Pathways to Higher Education

Bahujan Digital Publishing Infrastructures

Yatharth — 2025-01-20T10:48:39Z

In this study, we look at alternative Bahujan digital publishing as sites where Bahujans can claim media representation and how a vision of an anti-caste internet is emerging through these publishing practices.

Formal knowledge production, media, and technology in India are dominated and hegemonised by elite oppressor castes (the Savarnas). The exclusion of the caste-oppressed majority (the Bahujans) from mass media systematically erases their narratives, histories, and opportunities present to them.

We study how, despite systemic challenges, Bahujan publication spaces have emerged across digital media as sites of intersectional discourse on caste, using new media such as blogs, visual art, memes, YouTube channels, infographics, podcasts, etc. Further, we look at how this has exposed casteism buried under the ‘casteless’ facade of digital technologies, which are rife with issues of caste-based hate speech, poor moderation, algorithmic bias, and inadequate platform governance. For this, we draw on qualitative interviews with ten Bahujan publishing projects across social media.

Through a caste-critical lens, we look at motivations, infrastructural needs, editorial processes, audience engagement, other challenges, and the future vision for these publishing projects. We discuss questions of identity, community, hate speech, platform censorship, mental health, and self-care that emerge in online anti-caste publishing. Finally, we try to articulate an emerging vision of an anti-caste internet.

We explore the following questions through our research:

Why do Bahujans start publishing?
What are the infrastructures of Bahujan publishing?
Who engages with anti-caste content?
What resistance do Bahujan publishers face?
How do Bahujan publishers view mainstream progressive movements?
How do Bahujan publishers think about the future of the internet?

The key takeaways from our research are:

Publishing is a socio-technical response Digital Bahujan publishers have largely started in response to shifting political landscapes within India, where caste oppression, while increasingly invisibilised, has only strengthened. Bahujan publishing uses digital tools to challenge caste oppression, fostering anti-caste discourse and community building despite limited resources and systemic barriers.

Publishing is a community effort Bahujan publishing exists primarily within online anti-caste communities. Anti-caste communities help each other navigate resource constraints to raise funds, build safe spaces to provide critical mental health support, provide safety from hate speech, and build resistance and resilience together.

Caste mediates publishing infrastructure Caste hierarchies restrict resources and opportunities for Bahujan publishers, who often precariously self-fund their work. Meanwhile, media circles and the funding ecosystem are dominated by savarnas, who gatekeep their resources and knowledge from Bahujan publishers.

Online Casteism is enabled by Platforms Social media platforms have failed to address rampant caste-based hate speech effectively, leaving Bahujan publishers to manage the hate speech on their own. This takes a severe toll on the publisher’s mental and emotional health, especially hurting Bahujan publishers from smaller towns, women, and queer folks.

The future of Anticaste publishing is uncertain The reach of Bahujan publishers varies wildly and unexplainably, which makes it difficult for them to rely on social media for audiences and monetisation. Bahujan publishers face a triple whammy: algorithms that suppress anti-caste content, social media platforms moving away from political content, and contentious legislation that censors independent political content.

The future of Anticaste publishing is on independent platforms Bahujan publishers desire platform sovereignty—to own and control their own platforms and to be able to control what they put out and how it reaches their audiences—and a vision of the internet that works towards the annihilation of castes, both online and offline.

Read the full report here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/bahujan-digital-publishing-infrastructures

Explainer | Predatory Pricing

Abhineet Nayyar, and Isha Suri — 2024-12-23T11:07:14Z

Who doesn't love discounts? After all, that is what got so many of us on the internet for the first time. And yet, earlier this year, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, in its draft Digital Competition Bill, mentioned 'Pricing/Deep Discounting' as one of the Anti-Competitive Practices, or ACPs, that the draft Bill relies on. Does this mean that discounting or pricing can be anti-competitive? If so, how do we identify this form of predatory pricing?

In this Explainer, we explore the practice of 'Predatory Pricing' and unpack it not just for legal practitioners and antitrust authorities, but also for lay people whose reliance on BigTech platforms continues to increase every day."

Credits

Conceptualisation and research by Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri

Design by Chris

Click here to see the explainer.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/explainer-predatory-pricing

AI for Healthcare: Understanding Data Supply Chain and Auditability in India

2024-11-30T08:17:48Z

This report aims to understand the prevalence and use of AI auditing practices in the healthcare sector. By mapping the data supply chain underlying AI technologies, the study aims to unpack i) how AI systems are developed and deployed to achieve healthcare outcomes and, ii) how AI audits are perceived and implemented by key stakeholders in the healthcare ecosystem.

Read our full report here.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies constitutes a significant development in the Indian healthcare sector, with industry and government actors showing keen interest in designing and deploying these technologies. Even as key stakeholders explore ways to incorporate AI systems into their products and workflows, a growing debate on the accessibility, success, and potential harms of these technologies continues, along with several concerns over their large-scale adoption. A recurring question in India and the world over is whether these technologies serve a wider interest in public health. For example, the discourse on ethical and responsible AI in the context of emerging technologies and their impact on marginalised populations, climate change, and labour practices has been especially contentious.

For the purposes of this study, we define AI in healthcare as the use of artificial intelligence and related technologies to support healthcare research and delivery. The use cases include assisted imaging and diagnosis, disease prediction, robotic surgery, automated patient monitoring, medical chatbots, hospital management, drug discovery, and epidemiology. The emergence of AI auditing mechanisms is an essential development in this context, with several stakeholders ranging from big-tech to smaller startups adopting various checks and balances while developing and deploying their products. While auditing as a practice is neither uniform nor widespread within healthcare or other sectors in India, it is one of the few available mechanisms that can act as guardrails in using AI systems.

Our primary research questions are as follows:

What is the current data supply chain infrastructure for organisations operating in the healthcare ecosystem in India?
What auditing practices, if any, are being followed by technology companies and healthcare institutions?
What best practices can organisations based in India adopt to improve AI auditability?

This was a mixed methods study, comprising a review of available literature in the field, followed by quantitative and qualitative data collection through surveys and in-depth interviews. The findings from the study offer essential insights into the current use of AI in the healthcare sector, the operationalisation of the data supply chain, and policies and practices related to health data sourcing, collection, management, and use. It also discusses ethical and practical challenges related to privacy, data protection and informed consent, and the emerging role of auditing and other related practices in the field. Some of the key learnings related to the data supply chain and auditing include:

Technology companies, medical institutions, and medical practitioners rely on an equal mix of proprietary and open sources of health data and there is significant reliance on datasets from the Global North.
Data quality checks are extant, but they are seen as an additional burden; with the removal of personally identifiable information being a priority during processing.
Collaboration between medical practitioners and AI developers remains limited, and feedback between users and developers of these technologies is limited.
There is a heavy reliance on external vendors to develop AI models, with many models replicated from existing systems in the Global North.
Healthcare professionals are hesitant to integrate AI systems into their workflows, with a significant gap stemming from a lack of training and infrastructure to integrate these systems successfully.
The understanding and application of audits are not uniform across the sector, with many stakeholders prioritising more mainstream and intersectional concepts such as data privacy and security in their scope.

Based on these findings, this report offers a set of recommendations addressed to different stakeholders such as healthcare professionals and institutions, AI developers, technology companies, startups, academia, and civil society groups working in health and social welfare. These include:

Improve data management across the AI data supply chain

Adopt standardised data-sharing policies. This would entail building a standardised policy that adopts an intersectional approach to include all stakeholders and areas where data is collected to ensure their participation in the process. This would also require robust feedback loops and better collaboration between the users, developers, and implementers of the policy (medical professionals and institutions), and technologists working in AI and healthcare.

Emphasise not just data quantity but also data quality. Given that the limited quantity and quality of Indian healthcare datasets present significant challenges, institutions engaged in data collection must consider their interoperability to make them available to diverse stakeholders and ensure their security. This would include recruiting additional support staff for digitisation to ensure accuracy and safety and maintain data quality.

Streamline AI auditing as a form of governance

Standardise the practice of AI auditing. A certain level of standardisation in AI auditing would contribute to the growth and contextualisation of these practices in the Indian healthcare sector. Similarly, it would also aid in decision-making among implementing institutions.

