Pathways to Higher Education

Intellectual Property Rights — Open Access for Researchers

nehaa — 2015-03-24T01:22:20Z

In the year 2013, Nehaa Chaudhari had worked on a module on Intellectual Property Rights for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)'s Open Access Curriculum (Curriculum for Researchers) as part of a project for the Commonwealth Educational Media Centre for Asia. UNESCO published the module this year. Nehaa Chaudhari and Varun Baliga were among the Module preparation team. Nehaa Chaudhari was the writer for Units 1, 2 and 3: Understanding Intellectual Property Rights, Copyright and Alternative to a Strict Copyright Regime.

This publication is available in Open Access under the Attribution - ShareAlike 3.0 IGO (CC-BY-SA 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/igo/). By using the content of this publication, the users accept to be bound by the terms of use of the UNESCO Open Access Repository (http://www.unesco.org/open-access/terms-use-ccbysa-en).

Module Introduction

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are set of rights associated with creations of the human mind. An output of the human mind may be attributed with intellectual property rights. These are like any other property, and the law allows the owner to use the same to economically profit from the intellectual work. Broadly IPR covers laws related to copyrights, patents and trademarks. While laws for these are different in different countries, they follow the international legal instruments. The establishment of the Wold Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has established the significance of IPR for the economic growth of nations in the knowledge economy.

This module has three units, and while the Unit 1 covers the basics of IPR, Unit 2 expands in detail the components of copyright and explains the origins and conventions associated with it. Unit 3 discusses the emergence of liberal licensing of copyrighted work to share human creation in the commons. In the last unit, we discuss the Creative Commons approach to licensing of creative works within the structures of the copyright regime that permits the authors to exercise their rights to share in the way they intend to. Creative Commons provides six different types of licenses, of which the Creative Commons Attribution license is the most widely used in research journals part of the Open Access framework.

At the end of this module, you are expected to be able to:

Understand intellectual property rights and related issues
Explain copyright, authors’ rights, licensing and retention of rights; and
Use the Creative Commons licensing system

Acknowledgements

Nehaa would like to thank Varun Baliga and Anirudh Sridhar for their research and writing support in Unit 1, and Samantha Cassar for Unit 2.

Click to download the PDF containing the Modules. Also read UNESCO’s Open Access (OA) Curriculum is now online

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/unesco-nehaa-chaudhari-march-19-2015-communication-and-information-resources-news-and-in-focus-articles-unesco-open-access-curriculum-is-now-online

Preliminary Submission on "Internet Governance Issues" to the Associated Chambers of Commerce & Industry of India

geetha — 2015-02-12T14:52:04Z

On January 30, 2015, Associated Chambers of Commerce & Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) held a consultation on Internet governance. A committee was set up to draft a report on Internet governance, with a focus on issues relevant to India. The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is represented on the committee, and has provided its preliminary comments to ASSOCHAM.

ASSOCHAM convened a meeting of its members and other stakeholders, at which CIS was represented. At this meeting, inputs were sought on Internet governance issues relevant for India, on which the industry body proposed to make comments to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Such a discussion, proposing to consolidate the views of ASSOCHAM members in consultation with other stakeholders, is a commendable move. This submission presents preliminary comments from the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in light of ASSOCHAM's consultation on Internet governance.

I. About CIS

1. CIS is a non-profit research organization that works, inter alia, on issues relating to privacy, freedom of expression, intermediary liability and internet governance, access to knowledge, open data and open standards, intellectual property law, accessibility for persons with disabilities, and engages in academic research on the budding Indian disciplines of digital natives and digital humanities.

2. CIS engages in international and domestic forums for Internet governance. We are a Sector-D member of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),[1] and participated in the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), 2012 (Dubai) [2] and the Plenipotentiary Conference, 2014 (Busan).[3] We have also participated in the WSIS+10 Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform (MPP)[4] and the WSIS+10 High Level Event, organized by the ITU.[5]

3. CIS is also a member of the Non-Commercial Users Constituency (NCUC) at ICANN. Pranesh Prakash, our Policy Director, held a position on the NCUC Executive Committee from December 2013 to November 2014.[6]

4. CIS has been engaging at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) since 2008, and has organized and participated in over 60 panels to date.[7] We have also organized panels at the Asia-Pacific Regional IGF (APrIGF). [8] Our Executive Director Sunil Abraham is a member of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) for the India-IGF, and has attended in its meetings.[9] We are also in the process of developing international principles for intermediary liability, in collaboration with international civil society organisations like EFF and Article19. [10]

II. Structure of Submission

5. In this submission, we identify issues in Internet governance where engagement from and within India is necessary. In particular, brief descriptions of issues such as freedom of expression and privacy online, cyber-security, critical Internet resources and ICANN, multistakeholderism and net neutrality are provided.

III. Internet Governance Issues

6. The history of the Internet is unique, in that it is not exclusively government-regulated. Though governments regulate the Internet in many ways (for instance, by ordering website blocking or filtering, licensing of ISPs, encryption controls, investment caps, etc.), the running of the Internet is largely in the hands of private businesses, technical organisations and end-users.

7. International processes like the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), and forums such as ICANN, the ITU, the IGF and the UN are involved in governing in the Internet in many ways. Regional organisations like the OECD, APEC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are also involved (for instance, in cyber-security matters).

8. The issues surrounding Internet governance are many, and range from telecom infrastructure and technical coordination to human rights and access to information.

Rights Online

9. The status of 'human rights online' has come under discussion, with the NETmundial Outcome Document affirming that offline rights must also be protected online. These issues are important in the context of, among others, the large scale violations of privacy in light of the Snowden Revelations,[11] and increased instances of website blocking and takedowns in different parts of the world.[12]

10. Internationally, issues of freedom of speech, privacy and access or the digital divide (though it is debatable that the latter is a human right) are discussed at the UN Human Rights Council, such as the resolution on human rights and the Internet, and the UN Human Rights Commissioner's report on the right to privacy in the digital age , which discusses the need for checks and balances on digital mass surveillance. During the Universal Periodic Review of India in 2012, India noted a recommendation from Sweden to " ensure that measures limiting freedom of expression on the internet is based on clearly defined criteria in accordance with international human rights standard ".

11. Freedom of speech and privacy are also relevant for discussion at the ITU.[13] For instance, at the Plenipotentiary meeting in 2014 (Busan), India proposed a resolution that sought, among other things, complete traceability of all Internet communications. [14] This has implications for privacy that are not yet addressed by our domestic laws. A Privacy Bill and such other protections are only in the pipeline in India.[15]

12. At ICANN as well, the root zone management function may affect freedom of expression. If, for instance, a top level domain (TLD) such as .com is erased from the root zone file, hundreds of thousands of websites and their content can be wiped from the World Wide Web. A TLD can be erased by Verisign if a request to that effect is raised or accepted by ICANN, and signed off on by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US government. Similarly,the WHOIS database, which contains information about the holders of domain names and IP addresses, has implications for privacy and anonymity.

13. In India, the judiciary is currently adjudicating the constitutionality of several provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as amended in 2008), including S. 66A, S. 69A and S. 79. A series of writ petitions filed, among others, by the Internet Service Providers Association of India (ISPAI) and Mouthshut.com, relate to the constitutionality of the nature of content controls on the Internet, as well as intermediary liability. [16]

14. A judgment on the constitutionality of Ss. 66A, 69A and 79 are crucial for end-users and citizens, as well as companies in the Internet ecosystem. For instance, an uncertain intermediary liability regime with penalties for intermediaries - S. 79, IT Act and Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011 - disincentivises ISPs, online news websites and other content providers like Blogger, Youtube, etc. from allowing free speech to flourish online. [17] The ongoing cases of Kamlesh Vaswani v. UOI and Sabu George v. UOI also have consequences for ISPs and search engines, as well as for fundamental rights.[18] International and domestic engagement is desirable, including in consultations with the Law Commission of India (for instance, the consultation on media laws).

Critical Internet Resources

15. Critical Internet Resources form the backbone of the Internet, and include management of IP addresses, the domain name system (DNS) and the root zone. [19] ICANN, a global non-profit entity incorporated in California, manages the IANA functions (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) for the global Internet. These functions include allocating the global pool of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), administering the domain name system and maintaining a protocol registry.

16. At present, the IANA functions are performed under a contract with the NTIA. On March 14, 2014, the NTIA announced its intention to transition oversight of the IANA functions to an as-yet-undetermined "global multi-stakeholder body". The deadline for this transition is September 30, 2015, though the NTIA has expressed its willingness to renew the IANA contract and extend the deadline. ICANN was charged with convening the transition process, and set up the IANA Coordination Group (ICG), a team of 30 individuals who will consolidate community input to create a transition proposal. At the moment, thenames (CWG-Names),numbers (CRISP) and protocols (IETF) communities are debating existing draft proposals. A number of new entities with which ICANN will have contractual arrangements have been proposed. At ICANN's meetings in Singapore (February 7-12, 2015) and Buenos Aires (June 2015), these proposals will be discussed.

17. At the same time, a parallel track to examine ICANN's own transparency and accountability has been introduced. The CCWG-Accountability is considering ICANN's accountability in two Workstreams: first, in light of the IANA transition and second, a revision of ICANN's policies and by-laws to strengthen accountability. ICANN's accountability and transparency are crucial to its continued role in Internet governance.

18. Several issues arise here: Should ICANN continue to remain in the US? Should the IANA Functions Department be moved into a separate entity from ICANN? Ought ICANN's by-laws be amended to create oversight over the Board of Directors, which is now seen to have consolidated power? Ought ICANN be more transparent in its financial and operational matters, proactively and reactively?

19. It is, for instance, beneficial to the stability of the Internet and to India if the IANA department is separate from ICANN - this will ensure aseparation of powers. Second, stronger transparency and accountability mechanisms are necessary for ICANN; it is a growing corporate entity performing a globally Internet function. As such, granular information about ICANN's revenues and expenses should be made public. See, for ex.,CIS' request for ICANN's expenses for travel and meetings, and ICANN's response to the same.

