Pathways to Higher Education

Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act

pranesh — 2012-12-14T09:51:17Z

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which prescribes 'punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.' is widely held by lawyers and legal academics to be unconstitutional. In this post Pranesh Prakash explores why that section is unconstitutional, how it came to be, the state of the law elsewhere, and how we can move forward.

Back in February 2009 (after the IT Amendment Act, 2008 was hurriedly passed on December 22, 2008 by the Lok Sabha, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha[1] but before it was notified on October 27, 2009) I had written that s.66A is "patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India":

Section 66A which punishes persons for sending offensive messages is overly broad, and is patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The fact that some information is "grossly offensive" (s.66A(a)) or that it causes "annoyance" or "inconvenience" while being known to be false (s.66A(c)) cannot be a reason for curbing the freedom of speech unless it is directly related to decency or morality, public order, or defamation (or any of the four other grounds listed in Art. 19(2)). It must be stated here that many argue that John Stuart Mill's harm principle provides a better framework for freedom of expression than Joel Feinberg's offence principle. The latter part of s.66A(c), which talks of deception, is sufficient to combat spam and phishing, and hence the first half, talking of annoyance or inconvenience is not required. Additionally, it would be beneficial if an explanation could be added to s.66A(c) to make clear what "origin" means in that section. Because depending on the construction of that word s.66A(c) can, for instance, unintentionally prevent organisations from using proxy servers, and may prevent a person from using a sender envelope different from the "from" address in an e-mail (a feature that many e-mail providers like Gmail implement to allow people to send mails from their work account while being logged in to their personal account). Furthermore, it may also prevent remailers, tunnelling, and other forms of ensuring anonymity online. This doesn't seem to be what is intended by the legislature, but the section might end up having that effect. This should hence be clarified.

I stand by that analysis. But given that it is quite sparse, in this post I will examine s.66A in detail.

Here's what s. 66A of the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 states:

66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.,
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character;
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Explanation: For the purposes of this section, terms "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, images, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.[2]

A large part of s.66A can be traced back to s.10(2) of the UK's Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935:

If any person —
(a) sends any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character; or
(b) sends any message by telephone, or any telegram, which he knows to be false, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety to any other person; or
(c) persistently makes telephone calls without reasonable cause and for any such purposes as aforesaid;
he shall be liable upon summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Section 66A bears a striking resemblance to the three parts of this law from 1935, with clauses (b) and (c) being merged in the Indian law into a single clause (b) of s.66A, with a whole bunch of new "purposes" added. Interestingly, the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, was never amended to add this provision.

The differences between the two are worth exploring.

Term of Punishment

The first major difference is that the maximum term of imprisonment in the 1935 Act is only one month, compared to three years in s.66A of the IT Act. It seems the Indian government decided to subject the prison term to hyper-inflation to cover for the time. If this had happened for the punishment for, say, criminal defamation, then that would have a jail term of up to 72 years! The current equivalent laws in the UK are the Communications Act, 2003 (s. 127) and the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (s.1) for both of which the penalty is up to 6 months' imprisonment or to a maximum fine of £5000 or both. What's surprising is that in the Information Technology (Amendment) Bill of 2006, the penalty for section 66A was up to 2 years, and it was changed on December 16, 2008 through an amendment moved by Mr. A. Raja (the erstwhile Minister of Communications and IT) to 3 years. Given that parts of s.66A(c) resemble nuisance, it is instructive to note the term of punishment in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for criminal nuisance: a fine of Rs. 200 with no prison term.

"Sending" vs. "Publishing"

J. Sai Deepak, a lawyer, has made an interesting point that the IT Act uses "send" as part of its wording, and not "publish". Given that, only messages specifically directed at another would be included. While this is an interesting proposition, it cannot be accepted because: (1) even blog posts are "sent", albeit to the blog servers — s.66A doesn't say who it has to be sent to; (2) in the UK the Communications Act 2003 uses similar language and that, unlike the Malicious Communication Act 1988 which says "sends to another person", has been applied to public posts to Twitter, etc.; (3) The explanation to s.66A(c) explicitly uses the word "transmitted", which is far broader than "send", and it would be difficult to reconcile them unless "send" can encompass sending to the publishing intermediary like Twitter.

Part of the narrowing down of s.66A should definitely focus on making it applicable only to directed communication (as is the case with telephones, and with the UK's Malicious Communication Act), and not be applicable to publishing.

Section 66A(c)

Section 66A(c) was also inserted through an amendment moved by Mr. Raja on December 16, 2008, which was passed by the Lok Sabha on December 22, 2008, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha. (The version introduced in Parliament in 2006 had only 66A(a) and (b).) This was done in response to the observation by the Standing Committee on Information Technology that there was no provision for spam. Hence it is clear that this is meant as an anti-spam provision. However, the careless phrasing makes it anything but an anti-spam provision. If instead of "for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages" it was "for the purpose of causing annoyance and inconvenience and to deceive and to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages", it would have been slightly closer to an anti-spam provision, but even then doesn't have the two core characteristics of spam: that it be unsolicited and that it be sent in bulk. (Whether only commercial messages should be regarded as spam is an open question.) That it arise from a duplicitous origin is not a requirement of spam (and in the UK, for instance, that is only an aggravating factor for what is already a fine-able activity).

Curiously, the definitional problems do not stop there, but extend to the definitions of "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" in the 'explanation' as well. Those are so vast that more or less anything communicated electronically is counted as an e-mail, including forms of communication that aren't aimed at particular recipients the way e-mail is.

Hence, the anti-spam provision does not cover spam, but covers everything else. This provision is certainly unconstitutional.

Section 66A(b)

Section 66A(b) has three main elements: (1) that the communication be known to be false; (2) that it be for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will; (3) that it be communicated persistently. The main problem here is, of course, (2). "Annoyance" and "inconvenience", "insult", "ill will" and "hatred" are very different from "injury", "danger", and "criminal intimidation". That a lawmaker could feel that punishment for purposes this disparate belonged together in a single clause is quite astounding and without parallel (except in the rest of the IT Act). That's akin to having a single provision providing equal punishment for calling someone a moron ("insult") and threatening to kill someone ("criminal intimidation"). While persistent false communications for the purpose of annoying, insulting, inconveniencing, or causing ill will should not be criminalised (if need be, having it as a civil offence would more than suffice), doing so for the purpose of causing danger or criminal intimidation should. However, the question arises whether you need a separate provision in the IT Act for that. Criminal intimidation is already covered by ss. 503 and 506 of the IPC. Similarly, different kinds of causing danger are taken care of in ss.188, 268, 283, 285, 289, and other provisions. Similarly with the other "purposes" listed there, if, for instance, a provision is needed to penalise hoax bomb threats, then the provision clearly should not be mentioning words like "annoyance", and should not be made "persistent". (At any rate, s. 505(1) of the IPC suffices for hoax bomb threats, so you don't need a separate provision in the IT Act).

I would argue that in its current form this provision is unconstitutional, since there is no countervailing interest in criminalising false and persistent "insults", etc., that will allow those parts of this provision to survive the test of 'reasonableness' under Art.19(2). Furthermore, even bits that survive are largely redundant. While this unconstitutionality could be cured by better, narrower wording, even then one would need to ensure that there is no redundancy due to other provisions in other laws.

Section 66A(a)

In s.66A(a), the question immediately arises whether the information that is "grossly offensive" or "menacing" need to be addressed at someone specific and be seen as "grossly offensive" or "menacing" by that person, or be seen by a 'reasonable man' test.

Additionally, the term "grossly offensive" will have to be read in such a heightened manner as to not include merely causing offence. The one other place where this phrase is used in Indian law is in s.20(b) of the Indian Post Office Act (prohibiting the sending by post of materials of an indecent, obscene, seditious, scurrilous, threatening, or grossly offensive character). The big difference between s.20(b) of the IPO Act and s.66A of the IT Act is that the former is clearly restricted to one-to-one communication (the way the UK's Malicious Communication Act 1988 is). Reducing the scope of s.66A to direct communications would make it less prone to challenge.

Additionally, in order to ensure constitutionality, courts will have to ensure that "grossly offensive" does not simply end up meaning "offensive", and that the maximum punishment is not disproportionately high as it currently is. Even laws specifically aimed at online bullying, such as the UK's Protection from Harassment Act 1997, can have unintended effects. As George Monbiot notes, the "first three people to be prosecuted under [the Protection from Harassment Act] were all peaceful protesters".

Constitutional Arguments in Importing Laws from the UK

The plain fact is that the Indian Constitution is stronger on free speech grounds than the (unwritten) UK Constitution, and the judiciary has wide powers of judicial review of statutes (i.e., the ability of a court to strike down a law passed by Parliament as 'unconstitutional'). Judicial review of statutes does not exist in the UK (with review under its EU obligations being the exception) as they believe that Parliament is supreme, unlike India. Putting those two aspects together, a law that is valid in the UK might well be unconstitutional in India for failing to fall within the eight octagonal walls of the reasonable restrictions allowed under Art.19(2). That raises the question of how they deal with such broad wording in the UK.

Genealogy of UK Law on Sending 'Indecent', 'Menacing', 'Grossly Offensive' Messages

Quoting from the case of DPP v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40 [6]:

The genealogy of [s. 127(1) of the Communication Act] may be traced back to s.10(2)(a) of the Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935, which made it an offence to send any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character. That subsection was reproduced with no change save of punctuation in s.66(a) of the Post Office Act 1953. It was again reproduced in s.78 of the Post Office Act 1969, save that "by means of a public telecommunication service" was substituted for "by telephone" and "any message" was changed to "a message or other matter". Section 78 was elaborated but substantially repeated in s.49(1)(a) of the British Telecommunications Act 1981 and was re-enacted (save for the substitution of "system" for "service") in s.43(1)(a) of the Telecommunications Act 1984. Section 43(1)(a) was in the same terms as s.127(1)(a) of the 2003 Act, save that it referred to "a public telecommunication system" and not (as in s.127(1)(a)) to a "public electronic communications network". Sections 11(1)(b) of the Post Office Act 1953 and 85(3) of the Postal Services Act 2000 made it an offence to send certain proscribed articles by post.

While the above quotation talks about s.127(1) it is equally true about s.127(2) as well. In addition to that, in 1988, the Malicious Communications Act (s.1) was passed to prohibit one-to-one harassment along similar lines.

The UK's Post Office Act was eclipsed by the Telecommunications Act in 1984, which in turn was replaced in 2003 by the Communications Act. (By contrast, we still stick on to the colonial Indian Post Office Act, 1898.) Provisions from the 1935 Post Office Act were carried forward into the Telecommunications Act (s.43 on the "improper use of public telecommunication system"), and subsequently into s.127 of the Communications Act ("improper use of public electronic communications network"). Section 127 of the Communications Act states:

127. Improper use of public electronic communications network
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character; or
(b) causes any such message or matter to be so sent.
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another, he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that he knows to be false,
(b) causes such a message to be sent; or
(c) persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to anything done in the course of providing a programme service (within the meaning of the Broadcasting Act 1990 (c. 42)).

Currently in the UK there are calls for repeal of s.127. In a separate blog post I will look at how the UK courts have 'read down' the provisions of s.127 and other similar laws in order to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Comparison between S. 66A and Other Statutes

Section 144, IPC, 1860

Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger

...obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity

Babulal Parate v. State of Maharastra and Ors. [1961 AIR SC 884] (Magistrates order under s. 144 of the Cr. PC, 1973 was in violation of Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution).

A special thanks is due to Snehashish Ghosh for compiling the below table.

Section	Term(s)/phrase(s) used in 66A	Term(s)/ phrase(s) used in similar sections
Section 66A (heading)	Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc	Section 127, CA, 2003, "Improper use of public electronic communications network"
Section 66A(a)	Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device	Section 1(1), MCA 1988, "Any person who sends to another person..."
Section 66A(a)	Grossly offensive	Section 1(1)(a)(i), MCA 1988; Section 127(1)(a),CA, 2003; Section 10(2)(a), Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935; Section 43(1)(a), Telecommunications Act 1984; Section 20, India Post Act 1898
Section 66A(a)	Menacing character	Section127(1)(a),CA, 2003
Section 66A(b)	Any information which he knows to be false	Section 1(1)(a)(iii), MCA 1988 "information which is false and known or believed to be false by the sender"; Section 127(2)(a), CA, 2003, "a message that he knows to be false"
Section 66A(b) “purpose of...”	Causing annoyance	Section127(2), CA, 2003
	Inconvenience	Section 127 (2), CA, 2003
	Danger
	Insult	Section 504, IPC, 1860
	Injury	Section 44 IPC, 1860, "The word 'injury' denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property."
	Criminal intimidation	Sections 503 and 505 (2), IPC, 1860
	Enmity, hatred or ill-will	Section 153A(1)(a), IPC, 1860
	Persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device	Section 127(2)(c), CA, 2003, "persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network."
Section 66A(c)	Deceive or to mislead	-

Notes
MCA 1988: Malicious Communications Act (s.1)
CA: Communications Act 2003 (s.127)
*Replaced by Communications Act 2003

[1]. The Information Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2008, was one amongst the eight bills that were passed in fifteen minutes on December 16, 2008.
[2]. Inserted vide Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008.

This was re-posted in Outlook (November 28, 2012)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act

Whose Change is it Anyway?

nishant — 2015-04-17T10:56:47Z

This thought piece is an attempt to reflect critically on existing practices of “making change” and its implications for the future of citizen action in information and network societies. It observes that change is constantly and explicitly invoked at different stages in research, practice, and policy in relation to digital technologies, citizen action, and network societies.

The White Paper by Nishant Shah was published by Hivos recently.

However, we do not have adequate frameworks to address the idea of change. What constitutes change? What are the intentions that make change possible? Who are the actors involved? Whose change is it, anyway?

Drawing on the Hivos Knowledge Programme and on knowledge frameworks around youth, technology, and change from the last four years, this thought piece introduces new ways of defining, locating, and figuring change. In the process, it also helps understand the role that digital technologies play in shaping and amplifying our processes and practices of change, and to understand actors of change who are not necessarily confined to the category of “citizen”, which seems to be understood as the de facto agent of change in contemporary social upheavals, political uprisings, and cultural innovations.

Methodologically, this thought piece attempts to make three discursive interventions: It locates digital activism in historical trajectories, positing that digital activism has deep ties to traditional activism, when it comes to the core political cause. Simultaneously, it recognises that new modes of political engagement are demanding and producing novel practices and introducing new actors and stakeholders. It looks at contemporary digital and network theories, but also draws on older philosophical lineages to discuss the crises that we seek to address. It tries to interject these abstractions and theoretical frameworks back into the field by producing two case studies that show how engagement with these questions might help us reflect critically on our past practices and knowledge as well as on visions for and speculations about the future, and how these shape contemporary network societies. It builds a theoretical framework based on knowledge gleaned from conversations, interviews, and on-the-ground action with different groups and communities in emerging information societies, and integrates with new critical theory to build an interdisciplinary and accessible framework that seeks to inform research, development-based interventions, and policy structures at the intersection of digital technologies, citizen action, and change by introducing questions around change into existing discourse.

Click to download the full White Paper here (PDF, 321 Kb)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/digital-natives/blog/hivos-knowledge-programme-june-14-2013-nishant-shah-whose-change-is-it-anyway

Negative of porn

namita — 2011-08-02T08:35:34Z

The post deals with what has been written about Savita Bhabhi in an attempt to make sense of her peccadiloes and with the seeming futility of Porn studies located in America to our different reality. I take the liberty of exploring my own experiential account of pornography since I feel that in that account (mine and others) when done seriously, certain aspects of pornography emerge that address questions that are about cinema, images, sex, philosophy and how desire works. The title is mischeviously inspired from Dr. Pek Van Andel's recent video of MRI images of people having sex.

Jonathan James McCreadie Lillie in his article “Cyberporn, Sexuality and the Net Apparatus” while talking about academic engagement with pornography (by Kipnis, Hunt, Waugh, Kendrick) points to how they share “a common concern with analysing pornography within the various cultural constructs and social spaces in which it appears, and in which people encounter it”. He says that a new agenda for cyberporn research has to acknowledge that “people have produced pornography in many different forms for many different purposes, and the reasons why people use it or do not use it, and what meanings they make of it, are equally diverse”. (1)

Lillie points towards cyberporn reception studies – the home/office terminal as a site of cyberporn reception – as a possible starting point of further work on cyberporn. My interest is located in how does one understand your own consumption of internet porn, located as it is in the context that is not the global North and more specifically not male and not heterosexual. Attempting to do that through the readings in porn studies (Porn studies, edited by Linda Williams) (2), or specifically net porn studies (C’lick me – Net Porn Reader) (3), has not been entirely fruitful though what is talked about is highly interesting. One of the problems perhaps lies in what Lillie says about the need for analyzing pornography within the various cultural constructs and social spaces in which it appears, rather than separate or floating above them. The Internet does not entirely make protean beings (cyborgs?) of us after all, and the relevance of porn studies elsewhere can only be partially relevant to a study here.

[Curiously though the debates within feminism and the women’s movement around pornography in the global North – the familiar rhetoric of the causal links between pornography and violence, do have a resonance in similar debates in the women’s movement here. At a roundtable discussion on the role of media at the recent Courts of Women organized by Vimochana (4), many of the sentiments expressed by activists and organizations see a causal link between explicit sexual material, violence and its direct negative impact on morals, attitudes and behaviour of people.]

Linda Williams begins the volume on Porn Studies by stating that there has been a movement from the deadlock of pro-censorship and sex positive feminist discourse on pornography, to a stage where there is a veritable explosion of sexual material that is crying out for analysis, and that sexually explicit imagery is a fixture in popular culture today (obviously referring to America but to some extent true for other contexts as well). In some ways there is an attempt amongst academics, intellectuals, journalists and other writers here to make sense of the pornographic material that has crept into our media saturated cities. Many recent articles spawned by the ban on Savita Bhabhi attempt to understand the unleashing of desire around Savita Bhabhi (from a rock song to unashamed fandom) and to analyse the reasons for the ban or rather what makes Savita Bhabhi threatening.

Savita Bhabhi, the [porn] [toon] [star]

Itty Abraham undertakes a fairly detailed analysis of what is happening in twelve episodes of Savita Bhabhi and perhaps unconvincingly places the crux of the story of Savita Bhabhi on her cuckolded husband, Ashok (5). He says “Their family life is relentless modern, nuclear, bourgeois, if also gendered in familiar ways. The couple eats together (and at the same time), they watch TV together in the evenings, and sleep in the same bed.” For Abraham, the comic is about “these new sexual possibilities.. that begin from a new kind of freedom to which the modern urban woman has access”. The article suggests that we seem to be faced with a choice between the free untrammeled Savita and her easy occupation of urban spaces protected by an aura of class and her husband Ashok who is the hard worker earning enough to keep alive her/our illusion of abundant urban neoliberal existence. Interestingly the article is not attempting to make a point about pornography in relation to ideas of culture, tradition, vulgarity or other familiar motifs in the debate on obscenity.