Build organisational knowledge and inter-stakeholder collaboration. It is imperative to build knowledge and capacity among technical experts, healthcare professionals, and auditors on the technical details of the underlying architecture and socioeconomic realities of public health. Hence, collaboration and feedback are essential to enhance model development and AI auditing.

Prioritise transparency and public accountability in auditing standards. Given that most healthcare institutions procure externally developed AI systems, some form of internal or external AI audit would contribute to better public accountability and transparency of these technologies.

Centre public good in India’s AI industrial policy

Adopt focused and transparent approaches to investing in and financing AI projects. An equitable distribution of AI spending and associated benefits is essential to guarantee that these investments and their applications extend beyond private healthcare, and that implementation approaches prioritise the public good. This would involve investing in entire AI life cycles instead of merely focusing on development and promoting transparent public–private partnerships.

Strengthen regulatory checks and balances for AI governance.
While an overarching law to regulate AI technologies may still be under debate, existing regulations may be amended to bring AI within their ambit. Furthermore, all regulations must be informed by stakeholder consultations to guarantee that the process is transparent, addresses the rights and concerns of all the parties involved, and prioritises the public good.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ai-for-healthcare-understanding-data-supply-chain-and-auditability-in-india

Explainer | Tying and Bundling

Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri — 2024-12-23T11:05:31Z

Earlier this year, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs released the draft Digital Competition Bill for public comment. Although much has been written about the ex-ante process it proposes, there is little discussion of the nine Anti-Competitive Practices, or ACPs, that the draft Bill builds on. Even when it exists, this discussion is often accompanied by heavy jargon, thereby limiting its accessibility for small businesses, workers, and consumers who are most affected by these ACPs.

In this iteration of Explainer, we delve deeper into 'Tying and Bundling', one of these practices and unpack it not just for legal practitioners and antitrust authorities, but also for lay people whose reliance on BigTech platforms continues to increase every day.

Credits

Conceptualisation and research by Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri

Design by Chris

Click to read the research

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/explainer-tying-and-bundling

Platforming precarity: Data narratives of workers sustaining urban platform services

2024-10-15T02:42:26Z

CIS conducted quantitative surveys with over 800 workers employed in the app-based taxi and delivery sectors across 4 cities in India as part of the ‘Labour Futures’ project supported by the Internet Society Foundation. The surveys covered key employment indicators, including earnings and working hours, work-related cost burdens, income and social security, and platform policies and management. Findings from these surveys are presented as data visualisation briefs centring workers’ everyday experiences. These data briefs form a foundational evidence base for policy and action around labour rights, social protection, and urban inclusion in platform work.

It has been over a decade since app-based delivery and taxi sectors began operations in India, and have since expanded to several metropolitan and smaller cities. These sectors together account for the largest proportion of the platform workforce in India. Workers’ organising and collective action have long revealed extractive labour practices in the platform economy. Their demands call for the recognition of their labour rights by policymakers and platforms, an end to exploitative working conditions, and the introduction of effective policy that protects their rights and wellbeing.

In 2021-22, the labour research vertical at the Centre for Internet and Society conducted quantitative surveys with over 800 workers in the app-based taxi services and app-based delivery services sectors. Spanning four cities (Delhi-NCR, Mumbai, Guwahati, Lucknow), the surveys gathered comprehensive data on the conditions of work in the platform economy in these cities, within its two dominant sectors.

The survey covered key labour indicators—(i) the conditions of work for workers, including recruitment, wages, incentive structures, and work-related cost burdens (ii) workforce management, including hours spent working for the platform, surveillance and control measures, and (iii) workers’ coverage under income security, social security and social protections, including provident funds, health and accident insurance, and pensions.

Key Findings

The generation of city-level data aimed to support policymaking and advocacy towards achieving just outcomes for workers in the rapidly platformising Indian economy. These survey findings speak to i) top-down approaches of regulatory, legislative, and judicial action through evidence-building, and ii) bottom-up approaches of mobilisation and advocacy campaigns of workers’ collectives.

The city-wise data briefs highlight region-specific differences and similarities shaped by histories and newer developments of labour platforms operating in the urban economy. Across the four survey cities, the data briefs reveal the ways in which precarity materialised in platform work. Workers grappled with numerous socioeconomic vulnerabilities that influenced their entry and continued employment in platform work. They faced low-wage outcomes, worsened by a reduction in bonuses, and high operational work-related expenses. Earnings remained low and uncertain despite workers putting in immensely long hours working for platforms. Worsening these burdens was widespread income insecurity that workers faced in both app-based taxi and delivery sectors.

Mapping delivery and taxi platform services across cities

The taxi services sector in all cities was dominated by two large platforms—Uber and Ola Cabs. These platforms had established a highly concentrated labour market for taxi workers. The exception to this was the taxi platform labour market in Guwahati, where the local platform, PeIndia, employed 35% of taxi workers in the city.

The delivery services sector in all cities had a high concentration of pan-India platforms. Food delivery services were concentrated by Swiggy and Zomato across cities. E-commerce delivery services had a diversity of platforms including Amazon, Flipkart, E-kart Logistics, and Shadowfax, as well as grocery delivery services like Big Basket, Dunzo, and Jio Mart.

Economic necessity and a lack of alternative employment pushing workers into precarious platform work

The pathway to precarious platform work was distress-driven, borne out of low wages in previous salaried work, or a lack of alternative employment. A large proportion of workers were previously engaged in salaried employment, who then shifted to platform work, marking increased informality and precarity in their employment status. In Mumbai, over 64% of workers were in salaried employment previously, and this also the case for over 50% of workers in Guwahati, and over 42% of workers in Delhi-NCR. In Lucknow and Delhi-NCR, pandemic-driven unemployment was a key driver for a staggering proportion of workers who joined platform work as a distress employment source. Over 30% of workers in Lucknow and Delhi-NCR were previously unemployed.

These socioeconomic vulnerabilities influenced workers entry and continued employment in platform work. Key factors for workers entering were the lack of alternative employment sources and the hope for better pay and potential job flexibility. The lack of alternative jobs was a major push into platform work for workers in Delhi-NCR and Lucknow—over 60% of workers in Delhi-NCR and over 50% of workers in Lucknow. At least 40% of workers across cities mentioned the expectation of better pay as a major reason to start platform work, while potential job flexibility was also a key reason for workers in Mumbai and Guwahati. However, as the findings below show, workers’ expectations were unmet.

Externalised joining, statutory, and operational costs

High joining, statutory, and operational costs were offloaded onto workers to access and continue platform work. This was especially the case for taxi workers who owned their vehicles, and had to incur vehicle investment costs and downpayment, as well as statutory costs that included operating permits, road tax, vehicle insurance, and fitness fee. Across all cities, average monthly expenses for taxi workers were above INR 30,000. For delivery workers, average monthly expenses mostly comprised fuel costs, and were around INR 5,500 in Guwahati and Lucknow, and around INR 6,700 in Delhi-NCR and Mumbai. These high externalised costs reveal the economic vulnerabilities inherent within platform work.

Compounding these costs, platforms in the taxi services sectors also charged commissions unevenly and in varying fee structures—ranging from 20% to 30% of the fare in Mumbai and Lucknow, and going as high as 35% in Delhi-NCR and Guwahati. It is important to note that high commissions persist despite the mandate under the Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, 2020 to cap commissions and other platform charges at 20% of the fare.

Platforms’ offloading of costs to workers have resulted in workers’ having to rely on informal leasing, debt, and subcontracting arrangements. These arrangements were seen across all cities, where workers in the city were either renting the vehicle they were driving, paying a commission to a vehicle owner, paying off vehicle EMIs on someone else’s behalf, or were paid a fixed salary by a vehicle owner. Notably, in Lucknow, around 35% of taxi workers were engaged under these informal arrangements.

Insufficient incomes and economic vulnerabilities

Workers' experiences, across cities, highlight how a majority contended with low-wage outcomes. Earnings remained low and uncertain for workers despite the fact that they were putting in long work hours. Several factors contributed to this insufficiency and uncertainty in workers’ earnings: stringent platform requirements around high acceptance rates and ratings, which were important determinants, decreased flexibility, and high offloaded work-related expenses.