20. The most ideal forum to engage in this is ICANN, and within India, working groups on Internet governance at the Ministry level. As such, ASSOCHAM may seek open, transparent and inclusive consultations with the relevant departments of the Government (the Ministry of External Affairs, DeitY, Department of Telecommunications). At ICANN, industry bodies can find representation in the Business Constituency or the Commercial Stakeholders Group. Additionally, comments and proposals can be made to the ICG and the CCWG-Accountability by anyone.

Cyber-security

21. Cyber-security is often used as an umbrella-term, covering issues ranging from network security (DNSSEC and the ICANN domain), cyber-crime, and cyber-incidents such as the Distributed Denial of Service attacks on Estonian public institutions and the Stuxnet virus that attacked Iran's nuclear programme. Within the ITU, spam and child safety online are also assessed as security issues (See Study Group 17 under ITU-T).

22. At the international level, the UN Group of Governmental Experts has published three reports to date, arguing also that in cyber-security incidents, international humanitarian law will apply. International humanitarian law applies during armed attacks on states, when special rules apply to the treatment of civilians, civilian and military buildings, hospitals, wounded soldiers, etc.

23. The ITU also launched a Global Cybersecurity Agenda in 2007, aiming at international cooperation. Such cooperative methods are also being employed at the OSCE, APEC and the SCO, which have developed drafts of Confidence Building Measures. The Global Conferences on Cyberspace (London 2011, Budapest 2012, Seoul 2013, The Hague 2015) resulted in, inter alia, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. India has not ratified the Convention, and remains tight-lipped about its security concerns.

24. Surveillance and monitoring of online communications is a crucial issue in this regard. In India, the surveillance power finds its source in S. 5, Telegraph Act, 1888, and the Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules, 1951. Further, S. 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Interception Rules, 2009 enable the government and authorized officers to intercept and monitor Internet traffic on certain grounds. Information regarding the implementation of these Rules is scant.

25. In any event, the applicability of targeted surveillance should be subject to judicial review , and a balance should be struck between fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and privacy and the needs of security. An accountability model such as that present in the UK for the Interception of Communications Commissioner may provide valuable insight.

26. In India, the government does not make public information regarding its policies in cyber-security and cybercrime. This would be welcome, as well as consultations with relevant stakeholders.

Models of Internet Governance

27. Multi-stakeholderism has emerged as one of the catchphrases in Internet governance. With the display of a multi-stakeholder model at NETmundial (April 2014), controversies and opinions regarding the meaning, substance and benefits of multi-stakeholderism have deepened.

28. The debates surrounding stakeholder-roles in Internet governance began with ¶49 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles and ¶35 of the Tunis Agenda, which delineated clear roles and responsibilities. It created a 'contributory' multi-stakeholder model, where states held sovereign authority over public policy issues, while business and civil society were contributed to 'important roles' at the 'technical and economic fields' and the 'community level', respectively.

29. As the WGEC meeting (April 30-May 2, 2014) demonstrated, there is as yet no consensus on stakeholder-roles. Certain governments remain strongly opposed to equal roles of other stakeholders, emphasizing their lack of accountability and responsibility. Civil society is similarly splintered, with a majority opposing the Tunis Agenda delineation of stakeholder-roles, while others remain dubious of permitting the private sector an equal footing in public policy-making.

30. The positions in India are similarly divided. While there is appears to be high-level acceptance of "multi-stakeholder models" across industry, academia and civil society, there exists no clarity as to what this means. In simple terms, does a multi-stakeholder model mean that the government should consult industry, civil society, academia and the technical community? Or should decision-making power be split among stakeholders? In fact, the debate is more specific.

31. In India, the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) for the India-IGF was established in February 2014, and some meetings were held. Unfortunately, neither the minutes of the meetings nor action points (if any) are publicly available.

32. The Indian government's position is more complex. At the 68^th UN General Assembly session in 2011, India argued for a (multilateral) 50-member UN Committee on Internet-related Policies (CIRP). However, the Ministry for Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) has, over the years, presented differing views at the IGF and ITU through its two departments: DeitY and DoT. Further, at the meetings of the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC), India has presented more nuanced views, suggesting that certain issues remain within the governmental domain (such as cyber-security and child online protection). At the 9^th IGF (Istanbul, September 2014), Mr. R.S. Sharma of the DeitY echoed such a view of delineated roles for stakeholders.

33. A clear message from the Indian government, on whether it favours multistakeholderism or governmental policy authority for specific issues, would be invaluable in shaping opinion and domestic processes. In any event, a transparent consultative procedure to take into account the views of all stakeholders is desirable.

Emerging Issues

Net Neutrality

34. In simple terms, net neutrality concerns differential treatment of packets of data by carriers such as ISPs, etc. over networks. The issue has gained international attention following the U.S. FCC's regulatory stance, and the U.S. Court of Appeal's 2014 decision in Verizon v. FCC. Though this decision turned on the interpretation of 'broadband providers' under the Communications Act, 1934, net neutrality has since been debated in the US, both by the FCC and other stakeholders. There is no international consensus in sight; the NETmundial Outcome Document recognized net neutrality as an emerging issue (page 11, no. IV).

35. In India, a TRAI consultation on Over-The-Top Services on August 5, 2014 brought concerns of telecom and cellular operators to light. OTTs were seen as hijacking a portion of telcos' revenues, and as lacking consumer protection and privacy safeguards. While these concerns are legitimate, net neutrality regulation is not yet the norm in India. In any event, any such regulation must take into account the consequences of regulation on innovation, competition, and consumer choice, as well as on the freedom of the medium (which may have detrimental impacts freedom of expression).

36. Though net neutrality regulation is being mooted, there is as yet anarray of definitions of 'net neutrality'. The views of telcos themselves differ in India. Further study on the methods of identifying and/or circumventing net neutrality is necessary before a policy position can be taken.

IV. Conclusions

37. CIS welcomes ASSOCHAM's initiative to study and develop industry-wide positions on Internet governance. This note provides brief descriptions of several issues in Internet governance where policy windows are open internationally and domestically. These issues include freedom of expression and privacy under Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court's hearing of a set of cases alleging unconstitutionality of Ss. 66A, 69, 69A and 79 (among others) of the IT Act, 2000, as well as consultations on issues such as pornography by the Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Committee and media laws by the Law Commission of India are important in this regard.

38. International and domestic engagement is necessary in the transition of stewardship of the IANA functions, as well as ICANN's own accountability and transparency measures. Similarly, in the area of cyber-security, though several initiatives are afoot internationally, India's engagement has been cursory until now. A concrete position from India's stakeholders, including the government, on these and the question of multi-stakeholderism in Internet governance would be of immense assistance.

39. Finally, net neutrality is an emerging issue of importance to industry's revenues and business models, and to users' rights such as access to information and freedom of expression.

[1] CIS gets ITU-D Sector Membership, goo.gl/PBGKWt (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[2] Letter for Civil Society Involvement in WCIT, goo.gl/gXpYQD (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[3] See, ex., Hariharan, What India's ITU Proposal May Mean for Internet Governance, goo.gl/hpWaZn (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[4] Panday, WSIS +10 High Level Event: Open Consultation Process MPP: Phase Six: Fifth Physical Meeting, goo.gl/3XR24X (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[5] Hariharan, WSIS+10 High Level Event: A Bird's Eye Report, goo.gl/8XkwyJ (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[6] Pranesh Prakash elected as Asia-Pacific Representative to the Executive Committee of NonCommercial Users Constituency, goo.gl/iJM7C0 (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[7] See, ex., CIS@IGF 2014, goo.gl/Werdiz (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[8] Multi-stakeholder Internet Governance: The Way Ahead , goo.gl/NuktNi; Minimising legal risks of online Intermediaries while protecting user rights, goo.gl/mjQyww (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[9] First Meeting of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group for India Internet Governance Forum, goo.gl/NCmKRp (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[10] See Zero Draft of Content Removal Best Practices White Paper, goo.gl/RnAel8 (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).

[11] See, ex., UK-US surveillance regime was unlawful 'for seven years', goo.gl/vG8W7i (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[12] See, ex., Twitter: Turkey tops countries demanding content removal, goo.gl/ALyO3B (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[13] See, ex., The ITU convenes a programme on Child Online Protection, goo.gl/qJ4Es7 (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[14] Hariharan, Why India's Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms, goo.gl/Sxh5K8 (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[15] Hickok, Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy vs. The Leaked 2014 Privacy Bill, goo.gl/454qA6 (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[16] See, Supreme Court Of India To Hear Eight IT Act Related Cases On 11th April 2014 - SFLC, goo.gl/XLWsSq (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[17] See, Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, goo.gl/bwBT0x (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[18] See, ex., Arun, Blocking online porn: who should make Constitutional decisions about freedom of speech?,goo.gl/NPdZcK; Hariharan & Subramanian, Search Engine and Prenatal Sex Determination: Walking the Tight Rope of the Law, goo.gl/xMj4Zw (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

[19] CSTD, The mapping of international Internet public policy issues, goo.gl/zUWdI1 (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/preliminary-submission-on-internet-governance-issues-to-assocham

Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi

rohini — 2016-02-14T04:39:01Z

After the government introduced the "Make in India" and "Digital India" programmes, the air is thick with the promise of reduced imports, new jobs, and goods for the domestic market. In light of the patent wars in India, the government can ill-afford to overlook the patent implications in indigenously manufactured mobile phones. CIS proposes that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and a five percent compulsory license.

The blog post was re-published by Medianama on March 24, 2015.

Honourable Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi,

We at the Centre for Internet and Society support the "Make in India" and "Digital India" initiatives of the Indian government and share your vision of a digitally empowered India where “1.2 billion connected Indians drive innovation”, where “access to information knows no barriers”, and where knowledge is the citizens’ power. The government’s plan of incentivising the manufacturing of electronics hardware, including that of mobile phones in the 2015 Union Budget is equally encouraging. Towards this important goal of nation building, the Centre for Internet and Society is researching the patent and copyright implications of Internet-enabled mobile devices that are sold in the Indian market for Rs 6,000 or less.

