We are anonymous, we are legion

And now, Aadhaar-enabled smartphones for easy verification and money transfer

praskrishna — 2016-08-12T02:50:58Z

As reported earlier, the Indian government has planned to make Aadhaar-enabled smartphones , with which users would be able to self-authenticate and let businesses and banks verify the identity of their clients. This would also help in the government's aim of a cashless society.

The article was published in Business Insider on August 10, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

While applauding this plan Nandan Nikelani, former chairman of UIDAI told ET that, "Iris and fingerprint sensors are now becoming a standard feature in smartphones anyway, and this requirement will only take a minor tweak to the operating system. Once enabled, people will be able to use phones to do self-authentication and KYC (know your customer)."

In July, senior executives of UIDAI and smartphone companies met to discuss ways to allow smartphones let citizens authenticate their fingerprints and iris on the phone, so that they could avail government services from the comfort of their homes.

The most immediate use for these smartphones would be the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), a new payment system which would allow money transfer between any two parties by simply using their mobile phones and a virtual payment address.

"The two-factor authentication in UPI is now being done with mobile phone as one factor, and MPIN as the second factor. But once you have Aadhaar authentication on the phone, then the second factor can be biometric authentication through Aadhaar," said Nilekani.

With time, Aadhaar authentication will also be made open to third party apps, said another person familiar with the ongoing discussions on the condition of anonymity.

This would let users allow apps to access their biometric and iris scans, just like they grant access to other features like camera, contacts, SMS etc. However, from their end, handset makers have raised security concerns about using iris scan for Aadhar authentication.

"The primary challenge lies in safe storing of the iris scan between the time it is captured by the camera and then sent to UIDAI server seeking authentication," said an industry insider.

For this, the he proposal includes a "hardware secure zone" which would encrypt biometric data before sending it out. However, even this isn't a foolproof idea.

"Unfortunately, from the biometric sensor the data goes to the hardware secure zone via the operating system. Therefore, the biometric data can be intercepted by the operating system before it is sent to the hardware secure zone," said Sunil Abraham, executive director at Bengaluru-based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society.

To this, Nilekani said, "the reluctance to make changes at the vendor level is mainly coming from a desire for control of biometric data for strategic and commercial purposes. Privacy and security are bogus reasons." He added that both ends, the handset and the Aadhaar database, will be using the highest level of encryption.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-insider-august-10-2016-and-now-aadhaar-enabled-smartphones-for-easy-verification-and-money-transfer

Implementing Indian languages in feature phones will be difficult

praskrishna — 2016-08-10T15:51:44Z

A recent government standard requiring support for inputting text in any one Indian language in mobile phones - along with Hindi and English - has manufacturers worried. The companies argue that the well-intentioned move may be difficult to implement, especially in the case of feature phones, because inventory and logistics will have to be planned for each state.

The article by Gulveen Aulakh and Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on August 10, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) said in June that all mobile phones must support the ability to type messages in English, Hindi and at least one additional Indian official language. It also requires message readability for all 22 Indian official languages. The objective is to enable widespread communication in local languages, especially for people who may not use English or Hindi with as much ease.

Handset makers said while such changes, which are yet to be notified, can be done easily through software in smartphones, it would be a big challenge for feature phones because of screen and keypad limitations, apart from managing supplies.

"It will be nightmarish to do planning for the number of models (with different languages) to be sold in each state, and plan inventory and logistics around that, so it's very challenging," said Gaurav Nigam, product head of Lava International, which has a phone with message-reading ability in all 22 Indian official languages.

Nigam said the BIS standard does not mandate the printing of vernacular languages on keypads, which would have created a massive hurdle for mobile phone manufacturers. "I might end up over-stocking in some states and lesser inventory in some states, which might lead to loss of sales since I won't be able to divert a Kerala-printed stock to Punjab or any other state," Nigam said. However, the government is hopeful of compliance.

An official said logistical and supply-chain issues can be addressed by companies. "We are talking to them and we are open to giving them a leeway of nine to 12 months to implement the order," said the official, requesting anonymity.

The official said although the government had started consultations on the premise that the third language should be imprinted on the keypad, it was felt in due course that other technologies could also be used. "Some lanFeature phones account for 65 per cent of the total mobile phone user base of about 700 million in India and are popular in rural areas and smaller towns. Sales of feature phones in the country declined to 150 million last year from 179-180 million, according to International Data Corporation, a US market research company.

The Indian Cellular Association, which represents mobile phone makers in India including Apple, Samsung Electronics, Micromax Informatics and Intex, said that it was talking to the BIS and the Department of Electronics and Information Technology on excluding the imprinting of vernacular language characters on keypads from the standard and allowing handset makers to develop solutions for local language input capability in phones.

"A formal communication or notification is expected soon from DeitY on implementing the rules," said Pravin Gondane, associate director at ICA. The department is expected to hold consultations with the industry by the month-end before it comes out with a notification that mandates the standard.

Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society, suggested a middle ground where the government could map all reasonably popular input standards and document them so that customers can pick a phone they are comfortable with.

While awaiting the notification, the association has internally sent notices to all companies stating that printing on keypads may not be necessary, even for feature phones, Gondane said. Alternative solutions could include a keypad cover that lists vernacular language characters for text input and inputting of text through a virtual keypad.

While a task force set up by DeitY admits it's a challenge to implement this rule for feature phones because the number of keys is limited, it suggested that a common minimum framework to assign characters on 12 keys should follow international standards and incorporate Indian languages requirement on the same. The taskforce has issued best practices for designing Indian language text-entry mechanisms for phones with 12 keys, rather than lay out a standard for keypads.

Smartphones have touchscreens, making language reading and inputting changes a software requirement that's easy to implement. Samsung smartphones and feature phones are enabled with typing, reading and changing user interface in 14 local languages, said Manu Sharma, the company's VP of mobile business.guages can be easily printed on the keyboard, while others can be enabled through typing on the screen," the official said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-august-10-2016-gulveen-aulakh-neha-alawadhi-implementing-indian-languages-in-feature-phones-will-be-difficult

Indian companies need to boost encrpytion adoption rate: experts

praskrishna — 2016-08-10T14:36:05Z

Most banks do not follow Reserve bank of India’s standard 64/128-bit encryption policy due to laxity and unavailability of funds.

The article by Koustav Das was published in the Deccan Chronicle on August 9, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

A recent report by security software firm Sophos highlighted the increasing number of online attacks on Indian businesses, suggesting strong encryption policies can change the existing scenario.

As per a SophosLab research, India’s threat exposure rate has been pegged at 16.7 per cent, ranking fifth in terms of highest percentage of endpoints exposed to malware attack.

The research said cyber-criminals have developed a keen sense of luring organisations on the basis of location, language and disguise, leading to an acute increase in the number of targeted attacks.

Global Experts have explained that digital attackers have taken the aid of advanced malware including deadly ransomwares, which involve locking or capturing an organisation’s valued data and demanding money to unlock it.

In future, ransomware have been predicted to become deadlier, allowing hackers to take control of an organisation’s entire network security.

Not only financial and IT companies but Government websites also face similar obstructions due to lack of updated security tools.

Mohit Puri, Head of Pre-sales, Sophos India and SAARC, said, "India faces increased risk from cyber-criminals due to its high economic growth, which has left several companies to re-think their security strategy."

Reactive to attacks, not proactive

Though Puri mentioned that Indian enterprises have been trying to prevent such attacks, large fissures in network security have made the task easier for online criminals.

One of the major reasons for companies failing to prevent advanced cyber-attacks can be attributed to the lack of pragmatic solutions, albeit their awareness about the situation.

Puri said, “While companies are aware about security threats to our systems, we are still not there in terms of how we are trying to mitigate these threats.”

According to Sunil Abraham, Director of The Centre For Internet and Society (CIS), there are manifold issues that have led to the scenario of India’s poor online security.

He said that Indian businesses and financial organisations recognize the situation but do not want to allocate budget for updating their security infrastructure.

“The problem with cyber-security is just like smoking; people are aware of it but they do not care about the warnings. Companies know about the looming threats but need an episode to make a move towards updating their network infrastructure,” Abraham added.

Enterprises also struggle due to the absence of sufficient cyber-security professionals in the country. Abraham said, “There are uncountable software professionals in India but the story is totally opposite when it boils down to cyber-security professionals.”

Weak encryption adoption

According to technology enthusiast Blaise Crowly, Co-Founder & Head Of Security Design Gladius & Schild, "Cryptography—a broader form of encryption—can be defined as a branch of mathematical algorithms that can be used to securely protect data."

Crowly added, “It is the one of the strongest form of all defence mechanisms against cyber attacks.”

However, a Sophos assessment—State of Encryption Today—where 1,700 Indian IT managers were surveyed, showed the ignorance of companies towards integrating strong encryption tools.

Out of the total number of participants, 61 per cent felt encryption holds significant importance in protecting a company’s proprietary data.

Others had peculiar reasons—18 per cent felt that encryption would help avoid incurring additional costs after a breach and 23 per cent just wanted to avoid negative publicity of the company.

Even in case of banks, reports suggested that most banks do not follow Reserve bank of India’s (RBI) standard 64/128 bit encryption policy due to laxity and unavailability of funds.

“Indian organisations need to take a second look at their security posture and deploy up-to-date synchronized security solutions that are able to combat today’s threats as well as tomorrows,” said Puri.

Government’s role

A 2015 CIS study, titled “How India Regulates Encryption” mentioned that under section 84A of the IT Act, the government has the sole authority to prescribe modes and methods of encryption.

Though the government has not yet issued any rules in exercise of these powers, it had released earlier released a draft encryption policy on September 21, 2015. However, it failed to pass it due to wide-spread criticism regarding certain mandates in the draft.

In addition, the Internet Service Providers (ISP) License Agreement, between the Department of Telecommunication (DoT) and Internet Service Providers (ISP), limit the use of encryption up to 40-bit key length in symmetric algorithms—an extremely weak standard.

Although it cannot be enforced if organisations employ third-party encryption systems, it becomes extremely expensive for them. In such a scenario, companies hesitate in using better encryption standards.

CIS Director Sunil Abraham said, “To solve the issue, the government should work towards incentivising and enforcing strong security infrastructure which will help companies get these features at a lower price.”

Adding to the aforementioned statement, Crowly highlighted that current security standards set by the government cannot adeptly counter advanced threats.

“OpenSSL, LibNaCl and similar protocols provide free implementation of encryption schemes that companies can use. The only issue is that companies and government agencies should show proper diligence in hiring experts in this field,” Crowly concluded.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-chronicle-koustav-das-august-9-2016-indian-companies-need-to-boost-encryption-adoption-rate

Aadhaar-enabled smartphones will ease money transfer

praskrishna — 2016-08-10T13:33:54Z

With its plans to make smartphones Aadhaar-enabled, the government hopes to provide users a means to do self-authentication and let businesses and banks verify the identity of their clients through their smartphones, a move that could potentially lead the way to a cashless society.

