-27T03:27:16Z

India's surveillance system fails to track the servers of internet giants like Google or Facebook because these do not have servers in the country, says a leading cyber law expert.

The article by Anita Babu was published in the Business Standard on December 26, 2014. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

Back in 2009, after the investigation team, probing into the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, almost cracked the case, it was the US’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which connected the missing links by arresting David Headley, the mastermind.

Five years later, India is staring at a similar situation, when Bengaluru-based Mehdi Masroor Biswas, was allegedly found to be operating a pro-ISIS (Islamic State) Twitter handle. It was a British broadcaster, Channel 4, which blew the lid off Biswas’s activity. Soon after the report, Indian authorities swung into action. Last year, when communal violence broke out in some parts of Uttar Pradesh, a Pakistani news organisation reported that a fake video was being circulated to fan sentiments.

But, why have Indian agencies failed to detect such activities which pose a threat to the national security? A senior government official said intelligence agencies in the country scan the internet for leads. But, in the light of increased threats, systems need to be beefed up significantly. Perhaps, as a first step towards this, the home ministry on Wednesday formed a committee to prepare a road map for tackling cyber crimes in the country.

It will give suitable recommendations on all facets of cyber crime, apart from suggesting possible partnerships with public and private sector, non-governmental organisations and international bodies.

According to Sunil Abraham, executive director of a Bengaluru-based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society, it’s time we move closer towards intelligent and targeted surveillance, rather than mass surveillance. This will require monitoring a selected accounts or profiles, instead of tapping information from across the population. Old-fashioned detective work is also very important, as it has helped zero in on Biswas.

Another problem the country faces is that a lot of data is being pooled in by multiple agencies, but of little use. “We must free up our law enforcement agencies and intelligence services from the curse of having too much data,” Abraham adds. Since most of the internet companies are headquartered outside India, the authorities face a lot of difficulties in accessing information from these networks.

“India’s surveillance system fails to track the servers of internet giants like Google or Facebook because these do not have servers in the country. Our system is only confined within the country,” says Pavan Duggal, a leading cyber law expert.

Since the US has the capability to access information from telecom companies, service providers such as Twitter and Facebook and the consortia that run submarine cables, these companies cooperate in a much more effective and immediate manner, adds Abraham. “But these are things that we will never be able to do in India,” he adds.

For instance, India follows the mutual legal assistance treaty procedure, to gather and exchange information in an effort to enforce public laws or criminal laws. However, this is a time-consuming process and often takes up to two years before we get any data from these companies.

But due to the threat of cyber-terrorism being shared by both companies and governments, companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook are cooperating more than before, experts say.

Internet and Jurisdiction Project, an international group that works towards ensuring digital coexistence, tries to get a procedural law between two countries in a harmonised manner and includes collection, storage, handling and processing of evidence.

More lubricating efforts should be undertaken internationally on these lines, say experts. Hopefully, the new committee will take steps in this direction.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-december-26-2014-anita-babu-why-india-failed-to-discover-the-isis-twitter-handle

Security, Governments, and Data: Technology and Policy

elonnai — 2014-12-24T08:06:59Z

The Centre for Internet & Society and the Observer Research Foundation invite you to a one day conference on January 8, 2015 in New Delhi.

About the Conference

The conference will focus on the technologies, policies, and practices around cyber security and surveillance. The conference will reach out to a number of key stakeholders including civil society, industry, government, and academia and explore the present scenario in India to reflect on ways forward.

Conference Context

Ensuring the security of the India’s cyber space is a complex, challenging, and ever changing responsibility that the government is tasked with. Doing so effectively requires a number of factors to come together in a harmonized strategy including: laws & policies, technical capabilities, markets, and a skilled workforce. It also requires collaboration on multiple levels including with foreign governments, domestic and foreign industry, and law enforcement. The first of these is particularly important given the ability of attackers to penetrate across borders and the global nature of data. Any strategy developed by India must be proactive and reactive – evolving defences to prevent a potential threat and applying tactics to respond to a real time threat. To do so, the government of India must legally have the powers to take action and must have the technical capability to do so. Yet, many of these powers and technical capabilities require a degree of intrusion into the lives of citizens and residents of India through means such as surveillance. Thus, such measures must be considered in light of principles of proportionality and necessity, and legal safeguards are needed to protect against the violation of privacy. Furthermore, a principle of optimization must be considered i.e, how much surveillance achieves the most amount of security and how can this security be achieved with the optimal mix of technology, policy and enforcement.