Bolstered by Make in India, several mobile phone manufacturers have started or ramped up their manufacturing facilities in India. Homegrown brands — such as Spice, Maxx Mobile and Lava — and foreign manufacturers alike are making humongous investments in mobile phone plants. Chip manufacturer Mediatek; one of the newest entrants in the Indian smartphone market, Xiaomi; and telecom company Huawei, all different links in the mobile phone manufacturing chain, are setting up research and development units in India having recognised its potential as a significant market. These developments promise to cut or substitute imports, cater to the domestic market, create millions of jobs, and stem the outflow of money from India.

However, mobile phone manufacturers, big and small, have also been embroiled in litigation in India for the past few years over patents pertaining to crucial technologies. Micromax, one of the several Indian mobile phone manufacturers with original equipment manufacturers in China was ordered by the Delhi High Court late last year to pay a substantial 1.25 to 2 per cent of the selling price of its devices to Ericsson, which has claimed infringement of eight of its standard essential patents. Intex and Lava, two members of Micromax’s ilk, have been similarly sued and claim to have received the short end of the stick in the form of unreasonable and exorbitant compensations and royalty rates. Chinese budget phone manufacturers operating in India — Xiaomi, OnePlus, and Gionee — also have come under the sledgehammer of sudden suspension of the sale of their devices. The bigger companies such as Asus, Samsung and ZTE have faced the heat of patent litigation as well.

The fear of litigation over patent infringement could thwart local innovation. Additionally, the expenses incurred due to litigation and compensation could lead to the smaller manufacturers shutting shop or passing on their losses to their consumers, and in turn, driving the price points of Internet-enabled mobile devices out of the reach of many. It could also become a stumbling block to the success of ambitious plans of the government, such as the one to provide free WiFi in 2,500 cities and towns across India.

We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license. Such a pool would possibly avert patent disputes by ensuring that the owners' rights are not infringed on, that budget manufacturers are not put out of business owing to patent feuds, and that consumers continue to get access to inexpensive mobile devices. Several countries including the United States regularly issue compulsory licenses on patents in the pharmaceutical, medical, defence, software, and engineering domains for reasons of public policy, or to thwart or correct anti-competitive practices.[1] [2] Unfortunately, we did not receive a response from the previous government to our suggestion of establishing such a patent pool. We believe that our proposal falls in line with your ambitious programmes designed to work towards your vision of India, and we hope that you would consider it.

Yours truly,
Rohini Lakshané,
Programme Officer,
The Centre for Internet and Society

Copies to:

Shri Arun Jaitley, Minister for Finance
Shri Rajiv Mehrishi, Secretary to Ministry of Finance
Smt. Smriti Zubin Irani, Minister for Human Resource Development
Shri Satyanarayan Mohanty, Secretary to Ministry of Human Resources Development
Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, Minister for Commerce and Industry
Shri Amitabh Kant, Secretary to Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion
Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, Minister for Communication and Information Technology
Shri Rakesh Garg, Secretary to Department of Telecommunications
Shri R. S. Sharma, Secretary for Department of Electronics and Information Technology

Also read: FAQ: CIS' Proposal for Compulsory Licensing of Critical Mobile Technologies

[1]. James Love, Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) written comments and notice of intent to testify at the Special 301 Public Hearing, Page 6, "US use of compulsory licensing",http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/KEI_2014_Special301_7Feb20014_FRComments.pdf, February 7, 2014, Last accessed February 10, 2015.

[2]. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation, Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Volume 18, Issue 3, Article 3, Page 862, "Compulsory licensing in the United States", http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1429&context=btlj, June 2003, Last accessed February 10, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi

National IPR Policy Series : CIS Comments to the First Draft of the National IP Policy

nehaa — 2015-02-09T00:59:10Z

The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India invited comments on the First Draft of India's National IPR Policy. The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) made this submission. The comments were prepared by Nehaa Chaudhari, Pranesh Prakash and Anubha Sinha. We also thank our intern, Varnika Chawla for her assistance.

The press release from the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion in which it invited comments is here. The First Draft of India's National IPR Policy is here. Click to view the PDF. Note: In some places there might be references to paragraph/page numbers (of the document) and for that readers should refer to the PDF since the formatting in HTML is slightly different.

Preliminary

This submission presents comments from the Centre for Internet and Society, India ("CIS")¹ on the proposed National Intellectual Property Rights Policy ("the Policy") to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.("DIPP").
This submission is made in response to the requests and suggestions from stakeholders sought by the DIPP in its Press Release. ²
CIS commends the DIPP for this initiative, and appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR Policy. CIS' comments are as stated hereafter.

About CIS

CIS³ is a non-profit research organization that works on among others, issues of intellectual property law reform,⁴ openness,⁵ privacy, freedom of speech and expression and internet governance,⁶ accessibility for persons with disabilities,⁷ and engages in academic research on digital humanities⁸ and digital natives. ⁹
CIS is an accredited Observer¹⁰ at the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), enabling us to attend formal meetings of member states and participate in debates and consultations on various issues. CIS has been attending meetings of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights since 2010. At these sessions, CIS has actively participated through various interventions, emphasizing the adoption of an approach balancing the rights holders' perspective with public interest. CIS has also attended sessions of some other committees at WIPO, made interventions wherever applicable, produced reports of these meetings, and profiled the work of other non-governmental organizations engaging in similar work on intellectual property law and policy reform. ¹¹
CIS undertakes research in other fields of intellectual property, in addition to WIPO-related work. Over the past five years since our inception, some of our key research has included analyses of intellectual property issues of the proposed Indo-EU Free Trade Agreement¹² and other free trade agreements,¹³ the US Special 301 Report,¹⁴ the (2010) amendment to the Copyright Act, 1957,¹⁵ the (draft) Science, Technology and Innovation Policy,¹⁶ parallel importation, ¹⁷ the (draft) Patent Manual and the subsequent Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions,¹⁸ royalty caps,¹⁹ copyright exceptions and limitations for education, ²⁰ and the preparation of the India Report for the Consumers International IP Watch List.²¹

Structure of this Submission

This submission is divided into 4 parts. The first part gives a preliminary overview of the suggestions submitted by CIS. The second part highlights the principles that should be followed in the formulation of a National IPR Policy, the third part provides detailed comments and recommendations for the National IPR Policy and the last part provides certain concluding remarks.

Principles

The characterization of intellectual property rights may be two-fold - first, at their core, intellectual property rights, are temporary monopolies granted to inter alia, authors and inventors; and second, they are a tool to ensure innovation, social, scientific and cultural progress and further access to knowledge. This dual nature and purpose of intellectual property protection is particularly critical in developing economies such as India. Excessive intellectual property protection could result in stunted innovation and negatively impact various stakeholders.²² It is therefore our submission that the development of the IPR Policy be informed by broader principles of fairness and equity, balancing intellectual property protections with limitations and exceptions/user rights such as those that promote freedom of expression, research, education and access to medicines, cultural rights, data mining, use of governmental works, etc.

Detailed Comments

This section will detail CIS' submissions on various aspects of the National IPR Policy. Submissions have been categorised thematically.

On the Vision

It is submitted that the Vision of the National IPR Policy ("Vision") in encouraging growth for the 'benefit of all' and in accepting the philosophy that knowledge owned 'is transformed into knowledge shared' ²³ is commendable.However, the vision is at odds with the methods proposed in the document. True advancement in science and technology, arts and culture, protection of traditional knowledge as well as bio-diverse resources and the true sharing of knowledge would be impaired by a system centred only around the development and maximization of intellectual property.
An attractive social culture would be one where citizens had access to a cornucopia of ideas and information, thereby fostering an environment of cultural diversity, which would enable individuals to shape themselves. Indeed, this is not just an ideal, but is a right recognized under Article 27(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 15 of the .²⁴ However, an IP maximization approach, which the draft stategy seems to embrace, hinders the growth of such a culture, creating a protectionist environment while preventing access to various resources which may be of use for further innovations.
The question of whether IP rights given to innovators are the most effective tools to promote innovation in society has been widely discussed in economics, politics and law, especially in the last four decades.²⁵ Traditional arguments in favour of temporary monopolies incentivising innovation have been effectively questioned as creating monopolies on innovation, contributing to increasing prices and a distorted allocation of resources, inefficiency and a net loss of welfare. ²⁶ It has also been effectively established that most innovation is incremental and cumulative, necessitating the access to pre-existing data and works.²⁷ It would be welcome if the huge amount of academic literature on these matter were taken into consideration by the expert group. While intellectual property rights are not per se antithetical to innovation, creativity, and cultural development, an IP-maximalist policy and law has been shown to harm those very objectives.
CIS therefore submits that the vision of the policy also reflect the commitment to the creation of a holistic and balanced framework of intellectual property rights in the nation with the recognition that an intellectual property-centric system would not necessarily be the best means of promoting creativity, innovation and access, the promotion of which are part of the stated desire of the policy.
Further, we believe that the principles of freedom of expression and of due process of law, both of which are constitutionally-recognized rights in India, should be recognized in the vision as principles that any intellectual property rights regime should respectively seek to promote and respect.

On the Mission

CIS appreciates the commitment to establish a balanced, dynamic and vibrant intellectual property system in India.²⁸ We recommend that the mission of the policy also include a commitment tofoster access to knowledge as well as the commitment to creating asystem of intellectual property rights which serve the public interest by strengthening limitations and exceptions to IP regimes, which are aimed to provide a public interest oriented counterbalance to the monopoly rights granted under IPR laws.
We believe that preventing unreasonable and disproportionate remedies to IPR law violations are an important part of ensuring that these laws serve the public interest rather than subvert them for purely private interests. This important principle ought to find reflection in the policy's mission statement.
It is suggested that in addition to public health, food security and the environment²⁹, other areas of socio-economic and cultural importance, including inter alia,foundational scientific research, education, disability rights, and access to knowledge, be added as additional areas that warrant special protection , in the mission statement.
It is submitted that these commitments are essential to the creation and working of a balanced intellectual property framework that the Policy seeks to achieve.