The article by Neha Alawadhi and Gulveen Aulakh was published in the Economic Times on August 10, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

"Iris and fingerprint sensors are now becoming a standard feature in smartphones anyway, and this requirement will only take a minor tweak to the operating system. Once enabled, people will be able to use phones to do self-authentication and KYC (know your customer)," Nandan Nikelani, former chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India, told ET, welcoming the government's plan to make smartphones Aadhaar-enabled.

ET was the first to report that on July 27 a meeting between UIDAI, which administers Aadhaar, and senior executives of smartphone-makers discussed ways to allow smartphone handsets let citizens authenticate their fingerprints and iris on the phone to get services. The most immediate use for the Aadhaar-enabled smartphones is the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), the new payment system that allows money transfer between any two parties using mobile phones and a virtual payment address.

"The two-factor authentication in UPI is now being done with mobile phone as one factor, and MPIN as the second factor. But once you have Aadhaar authentication on the phone, then the second factor can be biometric authentication through Aadhaar," said Nilekani. Over time, the idea is to open Aadhaar authentication to third party apps, said another person familiar with the ongoing discussions, who did not wish to be named.

In effect, biometric and iris scan authentication could become one of the permissions a user grants to different third party apps, such as access to camera, contacts, phone book and so on. Handset makers have raised concerns about some security issues on using iris scan for Aadhar authentication. Also, companies such as Apple that have very closed ecosystems, would not be easy to get on board, several people told ET.

"The primary challenge lies in safe storing of the iris scan between the time it is captured by the camera and then sent to UIDAI server seeking authentication," said an industry insider, who is aware of the discussions, requesting anonymity. The proposal for smartphone makers includes a "hardware secure zone" where biometric data will be encrypted and sent out. It will not leave the electronic secure zone without encryption, and every phone doing Aadhaar authentication will be registered in the UID system.

"Unfortunately, from the biometric sensor the data goes to the hardware secure zone via the operating system. Therefore, the biometric data can be intercepted by the operating system before it is sent to the hardware secure zone," said Sunil Abraham, executive director at Bengaluru-based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society.

"The reluctance to make changes at the vendor level are mainly coming from a desire for control of biometric data for strategic and commercial purposes. Privacy and security are bogus reasons," Nilekani said, adding that both ends - the handset and the Aadhaar database -- will use the highest level of encryption.

Samsung India, which in May launched the Galaxy Tab Iris, a device that uses Aadhaar authentication, said it has taken care that its user's biometric data does not fall into the wrong hands. "We ensure that biometric data is encrypted as per UIDAI specifications in device itself for Galaxy Tab Iris," Sukesh Jain, vice president, Samsung India Electronics, told ET in an email response.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-august-10-2016-neha-alawadhi-gulveen-aulakh-aadhaar-enabled-smartphones-will-ease-money-transfer

Apps can give personal information to strangers

praskrishna — 2016-08-08T01:22:20Z

We love our apps. A study done last year, found that app usage in India has grown 131 per cent. But apps are notorious for accessing personal data and we’re obligingly careless with our privacy. Inadvertently, users give away third-parties access to their phone calls and right to operate cameras on their mobiles.

The article by Mebin John was published in the New Indian Express on August 8, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

Therefore, they can listen in to conversations and click photos as and when it pleases them.

“The detailed privacy policy of most of these apps run into pages and people rarely read through them,” says Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of The Centre for Internet and Society. “The policy is also loaded with tech jargon, which is lost on the general public.”

A study, done in June this year by Norton, reveals that one in two Indians have permitted access to their contacts and mobile data in exchange for free applications. Forty per cent have allowed access to their camera and browsing history, and 50 per cent given permission to send promotional text/emails.

A mobile application developer in Bengaluru, who wishes to remain anonymous, says, “App developers collect personal information of individuals and make a massive database. They then sell this data base to marketing agencies.” A database of 5 crore people pays `5,000 and this is sold over and over again.

Many application developers claim that they make large databases with the help of applications. “I have a database with email IDs of 2.5 lakh people,” says another app developer of the data he mined from one app.

Chief Technology Officer at T.I.G.E.R Innovations and Publicize Bengaluru, Geo Joy, says: “It is true that we can track an individual’s personal conversations and activities using mobile applications. I’ve heard that many applications scoop details from phone conversations for marketing purposes.”

“If you are not paying for anything, then you are the product,” Abraham puts it succinctly.

According to him, with access to your conversations or GPS, a third party could monitor your activities. It can get more specifid: with data from GPS, accelerometer and gyroscope, a developer can read your driving pattern.

Laws here are easy on developers too. Elonnai Hickok, a researcher from CIS, says, “Apart from Section 43A of the Information Technology Act, we don't have any strict laws or enforcement agencies to monitor these applications that breach the privacy of an individual.”

In India, since we don’t have a statutory body to monitor applications and their privacy violations, experts suggest individuals exercise caution.

CTO Joy suggests upgrading your operating systems. “Latest versions of all operating systems will warn you when an external medium tries to track your information,” he says. “So people who use the older versions should switch to the latest one or upgrade the software.

CE picks five permissions and how they could be misused.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/apps-can-give-personal-information-to-strangers

Why experts are worried about Aadhaar-based authentication

praskrishna — 2016-08-07T02:16:29Z

As private companies are increasingly using Aadhaar data, is the privacy and security of personal data really at risk? What do those defending Aadhaar have to say?

The post was published in Citizen Matters on August 2, 2016. Amber Sinha was quoted.

The Unique Identification numbers of Aadhaar card holders are being extensively used by government and private agencies for authentication purposes, as we have already seen in an earlier article.

There are 246 registered Authentication User Agencies in India, both government and private, which are helping organisations and individuals in executing the authentication process. In simple terms, they help the organisation that has placed the authentication request, to confirm the identity of a person during hiring, lending loans or while implementing welfare schemes.

But all does not seem well with the Aadhaar authentication process. Concerns have been raised about the privacy and security aspects and, loopholes in the law.

The amended Aadhaar Bill (now, Aadhaar Act) has a clause that allows the UIDAI to respond to any authentication query “with a positive, negative or any other appropriate response.” This move has drawn a lot of criticism from the activist fraternity. They have questioned the government on framing an Act that places the security and privacy of individual citizens at risk.

Even before the Bill was passed, legal scholar Usha Ramanathan had, in an article published in Scroll.in, expressed concern over private agencies using the Aadhaar database for authenticating the identity of an individual.

“Very little was heard about the interest private companies would have in this information data base. It is not until the 2016 Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha that we were told, expressly, that just about any person or company may draw on the Aadhaar system for its purposes. There are no qualifications or limits on who may use it and why. It depends on the willingness of the Unique Identification Authority of India, which is undertaking the project, to let them become a part of the Aadhaar system,” she wrote.

What’s crucial in the entire process is how the government is allowing private players to use Aadhaar-based information, putting the privacy of Aadhaar-holders at stake. The government is technically allowed to share the Aadhaar information with other agencies, only if the holder has given consent to sharing his information, during enrollment.

The guidelines for recording Aadhaar demographic data states: “Ask resident’s consent to whether it is alright with the resident if the information captured is shared with other organisations for the purpose of welfare services including financial services. Select appropriate circle to capture residents response as - Yes/No.”

In 2011, Citizen Matters had published a report on how people wanting to register for Aadhaar were not asked if they would agree to share their personal information. Citizens seemingly were unaware of the provision for sharing information with a third party and data operators had reportedly not asked them for their consent before marking ‘yes’ for the consent option.

There remains a regulatory vacuum

In less than four months of the enactment of the Aadhaar Act, the number of private agencies using Aadhaar database for identity authentication too has grown long. Amber Sinha, Programme Officer at the Center for Internet and Society expresses concern over the privacy implications that a project of this magnitude would lead to.

“The original idea of Aadhaar was to use it for providing services under welfare schemes. But the Aadhaar Act lets private agencies avail the Aadhaar authentication service. The scope of the Act itself doesn’t envisage sharing the data with private parties, but if any third party wants to authenticate the identity of an individual, they can use the UIDAI repository for the purpose,” he points out.

In the process, Amber says, the CIDR has to send a reply in ‘yes’ or ‘no’ format, for any request seeking to confirm the identity of an individual. The new legislation gives scope for the authorities to respond to a query with a positive, negative or any other appropriate response.

“The Aadhaar enrollment information includes demographic and biometric details. So at this stage, we do not know what that “other appropriate response” stands for. Further, while there are requirements to take the data subject’s consent under the Act, there is lack of clarity on the oversight mechanisms and control mechanisms in place when a private party collects information for authentication. The UIDAI is yet to frame the rules and the rules will probably determine this. Until the rules are framed, some of the issues will exist in regulatory vacuum,” Amber observes.

Under the current circumstances, Amber says, the responsible thing to do for UIDAI is not to make such services available until the rules are framed.

But why has the Authority then started the authentication process even before the rules have been framed? Assistant Director General of the Authentication and Application Division of UIDAI, Ajai Chandra says the rules when framed will have retrospective effect, from the date the Act was enacted.

Activists have also questioned the UIDAI for allowing private agencies to use and authenticate Aadhaar data, when the Supreme Court has restricted the use of Aadhaar. In its last order dated 15 October 2015, the Apex Court allowed the government to use Aadhaar in implementing selective welfare schemes such as PDS, LPG distribution, MGNREGS, pension schemes, PMJDY and EPFO. It makes no mention about the UIDAI using the Aadhaar data repository to provide services to private agencies.

“When the Supreme Court has restricted the use of Aadhaar number to a few specific government programmes only, how can UIDAI allow the data to be used for any other programmes, let alone by private agencies?” Amber asks.

In a very brief conversation, Reena Saha, Additional DG, UIDAI told Citizen Matters that UIDAI was acting as per the Supreme Court’s order dated October 15th. “We aren’t sharing the data with private agencies,” she said.

‘Authentication happening only with consent’

Srikanth Nadhamuni, CEO of Khosla Labs - a registered Authentication User Agency, who was also the Head of Technologies at UIDAI, rejects the accusations on the security aspect, saying that the authentication system is completely secure and foolproof.

“We have made a secure system so that there is no man in the middle taking the biometric information. The biometric information shared on the application is encrypted and neither the AUA nor the Authentication Service Agency (an intermediary between the AUA and the CIDR) can open it. Both the AUA and ASA will sign on the packet and forward it to the data repository as it is. There is no way that we can figure out what is inside the packet. Once the request reaches the data repository, they will unlock the signatures, run the authentication and reply in ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or with an error code,” Srikanth explains.