Panel Descriptions

Challenges & Present Scenario

Protecting and enhancing the cyber security of India is a complex and dynamic responsibility. The challenge of securing cyber space is magnified by the demarcated nature of the internet, the multiplicity of vulnerabilities that can be exploited at the national level, the magnitude of infrastructure damage possible from a cyber attack, and the complexity of application of a jurisdiction’s law to a space that is technologically borderless. A comprehensive ‘cyber security’ ecosystem is required to address such challenges – one that involves technology, skills, and capabilities – including surveillance capabilities. The Government of India has taken numerous steps to address and resolve such challenges. In July 2013, the National Cyber Security Policy was published for the purpose of creating an enabling framework for the protection of India’s cyber security. In February 2014, the 52^nd Standing Committee on Information Technology issued a report assessing the implementation of this policy – in which they found that a number of areas needed strengthening. The Government of India has also proposed the establishment of a number of centres focused on cyber security – such as the National Cyber Coordination Center and the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre. CERT-IN, under the Department of Electronics and Information Technology is presently the body responsible for overseeing and enforcing cyber security in India, while other bodies such as the Resource Centre for Cyber Forensic and TERM cells under the Department of Telecommunications play critical roles in overseeing and undertaking capabilities related to cyber security.

Law & Policy

India has five statutes regulating the collection and use of data for surveillance purposes. These laws define circumstances on which the government is justified in accessing and collecting real time and stored data as well as procedural safeguards they must adhere to when doing so. The Department of Telecommunications has also issued the Unified Access License which, among other things, mandates service providers to provide technical support to enable such collection. The Indian judicial system has also provided a number of Rulings that set standards for the access, collection, and use of data as well as defining limitations and safeguards that must be respected in doing so. The draft Privacy Bill 2011, released by the Department of Personnel and Training, also contained provisions addressing surveillance in the context of interception and the use of electronic video recording devices. In the Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy, the AP Shah Committee found that the legal regime for surveillance in India was not harmonized and lacked safeguards. Furthermore, in the era where the direct collection of large volumes of data is easily possible, there is a growing need to re-visit questions about the legitimate and proportionate collection and use (particularly as evidence) of such data. Questions are also arising about the applicability of standards and safeguards to the state. At a global level, catalyzed by the leaks by Edward Snowden, there has been a strong push for governments to review and structure their surveillance regimes to ensure that they are in line with international human rights standards.

Architecture & Technology

India is in the process of architecting a number of initiatives that seek to enable the collection and sharing of intelligence such as the CMS, NATGRID, and NETRA. At a regional level, the Ministry of Home Affairs is in the process of implementing ‘Mega Policing Cities’ which include the instalment of CCTV’s and centralized access to crime related information. Globally, law enforcement and governments are beginning to take advantage of the possibilities created by ‘Big Data’ and ‘open source’ policing. The architecture and technology behind any surveillance and cyber security initiative are key to its success. Intelligently and appropriately designed projects and technology can also minimize the possibility of intrusions into the private lives of citizens. Strong access controls, decentralized architecture, and targeted access are all principles that can be incorporated into the architecture and technology behind a project or initiative. At the same time, the technology or process around a project can serve as the ‘weakest link’ – as it is vulnerable to attacks and tampering. Such possibilities raise concerns about the use of foreign technology and dependencies on foreign governments and companies.

International and Domestic Markets

Globally, the security market is growing – with companies offering a range of services and products that facilitate surveillance and can be used towards enhancing cyber security. In India, the security market is also growing with studies predicting that it will reach $1.06 billion by 2015. Recognizing the potential threat posed by imported security and telecom equipment, India also develops its own technologies through the Centre for Development of Telematics –attached to the Department of Telecommunications, and the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing – attached to the Department of Electronics and Information Technology. At times India has also imposed bans on the import of technologies believed to be compromised. Towards this end, the Government of India has a number of bodies responsible for licensing, auditing, and certifying the use of security and telecommunication equipment. Though India has recognized the security vulnerabilities posed by these technologies, as of yet it has not formally recognized the human rights violations that are made possible. Indeed, though India has submitted a request to be a signing member of the Wassenaar agreement, they have yet to be accepted.