Across cities, earnings for delivery workers were considerably lower than those for taxi workers. When earnings were adjusted for standard weekly work hours (48 hours/week), over 50% of delivery workers in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Lucknow were earning less than the corresponding state-wise minimum wages. Further, over 75% of delivery workers in these cities were earning below estimated state-wise living wages. Platform work was also insufficient in meeting essential living needs for taxi workers in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Lucknow. Around 30% of taxi workers (23% in Guwahati) were earning less than minimum wages, and around 50% (80% in Mumbai) were earning less than estimated living wages. Earnings for both delivery and taxi workers in Delhi-NCR were substantially lower than minimum wage and living wage standards. 69% of workers in the taxi services sector and 87% of workers in the delivery services sector earned less than the minimum wage in Delhi. Moreover, 92% of workers in the taxi sector and 97% of workers in the delivery sector earned lower than the estimated living wage.

These insufficient incomes were particularly damaging to workers’ lives and livelihoods, considering their high dependence on income from platform work. An overwhelming proportion of workers (over 94% across all cities) were engaged in platform work as their main source of income, as opposed to part-time employment. They also faced significant economic burdens such as being sole earners in their household, having multiple financial dependents, having financial commitments to provide remittances back home, and so on. Worsening these burdens was widespread income insecurity that workers faced across all cities—for over 43% of workers (up to 65% in Guwahati), earnings from platform work were insufficient for covering basic household expenses.

Workplace risks and ineffective redressal mechanisms

Workers in both sectors were working immensely long hours in order to try and make adequate earnings while working for platforms, working several hours above standard weekly work hours (48 hours/week) typically prescribed by occupational health standards. Across all cities, delivery workers spent a median of over 60 weekly hours working for platforms, and taxi workers spent a median of around 84 weekly hours.

Alongside the adverse health impacts of long work hours, workers faced grievous workplace risks, including risks of physical assault, theft, poor road safety, and harsh weather conditions. Around 75% of delivery and taxi workers faced these issues in Mumbai and Lucknow. An even greater proportion of workers were exposed to these risks in Delhi-NCR (84%) and Guwahati (90%).

Despite several workplace risks, platforms remained unaccountable for their failure to guarantee safe working conditions. Across all cities, less than 10% of workers found that their platform took steps to improve working conditions. Workers’ overall experience with platform grievance redressal mechanisms was mixed. For instance, in Lucknow, only around 25% of workers who raised grievances did not receive a resolution. In contrast, 50% of taxi workers in Delhi-NCR did not receive a resolution, as was the case for 76% of taxi workers in Mumbai. Workers have limited recourse when their grievances go unanswered. Platforms, however, wield significant control over terms of work, making it difficult for workers to challenge unfair decisions.

Low coverage and accessibility of social protection mechanisms

Social security covered by platforms typically included health insurance and accident insurance. Workers faced significant gaps in insurance coverage, and these gaps were particularly glaring in the taxi services sector. Across cities, health and accident insurance coverage for taxi workers was below 10% (an exception was 11% of workers covered by accident insurance in Delhi-NCR). It is important to note that this low coverage exists despite the Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, 2020 mandating provision of health insurance and term insurance from platforms.

Delivery workers had a relatively higher percentage of insurance coverage from platforms, although coverage varied across cities. Health insurance coverage was low for delivery workers in Delhi-NCR (21%) and Guwahati (14%), but higher for workers in Lucknow (34%) and Mumbai (44%). In the case of accident insurance, insurance was covered by platforms for over 40% of delivery workers in Delhi-NCR and Lucknow, while a greater proportion of workers were covered in Mumbai (63%) and Guwahati (72%). Even though delivery workers were covered by platform-provisioned insurance, claiming benefits was an unreliable and time-consuming process. Workers who attempted to access benefits faced several obstacles, including poor awareness of available schemes, inadequate coverage, and little to no platform support in navigating complex claims procedures.

The inadequacy of platform-provisioned insurance was exacerbated by the exclusion of workers from government social protection mechanisms. In Delhi-NCR, Guwahati, and Lucknow, over 35% of workers in both sectors were left outside of social protection from governments. In Mumbai, over 66% of workers were excluded.

Contributors

Conceptualisation + planning: Aayush Rathi, Abhishek Sekharan, Ambika Tandon, Chetna V M, Chiara Furtado, and Nishkala Sekhar

Writing: Aayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon, Chetna V M, Chiara Furtado, and Nishkala Sekhar

Data analysis: Abhishek Sekharan, Chetna V M, and Nishkala Sekhar

Data visualisation: Sriharsha Devulapalli

Design + design direction: Annushka Jaliwala and Yatharth

Review: Aayush Rathi and Abhineet Nayyar

Survey design + planning: Abhishek Sekharan and Ambika Tandon

Survey implementation: Abhishek Kumar

Research advice: Nora Gobel and Uma Rani Amara

We are deeply grateful to the workers who participated in the surveys for generously sharing their time, experiences, and insights with us.

This work was supported by the Internet Society Foundation, as part of the “Labour Futures” project at the Centre for Internet and Society.

This work is shared under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0)

To know more about this work, please write to us at chiara@cis-india.org

Explore more of CIS’ research on labour and digitalisation at platformwork.in

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/platforming-precarity-data-narratives-workers

Gig and platform workers’ perspectives on worker collectives

Shaik Salauddin — 2024-08-13T02:50:05Z

This report highlights findings from a survey conducted by the Telangana Gig and Platform Workers’ Union on platform workers’ perspectives around various worker collectives, particularly platform worker unions and cooperative societies. The survey was conducted with workers working for app-based platform companies like Ola, Uber, InDriver, Swiggy, Zomato, and Flipkart.

Survey report: download (PDF)

Press release: download (PDF)

To understand worker perspectives on diverse types of worker collectives, the Telangana Gig and Platform Workers’ Union conducted surveys with 79 workers, who had worked in the sector for a median of 5 years. 51% of the workers who were surveyed were members of TGPWU.

The survey findings highlight workers’ perspectives relating to the type and effectiveness of various union structures, priority of union demands, and their interest in joining cooperative societies.

This report highlights key findings from the survey, some of which detailed below:

Workers had a high preference for collective structures that are democratically owned and controlled by workers, with 75% of them expressing interest in joining a cooperative society.
Out of several worker support services that cooperative societies can offer, priority services that workers highlighted were healthcare services, insurance services, and educational support for children of members.
46% of workers each cited independent unions, and unions that were affiliated with another trade union as their preferred forms of union structures.
Around 40% of workers each found that both these forms of union structure were effective in terms of i) presenting worker demands to central and state governments, and ii) promoting worker representation and democratic participation.
66% of workers placed high importance on union demands that focus on both platforms and governments.

Contributors

Design: Annushka Jaliwala
Research conceptualisation: Shaik Salauddin
Research support and writing: Chetna V.M., Nishkala Sekhar, Chiara Furtado, Aayush Rathi

About the Telangana Gig and Platform Workers’ Union

The Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union (TGPWU) is an independent, worker-led union founded in 2021 for gig and platform workers in Telangana, India. TGPWU has over 1,000 active members and has had over 10,000 registered members since its inception.

Contact: tgapwu@gmail.com; +91 96424 24799

Connect: Website; Twitter/X; Facebook; Telegram

The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of their individual authors. Unless the opposite is explicitly stated, or unless the opposite may be reasonably inferred, CIS does not subscribe to these views and opinions which belong to their individual authors. CIS does not accept any responsibility, legal or otherwise, for the views and opinions of these individual authors. For an official statement from CIS on a particular issue, please contact us directly.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/gig-and-platform-workers-perspectives-on-worker-collectives

Future of the Commons: A Conversation on Artificial Intelligence, Indian Languages, and Archives Conference Report

Soni Wadhwa, Puthiya Purayil Sneha, Garima Agrawal and Nishant Shankar — 2024-08-06T03:24:53Z

We are pleased to share our report on the ‘Future of the Commons: A Conversation on Artificial Intelligence, Indian Languages, and Archives’ conference, held in July 2024 at the Maharashtra Knowledge Corporation Limited (MKCL) in Pune.