ADG Chandra says that at present the CIDR is replying to authentication requests in an “yes/no” format. “We aren’t sharing the data with any agencies. Upon receiving the request for authentication, be it demographic, biometric or one time pin (OTP), a notification is sent to the registered mobile / email address of the Aadhaar holder,” he says. So if the Aadhaar holder has changed the address, phone number, email ID etc after Aadhaar enrollment, he/she should update the data with UIDAI by placing a request online or through post. This will avoid any confusion that may occur during the authentication.

Ajai Chandra further clarifies, “the private agencies seeking authentication (the Authentication User Agency) are not given direct access to the database. On receiving the request, the intermediary Authentication Service Agencies first examine the format of the authentication request. The request is forwarded to the CIDR only if it complies with the format.”

Apart from authentication, the eKYC (Know Your Customer) option also allows companies to retrieve eKYC data of the Aadhaar holder. This data includes photo, name, address, gender and date of birth (excludes mobile number and email ID). But in this case too, “eKYC data can be retrieved only with the consent of the Aadhaar card holder, the person has to be adequately informed about the retrieval and the data cannot be shared with a third party,” says Chandra.

Though Aadhaar Act allows the UIDAI to perform authentication of Aadhaar number, subject to the requesting entity paying the fee, UIDAI at present is providing the service free of cost. “We will provide free service till December 2016 and may levy the fee thereafter,” the ADG says.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bangalore-citizen-matters-august-2-2016-akshatha-why-experts-are-worried-about-aadhaar-based-authentication

Book Review: Apocalypse Now Redux

nishant — 2016-08-06T04:16:07Z

My review for Arundhati Roy and John Cusack's new book that captures their encounter with Edward Snowden, 'Things that can and cannot be said' is now out. It's an engaging, if somewhat freewheeling, political critique of the times we live in.

The review was published in the Indian Express on August 6, 2016.

Book: Things That Can and Cannot Be Said
Authors: Arundhati Roy & John Cusack
Publication: Juggernaut
Pages: 132
Price: Rs 250

The title of the book — Things That Can and Cannot be Said — demands an imperative. It is as if Arundhati Roy and John Cusack, aware of their internal turmoil in dealing with a world that is rapidly becoming unintelligible, though not incomprehensible, are demanding an order where none exists. Hence, they are advocating for certainty and assurance, only to undermine it, ironically, through their own freely associative writing that mimics linear time and causative narrative. This deep-seated irony of needing to say something, but knowing that saying it is not going to shine a divining light on the sordid realities of the world that is being managed through the production of grand structures like valorous nation states, virtuous civil societies, the obsequious NGO-isation of radical action, and the persistent neutering of justice through the benign vocabulary of human rights, defines the oeuvre, the politics and the poetics of the book. Written like a scrap book, filled with excerpts from long conversations scattered over time and space, annotated by reminiscences of books read long ago that have seared their imprints on the mind, and events that are simultaneously platitudinous for their status as global landmarks and fiercely personal for the scars that they have left on the minds of the authors, the book remains an engaging, if a somewhat freewheeling, ride into a political critique that makes itself all the more palatable and disconcerting for the levity, irreverence and the dark sense of humour that accompanies it.

Composed in alternating chapters, the first half of the book is about Cusack and Roy laying themselves bare. They spare no words, square no edges, and put their personal, political and collective wounds on display with humble pride and proud humility. Cusack’s experience as a screenplay writer comes in handy — he rescues what could have been a long tirade, into a series of conversations. The familiar narratives are rehistoricised and de-territorialised, put into new contexts while eschewing the older ones, thus providing a large landscape that refers to state-sponsored genocide, structural reorganisation of nation states, the dying edge of political action, the overwhelming but invisible presence of capital, and the dithering state of social justice that treats human beings like things. Cusack, identifying the poetic genius of Roy, gives her centre stage, making her the voice in command.

Roy, for her part, seems to have enjoyed this moment in the soapbox — something that she has been doing quite effectively and provocatively to a national and global audience — and gives it her all. There are moments when the text feels indulgent, when the voice feels a little relentless, when the almost schizophrenic global and historical references become a litany of mixed-up events that might have required further nuance and deeper interpretation. However, the whimsical style of Roy’s narrative, with her sense of what is right, and her demeanour that remains friendly, curious and disarming, saves the text from being heavy handed, even when it does dissolve into cloying poignancy and makes you pause, just so that you can breathe.

Surprisingly, it is the second part of the book, where the two encounter Edward Snowden along with Daniel Ellsberg, the “Snowden of the 1960s” who had leaked the Pentagon papers, that falters. Snowden had jocularly mentioned that Roy was there to “radicalise him”. She does that, but in a way that doesn’t give us anything more than what we already know. While Cusack and Roy were committed to getting to know Snowden beyond his systems-man image, there wasn’t much that they could uncover, either in dialogue or in discourse, that could have told us more, endeared us further to possibly the most over-exposed person in recent times. However, one realises that the genius of the narrative is actually in reminding us how transparent Edward Snowden has become to us. We know all kinds of things about this young man — from his girlfriends past to his actions future, from his values and convictions to his opinion on the NSA watching people’s naked pictures — and yet, what has been missing in the Snowden files, has been the larger arc of global politics, social reordering, and perhaps, a glimpse of the post-nation future that Snowden might have seen in his act of whistleblowing that is going to remain the landmark moment that defines the rest of this century.

Once you have gotten over the fact that this is not a book about Snowden, the expectations are better tailored for what is to come, and suddenly, the long prelude to the meeting falls into place. Snowden matches Roy and Cusack in whimsy, irony, political conviction, and the sacred faith in human values that make you want to give them all a fierce hug of hesitant reassurance. What Snowden says, what Roy and Cusack make of it, and how they leave us, almost abruptly at the end, breathless, unnerved, and severely conflicted about some of the 20th century structures like society, activism, nation states, governance, communication, technologies, sharing and caring is what the book has to be read for. The tight screen-writing skills of Cusack meet the perfect timing of Roy’s prose, and all of it becomes surreal, futuristic and indelibly real when it gets anchored on the physical presence of Snowden, who, in exile, talks achingly of the home that has thrown him out and the home that he can never really call his own.

And while there are lapses — fragments, translations and evocations which might have needed more explanations to have their pedagogic intent shine through — there is no denying that, in all its flaws, much like the narrators, the book manages to first immerse you in the cold shock of a sobering reality, clearly positioning the apocalypse as the now, and then drags you out and wraps you up in a warm blanket, opening up forms of critique, formats of intervention, and functions of political commitment towards saying things that have and have not been said. The book should have, perhaps, been titled what could, would, should have been said, but can’t, won’t, shan’t be said — not because of anything else, but because it seems futile.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indian-express-nishant-shah-august-6-2016-book-review-apocalypse-now-redux

Digital in South Asia

praskrishna — 2016-08-02T15:38:39Z

Sunil Abraham participated in this event organized by the World Economic Forum on July 19, 2016 at Taj Mahal Hotel in Bangalore.

The digital revolution is transforming all the aspects of business and society. The internet has been a principal contributor to evolution and growth in the global economy over the past decades. Modern technologies are dramatically altering today’s industries. It continues to have the potential to propel societies and economies by enabling government and business leaders to develop innovative solutions, platforms, and models.

This session will focus on how Governments are designing, implementing, governing, and monitoring their digital strategies particularly as it pertains to growing the digital economy. The focus of the workshop will be to learn and understand how the Government’s in South Asia have and are currently developing digital agendas to support innovation, entrepreneurship, commerce, and economic growth. Further, the hope is to examine the parameters, mechanisms, and governance structures in the region. This working session will explore the specific opportunities and digital development barriers presented to governments. As well as discuss potential approaches or solutions to these barriers.

Structure

(25 min) Opening, digital champions from the private sector and civil society will present on the key issues of policy and governance as it pertains to growing the digital economy. There will be four discussion leaders and each leader will be given 5-7 minutes to make their remarks

(15 min) The opening remarks will be followed by a moderated discussion and Q&A led by Alan Marcus from the World Economic Forum. Government leaders will have the opportunity to react to the discussion leader’s comments and answer any additional questions. Potential leaders to call on include:

(5min) The next portion of the session will involve breakouts directly related to the Digital Policy work at the WEF. Alan Marcus will describe the Digital Government/ Economy project that is being done at the WEF and how the outcomes from the breakouts will feed the ongoing work.

(45min) Following the moderated discussion, the group will split into four breakouts. Each breakout group will have a Table Leader and Firestarter. The role of the Table Leader is manage the flow of the discussion such that it addresses the three key questions below. The Firstarter will have prepared initial comments to commence the discussion.

1) What are the key policy issues that are critical to driving the digital economy? What hurdles, if any, are associated with governing these policies?

2) What mechanisms are currently being used to determine policy issues?

Many of the issues and needed digital policies straddle various government ministries/ agencies ?
What mechanisms determine policy at the national vs transnational level?

3) How can multistakeholder collaboration enhance and support respective government’s digital agendas?

(15 min) After the breakout groups have finished, each discussion leader will present the key and differentiating results of their table discussion to the plenary group. A moderator from the World Economic Forum will then lead invite comments on the outcomes, and discuss the next steps that could be taken to promote digital government in the region.

(15 min) Closing remarks will be made by Mr Ravi Shanker Prasad, Minister of Communications and Information Technology, India.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-in-south-asia

IGF Academy Regional Workshop

praskrishna — 2016-08-06T15:30:53Z

Sunil Abraham will be a speaker at this event organized by LIRNE Asia in Colombo, Sri Lanka on August 4, 2016. He will speak on the status of freedom of expression, internet governance and multi-stakeholder processes

Sunil Abraham made a presentation at the event.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/igf-academy-regional-workshop

Mandatory Aadhaar card for govt scholarships violates SC order

praskrishna — 2016-07-30T15:55:38Z

There seems to be no end to the government’s legal troubles.

The article by Neelam Pandey and Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on July 15, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The human resource development (HRD) ministry has made Aadhaar mandatory for government scholarship and fellowship from this academic year, a move that violates the Supreme Court’s order.

Under this decision, the government will transfer the funds to the students’ bank accounts only after they submit their Aadhaar number.

The court had last August barred the government from using Aadhaar for any purpose other than distributing food grain and cooking fuel such as kerosene and LPG. The SC had gone further to rule that production of Aadhaar would not be condition for obtaining any benefits due to a citizen.

It was this SC order that prompted the government to push the Aadhaar law through Parliament to ensure that the court’s restriction did not come in the way of expanding the direct benefit transfer project.

The law – that was passed by Parliament – gave the government powers to make Aadhaar mandatory for receiving any benefit, facility or service that involved any expenditure from the public exchequer.

But most provisions of the Aadhaar law have not come into force yet.