On Objective 1: IP Awareness and Promotion

The first objective of the Policy lays out a detailed action plan for creating awareness about intellectual property as well as for the promotion of intellectual property. The underlying rationale for this endeavour has been identified on various levels - that there are economic, social and cultural benefits of intellectual property;³⁰ that intellectual property protection accelerates development, promotes entrepreneurship as well as increases competitiveness; ³¹ and that the global regime is one of strongly protected intellectual property rights.³²
It is submitted that the identification of this underlying rationale is not backed by sufficient evidence. These justifications, in their pursuit of a favourable intellectual property regime do not present a balanced picture of all the facts.
Current existing empirical research does not show an unambiguous nexus between the granting of IP rights and an increase in innovation and productivity, as innovation and productivity cannot not identified with the number of patents awarded. ³³ This can be seen in the US economy, where despite an enormous increase in the number of patents, there has been no dramatic acceleration in technological progress. ³⁴ In fact, studies prove the contrary to be true. In the United States, patenting increased drastically over the last few decades, quadrupling from 59,715 patents being issued in 1983, to 244,341 in 2010. However, according to the Bureau of Labour Statistics, annual growth in the total factor productivity reduced from 1.2% in 1970-79 to below 1% in 2000-09, ³⁵ whereas the annual expenditure on research and development saw hardly any change, oscillating in a band of 2.5% of the GDP for over three decades.³⁶ In relatively new industries such as software and biotechnology, still in their nascent stages of development, patenting has been introduced without any positive contributions to innovation. In fact, in their empirical work described in Patent Failure (2008), ³⁷ Bessen and Meurer have argued that increased patenting has resulted in decreased social welfare.
Further, no unambiguous connections have been found between innovation and intellectual property rights in academic studies. In a meta-study conducted in 2006,³⁸ Boldrin and Levine observed that there was weak or no evidence which suggested that strengthening the patent regime led to an increase in innovation. Similarly, it was observed by Jaffe that "despite the significance of policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patenting, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovations of changes in patent policy are few. There is widespread unease that the costs of stronger patent protection may exceed the benefits. Both theoretical and, to a lesser extent, empirical research suggest this possibility." ³⁹
In his study of 60 nations over the past 150 years, Josh Lerner concluded that "the impact of patent protection-enhancing on innovation was in fact negative, thereby running counter to assumptions made by economists that incentives affect behavior and that stronger property rights encourage economic growth.⁴⁰
Even in those studies, where support is found for a positive correlation between patents and innovation, it is made clear that this correlation is not applicable to developing and least-developed countries. This, for instance, is the conclusion of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization's meta-study titled "The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence". ⁴¹
It is crucial that all policy be based on evidence, and not ideology.
Thus, it is submitted that any program that seeks to create awareness about intellectual property must necessarily be one that presents a balanced view, clearly stating all facts and as many diverse opinions as possible; avoiding the current situation where public interest groups and academics are sidelined in favour of rights-holders groups.
CIS submits that the nation-wide program of promotion on the benefits of intellectual property ⁴² must be based on evidence. Crucially, the importance of the public domain, for which a great deal of evidence exists,⁴³ must highlighted in any such also equally promote the importance the role of limitations and exceptions and clearly identify the issues with the intellectual property system, including the fact that it has not been proven that there is a nexus between intellectual property and innovation. The nation wide program should convey the role of different stakeholders, including libraries and archives, organizations working with persons with disabilities and educational institutions and the negative effects of a rights centric intellectual property system on such important institutions.
It is important that public-funded research organizations should be engaged in neutral - non-industry funded -research, and not campaigns (as identified in the policy).⁴⁴ This will help identify the issues of the present intellectual property system as well as the potential for reform, tailored to the Indian context. We have to ensure that campaigns - as with policymaking and pedagogic material - are based on research rather than faith or ideology. It is further submitted that course materials to be created for educational institutions at all levels as well as for online and distance learning programs ⁴⁵ should include a discussion on the drawbacks of a maximalist intellectual property system, a discussion on limitations and exceptions, alternatives to intellectual property, as well as case studies from different parts of the world highlighting the use of intellectual property as well as alternatives in a socio-economic and culture specific environment. Particularly in the case of education institutions as well as online and distance learning mechanisms, which are often faced with great challenges as a result of rights-holders centric intellectual property laws, the irony in promoting a system that only acts to their detriment would be great.

On Objective 2: Creation of IP

The second objective of the Policy seeks to stimulate the creation and growth of intellectual property through measures that encourage IP generation.⁴⁶ This objective seeks to encourage IP generation and creation across various sectors, including the introduction of the system of 'utility models' in India. There are several problems with this objective, primarily that it assumes IP generation is necessarily a means to innovation, whereas it is submitted that the emphasis should be on innovation holistically, including by incentive mechanisms other than IP.

On the IP-Innovation/ Creativity Nexus

It is submitted that similar to the earlier objective relating to the promotion and the creation of awareness about intellectual property, the underlying rationale behind this objective too seems to be the perception that there is a positive correlation between greater amounts of intellectual property and greater innovation, and the belief that intellectual property protection necesarrily promotes innovation. However, there is relatively little research to back this assumption. Illustratively, the following example may be considered. In a study conducted by Heidi L. Williams,⁴⁷ the sequencing of the human genome was used to provide an empirical context to showcase the deterioration in development due to the presence of IP. It was concluded by Williams that the presence of IP rights in the sequencing of the human genome resulted in reductions in subsequent scientific research and product development by up to 20-30%. ⁴⁸ Williams further observed that "if more socially valuable technologies are more likely to be held with IP, then the welfare costs for the same could be substantial." The presence of intellectual property rights, it is argued, stifles subsequent product development by restricting access to the data or technology required for further development. ⁴⁹
Prof. Petra Moser of Stanford has conducted a large volume of research on economic evidence on the linkages between patents and innovation. Her research, which shows that in the 19th century the majority of inventions happened outside the patent system ⁵⁰ indicates that alternative explanations might explain inventions better, including "the importance of a culture of entrepreneurship,⁵¹ experimentation,⁵² the free exchange of knowledge, ⁵³ and science.⁵⁴ In a paper titled, "How do Patent Laws Influence Innovation", she concludes that "I find no evidence that patent laws increased levels of innovative activity but strong evidence that patent systems influenced the distribution of innovative activity across industries."
Prof. Bryan Mercurio, in a paper written for the World Economic Forum and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, concludes, "The empirical evidence suggests that increasing levels of patent protection have not resulted in increased innovation. Instead, it has limited competition, and increased the cost of business, to the detriment of the world economy. Innovation has also suffered, as increasing protection has inhibited the ability of many firms to innovate." He further recommends that we "conduct further research on the correlation or causal relationship between patents and innovation, including the indirect benefits for innovation that patent protection may provide". Petra Moser notes, "Patent laws that existed in the mid-nineteenth century had been adopted in a relatively ad-hoc manner, dependent more on legal traditions than economic considerations".⁵⁵
The empirical data collected by scholars, as provided above is goes to show that innovation is not necessarily benefitted by stronger patent regimes. Further, even the literature that asserts a positive correlation between the two acknowledge that this doesn't apply to developing countries. In addition, whilepatents may provide revenue to patent owners, it also makes further innovation more costly, thereby discouraging competitors from entering the arena due to high prices, and due to the large number of pre-existing patents. This effect, known as the
The Supreme Court of Canada, has for instance, has on multiple occasions recognized the importance of the public domain. In "2002, Justice Binne, writing for the majority in Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc., stated: 'Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole (para.32).' Two years later, in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin spoke of the importance that there be 'room for the public domain to flourish as others are able to produce new works by building on the ideas and information contained in the works of others (para. 23).'"⁵⁶
Lastly, there is even evidence that in multiple sectors - including fashion, finance, font design, and software - lesser IP protection in the form of patents, trademarks, and copyright, actual encourages increased innovation.⁵⁷

On Utility Models

On the question of introduction of a new on utility models⁵⁸ CIS observes that DIPP has previously considered developing a framework for granting Utility Models for 'innovations' and invited suggestions on a discussion paper on the subject.⁵⁹ Reports ⁶⁰ suggest that Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises are in favour of the Utility Model Protection system in India because developing countries such as China and Korea have demonstrated a corresponding economic growth attributable to the introduction of the system. However, there is no evidentiary data to support this hypothesis. Studies suggest that there exist only correlations and not causal links between heightened innovative activity and implementation of utility model protection. ⁶¹ Empirical evidence on the role of intellectual property protection in promoting innovation and growth in general remains limited and inconclusive.⁶² Reports also suggest that in China, the abundance of Utility Model has led to lowering of quality of innovation. ⁶³ In Australia, an "innovation patent" - the Australian version of utility model protection - was awarded for a "circular transportation facilitation device", i.e., a wheel. ⁶⁴
It is this submitted that whether the ushering of a 2nd tier of protection model for lower and incremental innovations would have a positive impact on innovation in India is extremely debatable. There have been several criticisms of utility models, inter alia, explosion in litigation of poor quality patents and legal uncertainty - which impact small business the maximum in terms of costs ⁶⁵; the system may be more utilised by foreign companies rather than local firms, in which case there is a possibility that this will lead to an increase in a flow of royalties and licensing fees to overseas producers. Utility model rights can be, and have been, used by companies to cordon off entire areas of research. ⁶⁶
CIS submits that as the policy 'intends to harness the full benefits of creation and innovation in the larger interest of society and citizens' ⁶⁷ the introduction of a law on utility models would be antithetical to this objective.