Agenda

11.00	Registration & Tea
11.30	Key Note Speech
12.00	Challenges & Present Scenario
13.00	Law & Policy
14.00	Lunch
15.00	Architecture & Technology
16.00	International & Domestic Markets
17.00	Tea
17.30	Conclusion & Closing Remarks

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/security-governments-data-technology-policy

Reply to RTI filed with BSNL regarding Network Neutrality and Throttling

tarun — 2014-12-22T14:45:03Z

As part of its work on Network Neutrality, the Centre for Internet and Society through Tarun Krishnakumar had filed a Right To Information (RTI) application with Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL), a state-owned teleco holding a market share of 65 per cent in the Indian land line and broadband markets — regarding its position on and adherence to Network Neutrality principles.

The application — targeted at easing the information asymmetry between internet service providers (ISPs) and consumers — elicited responses that provide interesting insights into the functioning of ISPs in India.

The application queried BSNL about its:

Adherence to net neutrality / non-discrimination principles
Throttling on the basis of content
Throttling on the basis of protocol
Limiting traffic / speeds for pornographic websites
Limiting traffic / speeds for P2P / torrent connection

In its reply, BSNL denied all forms of throttling on the basis of content and reaffirmed that it is bound by the terms of its ISP license granted by the Department of Telecommunications. The application and response are below:

Application:

Request for Information under the Right to Information Act, 2005

To,

Sh. Suresh Kumar
Addl.GM (MIS) & CPIO ,BSNL Co.
R. No. -29, IR Hall
Eastern Court, Janpath
New Delhi – 110001

Date of application: 08-10-2014

Subject: Network Neutrality / Throttling / Data discrimination policies of BSNL

Please provide information as to the policies of BSNL / decisions taken in respect of the following questions. Please supply where possible a copy of the relevant documents, minutes of meeting, position papers etc.

Does BSNL support the principle of net neutrality and non-discrimination of data?
Does BSNL regulate internet traffic flows depending on the type of content being accessed by the user on its broadband connections?
Does BSNL regulate internet traffic flows depending on the type of protocol being used by the user on its broadband connections?
Please provide details of the various types of content/protocols for which BSNL regulates traffic and the nature of such regulations, restrictions as the case may be.
Please provide a list of traffic for which BSNL engages in limiting internet speed or throttling.
Does BSNL limit internet traffic or upload/download speeds for pornographic websites and content?
Does BSNL limit internet traffic or upload/download speeds for Peer-to-peer or torrent connections?

Please provide copies of all documents that pertain to BSNL’s policies and decisions in this regard.

It is certified that I am a citizen of India and that I do not fall within the BPL category. I am enclosing Rupees thirty (Rs. 30) towards the application fee and photocopying costs under the RTI Act for the information and documents requested. Kindly inform me at the address stated below if any further fees are required to be paid.

Applicant:

Tarun Krishnakumar
Centre for Internet and Society
No.194, 2nd C Cross Road, Domlur II Stage,
Bangalore - 560071

RESPONSE FROM BSNL:

To,

Sh. Tarun Krishnakumar
Centre for Internet and Society
No. 194, 2^nd C Cross Road, Domulur II stage,
Bengaluru – 560071

Subject: Supply of Information under RTI ACT – 2005

Case of Shri. Tarun Krishnakumar – reg.

Ref: - 1. No. BSNL/BBNW/RTI Act/Vol II/2012-13/52 dtd 28.10.2014

2. No. 23-744/14-RTI dtd 21.10.2014

With reference to the above subject, for the point wise information furnished as below:

BSNL is following the guidelines as per the ISP License Agreement of DOT.
NO, BSNL is NOT regulating the Internet traffic flow based on content.
NO, BSNL is not regulating the Internet traffic flow based on the type of protocol.
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
NO
NO
The documents relating to above are available on DOT’s website http://dot.gov.in

(Sd/-)

DE Admin and APIO
O/o General Manager
BBNW, BSNL,
5^th floor, BG (E), TE Building,
Lazar Road, Fraser Town,
Bengaluru – 560005
Tel No. 080 - 25808878

Copy to:

The Addl. GM (A) & CPIP O/o CGM, BBNW, New Delhi for information pl.

The scanned version of the reply is available here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reply-to-rti-filed-with-bsnl-regarding-network-neutrality-and-throttling