This week, it notified provisions that enabled it to appoint the chairperson of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) that issues the 12-digit unique number and set up offices in cities outside Delhi.

“This appears to be contempt of court,” said Sunil Abraham, head of the Bengaluru-headquartered advocacy group, Centre for Internet and Society.

Thomas Mathew, one of the petitioners in the case pending before the Supreme Court, agreed. “I am going to move a contempt petition against the HRD ministry and UGC,” Mathew said, pointing that oil companies were also forcing people to get Aadhaar.

The UGC directive to central universities sets July-end as the deadline for scholars at central universities to get their Aadhaar number. Many scholars who did not have an Aadhaar number said the fellowship were an important source of income for them to get by.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-neelam-pandey-aloke-tikku-july-15-2016-mandatory-aadhaar-card-for-govt-scholarships-violates-sc-order

It's That Eavesdrop Endemic

praskrishna — 2016-07-30T15:45:31Z

Whatsapp Says It’s Snoop-Proof Now, But There’s Always A Way In

The article by Arindam Mukherjee was published in Outlook on July 25, 2016. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Lock and Key

WhatsApp says it has end-to-end encryption, so no one, not even WhatsApp, can snoop into calls.

Experts say any encryption can be broken by security agencies. Android phones can also get infected by malware.

For years, a Delhi power-broker used to call from nondescript landline numbers, changing them ever so often. Of late, he has started using WhatsApp calls for ‘sensitive’ conversations. He’s not alone. WhatsApp has revealed that over 100 million voice calls are being made on the social network every day. That’s over 1,100 calls a second! India is one of the biggest user bases of WhatsApp. And many Indian users are making the app their main engine for voice calls.

One reason for this shift is that WhatsApp calls are seen to be essentially free (though they indeed have data charges). But for a lot of people, the chief allure lies in the touted fact that WhatsApp calling is far more secure than mobile calling. In April, the app introduced end-to-end encryption for its messages and voice calls.

Consequent to this, Sudhir Yadav, a Gurgaon-based software engineer filed a PIL in the Supreme Court seeking a ban on WhatsApp on the grounds that its calls are so safe that it could be misused by ‘terrorists’. Last month, a court in Brazil issued orders to block WhatsApp for 72 hours after it failed to provide the authorities access to encrypted data.

Are WhatsApp calls really impenetrable? WhatsApp believes so and says that the encryption key is held by the two persons at the two ends of the message or call and no one, not even the company, can snoop in. “The calls are end-to-end encrypted so WhatsApp and third parties can’t listen to them,” a WhatsApp spokesperson told Outlook. This is precisely Yadav’s concern. “Because the encryption is end to end, the government can’t break it and WhatsApp cannot provide the decryption key,” he says.

However, experts do not buy this argument. They believe everything on the Internet is vulnerable. “Anything that uses a phone number is vulnerable,” says Kiran Jonnalagadda, founder of technology platform HasGeek. “Anyone can impersonate the phone number by getting a duplicate SIM and get access to a phone. There are also bugs in the system which security agencies use.”

WhatsApp uses a person’s phone number to open an account and authenticate a user. So, if the government or a security agency wants to get access to a WhatsApp call, it would be very easy. “Telecom companies cannot access these calls as they are encrypted before they reach the network. But the government can. It just has to replicate a SIM to access any number and its messages or voice calls,” says Aravind R.S., a volunteer for Save the Internet campaign and founder of community chat app Belong,

There are other modes of attack as well. It is a given that Android phones, which form the majority of mobile phones used in India today, are most vulnerable to malware attacks. So, even if the app itself is secure, the device is not and if the device is attacked, just about everything in it can be tapped into. For instance, there’s the ‘man in the middle’ mode of attack, where a third person gets into a call and mirrors the messages to both the sides and relays the messages or calls to a different server. There is also the SS7 signalling protocol that can help hackers get into networks and calls. These attacks can make even a WhatsApp encryption vulnerable.

Security agencies and hackers routinely implant viruses into the phones of people they are monitoring. Once a phone is “infected”, everything is accessible. And Android phones are extremely prone to attacks from malware. “It's not perfectly secure, especially if there is any virus in an Android phone, which is what security agencies work with. They have many more ways to get into a phone. There is no defence against that,” says Aravind,

Experts believe it is possible that US intelligence agencies like the FBI and the NSA may have access to or are capable of breaking into even the WhatsApp encryption. This is proven by the recent incident where the FBI, after being refused by Apple to open up an iPhone used by a terrorist, broke into the phone by itself.

“If you are on the NSA list, there is nothing you can do to protect yourself,” says Pranesh Prakash, policy director with the Centre for Internet and Society. “They will find a way to get into your phone. In WhatsApp, many things like photographs and videos are not encrypted; these can get access to a person’s account.”

In India, the debate on access to encrypted phones has been on since the government engaged with Blackberry a few years ago. “There is no law governing an Over The Top (OTT) service like WhatsApp. If the government orders decryption of a call and WhatsApp cannot comply, it will become illegal,” says cyber lawyer Asheeta Regidi. The government’s seeming comfort level with all this legal ambiguity is yet another indicator that all is not what is seems with WhatsApp. As for callers, they would do well to speak discreetly on any network.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/outlook-july-25-2016-arindam-mukherjee-its-that-eavesdrop-endemic

Analysis of the Report of the Group of Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and Implications for India

Elonnai Hickok and Vipul Kharbanda — 2016-08-11T09:58:59Z

This paper analyses the report of the Group of Experts and and India’s compliance with its recommendations based on existing laws and policies. Given the global nature of these challenges and the need for nations to holistically address such challenges from a human rights and security perspective, CIS believes that the Group of Experts and similar international forums are useful and important forums for India to actively engage with.

The United Nations Group of Experts on ICT issued their report on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security in June, 2015. This paper analyses the report of the Group of Experts and and India’s compliance with its recommendations based on existing laws and policies. CIS believes that the report of the Group of Experts provides important minimum standards that countries could adhere to in light of challenges to international security posed by ICT developments. Given the global nature of these challenges and the need for nations to holistically address such challenges from a human rights and security perspective, CIS believes that the Group of Experts and similar international forums are useful and important forums for India to actively engage with.

Download: PDF (627 kb)

1. Introduction

2. Analysis of the Recommendations

2a. Consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, including to maintain international peace and security, States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may pose threats to international peace and security

2b. In case of ICT incidents, States should consider all relevant information, including the larger context of the event, the challenges of attribution in the ICT environment and the nature and extent of the consequences

2c. States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs; of the Recommendations

2d. States should consider how best to cooperate to exchange information, assist each other, prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative measures to address such threats. States may need to consider whether new measures need to be developed in this respect

2e. States, in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should respect Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 on the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, as well as General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166 on the right to privacy in the digital age, to guarantee full respect for human rights, including the right to freedom of expression

2f. A State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public

2g. States should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking into account General Assembly resolution 58/199 on the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures, and other relevant resolutions

2h. States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another State whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. States should also respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty

2i. States should take reasonable steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain so that end users can have confidence in the security of ICT products. States should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions

2j. States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities and share associated information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities to limit and possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-dependent infrastructure

2k. States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm the information systems of the authorized emergency response teams (sometimes known as computer emergency response teams or cyber security incident response teams) of another State. A State should not use authorized emergency response teams to engage in malicious international activity

3. Conclusion

1. Introduction

Cyberspace[1] touches every aspect of our lives, has enormous benefits, but is also accompanied by a number of risks. The international community at large has realized that cyberspace can be made stable and secure only through international cooperation. Traditionally, though there are a number of bilateral agreements and forms of cooperation the foundation of this cooperation has been the international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

To this end, on December 27, 2013 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 68/243 requesting the" Secretary General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts,…… to continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, including norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States and confidence-building measures, the issues of the use of information and communications technologies in conflicts and how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States……. and to submit to the General Assembly at its seventieth session a report on the results of the study. "In pursuance of this resolution the Secretary General established a Group of Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security; the report was agreed upon by the Group of Experts in June, 2015. On 23 December 2015, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 70/237[2] which welcomed the outcome of the Group of Experts and requested the Secretary-General to establish a new GGE that would report to the General Assembly in 2017.

The report developed by governmental experts from 20 States addresses existing and emerging threats from uses of ICTs, by States and non-State actors alike. These threats have the potential to jeopardize international peace and security. The experts gave recommendations which have built on consensus reports issued in 2010 and 2013, and offer ideas on norm-setting, confidence-building, capacity-building and the application of international law for the use of ICTs by States. Among other recommendations, the Report lays down recommendations for States for voluntary, non-binding norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.

As larger international dialogues around cross border sharing of information and cooperation for cyber security purposes take place between the US and EU, it is critical that India begin to participate in these discussions.[3] It is also necessary to take cognizance of the importance of implementing internal practices and policies that are recognized and set strong standards at the international level.

This paper marks the beginning of a series of questions we will be asking and processes we will be analysing with the aim of understanding the role of international cooperation for cyber security and the interplay between privacy and security. The report analyses the existing norms in India in the backdrop of the recommendations in the Report of Experts to discover how interoperable Indian law and policy is vis-à-vis the recommendations made in this report as well as making recommendations towards ways India can enhance national policies, practices, and approaches to enable greater collaboration at the international level with respect to issues concerning ICTs and security.

2. Analysis of the Recommendations

The Group of Experts took into account existing and emerging threats, risks and vulnerabilities, in the field of ICT and offered the following recommendations for consideration by States for voluntary, non-binding norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour.

2a. Consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, including to maintain international peace and security, States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may pose threats to international peace and security

1. India has been working with a number of countries such as Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, and France on a number of ICT-related isues thereby increasing international cooperation in the ICT sector, such as:

(i) setting up the India-Belarus Digital Learning Centre (DLC-ICT) to promote

development of ICT in Belarus;

(ii) sending an official business delegation to Canada to attend the 2^ndJoint Working Group meeting in ICTE;

(iii) holding Joint Working Groups on ICT with China.[4]

As can be seen from this, most of the cooperation with other countries is currently government to government (or government institution to government institution) cooperation. However, it must be noted that the entire digital revolution, including ICT necessarily involves ICT companies, and thus the role of the private sector in participating in these negotiations as well as the responsibilities of private sector ICT companies in cross border cooperation. Furthermore, the above examples are a few of the many agreements, Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), and negotiations that India has with other countries on cross border cooperation. It is important that, to the extent possible, these negotiations and transparent and easily publicly available.