Shohini Ghosh’s article takes on the task to find out what precisely is so transgressive about Savita Bhabhi (6). Savita Bhabhi is poised between the family and husband and illegitimate desires (similar to themes in Charulata, Hum aapke hain kaun). She points that the pleasure of the comic is not just that there are hard core sexual scenes as much as that the husband or a similar character cannot look at what you look at. The Indian erotica (or pornographic text) scene too is replete with tales of incest and transgressions with domestic workers or servants|maids as they are called in the stories. Ghosh while acknowledging the harm-violence debate within feminism on pornography, states that she is anti-censorship – that although it is obvious that media, images have an impact (otherwise why would they be cause of study) there is no neat causal link between porn and sexual violence. She ends by saying that “pornography then is a phantasmatic arena. It does not reflect people’s ‘real’ sex lives so much as it articulates the desires and aspirations for imagined ones.”

Both articles make important linkages to other and pre-existing debates on neo-liberal agendas, occupation of urban spaces, feminism and obscenity. Ghosh seems to also be referring to a broader category of Indian porn and the problems posed by it. She also gestures towards the problems that might be posed if Savita Bhabhi were a real person and not a comic, but by and large most journalistic writing/analysis of Savita Bhabhi flattens out the field – asking questions as if comic characters were real persons, and not taking into account aesthetics, technology (mode of delivery) or where and how it is viewed (reception) by people. There is a difference in the way I respond to a comic about sex than to an MMS or hidden camera porn where I am aware of the ‘realness’ of atleast some aspects of the image I’m looking at.

The ‘realness’ raises certain dilemmas – the anxiety is not as severe and troubled as in the case of Mysore Mallige which is haunted by urban legends of the couples or only the woman committing suicide, forced marriage at a police station etc. Nonetheless to encounter the MMS video, when the woman is looking directly at the camera often so it does not seem like a hidden camera or non-consensual video, is to acknowledge the taking of pleasure at the expense of someone else which may or may not bother you, but does render the activity far more illicit and scary. My feeling of fear|anxiety|secrecy|aloneness when surfing pornography, whether in the office, home or anywhere where I can be discovered, is an added layer to the experience even if the various aspects of violation of privacy, vulnerability of the woman in the video or the existence of a pornography industry are not uppermost in the mind when actually viewing the clips. One of the few works done that do address this complicated set of affects that circulate and attach themselves to pornography is Bharath Murthy’s film on Mysore Mallige ( the next post will be on this film and interview with Bharath Murthy). (7)

This is why I would insist that the comic is a different space for a viewer – some things such as anxieties about who this person I’m looking at is and what happened to her do disappear, while others such as a comic is bright, colourful and highly visible on my computer screen (for instance) become more important. It is harder to hide surfing Savita Bhabhi in an office than reading erotica or even downloading and discreetly watching a small video. The aspect of how Savita Bhabhi being a comic/drawn character changes how a viewer relates to the material is an area of study that needs to be looked at more closely, perhaps with the help of existing work that looks at the manga, anime, hentaii phenomenon in Japan and parts of South East Asia.

The makers of Savita Bhabhi were anonymous till the ban and after what seemed like a rather brief struggle with authority (SaveSavita campaign on twitter and a blog) they vacated the public scene. As a consequence of no real contest, the ban persists. But perhaps what is admirable is that many people have learnt to use tools that allow them to still view Savita (and to expose them here would be just foolhardy). In an interview online the makers of Savita Bhabhi state .. “For one, it (comic) is a unique medium in the context of Indian porn. We’ve had MMS’s, videos, stories, etc, but no porn comics. Also a comic allows us to explore the fantasy in a much more vivid way than any other medium.” This fantasy life however cannot be dismissed, as it is indeed very real, or as they say – “based on real life fantasies of our authors and fans. They are all something that a normal full blooded Indian male or female would be fantasizing about on their commute to work or a lazy evening at home.” In a short interview with the makers of the comic more recently and subsequent to the ban they said that probably it was Savita Bhabhi’s popularity that led to her downfall and that they set out to explore Indian sexuality, which “obviously is a big No”.

To return to Lillie’s call for a cyberporn reception studies perhaps it is time in relation to looking at such material that we step away, even if briefly, from these debates on feminism, vulgarity and obscenity in Indian culture and others. In an interview dated 5th September, 2009, Ratheesh Radhakrishnan says that what needs to be looked at when studying pornography, is not the questions of Indian culture, religion, roles of women and gender (as for questions related to obscenity) but the aesthetics of pornography. In his own work Radhakrishnan deals precisely with this question in relation to the category of ‘soft porn’ and how Shakeela becomes a star through soft porn cinema – a star not entirely governed by the narrative of the film but seemingly existing beyond the limit of the film itself. (8) By doing this, his work deals with the question of how desire works in such films, which perhaps is one of the more important question to ask about pornography. In the same interview, he states that there is “something that takes place between the text and the person watching” and that is what he is interested in.

Anti-porn

Radhakrishnan’s position is interesting in relation to this project as it opens up questions that are beyond the feminist deadlock on pornography and also goes beyond rhetoric of the liberating potential of the explosion of the polymorphous perverse online. The latter is where a lot of porn studies undertaken in the global North seems to get lost. The breathless recounting of the pornographic in the everyday, does not help since it becomes very obvious that any analysis would not be relevant to a vastly different context in India. (9)

Walter Metz in his article on Open Water (10) challenges the ethics of porn studies – though he acknowledges that pornography is more a symptom rather than a cause of anti-social behaviours that it is often linked to (violent rape, aggressive behaviour, sexism etc.), but still raises the question as to whether there are significant reasons to put the brakes on a rabid, radical celebration of the liberating potential of pornography. Metz talks about the need, within porn studies, to look at the positive and negative impact of pornography (possibly he would extend that to looking at violent martial arts film and other strands of cinema/new media).

Metz’s paper as such deals with Open Water as an anti-pornographic film (here referring to the generic practice of pornography rather than political positions) and this might be an interesting productive mode to understand the affect produced by pornography. Though Metz qualifies that he’s not using pornography as a genre, but rather “as a reading frame. If one keeps thinking about pornography while watching a non-pornographic film, what is the resulting interpretation?” Since I haven’t seen the film Open Water perhaps my interest in such an analysis is misfounded. Metz describes the frustration depicted in the film Open Water between the audience expectations for a reasonably good looking, tanned, blonde couple to get-it-on and what happens to their bodies instead in the open water of the sea and prey to sharks, is similar to the disjuncture that takes place in one of the films part of the Destricted project. (11)

Destricted is an interesting artistic|intellectual|new media|film experiments in the global North around pornography. It is a series of short films that resulted from an invitation to seven well known artists and filmmakers to try to respond to sex and especially the phenomenon of pornography in the contemporary. One of the films Death Valley by Sam Taylor-Wood borrows from the Biblical tale of Onan and places a man masturbating in the heaving, throbbing landscape of the Death Valley (the hottest place in the Western hemisphere where the earth’s crust is constantly changing and shifting). For precisely 7 minutes and 58 seconds, the protagonist of the film masturbates uncomfortably without reaching ejaculation and/or release. The painful un-release of this film, perhaps is meant to be juxtaposed with the assumed ease of pornography’s answer to desire. However peculiarly it actually is probably an accurate description of the experiential account of pornography – of looking, searching, finding, downloading on painfully low speeds, watching short clips that are blurred, shot only from one angle, badly drawn comics or looking at largely uninspiring material which is not acquired or found easily.

In some ways the experience of watching either of these films sounds similar to watching certain kinds of MMS video porn. For instance, one video was of a couple doing oral sex in a toilet cubicle. The angle of the camera was from the top and perhaps the intention behind this was to obscure the faces of the two persons, since only the top of their heads are visible. It did not seem like the couple were unaware of the video camera, as much as performing for it almost unwillingly and only if the anonymity was preserved. The video was low quality and highly blurred, to the point of any features being indistinct beyond blackness of hair (maybe) and generic skin tone which could be Indian, Iranian or generic South Asian. The resemblance to the Destricted video is because again of the time it takes to reach ejaculation – there is a painfully long uninspiring blowjob sequence. The video remains scary and leaves one with a feeling of claustrophobia, discomfort and peculiarly boredom or distance from what is happening. Yet perhaps it is here that the question of realness and the affect it produces enters again. The question that intrigues me is whether the affect produced by the video is because there are certain gestures of the woman that seem recognizable, because she seems like you (ethnically, racially ofcourse but also in sexual spaces she occupies and behaviour). After having accomplished the task of coaxing semen out of the uninspiring penis she is faced with, she folds her legs and speaks indistinctly. In that moment she seems uncomfortably familiar, like watching a friend having sex or maybe an aspect of yourself.

It is perhaps interesting that it is amateur pornography these days that seems to inspire the most complicated set of affects (unlike the schooled|disciplined and predictable response to cinema) – shocked recognition of yourself and desire to see it again, titillation, boredom but yet unwilling to look away, love for celebrities, pleasure of viewing a body like yours and even sometimes a recognition that this is what you look like during sex, fear about your own privacy, disgust for what seems unacceptable and provokes the moral|visual|auditory sensibilities and contempt for the material and the people who possibly are genuinely engaged with it. The article on Pam and Tommy’s video in Porn Studies infact displays these varied affects and underlines William’s assertion that this bracket of material, behaviour and practices that get termed pornography/pornographic does indeed deserve analysis, otherwise a potentially unique and interesting way of understanding the contemporary would be lost for squeamishness.

There are many aspects of the Minette Hillyer’s analysis (12) that are specifically relevant only to the American contexts – the notoriety of both the stars, the pre-existence and glorification of home videos in most families and the acknowledgement of amateur couple porn as even a healthy practice, perhaps suggested for couples with dull sex lives. In India, it was infact unknown people who were catapulted into the public eye with the circulation of their video, online and offline that was later titled Mysore Mallige ; not just the private spaces, holidays and fucking habits of already-celebrities like Pam and Tommy.

What might be relevant here from Hillyer’s analysis is the pre occupation with the realness of amateur pornography. The article follows the travels of the Pam and Tommy home video between different categories/genres, depending on different aspects of its realness. The video as such, contains scenes from the normal domestic lives of the stars and a eight minute sequence of sex in an almost fifty minute length video. So the questions of realness are answered not by the sex in the video, but the mundane recording of their lives, holidays, house and other details. This question of what exactly it is – home video or pornography (domestic/private or pornographic/public) is relevant to questions of legality (for damages upto 90 million dollars), how it circulates (a pornographic video of Pam and Tommy without the domestic padding perhaps would not be considered real and saleable) and genre which relates to some aspects of how people respond to the work. Ever since the advent of (cheap) video technology, pornography is rendered less cinematic and more concerned with the presentational act (of sex) than its representation (ibid). With MMS videos and hidden camera porn, though questions may no longer be about representation, they are still complicated questions about the aesthetics, reception of pornography and our relation to the technology that delivers it and for me viewing pornography today as only presentational does not help to understand the affects that surround and attach to it. Perhaps many strands of what is explored in this article can be explored in relation to Mysore Mallige in the next blog post.

Just as I finish this piece, after an interview with Nishant Shah at Center for Internet and Society, another question enters the frame in relation to pleasure, moving it beyond those raised above. Is pleasure now a question that is less about finding the corporeal thrill through pornography online, as much as pleasure that comes from simulation and the added rush of simulating cities, lives, personalities online. And is that pleasure, pornographic?

End notes:

1. Jonathan James McCreadie Lillie, “Cyberporn, Sexuality, and the Net Apparatus”, Convergence 2004; 10; 43

2. Williams Linda (ed), Porn Studies, Duke University Press, London and Durham, 2004.

3. Katrien Jacobs, Marije Janssen, Matteo Pasquinelli (eds), C’lick Me: A Netporn Studies Reader, Institute of Network Cultures, Amsterdam, 2007.

4. Courts of Women, Vimochana Bangalore, 27-29 July, 2009.

5. Itty Abraham, Sex in the Neo-liberal City: On Savita Bhabhi, Available at The Fish Pond at http://thefishpond.in/itty/2009/on-savita-bhabhi/#comments

6. Shohini Ghosh, The politics of porn, Himal South Asian Magazine, September 2009, Vol 22, No. 9.

7. Bharath Murthy (director), Mysore Mallige, 2007.

8. Ratheesh Radhakrishnan, “‘The Mis-en-scene of desire’: Stardom and the case of soft porn cinema in Kerala!” Unpublished work. Contact author for copy.

9. Bloomingdale's now sells Tom of Finland shirts and trousers, housewives celebrate their birthdays by piercing their geni- tals, college students dance naked instead of waiting tables to pay their tuition, and middle-level managers schedule a session with a dominatrix in their favorite dungeon after a game of racquetball at their regular health club. From Joseph W. Slade, Pornography and Sexual Representation: A Reference Guide, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001.

10. Walter Metz, “Shark Porn: Film Genre, Reception Studies, and Chris Kentis' Open Water” Film Criticism, March 22, 2007

11 Destricted: explicit films, Marina Abramovic, Matthew Barney, Marco Brambilla, Larry Clark, Gaspar Noé, Richard Prince, Sam Taylor Wood (directors), 2006.

12 Minnette Hillyer, “Sex in the suburban: Porn, Home movies and the Live Action Perofmance of Love in Pam and Tommy: Hardcore and uncensored”, Porn Studies, Duke University Press, London and Durham, 2004, p.50.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/blogs/law-video-technology/looking-closer-at-porn-with-x-ray-spectacles-savita-bhabhi-mms-video-and-others

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010

pranesh — 2011-09-21T06:01:54Z

CIS analyses the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, from a public interest perspective to sift the good from the bad, and importantly to point out what crucial amendments should be considered but have not been so far.

The full submission that CIS and 21 other civil society organizations made to the Rajya Sabha Standing Committee on HRD (which is studying the Bill) is available here. Given below is the summary of our submissions:

Existing Copyright Act

The Indian Copyright Act, 1957 has been designed from the perspective of a developing country. It has always attempted a balance between various kinds of interests. It has always sought to ensure that rights of authors of creative works is carefully promoted alongside the public interest served by wide availability and usability of that material. For instance, our Copyright Act has provisions for:

compulsory and statutory licensing: recognizing its importance in making works available, especially making them available at an affordable rate.
cover versions: recognizing that more players lead to a more vibrant music industry.
widely-worded right of fair dealing for private use: recognizing that individual use and large-scale commercial misuse are different.

These provisions of our Act have been lauded, and India has been rated as the most balanced copyright system in a global survey conducted of over 34 countries by Consumers International.

The Indian Parliament has always sought to be responsive to changing technologies by paying heed to both the democratisation of access as well as the securing of the interests of copyright holders. This approach needs to be lauded, and importantly, needs to be maintained.

Proposed Amendments

Some positive amendments

Fair Dealings, Parallel Importation, Non-commercial Rental: All works (including sound recordings and cinematograph films) are now covered the fair dealings clause (except computer programmes), and a few other exceptions; parallel importation is now clearly allowed; and non-commercial rental has become a limitation in some cases.
Persons with disabilities: There is finally an attempt at addressing the concerns of persons with disabilities. But the provisions are completely useless the way they are currently worded.
Public Libraries: They can now make electronic copies of works they own, and some other beneficial changes relating to public libraries.
Education: Some exceptions related to education have been broadened (scope of works, & scope of use).
Statutory and compulsory licensing: Some new statutory licensing provisions (including for radio broadcasting) and some streamlining of existing compulsory licensing provisions.
Copyright societies: These are now responsible to authors and not owners of works.
Open licences: Free and Open Source Software and Open Content licensing is now simpler.
Partial exemption of online intermediaries: Transient and incidental storage of copyrighted works has been excepted, mostly for the benefit of online intermediaries.
Performer’s rights: The general, and confusing, exclusive right that performers had to communicate their performance to the public has been removed, and instead only the exclusive right to communicate sound/video recordings remains.
Enforcement: Provisions on border measures have been made better, and less prone to abuse and prevention of legitimate trade.

Some negative amendments

WCT and WPPT compliance: India has not signed either of these two treaties, which impose TRIPS-plus copyright protection, but without any corresponding increase in fair dealing / fair use rights.
Increase in duration of copyright: This will significantly reduce the public domain, which India has been arguing for internationally.
Technological Protection Measures: TPMs, which have been shown to be anti-consumer in all countries in which they have been introduced, are sought to be brought into Indian law.
Version recordings: The amendments make cover version much more difficult to produce.
Moral rights: Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without requisite safeguards.

Missed opportunities

Government-funded works: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected to march towards with the Right to Information Act.
Copyright terms: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural progress.
Criminal provisions: Our law still criminalises individual, non-commercial copyright infringement.
Libraries and archives: The exceptions for ‘public libraries’ are still too narrow in what they perceive as ‘public libraries’.
Educational exceptions: The exceptions for education still do not fully embrace distance and digital education.
Communication to the public: No clear definition is given of what constitute a ‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and non-commercial ‘public’ communication.
Internet intermediaries: More protections are required to be granted to Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled.
Fair dealing and fair use: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This would not take away from the existing exceptions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-analysis

Fallacies, Lies, and Video Pirates

pranesh — 2011-08-04T04:43:08Z

At a recent conference on counterfeiting and piracy, industry representatives variously pushed for stiffer laws for IP violation, more stringent enforcement of existing IP laws, and championed IP as the most important thing for businesses today. This blog post tries to show how their arguments are flawed.

The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) organized its third annual conference on counterfeiting and piracy, with support from the United States Embassy and the Quality Brands Protection Committee of China (a body comprising more than 80 multinational companies). Last week we criticised the conference in an open letter. This week, we examine a few of the recurring themes that came up at the conference.

Something being substandard is not the same as something being counterfeit.

This was a mistake made by many whenever they invoked 'counterfeit' in the sense of something that is violative of one's patent and trademark rights. The Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act itself distinguishes between 'misbranded', 'adulterated', and 'spurious' drugs, thus recognizing that something that is made without proper authorization from rights owners isn't necessarily of a bad quality. Indeed, this was substantiated by an audience member, a lawyer from Dr. Reddy's Lab. She spoke of a mandi in Agra where they seized medicines being sold under the Dr. Reddy's name, but produced by local manufacturers. Upon lab testing, it turned out, much to their surprise, that the medicines were of the highest quality and were not substandard. Similarly, many large companies including trusted FMCG companies like Hindustan Unilever and ITC are upbraided by authorities for violations of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (for the cosmetics they produce) as well as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Thus, even legitimate businesses can produce substandard products. Thus, a product can be unauthorized but not substandard, just as a product can be substandard but not counterfeit.

This distinction becomes very important when we talk about patents, and especially drug patents. A generic drug is by definition identical or within an acceptable bio-equivalent range to the brand name counterpart with respect to pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic properties. Thus, this entire category of high-quality drugs is often sought to be made illegal or counterfeit by large pharma companies. Some countries like Kenya have capitulated. But so far the World Health Assembly has been forced by developing countries to keep the issue of substandard medicines separate from patent-bypassing medicines.