On Improving IP Output of National Research Laboratories, Universities et al

The Policy seeks to improve the output of national research laboratories, universities and technical institutions, among others.⁶⁸ It is submitted that these institutions are public funded institutions, ⁶⁹ and in effect, this recommendation of the Policy seeks to therefore promote intellectual property creation in public funded institutions.
A significant chunk of research and development occurs at public funded academic and research institutions and, excessive use of IPR as a tool to creating private ownership rights over inventions may preclude use of such innovation by the public. This may also create a barrier to access the best technologies and research- which were funded by taxpayers' money to begin with. CIS supports the principle that IPRs resulting from of publicly funded research should automatically belong to the funder.⁷⁰
Further, it is submitted that there exists a danger of public funded research institutions re-orienting their objectives focus only on areas of commercial value. This may lead to neglect of certain research areas. A stringent policy will create an unfavourable conflict between revenue generation and sharing of public good. The policy must ensure that it is flexible and compensates the inventors whilst permitting public access to research.
CIS submits that there should be no encumbrances over public funded research and inventions. The Policy must also ensure that such proposed IP creation does not prevent or interfere with dissemination of public funded research. ⁷¹
CIS strongly supports the recent steps by government agencies (including the Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Biotechnology⁷² as well as other institutions including the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research⁷³, Indian Council of Agricultural Research⁷⁴ and Institute of Mathematical Sciences ⁷⁵) in making scholarly research openly accessible. The benefits of implementing an open access policy with regard to scientific and scholarly works are manifold. Providing open access to scholarly research will ensure percolation of cutting edge research into the society.
It is thus submitted that the Policy should adopt a more nuanced, cautious and balanced take on the creation of intellectual property, particularly taking into consideration India's economic status as an emerging economy and our international position. The Policy must recognise that there is no inherent societal merit in the mere creation of intellectual property and that innovation flourishes even in the absence of intellectual property protections.

On Objective 3: Legal and Legislative Framework

According to the Policy, the objective sought to be achieved is the creation of strong and effective laws on intellectual property, consistent with national priorities as well as our international obligations, balancing the interest of the rights holders with public interest. ⁷⁶
CIS fully supports the view that the legislative framework on intellectual property must balance the rights of all stakeholders and be in public interest. CIS is also appreciates the importance of national priorities in the framing of India's legislative framework. CIS also notes with appreciation that the discussion in the Policy reiterates that India's laws are in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement ⁷⁷ as well as the stance that India will continue to utilize the flexibilities available in international treaties as well as the TRIPS Agreement⁷⁸ while creating its legal framework.
CIS also supports the acknowledgement of the fact that India's laws need to be updated periodically, depending on various factors.⁷⁹ CIS fully supports the process proposed for amendments to the law, including,inter alia, the conduction of objective and analytical studies and inputs from various stakeholders. ⁸⁰ It is submitted however, that equal weightage must be given to the inputs from all stakeholders and measures must be taken to ensure that the interests and demands of rights-holders do not outweigh the interests and demands of other stakeholders, particularly those at the other end of the spectrum, who greatly rely on the existence and guarantee of flexibilities, limitations and exceptions to intellectual property.

On Utility Models and Intellectual Property in Public Funded Research

The Policy envisages significant changes to India's intellectual property system, including the creation of a law for the protection of utility models as well as introduction of intellectual property in public funded research.
CIS recommends that it would not be advisable to introduce intellectual property in public funded research as well as cautions against the introduction of a law on utility patents. A detailed submission on these issues has been made earlier in this document, in Section 3.4.3. at page 7 for intellectual property in public funded research as well as in Section 3.4.2. at page 6 on utility models.

On the Negotiation of International Treaties and Agreements

CIS commends the recommendation of the Policy that the negotiation of international treaties and agreements will be in consultation with various stakeholders. However, CIS cautions against entering into bilateral or plurilateral international agreements which increase India's IPR obligations beyond our current obligations under multilateral agreements. It was only in 2006 that
It is submitted that FTAs often levy standards which are beyond those found in the TRIPS Agreement, and have thus been criticized. ⁸¹ A central aspect of this criticism is that TRIPS-plus-FTAs reduce policy space for the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities. This also creates the impression that TRIPS only imposes a "minimum level" of protection, which must be available in all national laws of its Member States, without any apparent limitation to a further extension of such protection or intervention which one country may impose on another. The World Health Organization enunciated that "bilateral trade agreements should not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus protection in ways that may reduce access to medicines in developing countries.⁸² Further, WHO members were urged in the Fifty-Seventh World Health Assembly "to take into account in bilateral trade agreements the flexibilities contained in the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and recognized by the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference."⁸³
Furthermore, TRIPS-plus initiatives consequent in the dilution into a bilateral forum, as opposed to the plurality provided in multilateral fora, provided by the TRIPS. The imposition of standards by FTAs may ultimately disturb the balance of rights and obligations which are enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement,⁸⁴ and also have the potential to constrain the flexibilities provided to Member States in the TRIPS, particularly in areas which are of extreme significance to developing countries, such as transfer of technology, socio-economic development, promotion of innovation, public health and access to knowledge. Furthermore, they also tend to negate decisions which were taken multilaterally such as the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
It is therefore submitted that the Policy must caution against entering into any international agreement that seeks to enforce TRIPS-plus standards, contrary to India's stance (as noted by the Policy itself) that its laws were compliant with international obligations.

On Limitations and Exceptions

It is observed that the Policy recommends that laws be enacted to address national needs, ⁸⁵ but the only mentions limitations and exceptions as an area of study for future policy development.⁸⁶It is submitted that while it is indeed necessary for further research to be undertaken in the area of limitations and exceptions, it is also critical to enact new laws and amend existing ones to foster a rich environment for limitations and exceptions, in order to achieve a holistic and balanced intellectual property framework. It is further submitted that this would also be in consonance with the objective of the negotiation of international treaties and agreements in consultation with stakeholders.
While the granting of exclusive rights over intellectual property is considered to be an incentive for further investments into innovative activities and the production of knowledge, allowing the exercise of the full scope of this exclusion in all circumstances may not meet the end goal of the enhancement of public welfare, using the intellectual property system. Therefore, it is essential that an intellectual property system be flexible allowing for certain limitations and exceptions in order to strike a balance between right holders, the public and third parties. The need for such flexibility in the intellectual property system of a country has also been highlighted by the World Intellectual Property Organization.
It is therefore suggested that the Policy include an additional recommendation for the inclusion, adoption and periodic renewal of limitations and exceptions in India's intellectual property laws, either be enacting new legislations or by amending existing legislations wherever applicable. It is further suggested that this recommendation also inform India's negotiations at the international level, where any agreement that India might potentially sign, not invalidate or narrow in any form any limitations and exceptions and provide for their continued exercise in the broadest possible scope and manner.

On Standard Setting

CIS commends the Policy's focus on standards in technology and standard setting organisations. CIS strongly supports the adoption of open standards as a measure that helps stimulate active competition amongst implementors of various standards, and thereby encourages innovation. The Department of IT finalized its Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance in 2010,⁸⁷ and CIS strongly supports this policy, and would encourage it be adopted by all state governments as well.
CIS strongly recommends developing and supporting the evolution of open standards. The Policy must not encourage use of IPR to limit access to standards, because these are the foundational rules any technology must adhere to enter the market or ensure quality. ⁸⁸ CIS submits that access to these standards must not be limited by making them proprietary through IPR protection. Further, the Policy must support transparent standard setting processes and procedures in national and at international for a for all participants.
CIS further appreciates the endeavor to encourage the development of global standards influenced by technologies developed in India.
CIS submits that it is also important to ensure that India emerges as a global player in the technology sector, not just in the development of indigenous standards, but also in the equally important space of manufacturing using existing standards, particularly in light of the Government's recent "Make In India" and "Digital India" initiatives. It is further submitted however, that in most instances, these standards are protected by patents; where patents essential to a standard would be standard essential patents. CIS suggests that the Policy recommend measures that might be adopted to ensure access to standards essential patents, including, for instance, the establishment of a government aided patent pool. It is submitted that addressing the question of access to standards and not just their development would be a holistic approach that the Policy should adopt.

On Objective 5: Commercialization of IP

CIS appreciates that the Policy seeks to promote licensing and technology transfer for intellectual property, and notes that the Policy also seeks to promote reasonable and non-discriminatory patent pooling to maximise the ability of smaller companies to commercialise IP and bring innovative solutions based on standards to the market.
CIS believes that the government establishing patent pools for digital technologies will promote access to knowledge and stimulate manufacturing in the information technology and electronics sectors in India, in line with the government's "Make In India" and "Digital India" initiatives. CIS has earlier urged the government to enable access to low cost access devices by establishing a government-aided patent pool of essential technologies, without which there is a high likelihood of such devices getting caught up in the 'patent wars' that have happened elsewhere around the world over smartphones.⁸⁹ CIS submits that the creation of government-aided patent pools and facilitation of cross-licensing will also be helpful in resolving issues created by patent thickets and gridlocks by reducing transaction costs for licensees and solving an economic cooperation problem.