2. The primary legislation governing ICT in India is the Information Technology Act, 2000 ("IT Act") which was passed to provide legal recognition for the transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and other means of electronic communication. The IT Act contains a number of provisions that declare illegal activities that threatenICT infrastructure, data, and individuals as illegal and provide for penalties for the same. These activities are:

Section 43 - Penalty and Compensation for damage to computer, computer system, etc.: If any person without permission: (i) accesses a computer, computer system or network; (ii) downloads, copies or extracts any data from such computer, computer system or network; (iii) introduces any computer contaminant or computer virus into, destroys, deletes or alters any information on, damages or disrupts any computer, computer system or network; (iv) denies or causes the denial of access to any computer, computer system or network by any means; (v) helps any person to access a computer, computer system or network in contravention of the Act; (vi) charges the services availed of by a person to the account of another person through manipulation; or (vii) Steals, conceals, destroys or alters or causes any person to steal, conceal, destroy or alter any computer source code used for a computer resource with an intention to cause damage, he shall be liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the person so affected.

Section 66 - Computer Related Offences: If any person, dishonestly, or fraudulently, does any act referred to in section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two three years or with fine which may extend to Rs. 5,00,000/- or with both.

Section 66B - Punishment for dishonestly receiving stolen computer resource or communication device: Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen computer resource or communication device knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen computer resource or communication device, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,00,000/- or with both.

Section 66C - Punishment for identity theft: Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly make use of the electronic signature, password or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to rupees one lakh.

Section 66D - Punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource: Whoever, by means of any communication device or computer resource cheats by personation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to Rs. 1,00,000/-.

Section 66E - Punishment for violation of privacy: Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes or transmits the image of a private area of any person without his or her consent, under circumstances violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding Rs. 2,00,000 or with both.

Section 66F - Punishment for cyber terrorism: (1) Whoever,- (A) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people by -

Denying or cause the denial of access to computer resource; or
Attempting to penetrate a computer resource; or
Introducing or causing to introduce any computer contaminant and by means of such conduct causes or is likely to cause death or injuries to persons or damage to or destruction of property or disrupts or knowing that it is likely to cause damage or disruption of supplies or services essential to the life of the community or adversely affect the critical information infrastructure, or

(B) knowingly or intentionally penetrates a computer resource and by by doing so obtains access to information that is restricted for reasons of the security of the State or foreign relations; or any restricted information with reasons to believe that such information may be used to cause or likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, group of individuals or otherwise, commits the offence of cyber terrorism.

(2) Whoever commits or conspires to commit cyber terrorism shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to imprisonment for life.

Section 67 - Publishing of information which is obscene in electronic form: Whoever publishes or transmits in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons, shall be punished on first conviction with a maximum imprisonment upto 2 years and a maximum fine upto Rs. 5,00,000 and for a second or subsequent conviction with a maximum imprisonment upto 5 years and also a maximum with fine upto Rs. 10,00,000.

Section 67A - Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit act, etc. in electronic form: Whoever publishes or transmits in the electronic form any material which contains sexually explicit act or conduct shall be punished on 1st conviction with a maximum imprisonment for 5 years and a maximum fine of upto Rs. 10,00,000 and for a 2nd or subsequent conviction with a maximum imprisonment of 7 years and a maximum fine upto Rs. 10,00,000.

Section 67B - Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material depicting children in sexually explicit act, etc. in electronic form: Whoever,- (a) publishes or transmits material in any electronic form which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit act or conduct; or (b) creates text or digital images, collects, seeks, browses, downloads, advertises, promotes, exchanges or distributes material in any electronic form depicting children in obscene or indecent or sexually explicit manner; or (c) cultivates, entices or induces children to online relationship with one or more children for and on sexually explicit act or in a manner that may offend a reasonable adult on the computer resource; or (d) facilitates abusing children online; or (e) records in any electronic form own abuse or that of others pertaining to sexually explicit act with children, shall be punished on first conviction with a maximum imprisonment upto 5 years and a maximum fine upto Rs. 10,00,000 and in the event of a 2nd or subsequent conviction with a maximum imprisonment upto 7 years and also a maximum fine upto Rs. 10,00,000.[5]

Section 72 - Breach of confidentiality and privacy: Any person who, in pursuance of any of the powers conferred under this Act, has secured access to any electronic record, book, register, correspondence, information, document or other material without the consent of the person concerned discloses the same to any other person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,00,000 or with both.

Section 72-A - Punishment for Disclosure of information in breach of lawful contract: Any person including an intermediary who, while providing services under the terms of lawful contract, has secured access to any material containing personal information about another person, with the intent to cause or knowing that he is likely to cause wrongful loss or wrongful gain discloses such material to any other person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with a fine which may extend to Rs. 5,00,000 or with both.

3. The broad language and wide terminology used IT Act seems to cover most of the cyber crimes faced in India as of now, though the technical abilities to prevent the crimes still leave a lot to be desired. The prevention of cyber crime is not the domain of the IT Act and is rather the responsibility of the law enforcement authorities (note: there is no specific authority created under the IT Act, the Act is enforced by the police and other law enforcement authorities). That said, it may be a useful exercise to briefly compare these provisions with the crimes mentioned in the Convention on Cybercrime, 2001 (Budapest Convention), an international treaty that seeks to addresses threats in cyber space by promoting the harmonization of national laws and cooperation across jurisdictions, to examine if there are any that are not covered by the IT Act. A comparison of the principles in Budapest Convention and the IT Act is below:

S. No.	Article of the Budapest Convention	Provisions of the IT Act which cover the same
1	Article 2 - Illegal Access	Section 43(a) read with Section 66
2	Article 3 - Illegal Interception	Section 69 of the IT Act read with section 45 as well as Section 24 of the Telegraph Act, 1885
3	Article 4 - Data interference	Sections 43(d) and 43(f) read with section 66
4	Article 5 - System interference	Sections 43(d), (e) and (f) read with section 66
5	Article 6 - Misuse of devices	Not specifically covered
6	Article 7 - Computer related forgery	Computer related forgery is not specifically covered, but it is possible that when such a case comes to light, the provisions of Section 43 read with section 66 as well as provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 would be pressed into service to cover such crimes
7	Article 8 - Computer related fraud	While not specifically covered by the IT Act, it is possible that when such a case comes to light, the provisions of Section 43 read with section 66 as well as provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 would be pressed into service to cover such crimes
8	Article 9 - Offences relating to child pornography	Section 67B

As can be seen from the above discussion, most of the criminal acts elucidated in the Budapest Convention are covered under the IT Act except for the provision on misuse of devices, which requires the production, dealing, trading, etc. in devices whose sole objective is to violate the provisions of the IT Act, though it is possible that provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 dealing with conspiracy and aiding and abetment may be pressed into service to cover such incidents.

4. Further, there are a number of laws which deal with critical infrastructure in India, however since these are mostly sectoral laws dealing with specific infrastructure sectors, the one most relevant to ICT is the Telegraph Act, 1885, which makes it illegal to interfere with or damage critical telegraph infrastructure. The specific penal provisions are listed below:

Section 23 - Intrusion into signal-room, trespass in telegraph office or obstruction: If any person - (a) without permission of competent authority, enters the signal room of a telegraph office of the Government, or of a person licensed under this Act, or (b) enters a fenced enclosure round such a telegraph office in contravention of any rule or notice not to do so, or (c) refuses to quit such room or enclosure on being requested to do so by any officer or servant employed therein, or (d) wilfully obstructs or impedes any such officer or servant in the performance of his duty, he shall be punished with fine which may extend to Rs. 500.

Section 24 - Unlawfully attempting to learn the contents of messages: If any person does any of the acts mentioned in section 23 with the intention of unlawfully learning the contents of any message, or of committing any offence punishable under this Act, he may (in addition to the fine with which he is punishable under section 23) be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year.

Section 25 - Intentionally damaging or tampering with telegraphs: If any person, intending - (a) to prevent or obstruct the transmission or delivery of any message, or (b) to intercept or to acquaint himself with the contents of any message, or (c) to commit mischief, damages, removes, tampers with or touches any battery, machinery, telegraph line, post or other thing whatever, being part of or used in or about any telegraph or in the working thereof, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine or with both.

Section 25A - Injury to or interference with a telegraph line or post: If, in any case not provided for by section 25, any person deals with any property and thereby wilfully or negligently damages any telegraph line or post duly placed on such property in accordance with the provisions of this Act, he shall be liable to pay the telegraph authority such expenses (if any) as may be incurred in making good such damage, and shall also, if the telegraphic communication is by reason of the damage so caused interrupted, be punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 1000:

5. The telecom service providers in India have to sign a license agreement with the Department of Telecommunications for the right to provide telecom services in various parts of India. The telecom regulatory regime in India has gone through a lot of turmoil and evolution and currently any service provider wanting to provide telecom services is issued a Unified License (UL) and has to abide by the terms of the UL. Whilst most of the prohibited activities under the UL refer to specific terms under the UL itself such as non payment of fees and not fulfilling obligations under the UL, section 38 provides for certain specific prohibited activities which may be relevant for the ICT sector. These prohibited activities include:

(i) Carrying objectionable, obscene, unauthorized or any other content, messages or communications infringing copyright and intellectual property right etc., which may be prohibited by the laws of India;

(ii) Provide tracing facilities to trace nuisance, obnoxious or malicious calls, messages or communications transported through his equipment and network, to the authorised government agencies;

(iii) Ensuring that the Telecommunication infrastructure or installation thereof, carried out by it, should not become a safety or health hazard and is not in contravention of any statute, rule, regulation or public policy;

(iv) not permit any telecom service provider whose license has been revoked to use its services. Where such services are already provided, i.e. connectivity already exists, the license is required to immediately sever connectivity immediately.

2b. In case of ICT incidents, States should consider all relevant information, including the larger context of the event, the challenges of attribution in the ICT environment and the nature and extent of the consequences

The Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) has released the XIIth Five Year Plan on the information technology sector and the report of the Sub-Group on Cyber Security in the plan recognizes that cyber security threats emanate from a wide variety of sources and manifest themselves in disruptive activities that target individuals, businesses, national infrastructure and Governments alike. [6] The primary objectives of the plan for securing the country's cyber space are preventing cyber attacks, reducing national vulnerability to cyber attacks, and minimizing damage and recovery time from cyber attacks. The plan takes into account a number of focus areas to achieve its stated objectives, which are described briefly below:

Enabling Legal Framework - Setting up think tanks in Public-Private mode to identify gaps in the existing policy and frameworks and take action to address them including addressing the privacy concerns of online users.
Security Policy, Compliance and Assurance - Enhancement of IT product security assurance mechanism (Common Criteria security test/evaluation, ISO 15408 & Crypto Module Validation Program), establishing a mechanism for national cyber security index leading to national risk management framework.
Security Resarch&Development (R&D) - Creation of Centres of Excellence in identified areas of advanced Cyber Security R&D and Centre for Technology Transfer to facilitate transition of R&D prototypes to production, supporting R&D projects in thrust areas.
Security Incident - Early Warning and Response - Comprehensive threat assessment and attack mitigation by means of net traffic analysis and deployment of honey pots, development of vulnerability database.
Security awareness, skill development and training - Launching formal security education, skill building and awareness programs.
Collaboration - Establishing a collaborative platform/ think-tank for cyber security policy inputs, discussion and deliberations, operationalisation of security cooperation arrangements with overseas CERTs and industry, and seeking legal cooperation of international agencies on cyber crimes and cyber security.