The industry, for all their talk about "out of the box" thinking on the issue, still only consider metrics such the number of piracy raids conducted as measures of success. A question was put forth by Manisha Shridhar of the Intellectual Property & Trade Unit of the World Health Organization upon learning of the quality of the drugs seized at the Agra mandi: Why not cut a licensing deal with those manufacturers, who obviously have excellent production facilities? That kind of thinking, which helped HMV in India in the 1980s, and copying innovative features from video pirates and pricing their products competitively has helped an Indian company, Moserbaer, do extremely well.

Counterfeiters and pirates are not always seeking to fool consumers.

Only lawyers hired by the industry would think that a consumer aspiring towards a Rolex watch would actually think that the one he purchased off the streets for one-hundredth the original's price was in fact original. Street-side DVD hawkers are not thought by the general public to be selling original wares. Still, despite knowing the difference between the original and the fake, consumers many times opt for the latter.

Having said that, counterfeiting, by using someone else's trademark and trying to pass off fake goods as real ones, is quite obviously wrong. It harms customers, and it harms the manufacturers. Thus, a distinction deserves to be made here between the counterfeiters who try to deceive consumers (for instance by copying authenticity marks, like holograms, etc.) and those who are just providing them with highly cheaper alternatives (pirated DVDs, etc.). In this light, it is also important here to distinguish between counterfeiting, traditionally taken to be trademark violation, and piracy, traditionally taken to be a violation of international law, but now generally meaning a large-scale violation of copyright law. While the former can lead to consumer confusion, the latter scarcely ever does. This is ignored by industry people who evoke the image of the consumer quite often, but only when it helps them, and not in any meaningful manner. They negate consumer choice when it comes to consciously purchasing pirated goods, and consumer freedoms when it comes to usage of copyrighted materials.

While commercial film piracy funds terrorists, so does pretty much every business activity.

A favourite of the MPAA (and by association, the MPA) is the RAND report on Film Piracy and its Connection to Organized Crime and Terrorism. This report, which was funded by the MPAA, predictably concludes that film piracy funds organized crime and terrorism. Even if we are to believe its findings wholesale, it leaves us wondering whether all business activities from which terrorists derive funds should be banned.

In India, there is a substantiated link between organized crime and film and music production, and terrorists have been said to make money off the stock market. If the MPA's arguments are taken to their logical conclusions, then film production and equity trading should also be prosecuted. Furthermore, while the mafia and terrorists are the ostensible targets, the laws that are brought about to tackle it affect poor roadside vendors and non-commercial online file sharers. To tackle the funding of terrorists, roadside piracy shouldn't become the target just as film production per se shouldn't. The invocation of the RAND report is thus only meant for rhetorical effect, as it is hard to find logic in there.

"To copy without authorization is to steal", the death penalty, and drug peddling.

At the conference, Dominic Keating of the US Embassy pointed out that "to copy without authorization is to steal" and David Brener of US Customs and Border Protection kept emphasising, on at least two occasions, that "drug peddling merits an automatic death sentence in many countries". There are numerous arguments one can make to show the lack of thought in the former. One could point out that 'stealing' and 'theft' are things that happen to tangible property, and that not only is copyright not tangible, but it is barely property. Copying without authorization creates one more of what existed, without depriving the authorizer (usually a corporation) of its original. This goes against our notion of 'stealing'. If the argument is to be shifted to the terrain of control over one's property/copyright, Mark Lemley in an illuminative article shows how the economic theories behind externalities in property and copyright are vastly different, and that complete control over either has never been, nor should it ever be, an aim of the law. Simply put, someone free riding on your property leaves you worse off than earlier, while someone free riding on your copyright usually doesn't.

One could also point out that 'stealing' is endemic in activities involving human creativity. T.S. Eliot notes that "Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different". He does not even consider the possibility that artistic borrowing, whether by imitation or by 'stealing' does not happen. Even Y.S. Rajan, Principal Adviser to CII recognized this when during the conference he noted that "imitation and innovation have an interesting and intertwining philosophical history". If we are to take Mr. Keating's admonishment seriously, we would indeed have a very illustrious list of thieves on our hands, including the Walt Disney Corporation, William Shakespeare, Vladamir Nabokov, Public Enemy, and pretty much every creative person who has ever lived. Books can be written about this (and indeed, numerous books have been), so we shall not dwell on this issue.

Mr. Brener's repeatedly spoke of how drug peddling attracts death penalty in many countries (though in neither the US nor in India has anyone ever received capital punishment for drug peddling), but he also clarified that he is not advocating for the death penalty for copyright violations. That made one wonder why he was bringing up the death penalty at all. He also made the dubious, non-substantiated claim (noting it as "true fact") that pirating movies is more profitable than selling heroin. This claim appears in an article about a report produced by the Australian Federation Against Counterfeit Theft (AFACT), but the original report is nowhere to be found. The article about the AFACT report also claims that the pirates are using their illicit profits promote drug smuggling. The seeming contradiction of film pirates investing in something that is riskier and less profitable doesn't seem to have caught the eye of the writers. One version of the 'drugs are less profitable than pirated DVDs' claim (with marijuana taking heroin's place) was debunked on the Commons Law mailing list. Pirated DVDs are sold for a fraction of the cost of the original. It would be obvious to anyone that DVDs that are typically sold for Rs.30-50, where the cost of manufacture alone may be estimable to be around Rs. 10, cannot be more profitable than heroin peddling. That apart, most online file sharing (deemed to be "piracy") is non-commercial. Thus the question of profit does not really arise. Still, for the industry, absence of a profit is equal to a loss.

Thus, the rhetoric of crime, and that too heinous crime, is continually used, despite its being completely inapposite. Why does used to try to make IP enforcement a matter of state concern, rather than a matter of private, and civil, interest. This way, illegitimate statistics and factoids are used to make individual file-sharers who earn no money get lengthy prison sentences. This and other ways in which IP enforcement has expanded are carefully documented in this paper by Susan Sell.

Repeating false 'statistics' does not make them true.

Again, we were subjected to a number of dubious claims during the conference: If only counterfeiting and piracy were eliminated, India's fiscal deficit would disappear; the Indian entertainment industry loses 16000 crore (USD 4 billion) yearly to piracy; 820,000 direct jobs are lost due to film piracy; software piracy costs the industry USD 2.7 billion annually, etc. These reports' methodologies have been thorougly discredited. Even The Economist, a very conservative and pro-industry newspaper, believes that the BSA-IDC annual reports on software piracy are utterly distorted. Similarly, in the U.S., the figure of 750,000 jobs (around 8% of the U.S. unemployed in 2008) being lost due to piracy were touted by everyone from the Department of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Border and Customs Protection, and the MPAA, RIAA, and BSA. The amount of money lost each year in the U.S. due to IP infringement has been estimated to be between USD 200-250 billion (that's more than the combined 2005 gross domestic revenues of the movie, music, software, and video game industries). In a lengthy piece in Ars Technica, Julian Sanchez traces back the history of both these figures, and shows how they are just large numbers used for lobbying, and are not based on actual studies. The industry-commissioned Ernst & Young report ("The Effects of Counterfeiting and Piracy on India's Entertainment Industry") was never made available to the public at large, thereby making it impossible to judge the methodological soundness of the survey and the veracity of the figures.

IP expansion and more stringent enforcement is counter-productive.

Chander Mohan Lall, copyright lawyer to various film studios (including Warner Bros.) in India, used a number of short film clips in presentation during the conference. Upon being questioned about it, he admitted that he did not have permissions of the copyright holders, but claimed that his use fell under "the education exception" in Indian copyright law. While I wish he were correct (because what he was doing was indeed educational use), as per the law he is wrong. Section 52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act only exempts educational usage of cinematograph film recordings when "audience is limited to such staff and students [of an educational institution], the parents and guardians of the students and persons directly connected with the activities of the institution". While there are other arguments he could seek to use to make his usage of the film clilps non-infringing, being excepted by the educational fair dealings clauses isn't one of them. Thus, more stringent enforcement of IP rights actually engenders such unauthorized, but perfectly legitimate copying and communication to the public such as that done by Mr. Lall.

Another way in which IP enforcement is being sought to be increased is by way of the so-called Goonda Acts. These are generally statutes aimed at criminals and lumpen elements in society. The Maharastra version, the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981, just became the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act. The term "video pirate" is very widely defined, to include any copyright infringement-chargesheeter who is "engaged or is making preparations for engaging in any of his activities as a video pirates, which affect adversely or likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order". Public order is deemed to be disturbed by "producing and distributing pirated copies of music or film products, thereby resulting in a loss of confidence in administration". Thus video pirates can possibly be interpreted to include individual sitting at home and using P2P networks to share films. The only requirement is that they should have had a chargesheet lodged against them previously -- they needn't even have been convicted; being chargesheeted suffices. Thus, non-commercial activities of file-sharing are equated to bootleggers and drug smugglers, and preventive detention (an anti-civil rights relic of India's colonial past) is applicable to them.

IP expansion is happening without the ostensible justifications for IP being kept in mind. That Tirupathi ladoos are going to get GI (geographical indicator) protection was announced at the conference with great pride. Geographical indicators are used to protect consumer interests, to ensure that no one outside a particular region (Champagne) can lay claim to be producing that product (Champagne) if the production of that product is intrinsically linked to special features found in that region (climate, etc.). However, no devout person would want to purchase anything advertised as "Tirupathi ladoo" if it were produced outside the Venkateswara temple at Tirupathi, thus the question of consumer confusion does not arise. What if someone malignantly advertises something as Tirupathi ladoo and claims it was made in Tirupathi (and not just that it tastes like the ladoo made there)? Such a person can be taken to task for deceptive advertising, and there is no need for something to have IP protection to do so. This represents a senseless expansionism of IP. It is now IP for IP's sake.

One of the speakers, Mr. V.N. Deshmukh, who though pro-stringent IP enforcement, astutely noted that, "When local demand is not met, they [consumers] turn to counterfeiters and pirates." Local demand can be unsatisfied because of lack of supply, or because the supply is overpriced, or because the supply is not easy to access, or because what is supplied is inferior to what is demanded. At the end of the day, as William Patry, Google's lead counsel, has noted, what companies sell to the public are products and services, and not IP. It would thus be wise for businesses to be innovative and compete rather than trying to extend their monopolies and engaging in rent-seeking behaviour that is economical harmful to consumers. They would also do well to remember that IP is not only a product but an input as well, so they are ultimately consumers themselves. All the harsher laws and enforcement mechanisms that they push for right now will have unintended consequences, and come to affect them adversely.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/fallacies-lies-and-video-pirates

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012

pranesh — 2013-11-12T14:13:04Z

There are some welcome provisions in the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012, and some worrisome provisions. Pranesh Prakash examines five positive changes, four negative ones, and notes the several missed opportunities. The larger concern, though, is that many important issues have not been addressed by these amendments, and how copyright policy is made without evidence and often out of touch with contemporary realities of the digital era.

The Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012 has been passed by both Houses of Parliament, and will become law as soon as the President gives her assent and it is published in the Gazette of India. While we celebrate the passage of some progressive amendments to the Copyright Act, 1957 — including an excellent exception for persons with disabilities — we must keep in mind that there are some regressive amendments as well. In this blog post, I will try to highlight those provisions of the amendment that have not received much public attention (unlike the issue of lyricists’ and composers’ ‘right to royalty’).

Welcome Changes

Provisions for Persons with Disabilities

India now has amongst the most progressive exception for persons with disabilities, alongside countries like Chile. Under the amendments, sections 51(1)(zb) and 31B carve out exceptions and limitations for persons with disabilities. Earlier s.52(1)(zb) dealt only with formats that were “special designed only for the use of persons suffering from visual, aural, or other disabilities”. Thanks to a campaign mounted by disability rights groups and public interest groups such as CIS, it now covers “any accessible format”. Section 52(1)(zb) allows any person to facilitate access by persons with disabilities to copyrighted works without any payment of compensation to the copyright holder, and any organization working the benefit of persons with disabilities to do so as long as it is done on a non-profit basis and with reasonable steps being taken to prevent entry of reproductions of the copyrighted work into the mainstream. Even for-profit businesses are allowed to do so if they obtain a compulsory licence on a work-by-work basis, and pay the royalties fixed by the Copyright Board. The onerousness of this provision puts its utility into question, and this won’t disappear unless the expression “work” in s.31B is read to include a class of works.

Given that the Delhi High Court has — wrongly and per incuriam, since it did not refer to s.14(a)(ii) as it was amended in 1994 — held parallel importation to be barred by the Copyright Act, it was important for Parliament to clarify that the Copyright Act in fact follows international exhaustion. Without this, even if any person can facilitate access for persons with disabilities to copyrighted works, those works are restricted to those that are circulated in India. Given that not many books are converted into accessible formats in India (not to mention the costs of doing so), and given the much larger budgets for book conversion in the developed world, this is truly restrictive.

Extension of Fair Dealing to All Works

The law earlier dealt with fair dealing rights with regard to “literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works”. Now it covers all works (except software), in effect covering sound recordings and video as well. This will help make personal copies of songs and films, to make copies for research, to use film clips in classrooms, etc.

Creative Commons, Open Licensing Get a Boost

The little-known s.21 of the Copyright Act, which deals with the right of authors to relinquish copyright, has been amended. While earlier one could only relinquish parts of one’s copyright by submitting a form to the Registrar of Copyrights, now a simple public notice suffices. Additionally, s.30 of the Act, which required licences to be in writing and signed, now only requires it to be in writing. This puts Creative Commons, the GNU Public Licence, and other open licensing models, on a much surer footing in India.

Physical Libraries Should Celebrate, Perhaps Virtual Libraries Too

Everywhere that the word “hire” occurs (except s.51, curiously), the word “commercial rental” has been substituted. This has been done, seemingly, to bring India in conformance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The welcome side-effect of this is that the legality of lending by non-profit public libraries has been clarified. The amendment states:

"2(1)(fa) “commercial rental” does not include the rental, lease or lending of a lawfully acquired copy of a computer programme, sound recording, visual recording or cinematograph film for non-profit purposes by a non-profit library or non-profit educational institution."

Even after this, the overwhelming majority of the ‘video lending libraries’ that you see in Indian cities and towns continue to remain illegal.

Another welcome provision is the amended s.52(1)(n), which now allows “non-commercial public libraries” to store an electronic copy of a work if it already has a physical copy of the work. However, given that this provision says that the storage shall be “for preservation”, it seems limited. However, libraries might be able to use this — in conjunction with the fact that under s.14 of the Copyright Act lending rights of authors is limited to “commercial rental” and s.51(b) only covers lending of “infringing copies” — to argue that they can legally scan and lend electronic copies of works in the same manner that they lend physical copies. Whether this argument would succeed is unclear. Thus, India has not boldly gone where the European Commission is treading with talks of a European Digital Library Project, or where scholars in the US are headed with the Digital Public Library of America. But we might have gone there quietly. Thus, this amendment might help foster an Indian Internet Archive, or help spread the idea of the Open Library in India.

On a final note, different phrases are used to refer to libraries in the amendment. In s.2(1)(fa), it talks about "non-profit library"; in s.52(1)(n) and (o), it refers to "non-commercial public library"; and in s.52(1)(zb), it talks of "library or archives", but s.52(1)(zb) also requires that the works be made available on a "non-profit basis". The differentiation, if any, that is sought to be drawn between these is unclear.

Limited Protection to Some Internet Intermediaries

There are two new provisions, s.52(1)(b) and 52(1)(c), which provide some degree of protection to 'transient or incidental' storage of a work or performance. Section 52(1)(b) allows for "the transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of electronic transmission or communication to the public", hence applying primarily to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), VPN providers, etc. Section 52(1)(c) allows for "transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has not been expressly prohibited by the right holder, unless the person responsible is aware or has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy". This seems to make it applicable primarily to search engines, with other kinds of online services being covered or not covered depending on one’s interpretation of the word 'incidental'.

Compulsory Licensing Now Applies to Foreign Works Also

Sections 31 ("compulsory licence in works withheld from public") and 31A ("compulsory licence in unpublished Indian works") used to apply to Indian works. Now they apply to all works, whether Indian or not (and now s.31A is about "compulsory licence in unpublished or published works", mainly orphan works). This is a welcome amendment, making foreign works capable of being licensed compulsorily in case it is published elsewhere but withheld in India. Given how onerous our compulsory licensing sections are, especially sections 32 and 32A (which deal with translations, and with literary, scientific or artistic works), it is not a surprise that they have not been used even once. However, given the modifications to s.31 and s.31A, we might just see those starting to be used by publishers, and not just radio broadcasters.

Worrisome Changes

Term of Copyright for Photographs Nearly Doubled

The term of copyright for photographs has now gone from sixty years from publication to sixty years from the death of the photographer. This would mean that copyright in a photograph clicked today (2012) by a 20 year old who dies at the 80 will only expire on January 1, 2133. This applies not only to artistic photographs, to all photographs because copyright is an opt-out system, not an opt-in system. Quite obviously, most photoshopping is illegal under copyright law.

This has two problems. First, there was no case made out for why this term needed to be increased. No socio-economic report was commissioned on the effects of such a term increase. This clause was not even examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee. While the WCT requires a ‘life + 50′ years term for photographs, we are not signatories to the WCT, and hence have no obligation to enforce this. We are signatories to the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, which require a copyright term of 25 years for photographs. Instead, we have gone even above the WCT requirement and provide a life + 60 years term.

The second problem is that it is easier to say when a photograph was published than to say who the photographer was and when that photographer died. Even when you are the subject of a photograph, the copyright in the photograph belongs to the photographer. Unless a photograph was made under commission or the photographer assigned copyright to you, you do not own the copyright in the photographs. (Thanks to Bipin Aspatwar, for pointing out a mistake in an earlier version, with "employment" and "commission" being treated differently.) This will most definitely harm projects like Wikipedia, and other projects that aim at archiving and making historical photographs available publicly, since it is difficult to say whether the copyright in a photograph still persists.

Cover Versions Made More Difficult: Kolaveri Di Singers Remain Criminals

The present amendments have brought about the following changes, which make it more difficult to produce cover versions:

Time period after which a cover version can be made has increased from 2 years to 5 years.
Requirement of same medium as the original. So if the original is on a cassette, the cover cannot be released on a CD.
Payment has to be made in advance, and for a minimum of 50000 copies. This can be lowered by Copyright Board having regard to unpopular dialects.
While earlier it was prohibited to mislead the public (i.e., pretend the cover was the original, or endorsed by the original artists), now cover versions are not allowed to "contain the name or depict in any way any performer of an earlier sound recording of the same work or any cinematograph film in which such sound recording was incorporated".
All cover versions must state that they are cover versions.
No alterations are allowed from the original song, and alteration is qualified as ‘alteration in the literary or musical work’. So no imaginative covers in which the lyrics are changed or in which the music is reworked are allowed without the copyright owners’ permission. Only note-for-note and word-for-word covers are allowed.
Alterations were allowed if they were "reasonably necessary for the adaptation of the work" now they are only allowed if it is "technically necessary for the purpose of making of the sound recording".