Concluding Remarks

Debabrata Saha, the Deputy Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, while speaking on the introduction of the Development Agenda at the World Intellectual Property Organization, with admirable clarity noted, "Let me start on a positive note by asking: with all the damage that TRIPS has wrought on developing countries could it possibly have a silver lining? Maybe - if we want to be generous. TRIPS, one might argue, did bring intellectual property to the forefront of consciousness of people everywhere, and, over time made them aware of the dangers inherent in a protective regime that takes little account of either public policy, or the state of development of a member country." It is thus imperative that when we fashion our public policy, we take account of the dangers he mentioned. He went on to note, "Intellectual property rights have to be viewed not as a self contained and distinct domain, but rather as an effective policy instrument for wide ranging socio-economic and technological development. The primary objective of this instrument is to maximize public welfare." We wholeheartedly support this position of the Indian government, and would encourage the IPR Think Tank to seek to maximize public welfare and creativity and innovation rather than maximizing IPR alone. Importantly, as Mr. Saha, speaking on behalf of the Indian government noted, IP is not an end in itself, contrary to what the current draft of the National IPR Policy seems to promote.
Flexibility is considered to be an essential characteristic in defining and shaping the intellectual property system of countries around the world. Such flexibility allows scope for further innovations and creations, thereby subserving the common good. As per Article 39 of the Constitution of India, "the State shall in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good." It is therefore submitted that the National IPR Policy of India should be contoured in such a manner that it encourages greater use of exceptions and limitations to the otherwise exclusionary use of intellectual property, encourages the expansion of the public domain, secures proportionality in enforcement of IP rights, promotes alternatives to IP - including open access to scholarly literature, open educational resources, free/open source software, open standards, open data, and aims to create a regime of intellectual property that aims to serve the public interest and not just the narrow interest of private right holders. Such an approach should not be merely rights-based, but look at interests of the general public, especially the poor, as well, in order to further the aim of the nation to create a more egalitarian society, and adopt the Directive Principles in the Constitution.

1 www.cis-india.org (last accessed 30 November, 2014).

2 http://www.dipp.nic.in/English/acts_rules/Press_Release/pressRelease_IPR_Policy_30December2014.pdf.

3 See http://cis-india.org/ (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

4 See http://cis-india.org/a2k (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

5 See http://cis-india.org/openness (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

6 See http://cis-india.org/internet-governance (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

7 See http://cis-india.org/accessibility (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

8 See http://cis-india.org/digital-natives (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

9 See http://cis-india.org/raw (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

10 See http://www.wipo.int/members/en/admission/observers.html (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

11 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/ngo-profile-knowledge-ecology-international (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/ngo-profile-third-world-network (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

12 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/analysis-copyright-expansion-india-eu-fta (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/india-eu-fta-copyright-issues (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

13 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/news/inet-bangkok-june-8-2013-governance-in-the-age-of-internet-and-fta (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

14 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/2010-special-301 (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

15 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012 (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/sc-report-on-amendments (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/copyright-bill-parliament (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/tpm-copyright-amendment (last accessed 16 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/copyright-privacy (last accessed 16 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/copyright-bill-analysis (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

16 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/comments-on-science-technology-and-innovation-policy-draft (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

17 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/exhaustion (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/parallel-importation-of-books (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

18 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010 (last accessed 18 January, 2015) and http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/comments-on-draft-guidelines-for-computer-related-inventions (last accessed 18 January, 2015) respectively.

19 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/lid-on-royalty-outflows (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

20 See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/exceptions-and-limitations (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

21 See illustratively http://cis-india.org/a2k/consumers-international-ip-watchlist-report-2012 (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/ip-watch-list-2011 (last accessed 18 January, 2015); http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/consumers-international-ip-watch-list-2009 (last accessed 18 January, 2015).

22 The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public Interest concluded after the Global Congress on Intellectual property and Public Interest in August 2011 attended by over 180 experts from 32 countries articulate this position perfectly. Available at: http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Washington-Declaration.pdf (Last Accessed: 29 November, 2014).

23 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 5.

24 Article 27(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."

25 Julia Brüggemann, Paolo Crosetto et al, Intellectual Property Rights Hinder Sequential Innovation - Experimental Evidence, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, Number 227, January 2015.

26 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, Duke Law Journal, 57(6): 1693-1724.

27 Graham M. Dutfield, Uma Suthersanen, The Innovation Dilemma: Intellectual Property and the Historical Legacy of Cumulative Creativity, Intellectual Property Quarterly, 2004 at 379.

28 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 5.

29 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 5.

30 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 6.

31 Id .

32 Id .

33 Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 27, No.1 - Winter 2013, 3-22.

34 Id .

35 Id .

36 Id .

37 James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats and Lawyers Put Innovation at Risk, March 2008.

38 Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine Supra Note 32.

39 B.J. Jaffe, The US Patent System in Transition: Innovation and the Innovation Process, Research Policy, 29, 531-557, 2000.

40 Josh Lerner, The Empirical Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Innovation: Puzzles and Clues, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth in the Long-Run: A Discover Model (2009).

41 Rod Falvey & Neil Foster, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence (UNIDO Working Paper,

42 ¶ 1.2 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 6.

43 See

44 ¶ 1.3 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 7.

45 ¶ 1.5 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 8.

46 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 8.

47 Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 16213, July 2010.

48 Id .

49 Id .

50 Petra Moser, Innovations and Patents in Oxford Handbook of Economic History (Cain et al., eds., forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2503503.

51 See generally , David. S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (1969).

52 See generally , Joel Mokyr. The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (1990).

53 See generally , Alessandro Nuvolari Collective Invention during the British Industrial Revolution: the Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 Cambridge J. Econ. 347 (2004). See also, Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 1 (1983).

54 A. Arora & N. Rosenberg, Chemicals: A US Success Story in Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth 71 (Arora et al., eds., 1998); see also, David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation. Technological Change in 20th-century America (1998).

55 Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs, NBER Working Paper Series 9909, http://www.nber.org/papers/w9909.

56 Meera Nair, A Short-Lived Celebration, Fair Duty (Jan. 8, 2012), https://fairduty.wordpress.com/2012/01/08/a-short-lived-celebration/

57 See generally, Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy (2012).

58 ¶ 2.10 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 10.

59 See FICCI Suggestions on Discussion Paper on Utility Model available at http://www.ficci.com/Sedocument/20179/UM.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

60 See FICCI Suggestions on Discussion Paper on Utility Model available at http://www.ficci.com/Sedocument/20179/UM.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

61 See Utility Model: A Tool for Economic and Technological Development: A Case Study of Japan available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/research_studies/finalreport_april2007.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

62 U. Suthersanen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 13 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf , (last accessed January 28, 2015).

63 See China's great leap forward in patents , available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-patents/id=38625/ (last accessed January 28, 2015).

64 Will Knight, Wheel Patented in Australia, New Scientist (July 3, 2001), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn965-wheel-patented-in-australia.html .

65 Keith E. Maskus, Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International Intellectual Property Law, February 6, 2000.

66 U. Suthersanen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 13 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf , (last accessed January 28, 2015).

67 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 1.

68 ¶ 2.3 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 10.

69 See http://mhrd.gov.in/technical-education-1 (last accessed 30 January, 2015).

70 See 'Expert Group Report on Role and Strategic Use of IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) in International Research Collaborations' by European Commission 'available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/pdf/ipr-eur-20230_en.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2015).

71 See 'Ministry of Science makes Open Access to Research Mandatory ', available at http://cis-india.org/news/down-to-earth-july-16-2014-aparajita-singh-ministry-of-science-makes-open-access-to-research-mandatory (last accessed January 28, 2015).

72 DBT and DST Open Access Policy - Policy on Open Access to DBT and DST Funded Research, Department of Biotechnology and Department of Science and Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India.

73 Id.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 11.

77 Id .

78 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at pages 10, 11.

79 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 12.

80 Id .

81 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements (2004), Available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/ec onomic/Occasional/TRIPS-Public-Health-FTAs.pdf.

82 World Health Organization, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Recommendation 4.26 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/ documents/thereport/CIPIHReport23032006.pdf [hereinafter WHO].

83 Fifty-Seventh World Health Assembly, May17-22,2004, (May 22, 2004), available at http:// apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA57/A57_R14-en.pdf;

84 Preamble, Articles 7, 8, TRIPS Agreement, 1994.

85 ¶ 3.2 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 12.

86 ¶ 3.6 IPR Think Tank, National IPR Policy (First Draft) at page 13.

87 See 'Open Standards Policy' , available at http://cis-india.org/news/open-standards-policy (last accessed January 28, 2015).

88 See 'The BIS, Standards and Copyright' , available at http://spicyip.com/2014/11/the-bis-standards-and-copyright.html (last accessed January 28, 2015).

89 See CIS' Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses , available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed January 29, 2015).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/national-ipr-policy-series-cis-comments-to-the-first-draft-of-the-national-ip-policy

Locating Constructs of Privacy within Classical Hindu Law

Ashna Ashesh and Bhairav Acharya — 2015-01-01T13:56:04Z

This white paper seeks to locate privacy in Classical Hindu Law, and by doing so, displace the notion that privacy is an inherently ‘Western’ concept that is the product of a modernist legal system.

Introduction: Conceptions of Privacy

Because of the variance exhibited by the various legal, social, and cultural aspects of privacy, it cannot be easily defined. As a legal concept, privacy may form a constitutional claim, a statutory entitlement, a tortious action or an equitable remedy. As a constitutional claim, privacy is either an explicitly recognised right that is capable of independent enforcement, read into a pre-existing right , or located within the penumbra of a larger right. Statutory recognition of privacy may be afforded by both criminal and civil statutes. The offence of criminal defamation for instance, is perceived as an act of violating an individual's privacy by tarnishing his or her reputation. Similarly the provision of in camera trials for divorce proceedings is an illustration of a civil statute implicitly recognising privacy. As a tortious claim the notion of privacy is commonly understood in terms of the right against trespass of property. Equity, co-terminus with a statutory mandate or in isolation, may also be a source of privacy.

Most legal conceptions of privacy in everyday use in India originated from the English common law. Other constitutional and statutory constructions of privacy, even when not found in the common law, arise within a broader modernist system of law and justice that originated in Europe. During the European colonisation of India, the British (and, in a different manner, the French ) attempted to recreate the common law in India through the establishment of a new legal and courts system, and the wholesale importation of the European idea of law. The very notion of privacy, as well as its legal conception, is a product of this legal modernity. In post-colonial societies, the argument against the right to privacy is usually premised on its perceived alien-ness - as a foreign idea brought by colonisers and imposed on a traditionalist society that favoured communitarian living over individual rights - in an effort to discredit it.