2c. States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs

As mentioned in response to (a) above, the primary legislation in India that deals with information technology and hence ICT as well is the Information Technology Act, 2000. The IT Act contains a number of penal provisions which make it illegal to indulge in a number of practices such as hacking, online fraud, etc. which have been recognised internationally as wrongful acts using ICT ( Please refer to answer under section (a) above for details of the penal provisions). Further section 1(2) of the IT Act provides that it also applies to any offence or contravention hereunder committed outside India by any person. This means that the IT Act also covers internationally wrongful acts using ICTs.

2d. States should consider how best to cooperate to exchange information, assist each other, prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative measures to address such threats. States may need to consider whether new measures need to be developed in this respect

There are a number of ways in which states can share information by using widely accepted formal processes precisely for this purpose. Some of the most common methods of international exchange used by India are given below.

MLATs

Although the exact process by which intelligence agencies in India share information with other agencies internationally is unclear, India is a member of Interpol and the Central Bureau of Investigation, which is a Federal/Central investigating agency functioning under the Central Government, Department of Personnel & Training and is designated as the National Central Bureau of India. A very useful tool in the effort to establish cross-border cooperation is Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). MLATs are extremely important for law enforcement agencies, governments and the private sector, since they act as formal mechanisms for access to data which falls under different jurisdictions. India currently has MLATs with the following 39 countries [7]

Although MLATs are considered to be a useful mechanism to ensure international cooperation, there are certain criticisms of the MLAT mechanism, such as:

The Lack of Clear Time Tables: Although MLATs do provide for broad time frames, they do not provide for more specific time tables and usually do not have any provision for an expedited process, for eg. it is believed that for requests to the U.S., processing can take from six weeks (for requests with minimal issues complying with U.S. legal standards) to 10 months.[8] Such a long time frame is clearly a burden on the investigation process and has been criticised for being ineffectual as they may not provide information fast enough;
Variation in Legal Standards: The legal standards for requesting information, for eg. the circumstances under which information can be requested or what information can be requested, differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These differences are often not understood by requesting nations thus causing problems in accessing information;[9]
Inefficient Legal Process: The legal process to carry out requests through the MLAT process is often considered too cumbersome and inefficient.
Non-incorporation of Technological Challenges: MLATs have not been updated to meet the challenges brought about by technology, especially with the advent of networked infrastructure and ICT which raise issues of attribution and cross-jurisdictional access to information. [10]

Extradition

Extradition generally refers to the surrender of an alleged or convicted criminal by one State to another. More precisely, it may be defined as the process by which one State upon the request of another surrenders to the latter a person found within its jurisdiction for trial ~~and punishment~~ or, if he has been already convicted, only for punishment, on account of a crime punishable by the laws of the requesting State and committed outside the territory of the requested State. Extradition plays an important role in the international battle against crime and owes its existence to the so-called principle of territoriality of criminal law, according to which a State will not apply its penal statutes to acts committed outside its own boundaries except where the protection of special national interests is at stake. India currently has extradition treaties with 37 countries and extradition arrangements with an additional 8 countries.[11]

Letters Rogatory

A Letter Rogatory is a formal communication in writing sent by the Court in which an action is pending to a foreign court or Judge requesting that the testimony of a witness residing within the jurisdiction of that foreign court be formally taken under its direction and transmitted to the issuing court making the request for use in a pending legal contest or action. This request entirely depends upon the comity of courts towards each other and usages of the court of another nation.

Apart from the above methods, India also regularly signs Bilateral MoUs with various countries on law enforcement and information sharing specially in cases related to terrorism. India also regularly helps and gets helps from Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organisation for purposes of investigation, arrests and sharing of information.[12]

Other than these formal methods states sometimes share information on an informal basis, where the parties help each other purely on the basis of goodwill, or sometimes even coercion. A recent example of informal cooperation between the security agencies of India and Nepal, although not in the realm of cyber space, was the arrest of YasinBhatkal, leader of the banned organisation Indian Mujahideen (IM) where the Indian security agencies allegedly sought informal help from their Neapaelese counterparts to arrest a person who was wantedhad long been wanted by the Indian security agencies for a long time. [13]

In the current environment of growing ICT and increased cross-border information sharing between individuals, the role of private companies who carry this information has become much more pronounced. This changed dynamic raises new problems, especially because manyin light of thesefact that a number of these companies do not have a physical presence in all the countries where they offer services over the internet. This leads to problems for states in terms of law enforcement, speciallyespecially if they want information from these companies who do not have an incentive or desire to provide itagainst their will. These circumstances lead to a number of prickly situations where states are often frustrated in using legal and formal means and often resort to informal pressure to get the companies to agree to data localization requests, encryption/decryption standards and keys, back doors, and other requests. etc., Tthe most famous of these in the Indian context being the disagreement/ heated exchange between the Indian government and Canada based Blackberry Limited (formerly Research in Motion) for data requests on their Blackberry enterprise platform.

2e. States, in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should respect Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 on the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, as well as General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166 on the right to privacy in the digital age, to guarantee full respect for human rights, including the right to freedom of expression

Right to Privacy

The right to privacy has been recognised as a constitutionally protected fundamental right in India through judicial interpretation of the right to life which is specifically guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Since the right to privacy was read into the constitution by judicial pronouncements, it could be said that the right to privacy in India is a creature of the courts at least in the Indian context. For this reason it may be useful to list out some of the major cases which deal with the right to privacy in India:

i. Kharak Singh v. Union of India¸[14] (1962)

a. For the first time, the courts recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right, although in a minority opinion.

b. The decision lLocated the right to privacy under both the right to personal liberty as well as freedom of movement.

ii. Govind v. State of M.P.,[15] (1975)

a. Adopted the minority opinion of Kharak Singh as the opinion of the Supreme Court and held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right.

b. An individual deDerivesd the right to privacy from both the right to life and personal liberty as well as freedom of speech and movement.

c. The right to privacy was said to encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing.

d. The court established that the rRight to privacy can be violated in the following circumstances (i) important countervailing interest which is superior, (ii) compelling state interest test, and (iii) compelling public interest.

iii. R. Rajagopal v. Union of India,[16] (1994)

a. Recognised that the rRight to privacy is a part of the right to personal liberty guaranteed under the constitution.

b. Recognizeds that the right to privacy can be both a tort (actionable claim) as well as a fundamental right.

c. Established that aA citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters and nobody can publish anything regarding the same unless (i) he consents or voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy, (ii) the publication is made using material which is in public records (except for cases of rape, kidnapping and abduction), or (iii) he is a public servant and the matter relates to their discharge of official duties.

iv. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,[17] (1996)

a. Extended the right to privacy to include communications privacy..

b. Laid down guidelines which form the backbone for checks and balances in interception provisions.

v. District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad and another v. Canara Bank and another, [18] (2004)

a. Refers to personal liberty, freedom of expression and freedom of movement as the fundamental rights which give rise to the right to privacy.

b. The rRight to privacy deals with persons and not places.

c. Intrusion into privacy may be by - (1) legislative provisions, (2) administrative/executive orders and (3) judicial orders.

vi. Selvi and others v. State of Karnataka and others,[19] (2010)

a. The Court acknowledged the distinction between bodily/physical privacy and mental privacy

b. Subjecting a person to techniques such as narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test without consent violates the subject's mental privacy
Although the judgements in the above cases (except for the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India) were pronounced given in a non telecomnot delivered in a telecommunications context, however the ease with which these principles were applied in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, suggests that these principles, where applicable, would be applied even in the context of ICT and are not limited to only the non-digital world.
It must however be noted that dueDue to some incongruities in the interpretation of the earlier judgments, the Supreme Court has recently referred the matter regarding the existence and scope of the right to privacy in India to a larger bench so as to bring clarity regarding the exact scope of the right to privacy in Indian law. The very concept that the Constitution of India guarantees a right to privacy was challenged due to an "unresolved contradiction" in judicial pronouncements. This "unresolved contradiction" arose because in the cases of M.P. Sharma & Others v. Satish Chandra & Others,[20] and Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, [21](decided byEigheighttandsixSixJudges respectively) the majority judgment of the Supreme Court had categorically denied the existence of a right to privacy under the Indian Constitution.

However somehow the later case of Gobind v. State of M.P. and another,[22] (which was decided by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court) relied upon the opinion given by the minority of two judges in Kharak Singh to hold that a right to privacy does exist and is guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India without addressing the fact that this was a minority opinion and that the majority opinion had denied the existeance of the right to privacy. Thereafter a large number of cases have held the right to privacy to be a fundamental right, the most important of which are R. Rajagopal& Another v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others,[23] (popularly known as Auto Shanker's case) and People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India & Another.[24] However, as was noticed by the Supreme Court in its August 11, 2015 order, all these judgments were decided by two or three Judges only which could not have overturned the judgments given by larger benches.[25] It was to resolve this judicial incongruity that the Supreme Court referred this issue to a larger bench to decide on the existence and scope of the right to privacy in India.

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression is one of the most important fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution and has been vehemently protected by the judiciary on a number of occasions whenever it has been threatened. With the advent of social media, the entire dynamics of the freedom of speech and expression have changed in that it is now possible for every individual, with an internet connection and a Facebook/Twitter/Whatsapp account to reach millions of people without spending any extra money. This ability to reach a much larger and wider audience also led to greater friction between people holding different opinions. As the ease of the internet removed the otherwise filtering effects of geography and made it easier for people to communicate with each other, the advent of social media made it easier for them to communicate with a larger number of people at the same time. This ability to communicate within a group also gave rise to "debates" which often turngot ugly, highlighting giving way to concerns of how easy it is to harass people on social media.
This concern over of harassment led a number of people to call for greater censorship of social media and it was perhaps this concern which gave rise to the biggest challenge to the freedom of speech and expression in the online world, in the form of section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which made it an offense to send information which was "grossly offensive" (s.66A(a)) or caused "annoyance" or "inconvenience" while being known to be false (s.66A(c)). This section was used widely seen by Oonline activists, including the Centre for Internet and Society, widely considered this section as a tool for the government to silence those who criticised it. In fact, statistics compiled by the National Crime Records Bureau from 2014 revealed that 2,402 people, including 29 women, were arrested in 4,192 cases under section 66A which accounted for nearly 60% of all arrests under the IT Act, and 40% of arrests for cyber crimes in 2014. [26]
The section was finally struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 in the case of Shreya Singhalv. Union of India, [27] on the ground of being too vague. This decision was seen as a huge victory for the campaign for freedom of speech and expression in the virtual world since this section was frequently used by the state (or rather government in power) to muzzle free speech against the incumbent government or political leaders. The offending section 66A made it an offence to send any information that was "grossly offensive or has menacing character" or "which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently makes by makinguse of such computer resource or a communication device,". These terms quoted above were held by the Court to be too vague and wide and falling foul of the limited restrictions constitutionally imposed on the freedom of expression. The Supreme Court therefore, and were therefore struck down section 66A by the Supreme Court.