Organized by the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru, and MKCL, the conference explored the development of localized or Indic generative AI models, state of digital commons, and the role of public institutions such as archives and digitization movements. It featured a mix of panel discussions, roundtables, and workshops, providing a platform for policymakers, civil society organizations, academia, researchers, technologists, archivists, and creative practitioners to exchange views and collaborate. The keynote address by P. Sainath, founder of the People's Archive of Rural India (PARI), dwelled on the importance of digitization and archives in India. He emphasized the role of human translators in maintaining the authenticity of stories and the socio-political implications of digitalization on low-resource languages.

The themes discussed at the conference included:

Ongoing Efforts and Innovations in AI:

Current state of research and development of localized generative AI systems.
Use-cases of generative AI products in Indian languages.
Challenges with the availability of training datasets and dependency on big tech.
Open-source development of generative AI models.

Development and Use of Digital Commons:

Digitizing, preserving, and using knowledge and cultural heritage for training AI models.
Practices and challenges in archives and digitization movements, especially in Indian languages.
Role of open knowledge movements and GLAM (Galleries, Libraries, Archives, and Museums) institutions.

Future of AI, including LLMs, in Indian Languages:

Designing AI systems that contribute to the digital commons.
Incentivizing expansion, foregrounding diversity, and safeguarding digital commons.
Role of law, policy, ethics, and algorithmic justice.

The conference concluded with participants emphasizing the need for multidisciplinary collaboration, fostering trust in AI applications, and importance of democratization of technology and data.

We invite you to read the full report for a comprehensive view of the discussions and recommendations that emerged.

If you would like to participate in further discussions on this topic, please write to us at anubha@cis-india.org.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/report-on-the-future-of-the-commons

Combinations and Competition: Why the draft DCB must account for digital mergers and acquisitions

Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri — 2024-08-08T07:47:01Z

Authored by Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri, reviewed by Nishant

“It is better to buy than to compete”

Mark Zuckerberg (Meta CEO, 2008)[1]

Mergers and Acquisitions (collectively, M&As or Combinations) have been a common practice in industry consolidation for many years now. In fact, as Zuckerberg’s infamous quote suggests, it might be one of the central pillars of today’s internet economy. The recently announced $1.5 billion merger between Reliance Industries and Disney, which, among other things, aims to combine their streaming services – Jio Platforms and Hotstar, respectively – is just another instance of this growing trend.[2] Data on market activity suggests that far from being an outlier, M&As are becoming commonplace in the Indian technology ecosystem as well - a trend likely to continue and increase unless market regulators intervene.

Built on direct and indirect network effects, digital markets are susceptible to concentration in the hands of a few dominant platforms. In addition to potentially anti-competitive practices that these platforms are likely to engage in such as deep discounting, they often use ‘strategic investments and partnerships’ with their competitors or other firms in their supply chains to further consolidate their position in the market. Examples include but are not limited to Facebook’s 2012 acquisition of Instagram for $1 billion, its 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp for $19 billion, or even its 2020 investment of $5.7 billion in Reliance Industries’ Jio – a partnership that positions itself at “bringing together JioMart, Jio’s small-business initiative, with WhatsApp”.[3][4][5][6] Through similar transactions, dominant players are in a position to foreclose competition and further entrench their position as market leaders.

In 2022, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on “Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies” also highlighted ‘killer acquisitions’ in India’s digital markets as one of the many concerning anti-competitive practices.[7] As per the Standing Committee, in the choice between ‘Build versus Buy’, “large platforms tend to pick the latter, thereby disallowing smaller firms to grow beyond a certain limit.” [8] However, the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL), specifically formed to look into competition-related concerns in digital markets, chose to exclude this particular anti-competitive practice from the ambit of its proposed Digital Competition Bill (Draft DCB). Moreover, the CDCL explains this choice by pointing to the Competition [Amendment] Act, 2023, which theoretically allows the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to review more M&As.

But this justification is only partial.[9] While the 2023 Amendment tries to answer the question “Are the right digital M&As being regulated by CCI?”, it ignores the more pertinent “Are the right principles being deployed to review digital M&As?”.

In this context, the first section of this article provides an overview of conventional M&A regulation in India and underlines prominent trends in the process. This is followed by an inquiry into the evolution of digital combinations in India, and their treatment by CCI. We conclude the piece by recommending CCI incorporate more accurate and relevant theories of harm for digital mergers – a practice that competition authorities have incorporated in other jurisdictions such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act, the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill and the 2022 guidelines released by Singapore’s Competition and Consumer Commission.[10]

Reviewing Combinations for Anti-competitiveness

M&As, including digital mergers, are governed through Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act, 2002 [Act] and the Combination Regulations, 2011. The Act lays out many key elements in this respect, including defining ‘Combinations’ - referred to a sub-group of M&As that qualify certain threshold values and are required to notify CCI about their existence.[11] In addition, the Act also empowers the CCI to evaluate and adjudicate on these combinations.[12]

Typically, a qualified combination – including a merger, an acquisition, or an investment that meets the threshold criteria – must notify the CCI of the relevant transaction.[13] Following this notification, as per the rules, the Commission conducts a thorough review of the anti-competitive effects of the proposed combinations. Once complete, the CCI is empowered to either approve or reject the transaction. Overall, the CCI primarily assesses the combination based on its effect on the competition structure of the relevant market. In cases where the CCI is satisfied that such adverse effects can be eliminated by suitable modification, it may approve the combination with modifications. Conversely, the Commission might also pursue an investigation against a combination that has failed to notify it of the relevant transaction.

It is important to note that not every M&A requires notification and approval from the Commission and depends on whether that particular transaction qualifies the threshold values set under Section 5 of the Act.[14] With massive digitisation underway across all sectors of the Indian economy, concerns about how these threshold values affect scrutiny of digital mergers – which usually didn’t qualify – have drawn focus in recent years.[15] Deals such as Facebook’s 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp, which evaded the regulator’s scrutiny since it failed to meet the qualifying thresholds, have also uncovered the need for newer ‘theories of harm’ that can be used to govern such combinations adequately [more on this later].[16]

Digital M&As and Limitations of the Status Quo

According to data released by CCI in its annual reports, the Commission reviewed 99 combination notices in 2022-23, an increase from 90 during the previous year.[17] Out of these 99, the Commission approved 92 such combinations in 2022-23, up from 89 in 2021-22.[18] However, it is pertinent to note that none of these combination notices were rejected by the Commission. In fact, CCI has not rejected any of the 400+ combination notices filed with it in the last five years.[19]

Furthermore, research undertaken by Deloitte suggests that there were more than 160 mergers or acquisitions in India in 2022-23.[20] This disparity between CCI’s figures and market estimates can largely be attributed to the threshold requirements under the 2002 Act. Taking into account that over 36% of these 160+ M&A deals are estimated to be in the ‘Technology, Media and Telecommunications’ industry, it is reasonable to assume that ‘asset-light’ digital combinations continue to escape the Commission’s scrutiny.[21] This is a risk because despite failing to meet the threshold values set under the 2002 Act, many deals are still significant in their scale. For example, Reliance Industries group, which also owns the telecom giant Jio, single-handedly accounted for eight (8) digital acquisitions in 2019.[22]

The Commission’s high approval rate, coupled with its inability to appropriately scrutinise such digital M&As, led to the government seeking modifications to India’s competition law.[23] In 2023, following the recommendations of the 2019 Competition Law Review Committee, the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 [or ‘the 2023 Amendment’] was passed.[24] Among other changes, the 2023 Amendment included “value of transaction” as one of the threshold measures for triggering the notifying clause.[25] This meant that even if a merger did not satisfy the ‘asset’ or ‘turnover’ threshold values, it could still be deemed a combination if the value of the transaction exceeded ₹2000 cr.[26] However, the impact of the 2023 Amendment on CCI’s future rulings is yet to be seen.