This ignores present-day realities. Kolaveri Di was covered numerous times without permission, and each one of those illegal acts helped spread its popularity. The singers and producers of those unlicensed versions could be jailed under the current India Copyright Act, which allows even non-commercial copyright infringers to be put behind bars. Film producers and music companies want both the audience reach that comes from less stringent copyright laws (and things like cover versions), as well as the ability to prosecute that same behaviour at will. It is indeed ironic that T-Series, the company that broke HMV’s stranglehold over the Indian recording market thanks to cover versions, is itself one of the main movers behind ever-more stringent copyright laws.

Digital Locks Now Provided Legal Protection Without Accountability

As I have covered the issue of Technological Protection Measures (TPM) and Rights Management Information (RMI), which are ‘digital locks’ also known as Digital Rights Management (DRM), in great detail earlier, I won’t repeat the arguments at length. Very briefly:

It is unclear that anyone has been demanding the grant of legal protection to DRMs in India, and We have no obligation under any international treaties to do so. It is not clear how DRM will help authors and artists, but it is clear how it will harm users.
While the TPM and RMI provisions are much more balanced than the equivalent provisions in laws like the US’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMC), that isn’t saying much. Importantly, while users are given certain rights to break the digital locks, they are helpless if they aren’t also provided the technological means of doing so. Simply put: music and movie companies have rights to place digital locks, and under some limited circumstances users have the right to break them. But if the locks are difficult to break, the users have no choice but to live with the lock, despite having a legal right.

Removal of Parallel Importation

In past blog posts I have covered why allowing parallel imports makes sense in India. And as explained above, the Delhi High Court acted per incuriam when holding that the Copyright Act does not allow parallel importation. The Copyright Act only prohibits import of infringing copies of a work, and a copy of a book that has been legally sold in a foreign country is not an “infringing copy”. The government was set to introduce a provision making it clear that parallel importation was allowed. The Parliamentary Standing Committee heard objections to this proposal from a foreign publishers’ association, but decided to recommend the retention of the clause. Still, due to pressure from a few publishing companies whose business relies on monopolies over importation of works into India, the government has decided to delete the provision. However, thankfully, the HRD Minister, Kapil Sibal, has assured both houses of Parliament that he will move a further amendment if an NCAER report he has commissioned (which will be out by August or September) recommends the introduction of parallel imports.

Expansion of Moral Rights Without Safeguards

Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without adequate safeguards. The changes might allow the legal heir of an author, artist, etc., to object to ‘distortion, mutilation, modification, or other act’ of her ancestors work even when the ancestor might not have. By this amendment, this right continues in perpetuity, even after the original creator dies and even after the work enters into the public domain. It seems Indian policymakers had not heard of Stephen Joyce, the grandson of James Joyce, who has “brought numerous lawsuits or threats of legal action against scholars, biographers and artists attempting to quote from Joyce’s literary work or personal correspondence”. Quoting from his Wikipedia page:

In 2004, Stephen threatened legal action against the Irish government when the Rejoyce Dublin 2004 festival proposed public reading of excerpts of Ulysses on Bloomsday. In 1988 Stephen Joyce burnt a collection of letters written by Lucia Joyce, his aunt. In 1989 he forced Brenda Maddox to delete a postscript concerning Lucia from her biography Nora: The Real Life of Molly Bloom. After 1995 Stephen announced no permissions would be granted to quote from his grandfather’s work. Libraries holding letters by Joyce were unable to show them without permission. Versions of his work online were disallowed. Stephen claimed to be protecting his grandfather’s and families reputation, but would sometimes grant permission to use material in exchange for fees that were often "extortionate".

Because in countries like the UK and Canada the works of James Joyce are now in the public domain, Stephen Joyce can no longer restrict apply such conditions. However now, in India, despite James Joyce’s works being in the public domain, Stephen Joyce’s indefensible demands may well carry legal weight.

Backdoor Censorship

As noted above, the provision that safeguard Internet intermediaries (like search engines) is very limited. However, that provision has an extensive removal provision:

Provided that if the person responsible for the storage of the copy has received a written complaint from the owner of copyright in the work, complaining that such transient or incidental storage is an infringement, such person responsible for the storage shall refrain from facilitating such access for a period of twenty-one days or till he receives an order from the competent court refraining from facilitating access and in case no such order is received before the expiry of such period of twenty-one days, he may continue to provide the facility of such access;

There are two things to be noted here. First, that without proof (or negative consequences for false complaints) the service provider is mandated to prevent access to the copy for 21 day. Second, after the elapsing of 21 days, the service provider may 'put back' the content, but is not mandated to do so. This would allow people to file multiple frivolous complaints against any kind of material, even falsely (since there is no penalty for false compalaints), and keep some material permanently censored.

Missed Opportunities

Fair Dealing Guidelines, Criminal Provisions, Government Works, and Other Missed Opportunities

The following important changes should have been made by the government, but haven’t. While on some issues the Standing Committee has gone beyond the proposed amendments, it has not touched upon any of the following, which we believe are very important changes that are required to be made.

Criminal provisions: Our law still criminalises individual, non-commercial copyright infringement. This has now been extended to the proposal for circumvention of Technological Protection Measures and removal of Rights Management Information also.
Fair dealing guidelines: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This would not take away from the existing exceptions, but would act as a more general framework for those cases which are not covered by the specific exceptions.
Government works: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected to march towards with the Right to Information Act. A simple amendment of s.52(1)(q) would suffice. The amended subsection could simply allow for “the reproduction, communication to the public, or publication of any government work” as being non-infringing uses.
Copyright terms: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural progress.
Educational exceptions: The exceptions for education still do not fully embrace distance and digital education.
Communication to the public: No clear definition is given of what constitute a ‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and non-commercial ‘public’ communication.
Internet intermediaries: More protections are required to be granted to Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled. Importantly, after the terrible judgment passed by Justice Manmohan Singh of the Delhi High Court in the Super Cassettes v. Myspace case, any website hosting user-generated content is vulnerable to payment of hefty damages even if it removes content speedily on the basis of complaints.

Amendments Not Examined

For the sake of brevity, I have not examined the major changes that have been made with regard to copyright societies, lyricists and composers, and statutory licensing for broadcasters, all of which have received considerable attention by copyright experts elsewhere, nor have I examined many minor amendments.

A Note on the Parliamentary Process

Much of the discussions around the Copyright Act have been around the rights of composers and lyricists vis-à-vis producers. As this has been covered elsewhere, I won’t comment much on it, other than to say that it is quite unfortunate that the trees are lost for the forest. It is indeed a good thing that lyricists and composers are being provided additional protection against producers who are usually in a more advantageous bargaining position. This fact came out well in both houses of Parliament during the debate on the Copyright Bill.

However, the mechanism of providing this protection — by preventing assignment of “the right to receive royalties”, though the “right to receive royalties” is never mentioned as a separate right anywhere else in the Copyright Act — was not critically examined by any of the MPs who spoke. What about the unintended consequences of such an amendment? Might this not lead to new contracts where instead of lump-sums, lyricists and music composers might instead be asked to bear the risk of not earning anything at all unless the film is profitable? What about a situation where a producer asks a lyricist to first assign all rights (including royalty rights) to her heirs and then enters into a contract with those heirs? The law, unfortunately at times, revolves around words used by the legislature and not just the intent of the legislature. While one cannot predict which way the amendment will go, one would have expected better discussions around this in Parliament.

Much of the discussion (in both the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha) was rhetoric about the wonders of famous Indian songwriters and music composers and the abject penury in which some not-so-famous ones live, and there was very little discussion about the actual merits of the content of the Bill in terms of how this problem will be overcome. A few MPs did deal with issues of substance. Some asked the HRD Minister tough questions about the Statement of Objects and Reasons noting that amendments have been brought about to comply with the WCT and WPPT which were “adopted … by consensus”, even though this is false as India is not a signatory to the WCT and WPPT. MP P. Rajeeve further raised the issue of parallel imports and that of there being no public demand for including TPM in the Act, but that being a reaction to the US’s flawed Special 301 reports. Many, however, spoke about issues such as the non-award of the Bharat Ratna to Bhupen Hazarika, about the need to tackle plagiarism, and how the real wealth of a country is not material wealth but intellectual wealth.

This preponderance of rhetoric over content is not new when it comes to copyright policy in India. In 1991, when an amendment was presented to increase term of copyright in all works by ten years (from expiring 50 years from the author’s death to 60 years post-mortem), the vast majority of the Parliamentarians who stood up to speak on the issue waxed eloquent about the greatness of Rabindranath Tagore (whose works were about to lapse into the public domain), and how we must protect his works. Little did they reflect that extending copyright — for all works, whether by Tagore or not — will not help ‘protect’ the great Bengali artist, but would only make his (and all) works costlier for 10 additional years. Good-quality and cheaper editions of Tagore’s works are more easily available post-2001 (when his copyright finally lapsed) than before, since companies like Rupa could produce cheap editions without seeking a licence from Visva Bharati. And last I checked Tagore’s works have not been sullied by them having passed into the public domain in 2001.

Further, one could find outright mistakes in the assertions of Parliamentarians. In both Houses, DMK MPs raised objections with regard to parallel importation being allowed in the Bill — only in the version of the Bill they were debating, parallel importation was not being allowed. One MP stated that “statutory licensing provisions like these are not found anywhere else in the world”. This is incorrect, given that there are extensive statutory licensing provision in countries like the United States, covering a variety of situations, from transmission of sound recordings over Internet radio to secondary transmission of the over-the-air programming.

Unfortunately, though that MP did not raise this issue, there is a larger problem that underlies copyright policymaking in India, and that is the fact that there is no impartial evidence gathered and no proper studies that are done before making of policies. We have no equivalent of the Hargreaves Report or the Gowers Report, or the studies by the Productivity Council in Australia or the New Zealand government study of parallel importation.

There was no economic analysis conducted of the effect of the increase in copyright term for photographs. We have evidence from elsewhere that copyright terms are already too long, and all increases in term are what economists refer to as deadweight losses. There is no justification whatsoever for increasing term of copyright for photographs, since India is not even a signatory to the WCT (which requires this term increase). In fact, we have lost precious negotiation space internationally since in bilateral trade agreements we have been asked to bring our laws in compliance with the WCT, and we have asked for other conditions in return. By unilaterally bringing ourselves in compliance with WCT, we have lost important bargaining power.

Users and Smaller Creators Left Out of Discussions

Thankfully, the Parliamentary Standing Committee went into these minutiae in greater detail. Though, as I have noted elsewhere, the Parliamentary Standing Committee did not invite any non-industry groups for deposition before it, other than the disability rights groups which had campaigned really hard. So while changes that would affect libraries were included, not a single librarian was called by the Standing Committee. Despite comments having been submitted to the Standing Committee on behalf of 22 civil society organizations, none of those organizations were asked to depose. Importantly, non-industry users of copyrighted materials — consumers, historians, teachers, students, documentary film-makers, RTI activists, independent publishers, and people like you and I — are not seen as legitimate interested parties in the copyright debate. This is amply clear from the the fact that only one MP each in the two houses of Parliament raised the issue of users’ rights at all.

Concluding Thoughts

What stands out most from this process of amendment of the copyright law, which has been going on since 2006, is how out-of-touch the law is with current cultural practices. Most instances of photoshopping are illegal. Goodbye Lolcats. Cover versions (for which payments have to be made) have to wait for five years. Goodbye Kolaveri Di. Do you own the jokes you e-mail to others, and have you taken licences for quoting older e-mails in your replies? Goodbye e-mail. The strict laws of copyright, with a limited set of exceptions, just do not fit the digital era where everything digital transaction results in a bytes being copied. We need to take a much more thoughtful approach to rationalizing copyright: introduction of general fair dealing guidelines, reduction of copyright term, decriminalization of non-commercial infringement, and other such measures. If we don’t take such measures soon, we will all have to be prepared to be treated as criminals for all our lives. Breaking copyright law shouldn’t be as easy as breathing, yet thanks to outdated laws, it is.

This was reposted in infojustice.org on May 25, 2012

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012

Super Cassettes v. MySpace

ujwala — 2012-10-31T10:27:36Z

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Super Cassettes v. MySpace last July is worrying for a number of reasons. The court failed to appreciate the working of intermediaries online and disregard all pragmatic considerations involved. The consequences for free expression and particularly for file sharing by users of services online are especially unfavourable.

The judgment[*]is extremely worrying since it holds MySpace liable for copyright infringement, despite it having shown that it did not know, and could not have known, about each instance of infringement; that it removed each instance of alleged infringement upon mere complaint; that it asked Super Cassettes to submit their songs to their song identification database and Super Cassettes didn't.

This, in essence, means, that all 'social media services' in which there is even a potential for copyright infringement (such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) are now faced with a choice of either braving lawsuits for activities of their users that they have no control over — they can at best respond to takedown requests after the infringing material has already been put up — or to wind down their operations in India.

The Facts

Aside from social networking, MySpace facilitates the sharing of content between its users. This case concerns content (whose copyright vested in T-Series) was uploaded by users to MySpace’s website. It appears that tensions between MySpace and T-Series arose in 2007, when T-Series entered into talks with MySpace to grant it licenses in its copyrighted content, while MySpace asked instead that T-Series register with its rights management programme. Neither the license nor the registration came about, and the infringing material continued to be available on the MySpace website.

Specifically, T-Series alleged that cases for primary infringement under section 51(a)(i) of the Copyright Act as well as secondary infringement under section 51 (a) (ii) could be made out. Alleging that MySpace had infringed its copyrights and so affected its earnings in royalties, T-Series approached the Delhi High Court and filed a suit seeking injunctive relief and damages. In proceedings for interim relief while the suit was pending, the court granted an injunction, but, in an appeal by MySpace, added the qualification that the content would have to be taken down only on receipt of a specific catalogue of infringing works available on MySpace, rather than a general list of works in which T-Series held a copyright.

The Defence

While other arguments such as one around the jurisdiction of the court were also raised, the central issues are listed below:

Non-Specificity of Prayer
T-Series’ claim in the suit is for a blanket injunction on copyrighted content on the MySpace website. This imposes a clearly untenable, even impossible, burden for intermediaries to comply with.
Knowledge
MySpace argued that no liability could accrue to it on two counts. The first was that it had no actual or direct knowledge or role in the selection of the content, while the second was that no control was exercised, or was exercisable over the uploading of the content. Additionally, there was no possible means by which it could have identified the offending content and segregated it from lawful content, or monitored all of the content that it serves as a platform for.
Intermediary status and Safe Harbour Protection
In relation to its status as an intermediary, MySpace raised several arguments. First, it argued that it had immunity under section 79 of the IT Act and under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (US DMCA). Another argument restated what is arguably the most basic tenet of intermediary liability that merely providing the platform by which infringement could occur cannot amount to infringement. In other words, the mere act of facilitating expression over internet does not amount to infringement. It then made reference to its terms of use and its institution of safeguards (in the form of a hash filter, a rights management tool and a system of take-down–stay-down), which it argued clearly reflect an intention to discourage or else address cases of infringement as they arise. MySpace also emphasized that a US DMCA compliant procedure was in place, although T-Series countered that the notice and take down system would not mitigate the infringement.
Relationship between MySpace and its Users
Taking from previous arguments about a lack of control and its status as an intermediary, MySpace argued that it was simply a licensee of users who uploaded content. The license is limited, in that MySpace is only allowed to alter user-generated content so as to make it viewable.

Outcomes

Infringement by Facilitation
The court concluded that infringement in terms of section 51 (a) (ii) had occurred in this case, since web space is a “place” in the terms required by the section and there were monetary gains in the form of ad revenue. The argument as to a lack of knowledge of infringement was also rejected on the ground that MySpace’s provision for safeguards against infringement clearly established a reason to believe that infringement will occur. Also referenced as evidence of knowledge, or at least a reason to believe infringement would occur, is the fact that MySpace modifies the format of the content before making it available on its website. It also tested for infringement by authorization in terms of section 14 read with section 51 (a) (i), but concluded that this did not arise here.
Reading away section 79?
The court accepted the argument made by T-Series to the effect that sections 79 and 81 of the IT Act must be read together. Since section 79 would be overridden by section 81’s non-obstante, the effect would be that rights holders’ interests under the Copyright Act will erode intermediaries’ immunity under section 79.
Due Diligence
The court rejected the argument that the provision of due diligence or curative measures post-infringement would be sufficient. Specifically, the contention that the quantum of content being uploaded precludes close scrutiny, given the amount of labour that would be involved, was rejected. Content should not immediately be made available but must be subject to enquiries as to its title or to authentication of its proprietor before it is made available. In fact, it holds that, “there is no reason to axiomatically make each and every work available to the public solely because user has supplied them unless the defendants are so sure that it is not infringement.” (Paragraph 88).

There is also an attempt to distinguish the Indian framework from the DMCA. While that law calls for post-infringement measures, it is argued that in India, on reading section 51 with section 55, the focus is on preventing infringement at the threshold. In response to the case that it would be impossible to do so, the court held that since the process here requires MySpace to modify the format of content uploaded to it to make it viewable, it will have a reasonable opportunity to test for infringement.

Analysis

Accounting for the Medium of Communication

The court’s analysis of the issues begins with a predictable emphasis on how the law of copyright would operate in the context of what is termed “internet computing”, peppered with trite statements about “the virtual world of internet” creating “complexit[ies]” for copyright law. The court appears to have entered into this discussion to establish that the notion of place in section 51 (a) (ii) should extend to “web space” but the statements made here only serve to contrast starkly against its subsequent failure to account for the peculiarities of form and function of intermediaries online. Had this line of argument been taken to its logical conclusion, after the character of the medium had been appreciated, the court’s final conclusion, that MySpace is liable for copyright infringement, would have been an impossible one to arrive at.

And What of Free Speech?

As it had argued before the court, intermediaries such as MySpace have no means by which to determine whether content is illegal (whether by reason of amounting to a violation of copyright, or otherwise) until content is uploaded. In other words, there is no existing mechanism by which this determination can be made at the threshold, before posting.

The court does not engage with the larger consequences for such a scheme of penalizing intermediaries. Censoring patent illegalities at the threshold, even if that were possible is one thing. The precedent that the court creates here is quite another. Given the general difficulty in conclusively establishing whether there is an infringement at all due to the complexities in applying the exceptions contained under section 52, it should not be for ordinary private or commercial interests such as intermediaries to sit in judgment over whether content is or is not published at all. In order to minimize its own liability, the likelihood of legitimate content being censored by the intermediary prior to posting is high.

The consequences for civil liberties, and free speech and expression online in particular, appear to have been completely ignored in favour of rights holders’ commercial interests.

Consequences for Intermediary Liability and Safe Harbour Protection

Even if every instance in question did amount to an infringement of copyright and a mechanism did exist allowing for removal of content, the effect of this judgment is to create a strict liability regime for intermediaries.