2f. A State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public

The researchers of this report could not locate any norms in India which address this issue. To the best of their knowledge, India does not support any ICT activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure.

2g. States should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking into account General Assembly resolution 58/199 on the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures, and other relevant resolutions

1. Section 70 of the IT Act gives the government the authority to declare any computer system which directly affects any critical information infrastructure to be a protected system. The term "critical information infrastructure" (CII) is defined in the IT Act "the computer resource, the incapacitation or destruction of which, shall have debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety." Once the government declares any computer resource as a protected system it gets the authority to prescribe information security practices for such as system as well as identify the persons who are authorised to access such systems. Any person who accesses a protected system in contravention of the provision of Section 70 of the IT Act shall be liable to be imprisoned for a maximum period of 10 years and also pay a fine. Further, section 70A of the IT Act gives the government the power to name a national nodal agency in respect of CII and also prescribe the manner for such agency to perform its duties. In pursuance of the powers under sections 70A the government has designated the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) situated in the JNU campus as the nodal agency [28]. This agency is a part of and under the administrative control of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) [29].

2. The functions and manner of performing such functions by the NCIIPC has been prescribed in the Information Technology (National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre and Manner of Performing Functions and Duties) Rules, 2013.[30] According to these Rules the functions of the NCIIPC include, inter alia, (i) the protecting and giving advice to reduce the vulnerabilities of CII against cyber terrorism, cyber warfare and other threats; (ii) identification of all critical infrastructure elements so that they can be notified by the government; (iii) providing strategic leadership and coherence across the government to respond to cyber security threats against CII; (iv) coordinating, sharing, monitoring, analysing and forecasting national level threats to CII for policy guidance, expertiese sharing and situational awareness for early warning alerts; (v) assisting in the development of appropriate plans, adoption of standards, sharing best practices and refinining procurement processes for CII; (vi) undertaking and funding research and development to innovate future technologies and collaborate with PSUs, academia and international partners for protection of CII; (vii) organising training and awareness programmes and development of audit and certification agencies for protection of CII; (viii) developing and executing national and international cooperation strategies for protection of CII; (ix) issuing guidelines, advisories and vulnerability notes relating to CII and practices, procedures, prevention and responses in consultation with CERT-In and other organisations; (x) exchanging information with CERT-In, especially in relation to cyber incidents; and (xi) calling for information and giving directions to critical sectors or persons having a critical impact on CII, in the event of any threat to CII.[31]

3. The NCIIPC had in the year 2013 released (non publicly) Guidelines for the Protection of National Critical Information Infrastructure [32] (CII Guidelines) which presented 40forty controls and respective guiding principles for the protection of CII. It is expected that these controls and guiding principles will help critical sectors to draw a CII protection roadmap to achieve safe, secure and resilient CII for India. The 'Guidelines for forty Critical Controls' is considered by the NCIIPC to be a significant milestone in its efforts for the protection of nation's critical information assets. These fort controls can be found in Section 6 (Best Practices, Controls and Guidelines) of the CII Guidelines. It must be noted that the CII Guidelines were drafted after taking inputs from a number of stakeholders such as the national Stock Exchange, the Airports Authority of India, National Thermal Power Corporation, Reserve Bank of India, Indian Railways, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, etc. This exercise of taking inputs from different stakeholders as well as developing a standard of as many as 40forty aspects of security seems to suggest that the NCIIPC is taking steps in the right direction.

4. The Recommendations on Telecommunication Infrastructure Policy issued by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India in April, 2011 are silent on the issue of security of critical information infrastructure.s. However, the National Policy on Information Technology, 2012 (NPIT) does address the issue of security of cyber space by saying that the government should make efforts to do the following:

"9.1 To undertake policy, promotion and enabling actions for compliance to international security best practices and conformity assessment (product, process, technology & people) and incentives for compliance.

9.2 To promote indigenous development of suitable security techniques & technology through frontier technology research, solution oriented research, proof of concept, pilot development etc. and deployment of secure IT products/processes

9.3 To create a culture of cyber security for responsible user behavior & actions including building capacities and awareness campaigns.

9.4 To create, establish and operate an 'Information Security Assurance Framework'."

5. The Department of Information and Technology has formed the Computer Emergency Response Term of India (CERT-In) to enhance the security of India's Communications and Information Infrastructure through proactive action and effective collaboration. The Information Security Policy on Protection of Critical Infrastructure released by the CERT-In considers information recorded, processed or stored in electronic medium as a valuable asset and is geared towards protection of such "valuable asset". The policy recognises the importance of critical information infrastructure network and says that any disruption of the operation of such networks is likely to have devastating effects. The policy prescribes that personnel with program delivery responsibilities should also recognise the importance of security of information resources and their management. Thus Ddue to this recognition of the growing networked nature of government as well as critical organisations and the need to have a proper vulnerability analysis as well as effective management of information security risks, the Department of Technology prescribes the following information security policy:

"In order to reduce the risk of cyber attacks and improve upon the security posture of critical information infrastructure, Government and critical sector organizations are required to do the following on priority:

Identify a member of senior management, as Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), knowledgeable in the nature of information security & related issues and designate him/her as a 'Point of contact', responsible for coordinating security policy compliance efforts and to regularly interact with the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Department of Information Technology (DIT), which is the nodal agency for coordinating all actions pertaining to cyber security;
Prepare information security plan and implement the security control measures as per ISI/ISO/IEC 27001: 2005 and other guidelines/standards, as appropriate;
Carry out periodic IT security risk assessments and determine acceptable level of risks, consistent with criticality of business/functional requirements, likely impact on business/ functions and achievement of organisational goals/objectives;
Periodically test and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of technical security control measures implemented for IT systems and networks. Especially, Test and evaluation may become necessary after each significant change to the IT applications/systems/networks and can include, as appropriate the following:

➢ Penetration Testing (both announced as well as unannounced)

➢ Vulnerability Assessment

➢ Application Security Testing

➢ Web Security Testing

Carry out Audit of Information infrastructure on an annual basis and when there is major upgradation/change in the Information Technology Infrastructure, by an independent IT Security Auditing organization;..........

Report to CERT-In the cyber security incidents, as and when they occur and the status of cyber security, periodically."

6. The Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) released the National Policy on Electronics in 2012 which contained the government's take on the electronics industry in India. Section 5 of the said policy talks about cCyber sSecurity and states that to create a complete secure cyber eco-system in the country, careful and due attention is required for creation of well-d defined technology and systems, use of appropriate technology and more importantly development of appropriate products and& solutions. The priorities for action should be suitable design and development of indigenous appropriate products through frontier technology/product oriented research, testing and& validation of security of products meeting the protection profile requirements needed to secure the ICT infrastructure and cyber space of the country.

7. In addition the CERT-In has issued an Information Security Management Implementation Guide for Government Organisations. [33] CERT-In has also prescribed progressive steps for implementation of Information Security Management System in Government & Critical Sectors as per ISO 27001. The steps prescribed are as follows:

Identification of a Point-of-Contact (POC) / Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) for coordinating information security policy implementation efforts and communication with CERT-In
Information Security Awareness Programme
Determination of general Risk environment of the organization (low / medium / hHigh) depending on the nature of web and& networking environment, criticality of business functions and impact of information security incidents on the organization, business activities, assets / resources and individuals
Status appraisal and gap analysis against ISO 27001 based best information security practices
Risk assessment covering evaluation of threat perception and technical and &operational vulnerabilities
Comprehensive risk mitigation plan including selection of appropriate information security controls as per ISO 27001 based best information security practices
Documentation of agreed information security control measures in the form of information security policy manual, procedure manual and work instructions
Implementation of information security control measures (Managerial, Technical and& operational)
Testing & evaluation of technical information security control measures for their adequacy & effectiveness and audit of IT applications/systems/networks by an independent information security auditing organization (penetration testing, vulnerability assessment, application security testing, web security testing, LAN audits, etc)
Information Security Management assessment and certification against ISO 27001 standard, preferably by an independent & accredited organization

8. The Unified License for providing various telecommunication services also discusses contains certain terms which talk about how to engagedeal with telecommunication infrastructure in light of national security, which include the following recommendations:

Providing necessary facilities to the Government to counteract espionage, subversive act, sabotage or any other unlawful activity;
Giving full access to its network and equipment to the authorised persons for technical scrutiny and inspection;
Obtaininggettting security clearance for all foreign nationals deployed on for installation, operation and maintenance of the network;
Being completely responsible for the security of its network and having organizational policy on security and security management of its network including Network forensics, Network Hardening, Network penetration test, Risk assessment;
Auditing its network or getting the network audited from security point of view once in a financial year from a network audit and certification agency;
Inducting only those network elements into its telecommunications network, which have been got tested according tos per relevant contemporary Indian or International Security Standards;
Including all contemporary security related features (including communication security) as prescribed under relevant security standards while procuring the equipment and implementing all such contemporary features into the network;
Keeping requisite records of operations in the network;
Monitoring of all intrusions, attacks and frauds on his technical facilities and provide reports on the same to the Licensor.

Further statutory restrictions on tampering critical infrastructure are already contained in the Telegraph Act and have been discussed above, though the penalties provided may need to be increased if they are to act as a deterrent in this age where the stakes are much higher.

2h. States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another State whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. States should also respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty

There is yet to be a publicly acknowledged request from a foreign government asking the Indian government to take steps to prevent malicious ICT acts originating from its territory.

2i. States should take reasonable steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain so that end users can have confidence in the security of ICT products. States should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions;

Section 4 of the National Electronics Policy, 2012 talks about "Developing and Mandating Standards" and says that in order to curb the inflow of sub-standard and unsafe electronic products the government should mandate technical and safety standards which conform to international standards and do the following:

Develop Indian standards to meet specific Indian conditions including climatic, power supply, and handling and other conditions etc., by suitably reviewing existing standards.

Mandate technical standards in the interest of public health and safety.

Set up an institutional mechanism within Department of Information Technology for mandating compliance to standards for electronics products.

Develop a National Policy Framework for enforcement and use of Standards and Quality Management Processes.