The fallacy of this argument lies in its ignorance of the cultural plurality of privacy. To begin with, the idea that is connoted by the modernist notion of privacy pre-dated the introduction of common law in India. By the time of the Enlightenment, Hindu law and Islamic law were established legal systems with rich histories of jurisprudence and diverse schools of law within them, each with their own juristic techniques and rules of interpretation. While neither Hindu law nor Islamic law use a term that readily translates to "privacy", thereby precluding a neat transposition of meanings between them, the notion of privacy existed and can be located in both the legal traditions. In this paper, the term 'privacy' is used to describe both the modernist notion that arises from the principle of personal autonomy as well as the diverse pre-modern concepts in Hindu and Islamic jurisprudence that resemble or relate to this notion. These pre-modern concepts are diverse, and do not permit an easy analysis. For instance, the Manusmriti, which is a source of classical Hindu law, prohibits bathing in tanks that belong to other men. Additionally it prohibits the use of wells, gardens, carriages, beds, seats and houses without the owner's permission. These prohibitions are not driven by the imperatives of privacy alone. The rationale is that in using others' belongings one appropriates a portion of their sins. Hence, these privacy protections are linked to an ideal of purity. Islamic law also restricts the use or misappropriation of another's property. However, this prohibition is designed to protect private property; it has no ideological link to purity.

This paper attempts to locate constructs of privacy in classical Hindu law. The purpose of this exercise is not to privilege one legal system over another. Therefore, we do not intend to normatively assess the existing modernist discourse on privacy. We simply seek to establish the existence of alternate notions of privacy that pre-date modernity and the common law.

The scope of the paper is confined to locating privacy in classical Hindu law. The materials within the realm of classical Hindu law, relevant to this exercise are- the sruti, smriti, and acara. Sruti comprises of the Vedas, Brahmanas, Aranyakas and the Upanishads. It is considered to symbolise the spirit of Hindu law and is not the source of any positivist command as such. Smriti involves various interpretations of the sruti, We have however restricted ourselves to the Dharmashastras in this realm. Acara refers to the body of customary practices.

The review of the material at hand however, is not exhaustive. The reasons for this are twofold- first, given the vast expanse of Hindu jurisprudence, the literature review has been limited; second, there is a limited availability of reliable English translations of ancient legal treatises.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part of this paper deals with the interface of colonisation with Hindu law and elucidates the nature of Hindu law. With the advent of colonialism, classical Hindu law was gradually substituted by a modernist legal system. Exploring the characteristics of modernity, the factors that contributed to the displacement of classical Hindu law will be identified.

One of the factors that contributed to the displacement was the uncertainty that characterised classical Hindu law. Classical Hindu law was an amalgamation of three sources, as. In an attempt to rule out the uncertainty, and the lack of positive command, the modernisation of Hindu law was brought about. Accordingly this part shall also examine the nature of Hindu law. Furthermore it shall determine whether the application of codified modern Hindu law, is informed by the precepts of classical Hindu law.

Having explicated the nature of Hindu law, the next part will focus on identifying instances of privacy in classical Hindu law.

Before ascertaining specific instances, however, this part will lay down a general understanding of privacy as it existed then. It will be demonstrated that regardless of the absence of an equivalent term, an expectation of privacy existed.

The specific illustrations of privacy will then be mapped out.

Given the different aspects wherein an expectation of privacy exists, there is also a possibility of competing claims. In the event that such conflicts arise, this part will attempt to resolve the same.

Part 1: The Transmogrification of the Nature of Hindu Law

The evolution of Hindu jurisprudence can be charted through three phases- classical, colonial, and modern.

In the classical phase, it was embodied by the Dharmashastra which elaborated on customary practices, legal procedure, as well as punitive measures. The Dharamshastra was accompanied by the Vedas, and acara. Whether this body of jurisprudence could be called 'law' in the strict modernist sense of the term is debatable.

Modernity has multifarious aspects. However, we are concerned with modernity in the context of legal systems, for the purpose of this paper. The defining attribute of a modernist legal system is the need for positivist precepts that are codified by a legislature. The underlying rationale for formalised legislation is the need for certainty in law. Law is to be uniformly applied within the territory. The formalised legislation is to be enforced by hierarchized courts. Furthermore this codified law can be modified through provisions for amendment, if need be.

This modernist understanding is what informs the English common law. With the advent of colonialism, common law was imported to India. The modernist legal system was confronted by plural indigenous legal systems here that were starkly different in nature. In the given context, the relevant indigenous system is classical Hindu law. The classical precepts were interpreted by the British. These interpretations coupled with the sources of Classical Hindu law, constituted colonial Hindu law.

It is pertinent to note that these interpretations were undertaken through a modernist lens. The implication was the attempted modernisation of a traditional legal system.

The traditional system of Classical Hindu law did not exhibit any of the introduced features. To begin with not all of classical Hindu law was text based. The problem with the textual treatises was threefold. First, they were not codes enacted by a legislature, but written by various scholars. Second, they were not phrased as positivist precepts. Third, their multiplicity was accompanied with the lack of an established hierarchy between these texts.

Additionally classical Hindu law was the embodiment of dharma, which in itself was an amorphous concept. The constitutive elements ofdharma were law, religious rites, duties and obligations of members of a community, as well as morality. These elements do not however, exhaustively define dharma. There exist varying definitions of dharma, and in some cases even ancient texts dealing with dharma fail to articulate its definition. This is on account of the fact that the meaning of dharma, varied depending on the in which it is used Owing to the fact that classical Hindu jurisprudence was informed by dharma, the former was an amalgamation of law, religion and morality. Therefore it was categorised as jurisprudence that lacked the secularity exhibited by modern positivist law.

The co-existence of law and morality in classical Hindu law has led to various debates regarding its nature. Before explicating the nature of classical Hindu law, its sources must be elaborated on. As referred to, the sources are sruti, smriti, and acara.

Sruti is constituted by the Vedas, Brahmanas, Aranyakas, and Upanishads. Vedas are divine revelations that contain no positive precept per se. They are considered as the spirit of law, and believed to be the source of the rules of dharma. The Vedas are constituted by the Rigveda, Samveda, Yajurveda and Athravaveda. Based on the Vedic texts, treatises have been written elucidating religious practices. These texts are known as the Brahmanas. The Aranyakas and the Upanishads engage in philosophical enquiries of the revelation in the Vedas.

Interpretations of the Sruti by various scholars are embodied in the Smriti. The connotations of smriti are twofold. First, it implies knowledge transmitted through memory, as opposed to knowledge directly revealed by divinity. Additionally, it is the term used to collectively reference the Dharmasutras and Dharmashastra.

Dharmasutras were essentially interpretations of revelation in only prose form, or a mixture of prose and verse. They detailed the duties and rituals to be carried out by a person, through the four stages, of his or her life. The duties laid down also varied depending on the caste of a person. They also laid down guidelines for determining punishments.

Dharmasastras on the other hand were in the verse form. Though their subject matter coincided with the Dharmasutra in terms of domestic duties and rituals, they had a wider ambit. The Dharmasastras also dealt with subjects such as statecraft, legal procedure for adjudicating disputes. In a limited way, they marked the diversification from strictly religious precepts, from those that were legal in nature. For instance the Manusmriti was an amalgamation of law and ritual. The Yajnawalkya Samhita however, has separate parts that deal with customary practices, legal procedure, and punitive measures. The Narada Smriti, in turn deals only with legal procedure and rules of adjudication.

It is opined that in due course of time, the Aryan civilisation diversified. Their life and literature were no longer limited to sacrificial practices, but took on a more 'secular' form. The Arthashastra is evidence of such diversification. Unlike the Dharmashastra, it deals with strategies to be employed in governance, regulations with regard to urban planning, commercialisation of surrogacy, espionage, among other things.

The third source of classical Hindu law, acara refers to customary practices and their authoritativeness was determined by the people. Their prevalence over textual tradition is contentious. Some opine that acara prevails over textual traditions. However, the opposing school of thought believes that customary practices prevail only if the text is unclear or disputed.

Other sources of classical Hindu law include the itihas (epics such as the Mahabharata and Ramayana), and digests written by scholars.

Given the diversity of sources and its non-conformity to positivism, the nature of classical Hindu law is a heavily contested issue. For instance, with regard to the legal procedure in the Dharmashastra, Maynes opines that these rules qualified as law in the modernist sense. Ludo Rocher however, opines that textual treatises would not qualify as law. Classical Hindu law can admittedly not be identified as strictly legal or strictly moral. However, it does in a limited way recognise the distinction between legal procedure and morality. This is to say, it is not merely a source of rituals, but also lays down precepts that are jurisprudentially relevant.

On account of its non-conformity with characteristics of a modernist legal system, classical Hindu law was displaced by its colonial version. The British attempted to accomplish this though the process of codification. The colonial attempts to codify Hindu law were carried forward by the Indian government post-independence. The result was the Hindu Code Bill. The context in which this codification took place must be examined in order to better comprehend this transmogrification. Post-independence, the idea of a Uniform Civil Code had been debated. However it was at odds with the Nehruvian notion of secularity. The codification of Hindu personal law was an attempt at modernising it, without infringing on the religious freedom of Hindus. The idea was to confine the influence of religion to the private sphere. What emerged was the Hindu Code Bill, which served as the blueprint for the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. Colonial Hindu law was thus displaced by modern Hindu law.

As Galanter observes however, modernisation through legislations may formalise or even modify classical precepts, but cannot erase them completely. For instance, Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which prescribes the ceremonial requirements for a Hindu marriage, replicates those prescribed in Classical Hindu law. Additionally a plethora of judicial decisions have relied on or taken into consideration, precepts of ancient Hindu jurisprudence.

It is evident thus that ancient precepts still inform modern Hindu law. Given their relevance, it would be erroneous to write off classical Hindu law as completely irrelevant in a modernist context.