Thereafter in 2023, the Government of India constituted the CDCL “to examine the need for a separate law on competition in digital markets”, including a framework similar to the EU’s Digital Markets Act.[27][28] However, unlike the US, the EU, the UK, or Singapore – jurisdictions that the CDCL referred to during its deliberations – it explicitly excluded ‘mergers and acquisitions’ from the draft bill’s scope, instead relying solely on the 2023 Amendment.[29] But the intended objectives of the 2023 Amendment and the proposed DCB are entirely different. While deal value thresholds aim to address the ‘threshold value’ problem to include more deals under merger review, they provide no guidance that can help adapt the merger review process to the context of digital markets.

Adopting Accurate and Relevant Theories of Harm

Established theories of harm lie at the core of any merger review process, with the competition regulator relying on them to assess potential damage to competition. Traditionally, if merging parties are neither competitors (horizontal) nor trading relationships (vertical), their combinations are usually not subject to strict enforcement under the conventional merger review regime.[30][31] As a result, traditional theories of harm focus on the risk that the post-merger firm will ‘bundle’ or ‘tie’ the pre-merger firms’ products together. In contrast, many inherent characteristics of digital markets – such as network effects and low marginal costs – have been found to exacerbate the gaps in these outdated theories of harm.[32][33] While network effects allow first movers to access a positive feedback loop and become dominant in digital markets, they also incentivise mergers between competitors because an increase in the network of users is likely to generate further returns.[34]

Take the case of ‘platform envelopment’, for example, where a platform dominant in one market i.e., ‘the origin market’, enters another platform market i.e., ‘the target market’ – through a merger or an acquisition – and bundles its original functionality with that of its newly acquired platform in the target market.[35] As a prominent example of this theory, Google entered mobile operating systems by bundling Android with Google Search – two separate markets – to leverage the data generated by users of both. Such data was effectively monetized through Google’s online advertising platforms, thereby enabling the firm to fund its entry in a way that could not be replicated by other competitors and contributed to its eventual dominance of the mobile operating system market.[36] However, recognising envelopment and using other such theories of harm requires an understanding of platform characteristics, the impact of direct and indirect network effects, and the role of data in enabling platform monopolisation – all of which the draft DCB seeks to do.[37]

As highlighted earlier, many other jurisdictions have also updated or are in the process of updating their merger guidelines to incorporate these newer theories of harm. For instance, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) amended its merger guidelines in 2019 to address the competitive concerns of conglomerate mergers, especially in digital markets. This allows the JFTC to consider factors such as network effects, the value of data, and the importance of marginal costs while reviewing digital combinations.[38]

With M&A activity in India’s digital sector also bound to witness an upward trend, we reiterate that merger review for digital markets should account for many of these characteristics that are likely to amplify the shortcomings of traditional theories of harm. This requires the CDCL to modify the draft DCB accordingly or, at the very least, for the CCI to publish detailed guidelines on reviewing digital M&As, accounting for more evolved theories of harm.

[1]FTC v. Facebook, Inc, FTC Amended Complaint, 2021, p. 1, available here

[2]Reliance and Disney team up to crush Netflix and Prime Video in India, Rest of World, March 2024, available here

[3]The Inside Story of How Facebook Acquired Instagram, OneZero, August 2020, available here

[4]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[5]CCI approves acquisition of approximately 9.99% of Jio Platforms by Facebook, AZB and Partners, 2020, available here

[6]Facebook Invests $5.7 Billion in Indian Internet Giant Jio, The New York Times, April 2020, available here

[7]Parliamentary Standing Committee on Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, p. 8, available here

[8]Parliamentary Standing Committee on Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, p. 8, available here

[9]Comments to the Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024, Nayyar, A., Suri, I., and Bedi, P., Centre for Internet and Society, May 2024, p. 20-22, available here

[10]Singapore: Competition law fact sheet, Norton Rose Fulbright, April 2024, available here

[11]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 8, available here

[12]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 12, available here

[13]Combination FAQs, Competition Commission of India, available here

[14]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 8, available here

[15]Big Data Mergers: Bridging the Gap for an Effective Merger Control Framework, Tyagi, K., May 2021, p. 34, available here

[16]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[17]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[18]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[19]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[20]India’s M&A Trends 2023, Deloitte, 2023, available here

[21]India’s M&A Trends 2023, Deloitte, 2023, available here

[22]2019 In Review: Top 10 High-Profile Startup Acquisitions In India, Inc42, 2019, available here

[23]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[24]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[25]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[26]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[27]Unstarred question No. 81, Government of India, Lok Sabha, December 2023, available here

[28]The Digital Markets Act Proposal of the European Commission: Ex-ante Regulation, Infused with Competition Principles, European Papers, 2021, available here

[29]Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law, Government of India, 2024, p. 151 onwards, available here

[30]A note on conglomerate mergers: The Google/Fitbit case, Nakagawa, K. and Matsushima, N., Japan and the World Economy, Volume 67, 2023, 101203, ISSN 0922-1425, available here

[31]Executive Summary of the Roundtable on Conglomerate effects of mergers, OECD, June 2020, available here

[32]Executive Summary of the Roundtable on Conglomerate effects of mergers, OECD, June 2020, available here

[33]Tying and bundling in the digital era, Holzweber, S., European Competition Journal, October 2018, available here

[34]Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects, Cosnita-Langlias, A. and Rasch, A., Bulletin of Economic Research, April 2018, available here

[35]Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World, Condorelli, Daniele; Padilla, Jorge, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 00(00), 1-45, 2020, available here

[36] Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World, Condorelli, Daniele; Padilla, Jorge, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 00(00), 1-45, 2020, available here

[37]Summary of Discussion of the roundtable on Conglomerate Effects of Mergers, OECD, Feb 2021, available here

[38]Conglomerate effects of mergers – Note by Japan, OECD, May 2020, available here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/combinations-and-competion

Karnataka’s uniform fare policy—Do attempts at parity consider the impact on workers?

Chiara Furtado and Nishkala Sekhar — 2024-07-08T03:53:37Z

Chiara Furtado and Nishkala Sekhar write in The News Minute about the Karnataka transport department’s February 2024 fare policy aiming for parity between aggregator (app-based) and other taxis. While policy interventions towards parity is a welcome step, the article highlights how inequalities and systemic barriers to parity remain for workers.

Calling for a worker justice lens to policy imaginations of parity

The Karnataka transport department’s February 2024 policy on uniform fares for aggregator (app-based) taxis and all other taxis is an encouraging step towards addressing disparities created by market-dominant platforms such as Ola Cabs and Uber. In a first, the policy attempts to bring parity between the app-based and offline taxi sectors by setting the same base and per kilometre fares for both categories. It also looks at a novel aspect of regulating app-based platforms through the prohibition of surge pricing.

This article views the policy against workers’ experiences with platforms’ management and income distribution practices. Policies such as these may well be one of many attempts to draw parity between aggregator platforms and other offline taxi firms. Yet, we find that workers have barely featured in these conversations of transport policy, whether on parity or otherwise.

The fare policy has been welcomed by some workers’ organisations as fulfilling a key demand for uniformity. However, it still remains silent on actual systemic issues and impacts for workers on platforms. This is a pressing issue in light of how workers face the worst impacts of platform practices that extract value and create disparities. CIS’ surveys showed that workers worked over 84 hours a week whilst only earning a median of Rs 5,000. For over half of them, these earnings were not sufficient to cover even basic household expenses. Further reflecting their vulnerability, 28% of workers had access to workplace accident insurance, and an even lower 6% had access to health insurance, while 57% depended on the government for benefits like food rations.

Operational and algorithmic accountability within a policy agenda on labour and data rights are inextricably linked to curbing disparities driven by dominant aggregator platforms. There is a need therefore to ensure that uniform fare policies are not limited only to customers, but also consider potential impacts on workers.

Contributors

Authors: Chiara Furtado and Nishkala Sekhar

Research data: Centre for Internet and Society

Reviewers: Aayush Rathi and Chetna V. M.