Strengthen the lab infrastructure for testing of electronic products and encouraging development of conformity assessment infrastructure by private participation.

Create awareness amongst consumers against sub-standard and spurious electronic products.

Build capacity within the Government and public sector for developing and mandating standards.

Actively participate in the international development of standards in the Electronic System Design and Manufacturing sector.

2j. States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities and share associated information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities to limit and possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-dependent infrastructure

Under section 70B of the IT Act, India has established a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) to serve as the national agency for incident responses. The functions mandated to be performed by CERT-In as per the IT Act are:

Collection, analysis and dissemination of information on cyber incidents;
Forecasting and alerts of cyber security incidents;
Emergency measures for handling cyber security incidents;
Coordination of cyber incidents response activities;
Issuing ofe guidelines, advisories, vulnerability notes and white papers relating to information security practices, procedures, prevention, response and reporting of cyber incidents;
Such other functions relating to cyber security as may be prescribed.

CERT-In also publishes information regarding various cyber threats on its websites so as to keep internet users aware of the latest threats in the online world. Such information can be accessed both on the main page of the CERT-In website or under the Advisories section on the website. [34]

2k. States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm the information systems of the authorized emergency response teams (sometimes known as computer emergency response teams or cyber security incident response teams) of another State. A State should not use authorized emergency response teams to engage in malicious international activity.

There are no official or public reports of India using its CERT-In to harm the information systems of another state, although it is highly unlikely that any state would publicly acknowledge such activities even if it was indulging in them.

3. Conclusion

As can be seen from the discussion above, the statutory, regulatory and policy regime in India does seem to address most of the cyber security norms in some manner or the other, but these efforts almost always fall short of meeting some of the norms. While the Information Technology Act along with the Rules thereunder, as being the umbrella legislation for digital transactions in India, does address some of the issues mentioned above, it does not address some of the problems that arise out of a greater reliance on the internet such as spamming, trolling, and, online harassment, etc. Although some of these acts may be addressed by regular legislation by applying them in the online world however this does not always take into account the unique features and complexities of committing these acts/crimes in the online world.

In the area of exchange of information between states, India has entered into a number of MLATs and extradition treaties, and frequently issues Letters of Rogatory. Yet however these mechanisms may not be adequate to address the needs of crime prevention of crimes in the age of ICT, as crime prevention it often requires exchange of information inon r a real time basis which is not possible with the bureaucratic procedures involved in the MLAT process. There also needsd to be stronger standards which are applicable to ICT equipment, including imported equipment especially in light of the fact that security concerns related to Chinese ICT equipment that from China have been raised quite frequently in the past. There also needs to be a better system of reporting ICT vulnerabilities to CERT-In or other authorized agencies so that mitigation measure can be implemented in time.

It should be noted that the work of the Group of Experts is not complete since the General Assembly has asked the Secretary General to form a new Group of Experts which would report back to the Secretary General in 2017. It is imperative that the Government of India realise the importance of the work being done by the Group of Experts and take measures to ensure that a representative from India is included in or atleast the comments and concerns of India are included and addressed by the Group of Experts. Meanwhile, India can begin by strengthening domestic privacy safeguards, improving transparency and efficiency of relevant policies and processes, and looking towards solutions that respect rights and strengthen security. Brutent force solutions such as demands for back doors, unfair and unreasonable encryption regulation, and data localization requirements will not help propel India forward in international discussions, dialogues, or agreements on cross-border sharing of information. Though the recommendations from the Group of Experts are welcome, beyond a preliminary mention of privacy and freedom of expression, the rights of individuals - and the ways in which these can be protected, various components that go into supporting those rights including redress, transparency, and due process measures - was inadequately addressed.

[1] The terms "cyberspace" has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as the notional environment in which communication over computer networks occurs. Although the scope of this paper is not to discuss the meaning of this term, it was felt that a simple definition of the term would be useful to better define the parameters of the discussion.

[2] https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-RES-70-237-Information-Security.pdf

[3] https://www.justsecurity.org/29203/british-searches-america-tremendous-opportunity/

[4] http://deity.gov.in/content/country-wise-status

[5] Provided that the provisions of section 67, section 67A and this section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure in electronic form-

(i) The publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern; or

(ii) which is kept or used for bona fide heritage or religious purposes

Explanation: For the purposes of this section, "children" means a person who has not completed the age of 18 years.

[6] http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Plan_Report_on_Cyber_Security.pdf

[7] List of the countries is available at http://cbi.nic.in/interpol/mlats.php

[8] https://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-some-thoughts-civil-society

[9] Peter Swire& Justin D. Hemmings, "Re-Engineering the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Process", http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/SHB2015/Swire.docx, cf. https://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-some-thoughts-civil-society .

[10] MLATS and International Cooperation for Law Enforcement Purposes, available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/presentation-on-mlats.pdf

[11] The full list of the countries with which India has agreed an MLAT is available at http://cbi.nic.in/interpol/extradition.php

[12] http://cbi.nic.in/interpol/assist.php

[13] http://www.firstpost.com/india/how-the-police-tracked-and-arrested-im-founder-yasin-bhatkal-1071755.html

[14] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=3641

[15] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=6014

[16] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=11212

[17] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=14584

[18] http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=26571

[19] http://dspace.judis.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/26592/1/36303.pdf

[20] AIR 1954 SC 300. In para 18 of the Judgment it was held: "A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction."

[21] AIR 1963 SC 1295. In para 20 of the judgment it was held: "… Nor do we consider that Art. 21 has any relevance in the context as was sought to be suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner. As already pointed out, the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movement of an individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III."

[22] (1975) 2 SCC 148.

[23] (1994) 6 SCC 632.

[24] (1997) 1 SCC 301.

[25] http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/right-to-privacy-in-peril

[26] http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-20-2015-aloke-tikku-stats-from-2014-reveal-horror-of-scrapped-section-66-a-of-it-act

[27] http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/FileServer/2015-03-24_1427183283.pdf

[28] http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/S_O_18(E).pdf

[29]

[30] http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR_19(E).pdf

[31] Rule 4 of the Information Technology (National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre and Manner of Performing Functions and Duties) Rules, 2013.

[32] Since these Guidelines were not publicly released they are not available on any government website. In this paper we have relied on a version available on a private website at http://perry4law.org/cecsrdi/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Guidelines-For-Protection-Of-National-Critical-Information-Infrastructure.pdf

[33] Available at http://www.cert-in.org.in/

[34] http://www.cert-in.org.in/

List of Acronyms

ICTs – Information Communication Technologies
GGE – Group of Experts
EU – European Union
DLC-ICT – India-Belarus Digital Learning Center
IT Act – Information Technology Act, 2000
UL - Unified License
DEITY – Department of Electronics and Information Technology
IT – Information Technology
ISO – International Organization for Standardisation
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team
CERT-In - Computer Emergency Response Team, India
MLAT – Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
CII – Critical Information Infrastructure
NCIIPC - National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre
NTRO - National Technical Research Organisation
NPIT - National Policy on Information Technology
CISO - Chief Information Security Officer

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-report-experts-information-telecommunications-security-implications-india

DIDP Request #28 - ICANN renews Verisign’s RZM Contract?

asvatha — 2016-07-30T08:10:17Z

Our request to ICANN was related to our (mistaken) assumption that Verisign and ICANN had signed an agreement for Root Zone Maintenance and had recently renewed it. In that context we had asked for information such as documents reflecting the decision making process, copy of the current RZM agreement, public comments and an audit report of Verisign’s RZM functions.

The request filed by Padmini Baruah can be found here.

What ICANN said

ICANN clarified that it has never been party to the RZM agreement which was made between NTIA and Verisign. According to an ICANN-Verisign joint document, the Root Zone Management Systems allows “ICANN as the IANA Functions Operator (IFO), Verisign, as the Root Zone Maintainer (RZM), and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), as the Root Zone Administrator (RZA).” The only agreement related to this is the one of cooperation between Verisign and the NTIA.

Accordingly, as the role of NTIA is transitioned to the multi-stakeholder community, Verisign and ICANN are working out terms and conditions of their own agreement to facilitate this transition together. In response to NTIA’s request for a proposal for this transition, Verisign and ICANN submitted this document. Besides these, ICANN states that it does not have any documents responsive to our requests.

ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be found here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-28-icann-renews-verisign2019s-rzm-contract

DIDP Request #27 - On ICANN’s support to new gTLD Applicants

asvatha — 2016-07-30T08:03:18Z

In order to promote access to the New gTLD Program in developing regions, ICANN set up the New gTLD Applicant Support Program (Program) which seeks to facilitate cooperation between gTLD applicants from developing countries and those willing and able to support them financially (and in kind).

Click for Applicant Support Directory

We requested ICANN for information about this program. Specifically, we asked them for information on:

The number of applicants to the program and the amount received by them;
The basis on which these applicants were selected;
The amount that has been utilized thus far for this program;
Contributions by donors;
What “in kind” support means and includes.

The request filed by Padmini Baruah can be found here.

What ICANN said

ICANN answered all our questions in a satisfactory manner. There were three applicants to the program. Two of these: Nameshop, and Ummah Digital Ltd, did not meet the eligibility criteria listed in the handbook and therefore only one other applicant, DotKids, received the financial support. Of the USD 2,000,000 set aside, USD 135,000 was awarded to them.

The eligibility criteria is listed in the New gTLD Financial Assistance Handbook and candidates are evaluated by the Support Applicant Review Panel (SARP), “which was comprised of five volunteer members from the community with experience in the domain name industry, in managing small businesses, awarding grants, and assisting others on financial matters in developing countries.”

The USD 2,000,000 allotted to this program was set aside by ICANN’s board and as it is not exhausted, no external contributions were sought by ICANN (in cash or in kind). However, ICANN failed to explain what “in kind” contributions would be.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-27-on-icann2019s-support-to-new-gtld-applicants

DIDP Request #25 - Curbing Sexual Harassment at ICANN

asvatha — 2016-07-30T06:14:29Z

Markus Kummer at Public Forum 2 mentioned that ICANN has standards of behavior regarding sexual harassment that are applicable for its staff.

Marrakech Public Forum 2

In light of that statement, CIS requested ICANN to publish the following information:

Information about the individual or organization conducting ICANN’s sexual harassment training
Materials used during this training
ICANN’s internal sexual harassment policy

The request filed by Padmini Baruah can be found here.

What ICANN said

ICANN’s response answered our questions adequately. The organization conducting their sexual harassment training is NAVEX Global. It is an interactive online training and as such, all materials are within that platform. Besides, ICANN could not publish these materials as it would be an infringement of NAVEX Global’s intellectual property right. ICANN also attached with the response, their internal sexual harassment policy.

ICANN's response to our DIDP request (and the attached policy document) may be found here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-25-curbing-sexual-harassment-at-icann