In other words, the court’s ruling will have the effect that courts’ determination of intermediaries’ liability will become detached from whether or not any fault can be attributed to them. MySpace did make this argument, even going as far as to suggest that doing so would impose strict liability on intermediaries. This would lead to an unprecedented and entirely unjustifiable result. In spite the fact that a given intermediary did apply all available means to prevent the publication of potentially infringing content, it would remain potentially liable for any illegality in the content, even though the illegality could not have been detected or addressed.

What is perhaps even more worrying is that MySpace’s attempt at proactively and in good faith preventing copyright infringement through its terms of use and in addressing them through its post-infringement measures was explicitly cited as evidence of knowledge of and control over the uploading of copyrighted material, at the threshold rather than ex post. This creates perverse incentives for the intermediary to ignore infringement, to the detriment of rights holders, rather than act proactively to minimize its incidence.

A final observation is that the court’s use, while pronouncing on relief, of the fact that MySpace makes a “copy” of the uploaded content by converting it into a format that could subsequently be hosted on the site and made accessible to show evidence of infringement and impose liability upon MySpace in itself is a glaring instance of the disingenuous reasoning the court employs throughout the case. There is another problem with the amended section 79, which waives immunity where the intermediary “modifies” material. That term is vague and overreaches, as it does here: altering formats to make content compatible with a given platform is not comparable to choices as to the content of speech or expression, but the reading is tenable under section 79 as it stands.

The result of all of this is to dislodge the section 79 immunity that accrues to intermediaries and replace that with a presumption that they are liable, rather than not, for any illegality in the content that they passively host.

Effect of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012

Since the judgment in the MySpace case, the Copyright Act has been amended to include some provisions that would bear on online service providers and on intermediaries’ liability for hosting infringing content, in particular. Section 52 (1) (b) of the amended Act provides that “transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of electronic transmission or communication to the public” would not infringe copyright. The other material provision is section 52 (1) (c) which provides that “transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has not been expressly prohibited by the right holder, unless the person responsible is aware or has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy” will not constitute an infringement of copyright. The latter provision appears to institute a rather rudimentary, and very arguably incomplete, system of notice and takedown by way of a proviso. This requires intermediaries to takedown content on written complaint from copyright owners for a period of 21 days or until a competent rules on the matter whichever is sooner, and restore access to the content once that time period lapses, if there is no court order to sustain it beyond that period.

This post does not account for the effect that these provisions could have had on the case, but it is already clear, from the sloppy drafting of section 52 (1) (c) and its proviso that they are not entirely salutary even at the outset. At any rate, there appears to be nothing that *determinatively* affects intermediaries’ secondary liability, i.e., their liability for users’ infringing acts.

Disclosure: CIS is now a party to these proceedings at the Delhi High Court. This is a purely academic critique, and should not be seen to have any prejudice to the arguments we will make there.

[*]. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. v. MySpace Inc. and Another, on 29 July, 2011, Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law. See http://bit.ly/quj6JW, last accessed on October 31, 2012.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/super-cassettes-v-my-space

Pervasive Mobile Technologies: Meet Our Mobile Devices!

jdine — 2012-12-21T07:48:40Z

As a part of the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace research project, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) is researching 12 mobile phone devices to generate a better understanding of the intellectual property (IP) implications of pervasive mobile technologies available in the Indian market. This post is an introduction to our 12 mobile phones.

As detailed in my introductory blog on Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace Research Initiative, CIS will be conducting research on mobile technologies as a small off-shoot of the overall project. Pervasive technologies that can be purchased for less than USD 100 play an integral role in bringing access to knowledge to those that routinely face barriers to the consumption of information. However, their legality, particularly in terms of their use of IP, is unclear. In order to better understand the legal environment in which these technologies exist, CIS purchased 12 mobile phones to study the patent implications of their hardware, software and content.

Through examination, research, interviews and consultancies, we hope to create an in-depth documentation of each device, an extensive database or account of the patents implicated, and a number of narrower research avenues on topics related to IP, patents, and mobile technologies.

This blog post will serve as a brief introduction to our mobile devices. The information that I have compiled was discovered through shallow interaction with the phones — turning a device on and exploring the interface and content — which is why the documentation is not particularly extensive at this point. I have had difficulty identifying certain features of some of the phones, like which media formats they support or whether or not they are EDGE[2] — enable, but I am confident that I will be able to ascertain these specifications in the near future; however, certain features, like what OS (operating system) they run on and what chip set they are using, will require collaboration with experts to identify. The exploration is on-going, and more information will be posted as it is discovered.

Aside from all of the usual functions of a mobile phone (making calls, receiving calls, saving numbers, etc.), each of our mobiles devices possess what I have termed the "basics": dual GSM SIM capabilities with dual standby, the ability to connect to 2G networks, GPRS, a WAP browser (except device 011), bluetooth capabilities, a microSD slot, a dual camera (a camera that takes still photos and records video), an FM radio receiver and the ability to play .mp3 audio files and .mp4 video files, record audio and view .jpg images. Each phone also has a handful of various "utilities" and "extras" applications (such as an alarm, a calculator, a calendar, etc.) as well as at least one game. The full specifications of each phone will be provided in the near future, along with further pictures of each device.

As much of the research in this project pertains to the IP implications of the devices, we have decided to withhold the make and model of each device to shield the producers from any negative repercussions that could be the result of our research inquiries. They have been assigned the numeric code names 001 to 012.

Without further ado, I'd like to introduce you to our mobile phones:

001 - The Classroom in a Box

Price: Rs. 6,300.00 / $113.00

KEY FEATURES

Pico-Projector
Analog TV Receiver
MS Office Document Viewer


This bar-design feature phone has all of the basics with a few added bonuses: an analog TV receiver, viewer, and a built-in pico-projector that projects the mobile's screen onto any surface. Though this phone does not technically fall into our definition of pervasive technologies because of its price, it was the first mobile phone with a built-in pico-projector as well as an analog TV receiver available on the Indian market for less than Rs. 10,000 when it was purchased more than a year ago. Since then, other sub-USD100 pico-projector mobile devices have made an appearance on the Indian market, but each of those devices appear to have been discontinued and 001 continues to be the cheapest pico-projector mobile phone available for purchase.

002 - The Supercharger

Price: Rs. 2,499.00 / $45.00

KEY FEATURES

Solar Panel
Hindi Keyboard

	002 is a sleek candybar feature phone with a particularly interesting innovation. While it uses a standard lithium-ion battery that can be recharged via connection to a wall socket or electrical device (such as a laptop), it also has a built-in solar panel that can generate some charge as well. The solar panel technology is not yet very efficient—the panel would have to be placed in direct sunlight for multiple hours to fully charge the battery—but it represents an important step towards untethering mobile phones and mobile phone users from costly electricity infrastructure, a development that would have significant implications for rural populations who have unreliable access to electricity.

003 - The Networker

Price: Rs. 1,250.00 / $22.00

KEY FEATURES

Wi-Fi
Optical Trackpad
Secondary Forward-facing Camera
Support for 8 Languages


With a boxy, QWERTY-keyboard design and relatively small screen, 003 does not appear, at first glance, to be anymore than an average feature phone — but appearances can be deceiving. With a highly responsive optical trackpad, an analog TV receiver, BlackBerry-esque interface and WiFi capabilities, this mobile device packs some sophisticated technologies and features. Further, it is the only phone in our collection that can connect to the internet using WLAN networks. Considering that some of the other devices are much more complex — and expensive — than 003, the wide-spread exclusion of WiFi capabilities in our collection is intriguing. Is the choice to include or exclude mobile technology a matter of economics? Are cellular WiFi components expensive, and producers are choosing to exclude WiFi as a method of cutting costs? Is it simply a response to patterns of consumer demand? The WiFi questions will be explored in more depth in up-coming blog posts.

004 - The Linguist

Price: Rs. 2,250.00 / $40.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Support for 14 Languages
Secondary Forward-facing Camera
Large Number of Pre-loaded Apps


Though it may be hard to believe at first glance, this mobile device was purchased for less than Rs. 2500. With its large internal memory, support for 14 different languages (including Tamil, Bengali and Hindi), and its large array of pre-loaded games and social media applications already set it apart from the less sophisticated mobiles in our collection, 004 also runs on a mysterious Android-like operating system similar to the popular MIUI Android ROM developed by the Chinese-based company Xiaomi Tech. This give it a very sophisticated interface with the look and feel of a smartphone, though the device itself lacks many of the capabilities that are often considered as smartphone criteria (GPS, high-speed internet access, push/pull email, Wi-Fi, an app store, etc.). Because this device, and others like it in our collection, have more sophisticated hardware, software and content than a generic feature phone, but are not as capable as a smartphone, I have taken to calling these devices "semi-smart".

005 - TV on the Go

Price: Rs. 1,450.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Analog TV receiver
Arabic Keyboard
Secondary Forward-facing Camera


Though it doesn't have any particular innovation that sets it apart from the other devices, 005 is a hardy QWERTY-design feature phone with all of the basics as well as a good collection of social media applications and an analog TV receiver. Though its keyboard can be programmed to write in English, Tamil, Arabic and Hindi script, the buttons have the Arabic abjad on them, which brings up the question of which market this mobile was originally designed for.

006 - The Spy

Price: Rs. 1,680.00 / $30.00

KEY FEATURES:

Secondary “Spy” Camera
Ability to behave as a modem via USB connection

	006 is an interesting candy bar feature phone. On initial examination, this mobile appears to be a completely generic feature phones with all of the basics, but nothing auxiliary. However, a more careful inspection will reveal a secondary camera with an unusual placement — instead of being place at the top of the screen like all of the other secondary cameras found on our devices, this camera is situated on the right hand side of the phone.

The manufacturer of this device actually refers to this secondary camera as a "spy" camera, and it is truly an appropriate name; from a distance, it looks more like a headphone jack than a camera, and its placement allows for photo and video to be taken without any suspicious movement or positioning by the user. The secondary camera has 1.3 megapixels and can take relatively high resolution photos and videos.

007 - The Semi-Smartphone

Price: Rs. 2,150.00 / $39.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS (maybe MIUI)
USB Tethering
Push Email


Device 007 is a semi-smart touchscreen phone, and by far the most sophisticated device in our collection. We believe that it uses MIUI OS, which gives it a very similar look to Android and a functionality that is reminiscent of iOSx. While it doesn't have an app store, 007 is jam-packed with pre-loaded applications and can support a wide variety of file formats. Further, while the phone cannot connect to WLAN networks on its own; it can connect to WiFi by tethering to a networked device via USB connection.

008 - The Trendy

Price: Rs. 2,350.00 / $42.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Support for 9 languages


Another mainstream look-alike, 008 runs the same unidentified OS as device 004 and has similar capabilities. Its plastic casing is a bit flimsy, but its "back", "home" and "list" buttons are touch sensitive. Its sophisticated OS and pre-loaded applications make it a semi-smart device.

009 - The Boombox

Price: Rs. 1,420.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Huge built-in speaker
Android-like OS

	Though it is less recognizable than some of the other devices, this mobile may have one of the significant smartphone qualifiers that our other devices lack: an app store — or what appears to be an app store. The app store icon itself is actually the icon for the Android app store, but the interface is completely different, and the only thing available for download is a handful of games. Interestingly enough, many of these games also make appearances on some of the other mobile devices (like fishing joy and tear clothes). Further, I would not call this phone semi-smart, as its interface is not particularly any more sophisticated than some of the other feature phones in our collection.

009 also features a large built-in speaker, the Opera Mini mobile browser and an Android-like OS, though this OS is less sophisticated than that of 004 and 008.

010 - 3D

Price: Rs. 1,440.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Pre-loaded Stereoscopic (3D) videos
Support for 13 languages


This semi-smart touchscreen phone also has an Android-like operating system. Though it lacks an app store and push-email, it comes pre-loaded with a veritable smorgasbord of games and social media applications and supports 13 different languages. It also comes with a pair of 3D glasses and two short, very basic pre-loaded stereoscopic videos.

011 - The Mighty Mini

Price: Rs. 750.00 / $14.00

KEY FEATURES

Dual GSM SIM support
Best bang-for-your-buck for a basic mobile phone


At Rs. 750, this little feature phone was the least expensive phone we could find that still had almost all of the basics. Even without any extra features, it is still almost Rs. 200 cheaper than the majority of the most basic GSM dual SIM mobiles available on the formal Indian market[3]— and, in most cases, 011 has more capabilities than most of those devices. With .mp3 and .mp4 file playback, a dual camera, colour display, a WAP browser, MMS messaging support, two charging ports and Urdu and Hindi language support, this mobile phone personifies affordable accessibility to knowledge and media.

012 - The Pianist

Price: Rs. 1,550.00 / $28.00

KEY FEATURES

Touch piano
Two charging ports
Support for a multitude of audio, video and image formats

	012 is a basic candy bar feature phone with a particularly novel innovation: a touch piano. It is quite sensitive to touch and has a one octave range.

013 - The Indian Experience

Price: Rs. 2,100.00 / $38.00

KEY FEATURES

India specific content
Proprietary App Store

	This little touchscreen mobile is chockfull of “Indian-specific” content, including an application that links directly to an online portal where consumers can download “Hungama” videos, music and movies onto the phone—for a price. Many of the games also charge a monthly user fee, though interestingly enough, Angry Birds and Talking Tom Cat are pre-loaded and free to play. This phone also has a proprietary app store with a limited amount of mBounce4] applications and games available for purchase. I am not yet sure if this app store can be remotely updated with new apps, but the device can receive data vis USB connection, so it is possible that new applications can be added through direct file transfer. It also has keyboard support for English, Hindi and Tamil, but the interface cannot be set it appear in anything other than English.

[2]. Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution, also known as Enchanced GPRS (EGPRS) is a mobile phone technology that also improved data transmission on GSM networks. It is considered a pre-3G radio technology. Read more about it here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution
[3]. Information retrieved from www.flipkart.com. The prices shown here have been verified as being the same or very similar (though never more expensive) to the prices offered by each brand's official distributors. See Flipkart search links:

Mircomax: http://bit.ly/UW3q0U

Spice Mobility: http://bit.ly/V0DK9i

Karbonn: http://bit.ly/10DKKbz

Lava: http://bit.ly/TSxUzQ

[4] mBounce Ltd is a Hong Kong-based company that performs a variety of mobile phone application support services like proprietary in-house billing infrastructure for app stores, the pre-loading of applications and app stores, and application creation. They are MediaTek-nominated key partner in providing MRE (Maui Runtime Environment) App Store Solutions, but mBounce applications and software can also be placed on other mobile operating systems. You can read more about mBounce here: http://www.mbounce.com/?lang=eng&module=ltrbox&menu=m1&content=home and here: http://developer.mediatek.com/mre/en/partner/335

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices

The State of the Internet's Languages Report

Puthiya Purayil Sneha — 2022-03-07T15:01:11Z

The first-ever State of the Internet’s Languages Report was launched by Whose Knowledge? on February 23, 2022 (just after the International Mother Language day), along with research partners Oxford Internet Institute and the Centre for Internet and Society. This extraordinarily community-sourced effort, with over 100 people involved is now available online, with translations in multiple languages.

There are over 7000 (spoken and signed) languages in the world, but only a few can be fully experienced online. Challenges in accessing the internet and digital technologies in our preferred languages also means that a vast body of knowledge, especially from and by marginalised communities, is not represented and remains inaccessible to the world, thereby reiterating existing social inequalities. The State of the Internet's Languages report explores these and many other aspects related to ongoing efforts in creating a multilingual and multi-modal internet. Comprising both numbers and stories, the report features contributions in 13 languages, representing 22 language communities from 12 countries, and explores how communities across the world experience the internet.

Read the full report here. See more details of the project here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/state-of-the-internet-languages-report-2022

The All India Privacy Symposium: Conference Report

natasha — 2012-04-30T05:16:41Z

Privacy India, the Centre for Internet and Society and Society in Action Group, with support from the International Development Research Centre, Privacy International and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative had organised the All India Privacy Symposium at the India International Centre in New Delhi, on February 4, 2012. Natasha Vaz reports about the event.

The symposium was organized around five thematic panel discussions:
Panel 1: Privacy and Transparency
Panel 2: Privacy and E-Governance Initiatives
Panel 3: Privacy and National Security
Panel 4: Privacy and Banking
Panel 5: Privacy and Health

Introduction

Elonnai Hickok (Policy Advocate, Privacy India) introduced the objectives of Privacy India. The primary objectives were to raise national awareness about privacy, do an in-depth study of privacy in India and provide feedback on the proposed ‘Right to Privacy’ Bill. Privacy India has reviewed case laws, legislations, including the upcoming policy and conducted state-level privacy workshops and consultations across India in Kolkata, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Guwahati, Chennai, and Mumbai. India like the rest of the world is answering some fundamental questions about the powers of the government and citizen’s rights and complications that arise from emerging technologies. Through our research we have come to understand that privacy varies across cultures and contexts, and there is no one concept of privacy but instead several distinct core notions that serve as complex duties, claims and obligations.

Privacy and Transparency

Panelists: Ponnurangam K, (Assistant Professor, IIIT New Delhi), ), Chitra Ahanthem (Journalist, Imphal), Nikhil Dey (Social & Political Activist), Deepak Maheshwari (Director, Corporate Affairs, Microsoft), Gus Hosein (Executive Director, Privacy International, UK), and Prashant Bhushan, (Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India).
Moderator: Sunil Abraham (Executive Director, Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore)
Poster: Srishti Goyal (Law Student, NUJS)

Srishti Goyal provided the general contours, privacy protections, limits to privacy and loopholes of policy relating to transparency and privacy, specifically analyzing the Right to Information Act, Public Interest Disclosures Act, and the Official Secrets Act.

Nikhil Dey commented on the interaction between the right to privacy and the right to information (RTI). He referred to Gopal Gandhi, the former Governor of West Bengal, “we must ensure that tools like the UID must help the citizen watch every move of government; not allow the government watch every move of the citizen.” Currently, the RTI and the UID stand on contrary sides of the information debate. A privacy law could allow for a backdoor to curb RTI. So, utmost care has to be taken while drafting legislation with respect to right to privacy.

Data and information has leaked furiously in India and it has leaked to the powerful. A person who is in a position of power can access private information irrespective of any laws in place to safeguard privacy. It is necessary to look at the power dynamics, which exists in the society before formulating legislation on right to privacy. According to Nikhil Dey, there should be different standards of privacy with respect to public servants. A citizen should be entitled to information related to funds, functions and functionaries. The main problem arises while defining the private space of a public servant or functionaries.

The RTI Act has failed to address the legal protection for the right to privacy. Perhaps, rules regarding privacy can be added to the Act. It can be defined by answering the questions: (i) what is ‘personal information’? (ii) what is it’s relation to public activity or public interest? (iii) what is the unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual? and (iv) what is the larger public good? Expanding on these four points can provide greater legal protection for the right to privacy.