Editors: The News Minute

Images: The News Minute

Publisher: The News Minute

Click to read the full essay

The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of their individual authors. Unless the opposite is explicitly stated, or unless the opposite may be reasonably inferred, CIS does not subscribe to these views and opinions which belong to their individual authors. CIS does not accept any responsibility, legal or otherwise, for the views and opinions of these individual authors. For an official statement from CIS on a particular issue, please contact us directly.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/karnataka2019s-uniform-fare-policy2014do-attempts-at-parity-consider-the-impact-on-workers

‘Future of work’ or 21st–century oppressed labour?: Findings from an AIGWU survey with 50 Urban Company housekeeping workers in Bengaluru

Nihira Ram — 2024-05-16T15:29:58Z

n this essay, Nihira Ram shares findings from a survey done by the All India Gig Workers Union with more than 50 migrant workers living in a slum in Bengaluru. The workers primarily provided cleaning and domestic services on the platform, Urban Company (previously UrbanClap).

Nihira highlights the impact that diluted rights and rising exploitation have had on the workers. The workers’ experiences show how they faced mounting costs merely to access work on the platform. Once they joined, the workers faced oppressive working conditions and stringent control by the platform, where rules and processes are designed in favour of the platform, at the expense of its workers. Not only were the workers from highly marginalised backgrounds and more vulnerable to this exploitation, a paucity of alternative jobs and their tenuous position as migrants meant that they were trapped by the platform’s unfair practices for years.

When workers join Urban Company as housekeeping services ‘partners’, they first pay INR 16,000 as ‘joining fees’. After undergoing an uncompensated training programme, which costs them INR 1,000, workers are rebranded as ‘professionals’ who are now eligible to provide the services for which they have been trained.

However, the provision of services comes at a huge cost to the workers. They have to pay INR 6,000 per month in order to receive a number of guaranteed jobs as part of the Minimum Guarantee plan (MG Plan) – or, as the workers refer to them – leads. Urban Company terms this a ‘subscription’.

In essence, Urban Company does not qualify people from whom they generate profit as workers. They consider them ‘professionals’ who are ‘subscribing’ to the platform in order to ‘market’ their ‘services’ to earn an income. Workers are cunningly portrayed as another set of ‘customers’ who buy guaranteed jobs from the platform on a monthly basis, essentially having to ‘pay to work’.

Apart from this monthly subscription, workers are made to pay GST on each job. They are required to purchase company-branded uniforms and bags costing around INR 2,000. Further, they must also buy all cleaning supplies relevant to their work from Urban Company at higher costs than those sold elsewhere (INR 10,000 per month or above). This is despite the fact that workers find these supplies to be of poor quality and thus hazardous to their safety.

The framing of Urban Company ‘partners’ as non-workers is inaccurate for a number of reasons. A majority of the housekeeping workers with whom we spoke were not previously employed in the services sector. Urban Company targeted their slum as part of its recruitment drives in 2018. Knowing that their cleaning and housekeeping services vertical faced a deficit of labour supply despite a perceived spike in demand in Bengaluru, Urban Company aggressively onboarded men from this slum to undergo their training programme and join the company as cleaning and housekeeping ‘professionals’. How, then, is Urban Company merely a platform from which pre-existing workers gain business, and not an employer hiring labour with particular skills for its supply chain?

Click to download the full essay

Contributors

Author: Nihira Ram
Images: All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU)
Design: Annushka Jaliwala
Copy edit: The Clean Copy

About the All India Gig Workers’ Union

The All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) is a registered trade union for all food delivery, logistics, and service workers that work on any app-based platforms in India.

Contact: contactaigwu@gmail.com

Connect: Twitter; Facebook

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/future-of-work-21st-century-oppressed-labour-findings-from-aigwu-survey-with-50-urban-company-housekeeping-workers-in-bengaluru

That Is Not A Livelihood – That Is Helplessness”: Field notes from the Fraazo Delivery Workers Strike in Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad

Rikta Krishnaswamy — 2024-04-24T02:05:03Z

In this essay, Rikta Krishnaswamy of the All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) narrates her experiences of organising and supporting delivery workers’ collective action against Fraazo (a now-defunct platform for produce and grocery delivery). Her essay sheds light on the challenges workers face in organising for better conditions of work. She describes how platforms hide behind legal smokescreens and threats of police action to shirk their responsibility as employers. To make matters worse, obscure employment terms and work management systems make it harder for workers to seek redress from the government through labour dispute resolution processes. The essay is illustrative of how digital platforms have exploited and violated freedoms of the gig workers they employ, while facing no accountability. For this to change, gig workers have to be guaranteed employment rights along with collective rights to their data.

We have observed that over time, Indian gig workers across platforms almost certainly face a decrease in overall wages, an increase in working hours, and ever-worsening working conditions. The rhetoric of ‘large-scale employment’ is a false one, as corporates do not consider the gig workers as employees and the workers do not come under the aegis of the country’s labour laws. But the gig workers on these platforms don’t share the corporate and government view at all.

Unlike the capital city of Delhi, the suburbs of Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad have fewer opportunities even for gig work. Delivery workers across platforms regularly face theft and petty crimes, especially during late-night deliveries. Housing societies prevent them from taking their bikes to customers’ apartments and, in some cases, deny them access to building lifts to carry out deliveries. Despite its dehumanising nature, gig work provides some means of survival in this epoch of rampant unemployment.

On 30 May 2022, striking delivery workers in Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad—all of whom work for an app-based, fresh produce and grocery delivery platform called Fraazo —approached the All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU). Many of these delivery workers, who are usually referred to as ‘partners’, had lost jobs at banks, data or telecom companies, and call centres during the pandemic, and had joined Fraazo after it started operations in December 2021. They were initially paid a daily wage, called a minimum guarantee (MG) payout, of INR 500 for a 10-hour work shift during which they delivered vegetables, fruits, and groceries to residences near them. Alongwith the MG payout that was disbursed weekly into their accounts, they were also given a petrol surcharge of four rupees for every kilometre they travelled.

The workers told us that on 28 May 2022, the Fraazo head office in Mumbai decided to replace their daily MG payout with a piece-rate payout of INR 45 per delivery. At a time of sky-rocketing fuel prices and inflation, the company decided to remove the petrol surcharge for delivery distances of less than five kilometres (which constitute a bulk of the orders that these delivery workers service). The delivery workers were apprised of these changes the next day by the Fraazo Store Managers, with a promise that the new piece-rate system would bring in more earnings.

The delivery workers rejected this new system outright and demanded that Fraazo restore the earlier payout system with an assurance that in the future, Fraazo will take the consent of the workers before introducing any drastic changes to their service conditions. In addition, they demanded that all delivery riders be provided with accident insurance and paid leaves.

The workers did not view themselves as merely freelance delivery partners. When the store’s operations had just begun, the company faced a lot of challenges in ensuring consistent service. Some delivery partners would help with unloading and sorting produce at the store during or after their work shifts. Even after operations stabilised, many worked overtime (with no pay) at the behest of the store managers to ensure that deliveries were completed to the customer’s satisfaction. A significant portion of deliveries involved carrying 10 kilos of produce to customers’ homes. Delivery workers were entrusted to escalate and resolve complaints as well. Fraazo’s customers complained that the store managers were lackadaisical when it came to providing appropriate support and often called the delivery workers directly to get items replaced.

Anywhere between 25–40 workers were tied to a store, according to the size of the operations, and helped Fraazo set up and smoothly run its services across its various stores in Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad in the first half of 2022. They usually worked through the week, had no paid sick leaves, and were allowed to take just one unpaid day off during a work week (they often incurred penalties if they took more than one leave). While there were problems with their previous time-wage system, they were dead against the new system of a piece-rate payout. The latter meant that their employer could potentially hire hundreds of workers for a store with no minimum guarantee pay, thereby annihilating the earnings of all the workers.

Click to download the full essay

Contributors

Author: Rikta Krishnaswamy

Images: All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU)

Design: Annushka Jaliwala

Copy edit: The Clean Copy

About the All India Gig Workers’ Union

The All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) is a registered trade union for all food delivery, logistics, and service workers that work on any app-based platforms in India.

Contact: contactaigwu@gmail.com

Connect: Twitter; Facebook

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/that-is-not-a-livelihood-2013-that-is-helplessness201d-field-notes-from-the-fraazo-delivery-workers-strike-in-noida-greater-noida-and-ghaziabad

The Platform Economy’s Gatekeeping of Class and Caste Dominance in Urban India

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi — 2024-04-19T03:11:44Z

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi contributed an essay on how gated society management apps like MyGate and NoBrokerHood feed on caste and income inequalities in new datafied forms. The essay features in The Formalization of Social Precarities, an anthology edited by Murali Shanmugavelan and Aiha Nguyen and published with Data & Society.

Ashrit is an experienced platform worker. He has been a delivery worker for three years, job-hopping frequently. Ashrit has worked as a package delivery worker for three platforms: two courier services and a hyperlocal grocery delivery company, which promises compressed ten-minute deliveries over short distances. While navigating the city, he often deals with omnipresent surveillance tools deployed in apartment complexes owned by upper-class and dominant-caste homeowners. Ashrit is used to being screened at every apartment complex he enters, including having his picture taken and verifying details such as his name, mobile number, and the platform he is delivering for. The everydayness of constant identity verification means that Ashrit is not bothered much by it — he said he doesn’t mind the process so much as the delay it causes when customers forget to approve his entry.

MyGate is one such company offering “gated community management,” claiming to service over 25,000 gated societies in India. A competing application, NoBrokerHood, services over 18,000 societies. Apps of this nature have sprung up across urban India in the past five years, offering “society management” services to a niche market of gated societies. Their bouquet of services includes everything from property listings with a commission rate for the platform, security services, accounting services for maintenance and related expenses, and in-app discussion forums for residents. These apps market digital security, which allows residents to regulate entries and exits and make a database of all non-resident visitors in the society. The objective of these apps is to legitimize surveillance as a way of ensuring safety in gated societies. Through a preliminary search online, we found over 20 different companies specializing in digital solutions for gated societies. The industry even had a business exposition in Mumbai on “Housing Society Management,” focused on technology solutions for gated societies.

This study uses the framework of platform urbanism to understand surveillance platforms. Platform urbanism analyzes the growing power of digital platforms in cities. Urban geographers have argued that platforms are a symptom of current models of capitalism, which exploit “idle resources” to produce new forms of urban spaces and value where they might not have existed earlier. Airbnb and Uber are often used as examples of this new form of extraction and value creation from existing assets by monetizing empty rooms and car seats. We argue that platforms offering surveillance services are another instance of this wider landscape of platform urbanism, manufacturing the need for surveillance systems in elite urban enclaves. We use this case study to show that platforms monetize not just idle resources but social inequality and stratification to generate value and capital.

Click to download the full essay

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/the-platform-economys-gatekeeping-of-class-and-caste-dominance-in-urban-india

Online Gender Based Violence on Short Form Video Platforms

Divyansha Sehgal and Lakshmi T. Nambiar — 2024-04-11T03:24:55Z

An inquiry into platform policies and safeguards. This report explores how short-form video platforms in India address online gender based violence (oGBV) by analysing their terms of service, community guidelines (CG), and reporting workflows.

Executive Summary

Being a woman or from a gender minority online is a harrowing experience. From early instances of sexual harassment in text-based internet communities in the 1990s, to apps such as Bulli Bai, and harassment in the Metaverse more recently, online gender-based violence (oGBV) is a pervasive problem, affecting 23 per cent of women globally. In India, nearly half of the women surveyed reported facing online harassment, leading to reduced online participation. Other consequences of oGBV include mental health issues, withdrawal from online spaces, and, offline violence.

In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women & girls, and its causes and consequences recognised online violence against women and the need to counter it, defining it as "any act of gender-based violence against women that is committed, assisted or aggravated in part or fully by the use of ICT, such as mobile phones and smartphones, the Internet, social media platforms or email, against a woman because she is a woman, or affects women disproportionately."

This report explores how short-form video platforms in India address oGBV by analysing their terms of service, community guidelines (CG), and reporting workflows. Recognising the role of intermediaries is crucial in understanding challenges and developing effective strategies to combat oGBV. We selected three Indian video-sharing platforms based on their download numbers, as well as Instagram reels (given their popularity in India).

The CG and terms of use of these platforms were measures against a typology of oGBV we put together based on a literature review.

The guidelines of the platforms included in the study demonstrated minimal recognition of the gendered effects of potential behaviours related to oGBV. None of the platforms had a separate policy or section dedicated to oGBV, and the policies were found to be ambiguous at several points, leaving them open to interpretation by moderators. Josh was particularly noted to have extremely poor coverage overall. Certain forms of oGBV, such as harassment, non-consensual information sharing, and extortion, were addressed to a slightly higher degree in the guidelines of Instagram, Moj, and Roposo. Some exemplary aspects are highlighted in our findings section. However, other forms, such as attacks on communication channels, omissions by regulatory actors, surveillance and stalking, and online domestic violence found little to no mention across policies, despite the likelihood of these issues manifesting offline as well. Further, policy provisions failed to address the needs of gender minorities. Reporting mechanisms were found to be lacking or inconsistent, and failed to consider the networked nature of harassment.

The harms of gendered violence are well-known and documented. The lack of clarity on implementation and policy is no longer an oversight but an active choice to disregard users.

Attributions

Co-authors: Divyansha Sehgal and Lakshmi T. Nambiar
Conceptualisation: Ambika Tandon, Torsha Sarkar
Review: Amrita Sengupta and Divyank Katira
Research Assistance: Cheshta Arora
Design: Anagha Musalgaonkar

The report can be downloaded here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/online-gender-based-violence-on-short-form-video-platforms

Digital Markets and India: Demystifying the Draft DCB

Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri (in alphabetical order) — 2024-04-15T06:15:21Z

This document summarises the proceedings of the Roundtable on the draft Digital Competition Bill (DCB) [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Roundtable’]. The Roundtable was conducted online on April 1, 2024, and included representation from academia, law, civil society, and policy organisations. The primary objective of the Roundtable was to discuss the recent report published by the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL) in March 2024 along with the draft of the DCB.

The event was organized by Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri.

The Roundtable began with a brief presentation by Abhineet Nayyar (Centre for Internet and Society - CIS) providing an overview of the various important themes identified by CIS during the course of their research. This introduction was followed by Roundtable discussions moderated by Isha Suri (CIS), focusing on important areas identified by CIS for the course of this discussion.

This summary seeks to crystallise the learnings that emanated from this Roundtable to inform the discourse and contribute to the ongoing public consultation for the draft DCB, due by April 15, 2024.

I. Ex-ante or ex-post

The initial parts of the discussion focused on the shift from a largely ex-post model to an ex-ante model to competition regulation in India. It was briefly summarised during the discussion that while the extant Competition Act of 2002 relied on ex-post methods to recognise anti-competitive practices, the proposed DCB adopts an ex-ante approach similar to what has been adopted or is being deliberated in other jurisdictions. Few participants highlighted the benefits and costs of switching from the former to the latter and highlighted specific learnings for digital markets in India, while some were sceptical of this shift towards an ex-ante model, given its potentially detrimental impact on MSMEs and lack of enforcement capacity in India.

The discussion began with the participants highlighting the gaps in the extant ex-post regulatory framework, including delayed enforcement and disposal of appeals, and its under-reliance on private enforcement techniques that increase the ecosystem’s dependence on CCI as a central node. Simultaneously, however, several participants also warned against potential issues in the ex-ante approach proposed under the draft DCB. While some of these concerns related to the general ineffectiveness of ex-ante regulations – as highlighted, for example, in data protection and broadcasting – many participants deliberated on specific sections of the draft DCB. It was also pointed out that telecom regulation does have ex-ante provisions to address competition concerns within the sector. One participant, for instance, highlighted the proposed bill’s wide scope and the risk it poses for an under-resourced regulatory regime.

Overall, the group emphasised the need to carefully consider the particulars of the ex-ante approach proposed under the draft DCB. While there was a broader consensus that this approach may address some issues with digital markets particularly, the discussion brought to the fore many concerns with how this approach is currently being articulated. In addition to the bill’s wide scope, the Roundtable also discussed the necessity for an impact assessment study to understand its effects better. Other concerns regarding the proposed threshold values and the draft DCB’s focus on ‘contestable’ markets were also tabled during the discussion.