Gus Hosein described the intersection and interaction of the right to information and the right to privacy. He referred to a petition filed by Privacy International requesting information on the expenses of members of parliament. Privacy and transparency of the government are compatible in the public interest. Gross abuse of the public funds by MPs was revealed by this particular petition such as pornography or cleaning of moats of MPs homes. Privacy advocates are supporters of RTI, however, it cannot be denied that there is no tension between transparency and privacy. In order chalk out the differences, there is a need of a legal framework. According to Gus Hosein, in many countries the government office that deals with right to information also deals with cases related to right to privacy.

Mumbai and New Delhi police have started using social media very aggressively, encouraging citizens to take photographs of traffic violations and upload them to Facebook or Twitter. In reference to this, Ponnurangam described the perceptions of privacy and if it agreed or conflicted with his research findings. Ponnurangam has empirically explored the awareness and perspective of privacy in India with respect to other countries. He conducted a privacy survey in Hyderabad, Chennai and Mumbai. People are very comfortable in posting pictures of others committing a traffic violation or running a red light. Ironically, many people have posted pictures of police officers committing a traffic violation such as not wearing a helmet or running a red light.

Chitra Ahanthem described the barriers and challenges of using RTI in Manipur. There are more than 40 armed militia groups, which are banned by the central and state government. The central government provides economic packages for the development of the north-east region. However, the state government officials and armed groups pocket the economic packages. These armed groups have imposed a ban on RTI. Furthermore, Manipur is a very small community. If people try and access information through RTI they risk getting threatened by the Panchayat members and being ostracized from the community or their clan.

People are apprehensive about filing RTI because they believe that these procedures are costly and the police and government may also get involved. Officials use the privacy plea to avoid giving out information. Since certain information are private and not in the public domain, government officials, use the defense of privacy to hide information. In addition, the police brutality prevalent in the area deters people to even have interactions with government officials.

According to Deepak Maheshwari, the open data initiative is a subset within the larger context of open information. There is an onus on the government to publish information, which is in the public domain. As a result, one does not necessarily have to go through the entire process of filing an RTI to get information, which is already there in the public domain. Moreover, if it is freely available in public domain, then one can anonymously access such information; this further strengthens the privacy aspects of requesting information and facilitating anonymity with respect to access to such information in the public domain. It has also to be noted that it is not sufficient to put data out in the public domain but it should also disclose the basis of the data for example, if there is representation of a data on a pie chart, the data which was used to arrive at the pie chart should also be available in the public domain. The main intention of releasing data to the public domain or having open data standards should not only be to provide access to such data but also should be in such a fashion so as to enable people to use the data for multiple purposes.

Prashant Bhushan noted that one of the grounds for withholding information in the RTI Act is privacy. An RTI officer can disclose personal information if he feels that larger public interest warrants the disclosure, even if it is personal information, which has no relationship to public activity or interest. This raises the important question, “what constitutes personal information?” He referred to the Radia Tapes controversy. Ratan Tata has filed a petition in the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Nira Radia tapes contained personal information and that the release of these tapes into the public domain violated his privacy. The Centre for Public Interest Litigation has filed a counter petition on the grounds that the nature of the conversations was not personal but in relation to public activity. They were between a lobbyist and bureaucrats, journalists and ministers. Prashant Bhushan stressed the importance of releasing these tapes into the public domain to show glimpses of all kinds of fixing, deal-making and show how the whole ruling establishment functions. It is absurd for Ratan Tata to claim that this is an invasion of privacy. Lastly, he felt when drafting a privacy law, clearly defining and distinguishing personal information and public is extremely important.

One of the interesting comments made during the panel was on the assumption that data is transparent. Transparency can be staged; questions have to be asked around whether the word is itself transparent.

Privacy and E-Governance Initiatives

Panelists: Anant Maringanti, (Independent Social Researcher), Usha Ramanathan, (Advocate & Social Activist), Gus Hosein, (Executive Director, Privacy International, UK), Apar Gupta, (Advocate, Supreme Court of India), and Elida Kristine Undrum Jacobsen (Doctoral Researcher, The Peace Research Institute Oslo).
Moderator: Sudhir Krishnaswamy (Centre for Law and Policy Research)
Poster: Adrija Das (Law Student, NUJS)

Adrija Das discussed the legal provision relating to identity projects and e-governance initiatives in India. The objective of any e-governance project is to increase efficiency and accessibility of public services. However, a major problem that arises is the linkage of the data results in the creation of a central database, accessible by every department of the government. Furthermore, implementing data protection and security standards are very expensive.

Sudhir Krishnaswamy highlighted the default assumptions surrounding e-governance initiatives: e-governance initiatives solve governance problems, increase efficiency, increase transparency and increase accountability. It is important to analyze the problems that arise from e-governance initiatives, such as privacy.

Usha Ramanathan described the increased number and vastness of e-governance initiatives such as UID, NPR, IT Rules and NATGRID. There are also many burdens on privacy that emanate from the introduction and existence of electronic data management systems. Electronic data management systems have allowed state to collect, store and use personal information of individual. Currently, the DNA Profiling Bill is pending before the Parliament. It is important to question the purpose and need for the government to collect such personal information. It is also to be noted that, there are certain laws such as Collection of Statistics Act, 2008 that penalize individuals if they do not comply with the information requests of the government.

Anant Maringanti discussed the limitations of data sharing that once existed. Currently, data can move across space in a very short time. He analyzed the state and market rationalities involved in e-governance initiatives, which raise the question “who can access data and at what price?”. Data may seem to be innocent or neutral, but data in the hands of wrong people becomes very crucial due to abuse and misuse. For example, Andhra Pradesh was praised as the model state for UID implementation. However, during the process of collecting data for UID a company bought personal information and sold the data to third parties.

Apar Gupta discussed the dilemmas of e-governance. Generally information in the form of an electronic record is presumed to be authentic. The data which government collects is most often inaccurate and wrong. So the digital identity of a person can be totally different from the real identity of that particular person. The process for correcting such information is also very inconvenient and sometimes impossible.
Under the evidence law any electronic evidence is presumed to be authentic and admissible as evidence. The Bombay High Court decided a case involving the authenticity of a telephone bill generated by a machine. The judgment said that since it is being generated by a machine, through and automated process, there is no need to challenge the authenticity of the document, it is presumed to true and authentic. The main danger in such case is that one does away with the process of law and attaches certain sanctity to the electronic record and evidence.

It should be also observed that how government maintains secrecy as to the ways in which it collects data. For example, the Election Commission has refused to disclose the functioning and design of electronic voting machines. The reason given for such secrecy is that if such information is put in the public domain then the electronic voting machines will be vulnerable and can be tampered with. But we, who use the voting machines, will never find out its vulnerabilities.

According to Gus Hosein, politicians generally have this wrong notion that technology can solve complex administrative problems. Furthermore, the industry is complicit; they indulge in anti-competitive market practice to sell these technologies as a solution to problems. However, such technology does not solve any problems rather it gives rise to problems.

Huge amount of government funds is associated with collection of personal data but such data is rendered useless or rather misused, because the government does not have clue as to how to use the data for development and security purposes. The UK National Health Records project estimated to cost around twelve to twenty billion pounds. However, a survey carried out by a professor in University College London showed that the hospital and other health institutions do not use the information collected by the National Health Records. Similarly, the UK Identity Card scheme was estimated to cost 1.3 billion pounds and finally it was estimated to cost five billion pounds. The identity cards are rendered obsolete, the sole department interested in the identity card was the Home Office Department, no other department intended on using it.

Technology should be built in such a manner that it empowers the individual. Technology should allow the individual to control his identity and as well as access all kinds of information available to the government and private bodies on that individual.

According to Elida Kristine Undrum Jacobsen, technology is regarded in this linear manner. It is increasingly being naturalized and as an all-encompassing solution. The use of biometric systems in the UID raises three areas of concern: power, value and social relationships.

With regards to power, there is a difference between providing documentation and information for identification. However, problems arise when the mode of identification becomes one’s body. It also leads to absolute reliance on technology, if the machine says that this is an individual’s identity then it is considered to be the absolute truth and it does not matter even if the individual is someone else. It becomes furthermore problematic with biometric system because it is generally used for forensic purposes.

The other component of UID or any national identification scheme is the question of consent and its relationship to privacy. In the case of UID project, people are totally unaware about how their information will be used and what purposes can it be used or misused for. Therefore, there is no informed consent when it comes to collection of biometric data under the UID project.

On the issue of social value it is to be noted that the value of efficiency becomes the most important value, which is valued. Many of the UIDAI documents state that the UID will provide a transactional identity. However, at the same time it takes away societal layers, which is inherently part of one’s identity. In addition, it makes it possible for the identity of a person to become a commodity to be sold. This also means that the personal information has economic value and players in the market such as insurance companies, banks can buy and sell the information.

When there is identification projects using biometrics it gives the State a lot of power; the power to determine and dictate one’s identity irrespective of the difference in real identity. Moreover, when such identifications projects are carried out at a national level it also gives rise to problem related to exclusion and inclusion of people or various purposes. The classification of the society based on various factors becomes easy and there is a huge risk involved with such classification.

The issues, which came out from the Q&A session, were:

The interplay between fairness and lawfulness in the context of privacy and data collection. There has to be a question asked as to why certain information is required by the State and how is it lawful.
In the neo-liberal era corporations are generally considered to be private. This has to be questioned and furthermore the difference between what is private and what is public. There are also concerns about corporations increasingly collaborating with the State. Can it be still considered as private?

Privacy and National Security

Panelists: PK Hormis Tharakan (Former Chief of Research and Analysis Wing, Government of India), Saikat Datta (Journalist), Menaka Guruswamy, (Advocate, Supreme Court, New Delhi), Prasanth Sugathan, (Legal Counsel, Software Freedom Law Center), and Oxblood Ruffin, (Cult of the Dead Cow Security and Publishing Collective).
Moderator: Danish Sheikh (Alternative Law Forum)
Poster: Suchitra Menon (Law Student, NUJS)

Suchitra Menon discussed the legal provisions for national security in relation to privacy. Specifically, she described the guidelines and procedural safeguards with respect to phone tapping and interception of communication decisional jurisprudence.

In the year 2000, the Information Technology Act (IT Act), 2000 was enacted, this Act had under section 69 allowed the State to monitor and intercept information through intermediaries. Prasanth Sugathan described how the government has been trying to bypass the procedural safeguard laid down by the Supreme Court in the PUCL case by using Section 28 of the IT Act, 2000. The provision deals with certifying authority for digital signatures. The certifying authority under the Act also has the authority to investigate offences under the Act. The provision mainly deals with digital signature but it is used by the government to intercept communication without implementing the procedural safeguards laid down for such interception. Furthermore, the IT Rules which was notified by the government in April, 2007 allows the government to intercept any communication with the help of the intermediaries. The 2008 amendment to the IT Act was an after effect of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. The legislation has become draconian since then and privacy has been sacrificed to meet the ends of national security.

Oxblood Ruffin read out his speech and the same is reproduced below.

“The online citizenry of any country is part of its national security infrastructure. And the extent to which individual privacy rights are protected will determine whether democracy continues to succeed, or inches towards tyranny. The challenge then is to balance the legitimate needs of the state to secure its sovereignty with protecting its most valuable asset: The citizen.

It has become trite to say that 9/11 changed everything. Yet it is as true for the West as it is for the global South. 9/11 kick started the downward spiral of individual privacy rights across the entire internet. It also ushered in a false dichotomy of choice, that in choosing between security and privacy, it was privacy that had adapted to the new realities, or so we’ve been told.

Let’s examine some of the fallacies of this argument.

The false equation which many argue is that we must give up privacy to ensure security. But no one argues the opposite. We needn’t balance the costs of surveillance over privacy, because rarely banning a security measure protects privacy. Rather, protecting privacy typically means that government surveillance must be subjected to judicial oversight and justification of the need to surveillance. In most cases privacy protection will not diminish the state’s effectiveness to secure itself.

The deference argument is that security advocates insist that the courts should defer to elected officials when evaluating security measures. But when the judiciary weighs privacy against surveillance, privacy almost always loses. Unless the security measures are explored for efficacy they will win every time, especially when the word terrorism is invoked. The courts must take on a more active role to balance the interests of the state and its citizens.

For the war time argument security proponents argue that the war on terror requires greater security and less privacy. But this argument is backwards. During times of crisis the temptation is to make unnecessary sacrifices in the name of security. In the United States, for example, we saw that Japanese-American internment and the McCarthy-era witch-hunt for communists was in vain. The greatest challenge for safeguarding privacy comes during times when we are least inclined to protect it. We must be willing to be coldly rational and not emotional during such times.

We are often told that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear. This is the most pervasive argument the average person hears. But isn’t privacy a little like being naked? We might not be ashamed of our bodies but we don’t walk around naked. Being online isn’t so different. Our virtual selves should be as covered as our real selves. It’s a form of personal sovereignty. Being seen should require our consent, just as in the real world. The state has no business taking up the role of Peeping Tom.

I firmly believe that the state has a right and a duty to secure itself. And I equally believe that its citizens are entitled to those same rights. Citizens are part of the national security infrastructure. They conduct business; they share information; they are the benefactors of democratic values. Privacy rights are what, amongst others, separate us from the rule of tyrants. To protect them is to protect and preserve democracy. It is a fight worth dying for, as so many have done before us.

PK Hormis Tharakan discussed the importance of interception communication in intelligence gathering. In the western liberal democracies, restrictions of privacy were introduced for the anti-terrorism campaigns and these measures are far restrictive than what the Indian legislations contemplate. Preventive intelligence is a major component in maintenance of national security and this intelligence is generated and can be procured through interception.

We do need laws to make sure that the power of interception is not excessive or out of proportion. But the graver issue is that the equipment used for interception of communication is freely available in the market at a cheap price. This allows private citizens also to snoop into others conversation. So, interception by civilians should be the main concern.

Menaka Guruswamy discussed the lack of regulation of Indian intelligence agencies that creates burdens on privacy. When there is a conflict between individual privacy and national security, the court will always rule in favour of the national security. Public interest always takes precedence over individual interest.

When there is a claim right to privacy vis-à-vis national security, generally these claims are characterized by dissent, chilling effects on freedom of expression and government accountability. In India, privacy is fragile and relatively a less justifiable right. Another challenge to privacy is that, when communication is intercepted, which part of the conversation can be considered to be private and which part cannot be considered so.

Saikat Datta described his experience of being under illegal surveillance by an unauthorized intelligence agency. When a person is under surveillance, he or she is already considered to be suspect. If the State commits any mistake as to surveillance, carrying surveillance, who is not at all a person of interest in such case upon discovery, there is no penalty for such discrepancy.
He warned of the dangers of excessive wiretapping, a practice that currently generates such a “mountain” of information that anything with real intelligence value tends to be ignored until it is too late, as happened with the Mumbai bombings in 2008. It is clear that the Indian government’s surveillance and interception programmes far exceed what is necessary for legitimate law enforcement.

The issues, which came during the Q&A session was:

In case of national security vis-à-vis privacy in heavily militarized zone, legislations such as Armed Forces Special Powers Act actually give authority to the army to search and seizure on mere suspicion? This amounts gross violation of privacy.

Privacy and Banking

Panelists: M R Umarji, (Chief Legal Advisor, Indian Banks Associations), N A Vijayashankar, (Cyber Law Expert), Malavika Jayaram, (Advocate, Bangalore)
Moderator: Prashant Iyengar (Associate Professor, Jindal Law University)
Poster: Malavika Chandu (Law Student, NUJS)

Prashant Iyengar highlighted how privacy has been a central feature in banking and finance. Even before the notion of privacy came into existence, banks had developed an evolved notion of secrecy and confidentiality, which was fairly robust. Every legislation dealing with banking and finance generally have a clause related to privacy and confidentiality. It might seem that it would be easy to implement privacy in banking and finance given the long relationship between banking and secrecy and confidentiality. However, this is not the case in the contemporary times. Specifically, with the growth in issues related to national security, transparency and technology, the highly regarded notion of privacy seems to be slowly depleting.

Malavika Chandu described the data protection standards that govern the banking industry. As part of the know-you-customer guidelines, banks are required to provide the Reserve Bank with customer profiles and other identification information. Lastly, she described case laws in relation to privacy with respect to financial records.

N A Vijayashankar noted that the confidentiality and secrecy practices in the banking sector emanate from the banker-customer relationship. In the present context, secrecy and privacy maintained by the banks should be analyzed from the perspective of the right of the customer to safeguard his or her information from any third party. Generally, banks and other financial institutions protect personal information as a fraud control measure and not as duty to protect the privacy of a customer.

There has been a paradigm shift in banking practices from traditional banking practices to more efficient but less secure banking practice. Some of the terms and conditions of internet banking are illegal and do not stand the test of law. In contemporary times, banking institutions use confidentiality to cover up problems and data breach rather than protecting the customer. But the banks are not ready to disclose data breach as it apprehends that it will result in public losing faith in the system. The Reserve Bank of India, has recently notified that protection which is provided to the customers in banking services should also be extended to e-banking services. However, the banks have not properly implemented this.

M R Umarji highlighted fourteen laws related to banking which carries confidentiality clauses. In India, public sector banks dominate the market. These banks are created under a statute and such statute governs them. Therefore, they are duty bound to maintain secrecy and confidentiality. Private banks and cooperative banks are not bound by any statute. They do not have any obligations to maintain secrecy, but they do strictly observe confidentiality as a form of banking practice.

Banks are not allowed to reveal any personal information of an individual unless it is sought by some authority that has a legitimate right to claim such information. There has been a constant erosion of confidentiality due to various laws which empowers authorities to seek confidential information from the banks. Recently, in the light of the growing national security concerns, banks also have an obligation to report suspicious transactions. These have caused heavy burdens on right to privacy of an individual.

Under the Right to Information Act, 2005 public sector banks are considered to be public authorities. By the virtue of the Statute, any person can access information from banks. For example, in a recent case an information officer directed Reserve Bank of India, to disclose Inspection Reports. These reports generally contain information regarding doubtful accounts, non-performing account, etc. There is a need that banks should be exempted from the Right to Information Act, 2005. Since they are not dealing with public funds there is no need to apply transparency law to the banks.

Malavika Jayaram described the major conflicts and tensions with respect to privacy vis-à-vis banking and financial systems and financial data. Other privacy and transparency issues include: the publication of online tax information and income data.

Surveillance is built in the design of banking system, so it is capable of tracking personal information and activity. There is a need to implement more privacy friendly and privacy by design systems in the banking sector. Customers are generally ignorant about privacy policies and this influences informed consent and furthermore marketing institution may influence customers to behave in a particular manner. In this context privacy by design becomes very important.

Data minimization principles should be applied; since the more data collected the more there is a risk of data breach and misuse. In case of data retention it is necessary that person giving such data should know how much proportion of the data is being retained and for how long it is stored and also what is the scope of the data and for what purpose will it be used.

Personal information and data, which was previously collected by the government, are gradually being outsourced to private bodies. On one hand it is a good thing that private sector get their technology and security measures right as compared to the government agencies but it comes with the risk that it can be sold out by private bodies as commodities in the market. Private bodies that are harvesting the data can also be forced by the government to disclose it under a particular law or statute without taking into consideration the consent of the individual whose personal information is sought for.

There is multiplicity of documentation for identification, which makes transactions less efficient. This has attracted customers to more convenient systems such as one-access point systems, but people tend to forget the issues related to privacy, in using such a system. What is portrayed as efficient for the consumer is a tool for social control and who has access and authority to use such information.

Often the reason given for collecting information is that it will help the service provider to combat fraud. However, studies have shown people more often fake situation rather than identity. The other concerns are that of sharing of information and lack of choice with respect to such sharing. There should be check as to sharing of personal information as the data belongs to the individual and not the bank or any other institution which requires furnishing personal information in lieu of services. This gives rise to a binary choice to the user; either the individual has to provide information to avail the service or else one cannot avail the services.

There is supposed to be market for privacy. The notion of personal information is subjective and varies from person to person. For example, one might be comfortable to share certain information. However, others might not be.

The issues that came out of the Q&A sessions are:

The default settings are generally put at the low protection settings. Unless the user is aware of the privacy protection setting, he or she is prone to breach of privacy. Should the default privacy setting be set to maximum security and option can be given to the user to change it according to his or her preference?
Is there any system in the banks, which allows the customers of bank to know about which all third parties the bank has shared his or her personal information with?

Health Privacy

Panelists: K. K. Abraham, (President, Indian Network for People with HIV), Dr. B. S. Bedi, (Advisor, CDAC & Media Lab Asia), and Raman Chawla, (Senior Advocacy Officer, Lawyers Collective).
Moderator: Ashok Row Kavi (Journalist and LGBT Activist)
Poster: Danish Sheikh (Researcher, Alternative Law Forum)

Danish Sheikh outlined the possible health privacy violations. These included the disclosure of personal health information to third parties without consent, inadequate notification to a patient of a data breach, the purpose of collecting data is not specified and improper security standards, storage and disposal. The disclosure of personal health information has the potential to be embarrassing, stigmatizing or discriminatory.

Subsequently, Danish Sheikh examined the status of sexual minorities’ vis-à-vis the privacy framework. Culling out some real life examples based on various studies, media reports and judgments from the Supreme Court and the High Courts of Delhi and Allahabad, he also described privacy violations committed by both individuals as well as state authorities.

Ashok Row Kavi recounted how privacy was very contextual when debating section 377 in the LGBT community. The paradigm upon which they were going to fight the anti-sodomy law was that it was consenting sex between two adults in private space. However, this paradigm was not well received by women, as women did not see private space as safe space, due to domestic violence. Perceptions of privacy are very subjective and it differs from person to person.

Raman Chawla recounted the history of the Draft HIV/AIDS Bill. In 2002, the need for law related to HIV/AIDS was realized in order to protect right to consent, right against discrimination and right to confidentiality of HIV patients. The bill was finalized in the year 2006. Alarmingly, it is yet to be tabled before the Parliament.

The privacy provisions in the HIV bill clearly state that no person can be tested, treated or researched for HIV without the consent of the patient. It also casts that in a fiduciary relationship the health care provider must maintain confidentiality, however if the patient provides written consent then their status may be disclosed. The HIV condition of the patient can also revealed by the doctor if there is a court order demanding such disclosure. The doctor may disclose the status of the patient to his or her partner but he has to follow a particular protocol. The doctor should have sufficient belief that his or her partner is at risk of contracting HIV. The person who is infected will be asked for his/her views and counseled before his/her partner is informed. However, there are doubts as to the implementation and enforcement of this protocol.

Conclusion

Natasha Vaz (Policy Advocate, Privacy India) brought the symposium to a close by thanking the partners, the panelists, the moderators and the participants for their sincere efforts in making the All India Privacy Symposium a grand success. In India, a public discussion regarding privacy has been long over due. The symposium provided a platform for dialogue and building greater awareness around privacy issues in health, banking, national security, transparency and e-governance. Using our research, expert opinions, personal experiences, questions and comments various facets of privacy were explored.

Press Coverage

The event was featured in the media as well:

India needs an independent privacy law, says NGO Privacy India, Economic Times, February 2, 2012
New Bill to decide on individual’s right to privacy, Tehelka, February 6, 2012
Lack of strong privacy law in healthcare a big worry, Daily News & Analysis, February 13, 2012
Privacy concerns grow in India, Washington Post, February 3, 2012

Click to download the Agenda and Profile of Speakers (PDF, 1642 Kb)

Download the PDF (555 Kb)
Follow the webcast of the event

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/all-india-privacy-delhi-report

List of Recommendations on the Aadhaar Bill, 2016 - Letter Submitted to the Members of Parliament

Amber Sinha, Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Sunil Abraham, and Vanya Rakesh — 2016-03-21T08:50:09Z

On Friday, March 11, the Lok Sabha passed the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016. The Bill was introduced as a money bill and there was no public consultation to evaluate the provisions therein even though there are very serious ramifications for the Right to Privacy and the Right to Association and Assembly. Based on these concerns, and numerous others, we submitted an initial list of recommendations to the Members of Parliaments to highlight the aspects of the Bill that require immediate attention.

Download the submission letter: PDF.

Text of the Submission

On Friday, March 11, the Lok Sabha passed the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016. The Bill was introduced as a money bill and there was no public consultation to evaluate the provisions therein even though there are very serious ramifications for the Right to Privacy and the Right to Association and Assembly. The Bill has made it compulsory for all Indian to enroll for Aadhaar in order to receive any subsidy, benefit, or service from the Government whose expenditure is incurred from the Consolidate Fund of India. Apart from the issue of centralisation of the national biometric database leading to a deep national vulnerability, the Bill also keeps unaddressed two serious concerns regarding the technological framework concerned:

Identification without Consent: Before the Aadhaar project it was not possible for the Indian government or any private entity to identify citizens (and all residents) without their consent. But biometrics allow for non-consensual and covert identification and authentication. The only way to fix this is to change the technology configuration and architecture of the project. The law cannot be used to correct the problems in the technological design of the project.
Fallible Technology: The Biometrics Standards Committee of UIDAI has acknowledged the lack of data on how a biometric authentication technology will scale up where the population is about 1.2 billion. The technology has been tested and found feasible only for a population of 200 million. Further, a report by 4G Identity Solutions estimates that while in any population, approximately 5% of the people have unreadable fingerprints, in India it could lead to a failure to enroll up to 15% of the population. For the current Indian population of 1.2 billion the expected proportion of duplicates is 1/121, a ratio which is far too high. [1]

Based on these concerns, and numerous others, we sincerely request you to ensure that the Bill is rigorously discussed in Rajya Sabha, in public, and, if needed, also by a Parliamentary Standing Committee, before considering its approval and implementation. Towards this, we humbly submit an initial list of recommendations to highlight the aspects of the Bill that require immediate attention:

Implement the Recommendations of the Shah and Sinha Committees: The report by the Group of Experts on Privacy chaired by the Former Chief Justice A P Shah [2] and the report by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance (2011-2012) chaired by Shri Yashwant Sinha [3] have suggested a rigorous and extensive range of recommendations on the Aadhaar / UIDAI / NIAI project and the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 from which the majority sections of the Aadhaar Bill, 2016, are drawn. We request that these recommendations are seriously considered and incorporated into the Aadhaar Bill, 2016.
Authentication using the Aadhaar number for receiving government subsidies, benefits, and services cannot be made mandatory: Section 7 of the Aadhaar Bill, 2016, states that authentication of the person using her/his Aadhaar number can be made mandatory for the purpose of disbursement of government subsidies, benefits, and services; and in case the person does not have an Aadhaar number, s/he will have to apply for Aadhaar enrolment. This sharply contradicts the claims made by UIDAI earlier that the Aadhaar number is “optional, and not mandatory”, and more importantly the directive given by the Supreme Court (via order dated August 11, 2015). The Bill must explicitly state that the Aadhaar number is only optional, and not mandatory, and a person without an Aadhaar number cannot be denied any democratic rights, and public subsidies, benefits, and services, and any private services.
Vulnerabilities in the Enrolment Process: The Bill does not address already documented issues in the enrolment process. In the absence of an exhaustive list of information to be collected, some Registrars are permitted to collect extra and unnecessary information. Also, storage of data for elongated periods with Enrollment agencies creates security risks. These vulnerabilities need to be prevented through specific provisions. It should also be mandated for all entities including the Enrolment Agencies, Registrars, CIDR and the requesting entities to shift to secure system like PKI based cryptography to ensure secure method of data transfer.
Precisely Define and Provide Legal Framework for Collection and Sharing of Biometric Data of Citizens: The Bill defines “biometric information” is defined to include within its scope “photograph, fingerprint, iris scan, or other such biological attributes of an individual.” This definition gives broad and sweeping discretionary power to the UIDAI / Central Government to increase the scope of the term. The definition should be exhaustive in its scope so that a legislative act is required to modify it in any way.
Prohibit Central Storage of Biometrics Data: The presence of central storage of sensitive personal information of all residents in one place creates a grave security risk. Even with the most enhanced security measures in place, the quantum of damage in case of a breach is extremely high. Therefore, storage of biometrics must be allowed only on the smart cards that are issued to the residents.
Chain of Trust Model and Audit Trail: As one of the objects of the legislation is to provide targeted services to beneficiaries and reduce corruption, there should be more accountability measures in place. A chain of trust model must be incorporated in the process of enrolment where individuals and organisations vouch for individuals so that when a ghost is introduced someone has can be held accountable blame is not placed simply on the technology. This is especially important in light of the questions already raised about the deduplication technology. Further, there should be a transparent audit trail made available that allows public access to use of Aadhaar for combating corruption in the supply chain.
Rights of Residents: There should be specific provisions dealing with cases where an individual is not issued an Aadhaar number or denied access to benefits due to any other factor. Additionally, the Bill should make provisions for residents to access and correct information collected from them, to be notified of data breaches and legal access to information by the Government or its agencies, as matter of right. Further, along with the obligations in Section 8, it should also be mandatory for all requesting entities to notify the individuals of any changes in privacy policy, and providing a mechanism to opt-out.
Establish Appropriate Oversight Mechanisms: Section 33 currently specifies a procedure for oversight by a committee, however, there are no substantive provisions laid down that shall act as the guiding principles for such oversight mechanisms. The provision should include data minimisation, and “necessity and proportionality” principles as guiding principles for any exceptions to Section 29.
Establish Grievance Redressal and Review Mechanisms: Currently, there are no grievance redressal mechanism created under the Bill. The power to set up such a mechanism is delegated to the UIDAI under Section 23 (2) (s) of the Bill. However, making the entity administering a project, also responsible for providing for the frameworks to address the grievances arising from the project, severely compromises the independence of the grievance redressal body. An independent national grievance redressal body with state and district level bodies under it, should be set up. Further, the NIAI Bill, 2010, provided for establishing an Identity Review Committee to monitor the usage pattern of Aadhaar numbers. This has been removed in the Aadhaar Bill 2016, and must be restored.

Endnotes

[1] See: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/Flaws_in_the_UIDAI_Process_0.pdf.

[2] See: http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_privacy.pdf.

[3] See: http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Finance/15_Finance_42.pdf.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/list-of-recommendations-on-the-aadhaar-bill-2016

Fueling the Affordable Smartphone Revolution in India

sinha — 2016-03-16T15:23:43Z

Smartphones have emerged as the exemplar of mankind's quest for shrinking technologies. They embody the realization of a simple premise – that computing devices would do more and cost less. This realization has been responsible for modern society's profound transformations in communication, governance, and knowledge distribution.

The essay was published as part of the The Good Life in Asia's Digital 21st Century essay collection.

The launch of the iPhone in 2007 is often credited with ushering in an era of smartphones. Ever since, the world's best tech R&D has focused on increasing the capabilities of these devices. And as a result, less than a decade later, we have sub-hundred dollar smartphones. The low-cost smartphone has found an enthusiastic and insatiable market in developing countries, especially Asia. India is no exception to the Asian narrative – Micromax, Spice, and Lava (low cost smartphone manufacturers) are household names in the Indian smartphone market, which accounted for 65% of internet traffic in 2014 (Meeker, 2015).

The Indian Prime Minister, carrying the twin aspirations of catalyzing the growth of indigenous manufacturing and bridging the digital divide, launched the “Digital India” and “Make in India” campaigns last year. During his US visit, Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook extended their support to the campaigns' vision (Guynn, 2011). The campaigns outline the government's elaborate initiatives to, inter alia, bridge the digital divide and build indigenous manufacturing capacity. While all these developments bode well for the indigenous smartphone, there remain some serious concerns affecting the growth of the industry – for instance, patent infringement litigations and the absence of clear legal and regulatory solutions.

From the state of the industry and its implications, it can be concluded that: first, growing access to smartphones has been influenced by their phenomenal affordability; second, smartphones are an excellent example of technology for development (UNDP, 2001) and a facilitator of access to knowledge; and third, domestic smartphone production has occurred in an imprecise legal and regulatory environment.

This essay attempts to build an appreciation for the role that smartphones are playing in development, specifically, by fostering Access to Knowledge. Conversations around development by public-interest groups and emerging industries often espouse Access to Knowledge to address concerns in international development, communications, technology, education, and intellectual property policy. Whereas the principle can be regarded as in-theworks, two theories inform us about the role of mobile phones in fostering Access to Knowledge. Lea Sheaver's theory classifies mobile as an Access-toKnowledge good. Lea enumerates the five key components of a robust Access to Knowledge framework, viz., education for information literacy, access to the global knowledge commons, access to knowledge goods, an enabling legal framework, and effective innovation systems (Sheaver, 2007). According to her, affordability of the good is the ultimate indicator of its efficacy as an access to knowledge good. Furthermore, inventions in microchip technology, electronics manufacturing, and software need to be supported by enabling legal and policy frameworks coupled with effective innovation systems.

Yochai Benkler's framework classifies mobile-devices as both informationembedded goods and information-embedded tools (Benkler, 2006). He says, “Information-embedded goods are those goods which are ‘better, more plentiful or cheaper because of some technological advance embedded in them or associated with their production,’ such as medicines, movies, and improved crop seed. Information-embedded tools, in turn, are those technologies necessary for research, innovation, and communication of knowledge” (Benkler, 2006). A smartphone qualifies as both because it can be used to obtain knowledge, and it depends on discoveries in microchip technology, electronics manufacturing, and software to function.

To date, there has been no formal, theoretical or evidentiary investigation on the emergence of smartphones as an Access-to-Knowledge good. In the following sections, I will attempt to explain the smartphone’s dependence on an enabling legal framework and effective innovation systems (Lea's components). It must be borne in mind that globally, discussions affecting access to knowledge have aimed at creating balanced and inclusive systems related to intellectual property (Kapczynski & Krikorian, 2010). Therefore, the essay will focus on: first, the relationship between constituent mobile technologies and intellectual property as a function of production/deployment of smartphones in India; and second, the relationship between innovation and access.

Creating an Enabling Legal Framework to Foster Access to Knowledge

The adage “the only lesson you can learn from history is that it repeats itself” is worth bearing in our narrative. The emergence of the smartphones industry in Asia has commonalities with the flourishing Asian piracy trade – which remains an essential access solution for low-income societies constantly barraged by expensive western media goods. The prohibitive cost of acquiring brand-name devices (e.g. Apple, HTC, Samsung, Sony) drove local production to imitate and innovate cheaper substitutes (WIPO, 2010). This occurred within the lenient and flexible intellectual property regimes prevalent in Asian countries, which continue to be constantly criticized for their failure to enact stricter intellectual property law. The hubs of smartphone production – China, Taiwan, and India – have flexible intellectual property protection law and lax enforcement measures (Centre for Internet and Society, 2012).

Concerns of intellectual property center around patent and copyright legislation, which have yet to be fully developed to address intellectual property in high-tech industries (since trademark issues remain unchanged, they will not be discussed in the essay.) As a result, constituent smartphone technologies have been shaped and governed by a blend of formal and informal rules and legal and illegal practices. This is why they are often referred to as “gray market” technologies. A smartphone in terms of constituent intellectual property can be broadly divided into hardware and software technologies. This piece will first deal with hardware, followed by software technologies.

Hardware Technologies and Their Relationship with IP Law

Presently, most Indian manufacturers import hardware from China and Taiwan, and assemble the phones in India. A few key Indian domestic players are Maxx Mobile, Intex, Spice, and Lava, whose dominance have not gone unnoticed by foreign manufacturers. A couple of these domestic manufacturers are now embroiled in patent litigation threats or infringement suits. And as litigation piles up in Indian courts, the judiciary is slowly waking up to mobile patent litigation, but is yet to rule comprehensively. To make matters worse, the jurisdiction of the Indian antitrust regulator remains unclear, and to a certain extent overlaps with the judiciary, adding to the ambiguity. For instance, when an appellate court ruled in favor of the Swedish tech-giant Ericsson, it ordered Micromax to pay a flat 1.25 – 2% of its devices' selling price to Ericsson (Lakshane, 2015). The ruling was devoid of a more rational and reasoned approach developed by courts of other jurisdictions in similar matters, which prescribed that the infringers pay damages based on the price of the patented components only, and not the retail price of the phones. This decision risks causing a significant increase in the price of phones and potentially threatens local innovation.

The Indian government's Make in India and Digital India campaigns aim to fulfill the vision of a digitally empowered India, and the 2015 Indian Union budget also targets boosting the electronics manufacturing industry. Despite these broad initiatives, there needs to be a more focused policy in place to ensure domestic companies do not get weighed down by patent related concerns. The root cause of litigation is the vesting of a majority of critical mobile patents (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs) by a handful tech-giants. For instance, Qualcomm owns 5700 patents around CDMA technology (qualcomm.com). In another instance, the DVD format constitutes 311 SEPs for DVD players and 272 SEPs for DVD recorders (CIS, 2012). Such a dense concentration of patents around SEPs creates a patent thicket and thereby compels Smartphone manufacturers to acquire multiple licenses, and to pay high transaction costs and huge royalties to the owner. To reduce conflict and protect domestic players from being arm-twisted into paying high royalties, the government can potentially identify critical technologies and initiate the formation of a patent pool of such technologies. The concept of a patent pool mandates that the patent holders issue licenses on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory basis to interested parties. However, a nuanced and cautious approach to setting up such pools is necessary (Shapiro, 2001).

There are interesting lessons in China's steps to encourage local innovation of Smartphone hardware as well, specifically in the form of standardized technologies. The Chinese government has actively supported the development of indigenous standards to shield domestic manufacturers from royalty exposure. In fact, the China Blue High-definition Disc (CBHD) standard was built as an alternative to the Blu-ray disc and was duly adopted by the Chinese government, which reportedly caused the royalty rates for the Blu-ray format to dip. Much later, Warner Bros, Paramount, and other motion picture producers adopted the CBHD standard as well for distribution in China.