II. Building Regulatory Capacity

The participants discussed existing regulatory capacity in light of the proposed ex-ante approach under the draft DCB. Several participants highlighted factors that currently inhibit CCI’s capacity, the foremost of them being the Commission’s reliance on enforcement by bureaucrats with time-bound deputations affecting continuity and sustained capacity. In the absence of professional capacity, particularly in digital markets, the wide scope proposed by the draft DCB is only likely to further test CCI’s ability to deliver on its mandate. Moreover, in discussing how to build CCI’s professional capacity, a participant also highlighted the risk of regulatory capture by the private sector if one were to follow a ‘revolving door’ approach.

Participants then delved into potential solutions for CCI’s constrained capacity. In addition to staffing the Commission with subject matter experts, a participant also stated that given the political economy, it may be prudent to design the regulatory ecosystem to work around the problem of legacy issues of lack of professional capacity and independence. The participants also briefly discussed the role of impact assessment in resolving this problem, specifically by including the effect of the draft DCB on CCI’s already strained capacity.

III. Proposed Threshold Values

Deliberations began with the rationale for the Threshold Values (TVs) proposed by the draft DCB. Several participants shared their reservations about the bill’s reliance on international standards, especially for metrics such as market capitalisation and global turnover. Some also identified certain areas where the proposed bill seeks to identify TVs that are more relevant to the Indian market. For example, a participant highlighted that the draft DCB, in Section 3(4) chooses to identify and calculate business users and end users for each of the core digital services separately.

In addition to discussing the rationale behind TVs, many participants also suggested avenues for potential improvement. For instance, one of the participants recommended the identification of threshold values for each of the core digital services, as opposed to the current service-agnostic thresholds. It was posited that the expedited timeline of three months may have constrained the committee from recommending nuanced thresholds suited for Indian contexts since that would require market studies or commissioned (independent) research for evidence gathering and analysis.

Some participants were optimistic that the currently open consultation process may leave room for further negotiation on the prescribed TVs. This includes, among other things, identifying more representative calculation methods for arriving at appropriate values and incorporating global best practices.

IV. Remedies and Penalties

The participants sought to ascertain the effectiveness of penalties in the form of fines as a tool for deterring abusive conduct by dominant entities in general, and digital behemoths, more specifically. On one hand, some participants highlighted the lack of evidence to support the assumption that currently imposed fines deter such abuse in the market. For instance, one of the participants referred to a recent incident where the Dutch competition regulator imposed a €5 million fine for every week Apple failed to comply with an antitrust decision by the regulator. In the end, Apple had accumulated fines worth €50 million, instead of allowing dating app providers to use alternative modes of payment, ostensibly indicating how companies perceive penalties as yet another operating cost.^{^[1]}

On the other hand, a few participants also underlined the need to look at ‘penalties’ as a part of a larger toolkit and not as a standalone deterrent. In this context, the draft DCB’s focus on settlements and commitments, and criminal penalisation were also highlighted by some attendees; while others pointed out the need for an institutional redesign – for example, by reviewing the current appellate process, or by potentially reintroducing the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT).

Additionally, the question of penalties led to a discussion on the calculation of the quantum of fines and the process followed therein. Stressing the need for more elaborate penalisation guidelines, one participant questioned CDCL’s choice of capping penalties at 10% of the enterprise’s global turnover, especially for industries that have comparatively higher profit margins. It was also pointed out that there is no empirical evidence suggesting the efficacy of the 10% cap, as a sufficient amount.

The discussion also briefly delved into the issue of structural remedies as a tool for correcting harms in digital markets, given the presence of strong network effects and winner-take-all outcomes. Even though there was not a deep dive into the issue of structural remedies, per se, a participant indicated that certain obligations under the DCB, such as the one on tying and bundling comprise a form of structural reform.

V. Digital Mergers and Acquisitions

Unlike the Competition Act 2002, the draft DCB explicitly excludes combination review from its scope, instead relying on the 2023 amendment to the Act. It was pointed out during the discussion that recent amendments in the merger review process such as the inclusion of deal value thresholds should check anticompetitive mergers. However, as highlighted by a few participants during the Roundtable – even though the amendment would potentially enable CCI to investigate digital M&As, the Commission would still have to rely on theories of harm established under the extant Act, which largely examines price-based effects of mergers. For instance, one participant highlighted the role of price-based assessments informing CCI’s working in many merger review cases and pointed out the limitations of these assessments in examining combinations in the digital market.

On the other hand, many obligations identified and elaborated under the proposed DCB are, in fact, better suited to support CCI’s regulation of such digital M&As. Another participant pointed out that while sections 3 and 4 of the extant Act can still, theoretically, allow CCI to borrow from the draft bill, the proposed regulatory landscape does not ensure this synergy between the two pieces of legislation.

VI. Gaps in the Consultation Process

Finally, the discussion highlighted the consultation process adopted by the CDCL during the drafting of this bill. While there was a general agreement that the process was not very representative, different participants brought up diverse perspectives. One participant, for instance, underlined the importance of including MSMEs in the drafting process, given their deep reliance on digital tools and technologies. Other attendees also echoed this viewpoint, highlighting that although the CDCL incorporated inputs from BigTech companies and industry associations, the perspectives of consumers, technology experts, and platform workers were missing from the list of stakeholders consulted during the process.

There was cautious optimism in the room that subsequent drafts of the Bill might address some of these concerns by including a diverse set of stakeholders and incorporating a bottom-up consultative process.

^{^[1]} https://www.reuters.com/technology/dutch-regulator-rejects-apples-objections-against-fines-2023-10-02/

To download the PDF, click here and the Presentation here

This report has been authored by (Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-markets-and-india-demystifying-the-draft-dcb

Understanding Feminist Infrastructures: An Exploratory Study of Online Feminist Content Creation Spaces in India

Puthiya Purayil Sneha and Saumyaa Naidu — 2024-03-25T13:02:28Z

This report explores the growth of feminist infrastructures (including the various interpretations of the term), through research on feminist publishing, content creation and curation spaces and how they have informed the contemporary discourse on feminism, gender, and sexuality in India. The rise of online feminist publications, and related digital media content creation and curation spaces, has engendered new forums for debate, networking, and community-building. This report looks at some of the challenges of developing such publications and platforms, and the role of digital infrastructures in mediating contemporary feminist work and politics.

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The internet and digital media technologies have played an important role in contemporary feminist practice – in addition to social media activism, their growing prevalence in academia, advocacy, and creative expression illustrate how digital media contributes to efforts to question asymmetries of power and knowledge. In the last few years, the concept of a feminist internet and forms of feminist infrastructures have emerged as crucial entry points to understand the affordances of the digital and its many challenges, especially for women and other structurally disadvantaged communities.Feminist content creation has been integral to contemporary feminist work in India, and is an entry-point into discussions on what could be a feminist internet. The growth of online feminist publications, and related digital media content creation and curation spaces, has engendered new forums for debate, networking, and community-building. This study looks at the development of feminist infrastructures (including various interpretations of the term) through an exploration of online feminist publishing, content creation and curation spaces, and their impact on the contemporary discourse on feminism, gender, and sexuality in India.

Through conversations with select online feminist publishing, content creation, and curation spaces, this study outlines motivations for choosing certain media, nature of content, languages and design, and how such choices inform practice and politics. In addition to the above, we also conducted two workshops on feminist infrastructure wishlists, and feminist principles of design and infrastructure. These conversations have offered several insights on the landscape of feminist content creation in India, and the affordances and challenges of digital technologies in facilitating contemporary feminist work. An overarching aim of the project is to unpack the term ‘feminist infrastructure’ and its interpretations in the context of the transition to digital content creation and publication. We aim to continue these conversations with a focus on the larger, often invisible role of digital infrastructures in the development of discourse on human rights, free speech and safety, to understand what are challenges to, and efforts being undertaken to create an inclusive, accessible and feminist internet.

Contributors

Research and Writing Puthiya Purayil Sneha and Saumyaa Naidu

Review Dr. Padmini Ray Murray, Design Beku

Design Saumyaa Naidu and Yatharth

Copy Editing The Clean Copy

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/understanding-feminist-structures