Software Technologies and Their Relationship with IP Law

Unlike hardware technology, where India is struggling to build manufacturing capacity, the success of the Indian software industry has already been realized. The software-as-a-service (SaAS) industry is led by Infosys, TCS, and Wipro in software exports. The prevailing trend in the industry since the 1980s was to assign ownership of their products to offshore clients. However, in the past decade, there has been a conscious shift by the Indian software development workforce to build products for Smartphone platforms. This is in response to the shift in local populations to accessing content and services online. Reports indicate that India has the second largest population of mobile applications developers (approx. 3 million) in the world, second only to the US (Livemint, 2015). The Indian government has recognized the potential of mobile application-based ventures and created funds to encourage app development in India (IAMAI, 2015).

Intellectual property protection around software is fairly ambiguous. A piece of code is potentially capable of gaining both patent and copyright protection. In the area of mobile application development, preliminary research findings indicate that coding occurs with an agnostic attitude towards intellectual property laws (Cassar, 2014). One of the reasons is ambiguity on a multitude of issues around the protection of software because Indian legislation on patent and copyright is frustratingly insufficient. There is a growing discontentment about long-term patent protection over software code, which could be detrimental to innovation – particularly, to the start-up segment of software industry. In more technologically advanced economies, software patenting has emerged as a scourge – last year, the US Supreme Court in Alice Corporation Pty Ltd v. CLS Bank International Et Al narrowed the eligibility of software inventions to gain patent protection. The activist discourse has shifted in favor of eliminating software patenting because of the incremental and obsolescent nature of a software invention, inter alia (Lapowsky, 2015). However, in a recent disappointing move, the Indian patent office widened the scope of patent-eligible subject matter for software-related inventions – a move that was decried by free software activists and industry alike. This widening of scope can only benefit tech-giants in building bigger patent portfolios, which is unnecessary and unhealthy for innovation by small and mid-tier entities (Sinha, 2015).

Effective Innovation Systems

Innovation ensures fresh creation of knowledge. A society cannot premise itself on the mere importation of knowledge; it must also strive to use the knowledge to meet its own local needs and environment. Innovation depends on a variety of factors – there is no singular path or factor to build an innovative and enterprising society. The patent system is often incorrectly credited with “promoting” innovation. The discourse around innovation was extremely patent-centric until studies disproved the assumptive correlation between high patenting activity and innovation. Continuing in the same vein, Lea states, “From the A2K perspective, however, relying on patents – which represent the right to exclude others from access to the innovation – is particularly problematic. Patents likely represent the segment of innovation of least value for expanding access to knowledge: improvements in the knowledge stock whose application is limited by exclusive property rights” (Shaver, 2007).

In this framework, it is also important to shed light on the growing movement of openness. Openness as a movement has been captured by various fields - Big data, software, education, media, etc. Free and Open Source Software has emerged as a key agent in information technology policy-making in India, with the Indian government adopting an open standards policy and an open software policy for its own purposes.

In the context of smartphone technologies, preliminary findings also support the shift towards openness (Huang, 2014). Industry participants have observed that openness will lead to greater benefits in private production of hardware technologies. Similarly, mobile applications developers have also voiced support of open source software (Cassar, 2014).

Conclusion

The discussion above identified a limited set of legal and regulatory concerns affecting the state of production/deployment of smartphones in India. These issues and findings are backed by preliminary research, and purport to sustain the emergence of the smartphone as an enabler of access to knowledge. The proposed solutions direct industry and the government alike to take immediate steps to fix problems impeding pervasive access to this knowledge good.

The experience of the smartphone industry with an imprecise legal and regulatory environment, akin to piracy, has thus far been a success story of affordability, quality substitution, and innovation. However, this narrative is now threatened by messy litigation, jurisdictional uncertainties between the anti-trust regulator and judicial system, SEP licensing issues, rise of software patents, inter alia. Despite these issues, the industry continues to grow. The future of access to knowledge is therefore bright, provided that stakeholders make efforts to meet the needs of this emerging industry and the public, including development and consumer interests.

References / Links / Resources

Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth Of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets And Freedom. Retrieved from http://www.benkler.org/wealth_of_networks/index.php?title=Chapter_9%2C_section_3.
Cassar, S. (2014). Interviews with App Developers: Open Source, Community, and Contradictions – Part III. Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-open-sourcecommunity-and-contradictions-iii
Cassar, S. (2014) Ambiguity in the App Store: Understanding India’s emerging IT sector in light of IP. Retrieved from http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ambiguity-in-the-app-store
Centre for Internet and Society, Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace(2012, September). Retrieved from http://cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf/view
Guynn, J. (2015, September 28). Facebook, Silicon Valley like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/09/27/narendra-modi-india-facebook-markzuckerberg-google-sundar-pichai-silicon-valley/72936544/
Huang, M. (2014). [Open] Innovation and Expertise > Patent Protection & Trolls in a Broken Patent Regime (Interviews with Semiconductor Industry - Part 3). Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-part-3
IAMAI (2015). An inquiry into India's app economy.
Kapczynski, A., Krikorian, G., (2010). Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property. Retrieved from: https://mitpress.mit.edu/sites/default/files/titles/free_download/9781890951962_Access_to_ Knowledge_in_the_Age_of_Intellectual_Property.pdf
Lakshane, R. (2015, September). FAQ: CIS Proposal for Compulsory Licensing of Critical Mobile Technologies. Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-ofcritical-mobile-technologies
Lakshane, R. (2015, February). Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi. Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/ a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi
Lapowsky, I. (2015, February). If You Want to Fix Software Patents, Eliminate Software Patents. Retrieved from https://www.eff.org/mention/follow-wired-twitter-facebook-rss-eff-if-you-want-fix-software-patentseliminate-software
Meeker, M. (2015). 2015 Internet Trends. Retrieved from http://www.kpcb.com/partner/mary-meeker
PTI (2015). Google aims to make India a hub for app development. Livemint. Retrieved from: http:// www.livemint.com/Industry/rwWUfp30YezONe0WnM1TIO/Google-aims-to-make-India-a-hub-for-appdevelopment.html
Qualcomm Enters Into CDMA Modem Card License Agreement with Seiko Instruments Incorporated. (n.d.). Retrieved November 13, 2015, from https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2000/06/20/ qualcomm-enters-cdma-modem-card-license-agreement-seiko-instruments
Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 1, 119-150. Retrieved from: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf
Shaver, L. (2007). Defining and Measuring Access to Knowledge: Towards an A2K Index. Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 22. retrieved from: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/22
Sinha, A. (2015). Comments on the Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). Retrieved from http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-the-guidelines-for-examination-of-computerrelated-inventions-cris
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (2001). Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2001/en/
World Intellectual Property Organisation. (2010, Dec 1-2). Media Piracy in Emerging Economies: Price, Market Structure and Consumer Behavior. Retrieved from the WIPO website: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_6/wipo_ace_6_5.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/digital-asia-hub-the-good-life-in-asias-21-st-century-anubha-sinha-fueling-the-affordable-smartphone-revolution-in-india

Internet Researchers' Conference (IRC) 2016 - Studying Internet in India: Call for Sessions (Extended to Nov 22)

sumandro — 2015-11-15T07:48:17Z

With great excitement, we are announcing the beginning of an annual conference series titled Internet Researchers' Conference (IRC), the first edition of which is to take place in Delhi during February 25-27, 2016 (yet to be confirmed). This first conference will focus on the theme of 'Studying Internet in India.' The word 'study' here is a shorthand for a range of tasks, from documentation and theory-building, to measurement and representation. We invite you to propose sessions for the conference by Sunday, November 22, 2015. Final sessions will be selected during December and announced by December 31, 2015. Below are the details about the conference series, as well instructions for proposing a session for the conference.

Call for Sessions document: Download (PDF)

Call for Sessions poster: Download (PNG)

Internet Researchers’ Conference

The last decades have seen a growing entanglement of our daily lives with the internet, not only as modes of communication but also as shared socio-politico-cultural spaces, and as objects of study. The emergence of new artifacts, conditions, and sites of power/knowledge with the prevalence of digital modes of communication, consumptions, production, distribution, and appropriation have expectedly attracted academic and non-academic explorers across disciplines, professions, and interests. Researchers across the domains of arts, humanities, and social sciences have attempted to understand life on the internet, or life after the internet, and the way digital technologies mediate various aspects of our being today. These attempts have in turn raised new questions around understanding of digital objects, online lives, and virtual networks, and have contributed to complicating disciplinary assumptions, methods, and boundaries.

The Researchers at Work (RAW) programme at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is very excited to invite you to take part in the first of a series of annual conferences for researchers (academic or otherwise) studying internet in India. These conferences will be called the Internet Researchers' Conference (IRC), with the abbreviation reminding us of an early protocol for text-based communication over internet. The first edition will be organised around the theme of ‘studying internet in India.’ The word study here is a shorthand for a range of tasks, from documentation and theory-building, to measurement and representation.

This conference series is founded on the following interests:

Creating discussion spaces for researchers studying internet in India and in other comparable regions.
Foregrounding the multiplicity, hierarchies, tensions, and urgencies of the digital sites and users in India.
Accounting for the various layers, conceptual and material, of experiences and usages of internet and networked digital media in India.
Exploring and practicing new modes of research and documentation necessitated by new (digital) forms of objects of power/knowledge.

Studying Internet in India

The inaugural conference will be held in Delhi (to be confirmed) on February 25-27, 2015. It will comprise of discussion and workshop sessions taking place during the first two days, and a writing sprint and a final round table taking place during the third day.

The conference will specifically focus on the following questions:

How do we conceptualise, as an intellectual and political task, the mediation and transformation of social, cultural, political, and economic processes, forces, and sites through internet and digital media technologies in contemporary India?
How do we frame and explore the experiences and usages of internet and digital media technologies in India within its specific historical-material contexts shaped by traditional hierarchies of knowledge, colonial systems of communication, post-independence initiatives in nation-wide technologies of governance, a rapidly growing telecommunication market, and informal circuits of media production and consumption, among others?
What tools and methods are made available by arts, humanities, social science, and technical disciplines to study internet in India; how and where do they fail to meet the purpose; what revisions and fresh tool building are becoming necessary; and how should the usage of such tools and methods be taught?
Given the global techno-economic contours of the internet, and the starkly hierarchical and segmented experiences and usages of the same in India, how do we begin to use the internet as a space for academic and creative practice and intervention?

Sessions

The conference will not be organised around papers but sessions. Each session will be one and half hour long. Potential participants may propose sessions that largely engage with one of the questions listed above.

Each proposed session must have at least two, and preferably three, co-leaders, who will drive the session, and prepare a session document after the conference. The proposed session can either involve a discussion, or a workshop.

In a discussion session, the co-leaders may present their works (not necessarily of the academic kind), or invite others to present their works, on a specific theme, which will be followed by a discussion, as structured by the co-leaders.

In a workshop session, the co-leaders will engage the participants to undertake individual or collaborative work in response to a series of questions, challenges, or provocations offered by the co-leaders at the beginning of the session. The proposed work may involve writing, searching, copying, building, etc., but not speaking.

Both the kinds of sessions are open to presentations and collaborations in the textual format or in other formats, including but not limited to code-based works and multimedia installations.

Writing Sprint

At the writing sprint, on the third day morning, all the participants will collaboratively put together the first draft of a handbook on tools and methods of studying Internet in India. It will be created as an online, open access, multilingual, and editable (wiki-like) book, and will be meant for extensive usage and augmentation by students, researchers, and others.

Final Round Table

This will take place after the lunch on the third day to wrap-up the conversations (and propose new initiatives, hopefully) emerging during the previous days of the conference, to make plans for follow-up works (including the first IRC Reader), and to speculate about the shape of the next year’s conference.

IRC Reader

The IRC Reader will be produced as documentation of the conversations and activities at the conference. The Reader, obviously, will have the same theme as the conference, and will largely comprise of the session documentation (not necessarily textual) prepared by the co-leaders of the session concerned. Once all the session documentation is shared by the co-leaders and is temporarily published online, all the participants will be invited to share their comments, which will all be part of the final Reader of the conference.

Proposing a Session

To propose a session, each team of two/three co-leaders will have to submit the following documents:

The name of the session: It should be created as a hashtag, as in #BlackLivesMatter, or #RefugeesWelcome.
A plan of the proposed session that should clarify its context, the key questions/challenges/provocations for the session, and how they connect to any one of the four questions listed above. Write no more than one page.
If it is a discussion session: Mention what will be presented at the session, and who will present it. Share the abstracts of the papers to be presented (if any). Each abstract should not be longer than 300 words.
If it is a workshop session: Mention what you expect the participants to do during the session, and how the co-leaders will support them through the work. Write no more than one page.
Three readings, or objects, or software that you expect the participants to know about before taking part in the session.
CVs of all the co-leaders of the session.

We understand that finding co-leaders for a session you have in mind might be difficult in certain cases. One possible way for you to find co-leaders is by sharing your session idea on the researchers@cis-india.org mailing list. Alternatively, you may keep an eye on the list to see what potential topics are being discussed. If you are facing any difficulty subscribing to the mailing list, please write to raw@cis-india.org.

All session proposals must be submitted by Sunday, November 22 (extended), 2015, via email sent to raw@cis-india.org.

Selection of Sessions

All proposed sessions, along with related documents, will be published online by November 30. All co-leaders of proposed sessions will be invited to vote for 8 sessions before December 15. The sessions with maximum votes will be selected for the conference, and the list of such sessions will be published on December 31, 2015.

Venue, Accommodation, and Travel

The conference is most likely to take place in Delhi on February 25-27, 2016. The place, dates, and venue will be confirmed by December 31, 2015.

The conference organiser(s) will cover all costs related to accommodation and hospitality during the conference.

Unfortunately, we are not sure if we will be able to pay for travel expenses of the participants. We will confirm this by December 31, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/irc16-call

Online Gender Based Violence on Short Form Video Platforms

Divyansha Sehgal and Lakshmi T. Nambiar — 2024-04-11T03:24:55Z

An inquiry into platform policies and safeguards. This report explores how short-form video platforms in India address online gender based violence (oGBV) by analysing their terms of service, community guidelines (CG), and reporting workflows.

Executive Summary

Being a woman or from a gender minority online is a harrowing experience. From early instances of sexual harassment in text-based internet communities in the 1990s, to apps such as Bulli Bai, and harassment in the Metaverse more recently, online gender-based violence (oGBV) is a pervasive problem, affecting 23 per cent of women globally. In India, nearly half of the women surveyed reported facing online harassment, leading to reduced online participation. Other consequences of oGBV include mental health issues, withdrawal from online spaces, and, offline violence.

In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women & girls, and its causes and consequences recognised online violence against women and the need to counter it, defining it as "any act of gender-based violence against women that is committed, assisted or aggravated in part or fully by the use of ICT, such as mobile phones and smartphones, the Internet, social media platforms or email, against a woman because she is a woman, or affects women disproportionately."

This report explores how short-form video platforms in India address oGBV by analysing their terms of service, community guidelines (CG), and reporting workflows. Recognising the role of intermediaries is crucial in understanding challenges and developing effective strategies to combat oGBV. We selected three Indian video-sharing platforms based on their download numbers, as well as Instagram reels (given their popularity in India).

The CG and terms of use of these platforms were measures against a typology of oGBV we put together based on a literature review.

The guidelines of the platforms included in the study demonstrated minimal recognition of the gendered effects of potential behaviours related to oGBV. None of the platforms had a separate policy or section dedicated to oGBV, and the policies were found to be ambiguous at several points, leaving them open to interpretation by moderators. Josh was particularly noted to have extremely poor coverage overall. Certain forms of oGBV, such as harassment, non-consensual information sharing, and extortion, were addressed to a slightly higher degree in the guidelines of Instagram, Moj, and Roposo. Some exemplary aspects are highlighted in our findings section. However, other forms, such as attacks on communication channels, omissions by regulatory actors, surveillance and stalking, and online domestic violence found little to no mention across policies, despite the likelihood of these issues manifesting offline as well. Further, policy provisions failed to address the needs of gender minorities. Reporting mechanisms were found to be lacking or inconsistent, and failed to consider the networked nature of harassment.

The harms of gendered violence are well-known and documented. The lack of clarity on implementation and policy is no longer an oversight but an active choice to disregard users.

Attributions

Co-authors: Divyansha Sehgal and Lakshmi T. Nambiar
Conceptualisation: Ambika Tandon, Torsha Sarkar
Review: Amrita Sengupta and Divyank Katira
Research Assistance: Cheshta Arora
Design: Anagha Musalgaonkar

The report can be downloaded here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/online-gender-based-violence-on-short-form-video-platforms

The Platform Economy’s Gatekeeping of Class and Caste Dominance in Urban India

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi — 2024-04-19T03:11:44Z

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi contributed an essay on how gated society management apps like MyGate and NoBrokerHood feed on caste and income inequalities in new datafied forms. The essay features in The Formalization of Social Precarities, an anthology edited by Murali Shanmugavelan and Aiha Nguyen and published with Data & Society.

Ashrit is an experienced platform worker. He has been a delivery worker for three years, job-hopping frequently. Ashrit has worked as a package delivery worker for three platforms: two courier services and a hyperlocal grocery delivery company, which promises compressed ten-minute deliveries over short distances. While navigating the city, he often deals with omnipresent surveillance tools deployed in apartment complexes owned by upper-class and dominant-caste homeowners. Ashrit is used to being screened at every apartment complex he enters, including having his picture taken and verifying details such as his name, mobile number, and the platform he is delivering for. The everydayness of constant identity verification means that Ashrit is not bothered much by it — he said he doesn’t mind the process so much as the delay it causes when customers forget to approve his entry.

MyGate is one such company offering “gated community management,” claiming to service over 25,000 gated societies in India. A competing application, NoBrokerHood, services over 18,000 societies. Apps of this nature have sprung up across urban India in the past five years, offering “society management” services to a niche market of gated societies. Their bouquet of services includes everything from property listings with a commission rate for the platform, security services, accounting services for maintenance and related expenses, and in-app discussion forums for residents. These apps market digital security, which allows residents to regulate entries and exits and make a database of all non-resident visitors in the society. The objective of these apps is to legitimize surveillance as a way of ensuring safety in gated societies. Through a preliminary search online, we found over 20 different companies specializing in digital solutions for gated societies. The industry even had a business exposition in Mumbai on “Housing Society Management,” focused on technology solutions for gated societies.

This study uses the framework of platform urbanism to understand surveillance platforms. Platform urbanism analyzes the growing power of digital platforms in cities. Urban geographers have argued that platforms are a symptom of current models of capitalism, which exploit “idle resources” to produce new forms of urban spaces and value where they might not have existed earlier. Airbnb and Uber are often used as examples of this new form of extraction and value creation from existing assets by monetizing empty rooms and car seats. We argue that platforms offering surveillance services are another instance of this wider landscape of platform urbanism, manufacturing the need for surveillance systems in elite urban enclaves. We use this case study to show that platforms monetize not just idle resources but social inequality and stratification to generate value and capital.

Click to download the full essay

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/the-platform-economys-gatekeeping-of-class-and-caste-dominance-in-urban-india