Part II: Precepts of Privacy in Classical Hindu Law

As referred to, we have not come across a terminological equivalent of the term 'privacy' in the course of our research. The linguistic lacuna is admittedly a hurdle in articulating the pre-modern understanding of privacy as found in Hindu jurisprudence. It is not however, an argument against the very existence of privacy. The lack of pre-modern terminology necessitates the usage of modern terms in classifying the aspects of privacy detailed in Hindu jurisprudence.

Thus, broadly speaking, the aspects of privacy we have culled out from the material at hand are those of physical space/ property, thought, bodily integrity, information, communication, and identity. As will be demonstrated these aspects overlap on occasion and are by no means an exhaustive indication. In order to contextualise these aspects within the realm of Hindu jurisprudence, they are detailed below through specific illustrations.

A. Privacy of physical Space/ property

Akin to the modern legal system that first understood privacy in proprietary terms, Hindu jurisprudence too accorded importance to privacy in terms of physical space. This is further illustrated by the similarity between the common law notion of a man's house being his castle, and the institutional primacy accorded by the Naradsmriti to the household . The common denominator here is the recognition of a claim to privacy against the sovereign. This claim operated against society at large as well. For instance, an individual caught trespassing on someone else's property was liable to be fined.

These religious precepts were supplemented by those reflected in texts such as the Arthashastra. By way of illustration the house building regulations prescribed by it are largely informed by the recognition of a need for privacy. To begin with, a person's house should be built at a suitable distance from a neighbour's house, to prevent any inconvenience. In addition the house's doors and windows should ideally not face a neighbours doors and windows directly. The occupants of the house should ensure the doors and windows are suitably covered. Furthermore in the absence of a compelling justification, interference in a neighbour's affairs is penalised.Juxtaposed to religious texts that often perceived privacy as a concept driven by the imperative of purity, the Arthashastra is reflective of a secular connotation of privacy.

Though the household was privileged as the foundational institution in Hindu jurisprudence, claims of privacy extend beyond one's house to other physical objects as well, regardless of whether they were extensions of the household or not. For instance, both the Yajnawalkya Samhita and the Manusmriti condemn the usage of another person's property without his or her permission.

What is noteworthy in the context of personal property is that in an era infamous for the denigration of women, Hindu jurisprudence recognised a woman's claim over property. This property, also known as Stridhana, had varied definitions. In the Yajnawalkya Samhita for instance, it is conceptualised as, "What has been given to a woman by the father, the mother, the husband or a brother, or received by her at the nuptial fire, or given to her on her husband's marriage with another wife, is denominated Stridhana or a woman's property". In the Manusmriti, it is defined as "What was given before the nuptial fire, what was given on the bridal procession, what was given in token of love, and what was received from her brother, mother, or father, that is called the sixfold property of a woman".

Beyond mere cognizance of proprietary rights however, these precepts were also informed by the notion of exclusivity. Consequently, a woman's husband or his family were precluded from using her Stridhana, unless they were in dire straits. Additionally it was a sin for a woman's relatives to use her wealth even if the same was done unknowingly.

B. Privacy of Thought

In addition to the aspect of physical space, a claim to privacy vis-a-vis the intangible realm of thought was afforded by Hindu jurisprudence. In the modern context the link between solitude and privacy has been recognised as early as 1850 by Warren and Brandeis. The key distinction is that in the modern era this need for solitude was seen as a function of the increasing invasion of privacy. In the pre-modern era however, solitude was considered essential for self-actualisation, and not as a response to the increasing invasion of the private realm. Meditation in solitude was perceived as enabling existence in the highest state of being. In fact a life in solitude was identified as a pre-requisite for being liberated.

Though solitude itself is intangible, engaging in meditation would require a tangible solitary space. This is where the privacy of thought overlapped with the aspect of privacy of space. Accordingly, the Arthashastra prescribed that forest areas be set aside for meditation and introspection. It also recognised the need for ascetics to live within these spaces harmoniously, without disturbing each other.

It is evident, that as far as the aspects of privacy were concerned, there were no watertight compartments.

C. Privacy with respect to bodily integrity

A claim to privacy of thought can only be substantively realised when complemented by the notion of privacy with respect to bodily integrity, as corporeal existence serves as a precursor to mental well-being. The inference drawn from the relevant precepts concerning this aspect is that they were largely women-centric. Arguably they were governed by a misplaced patriarchal notion that women's modesty needed to be protected. At best they could be considered as implicit references to an expectation of privacy.

The Manusmriti states, "But she who…goes to public spectacles or assemblies, shall be fined six krishnalas". Restrictions operating during a woman's menstruation were twofold. Her family was prohibited from seeing her. Additionally cohabitation with such a woman was also forbidden. It should be pointed out that that these constructs had little to do with a woman's expectation of privacy. They were forbidden due to the attached implications of impurity that would vest in the defaulter. A woman's autonomy with regard to her body was not regarded as a factor meriting consideration.

However, there were constructs, albeit limited, which were more egalitarian in their approach and did recognise her autonomy. They established that women do have an expectation of privacy in terms of bodily integrity. Sexual assault was considered as an offence. Evidence of this is found in the Yajnawalkya Samhita which states, "If many persons know a woman against her will, each of them should be made to pay a fine of twenty four panas". In addition, the Arthashastra vested in commercial sex workers the right to not be held against their will. Further it expressly states that even a commercial sex worker cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse.

Women could make a claim to privacy not only against society at large, but also against their husbands. Ironically, while our contemporary legal system (i.e., the Indian legal system) fails to criminalise marital rape, the Manusmriti considered it an offence. Additionally, husbands were also prohibited from looking at their wives when the latter were in a state of relaxation.

D. Privacy of Information and Communication

While the three aspects explicated above were by and large restricted to the individual, the privacy of information and communication has been largely confined by Hindu jurisprudence to the realm of the sovereign. Both the Manusmriti and the Arthashastra acknowledge the importance of a secret council that aids the king in deliberations. These deliberations are to be carried on in a solitary place that was well-guarded. The decisions made in these deliberations are to be revealed on a need to know basis. That is to say, only persons concerned with the implementation of these decisions are to be informed. The Manusmriti also provides for private deliberation by the king on matters not involving governance. It provides, "At midday or midnight , when his mental and bodily fatigues are over, let him deliberate, either with himself alone or with his ministers on virtue, pleasure, and wealth".

Apart from governance, privacy of information also pertained to certain types of documents that were considered private in nature. These are documents that involve transactions such as partition, giving of a gift, purchase, pledge and debt. What is interesting about this precept is the resemblance it bears to the common law notion of privity. The common characteristic of the documents referred to, is that they concerned transactions undertaken between two or more persons. The rights or obligations arising from these transactions were confined to the signatories of these documents. It could be possible that the privatisation of these documents was aimed at guarding against disruption of transactions via third party intrusions.

The limited reference to private communications is found within the realm of governance, within the context of privacy of information. The only illustration of this that we have come across is the precept in the Arthashastra that requires intelligence to be communicated in code.

E. Privacy of Identity

The final aspect that warrants detailing is the privacy of identity. The notion of privacy of identity can be understood in two ways. The first deals with protection of personal information that could be traced back to someone, thus revealing his or her identity. The second recognises the component of reputation. It seeks to prevent the misappropriation or maligning of a person's identity and thus reputation. In ancient Hindu jurisprudence there is evidence of recognition of the latter. An illustration of the same is offered by the precept which states "For making known the real defects of a maiden, one should pay a fine of a hundred panas". Another precept prescribes that false accusations against anyone in general are punishable by a fine. Additionally, there is also a restriction operating against destroying or robbing a person of his or her virtue. In the modern context, the above would be understood under the rubric of defamation. These precepts are indicative of the fact that defamation was recognised as an offence way before the modern legal system afforded cognizance to the same.

Conclusion

The dominant narrative surrounding the privacy debate in India is that of the alien-ness of privacy. This paper has attempted to displace the notion that privacy is an inherently 'Western' concept that is the product of a modernist legal system. No doubt the common understanding of the legal conception of privacy is informed by modernity. In fact, the research conducted in support of this paper has been synthesised from privacy information through a modernist lens. The fact still remains however, that privacy is an amorphous context, and its conceptions vary across cultures.

To better appreciate the relevance of Classical Hindu law in a modernist context, the nature of Hindu law must be examined first. While Hindu jurisprudence might not qualify as law in the positivist sense of the term, its precepts continue to inform India's statues and judicial pronouncements.

Privacy is subjective and eludes a straitjacketed definition. On occasion this elusiveness is a function of its overlapping and varying aspects. At other times it stems from a terminological lacuna that complicates the explication of privacy. These impediments notwithstanding, it is abundantly clear that the essence of privacy is reflected in Hindu culture and jurisprudence. This may give pause to thought to those who seek to argue that 'collectivist' cultures do not value privacy or exhibit the need for it.

Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 154(3), January 2006.

Id.

Upendra Baxi, Who Bothers About the Supreme Court: The Problem of Impact of Judicial Decisions, available at http://clpr.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/whobothersabouttheSupremeCourt.pdf (Last visited on December 23, 2014) (The enforceability of rights often sets their individual enjoyment apart from their jurisprudential value); In India, the reading of privacy into Article 21 has not resulted in a mechanism to enforce a standalone right to privacy, See R.H. Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, available at http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2046&context=vlr (Last visited on December 23, 2014) (In the United States, the right to privacy was located in the penumbra of the right to personal autonomy).

See PUCL v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 568.

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

See The Indian Penal Code, 1850, Section 499.

See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 22; The Special Marriage Act, 1954, Section 33.

Bhairav Acharya & Vidushi Marda, Identifying Aspects of Privacy in Islamic Law, available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/identifying-aspects-of-privacy-in-islamic-law (Last visited on December 23, 2014).

See Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India (1973).

Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (2010) (This importation must be viewed against the backdrop of the characteristics of the era of Enlightenment wherein primacy was accorded to secular reason and the positivist conception of law. Davis observes "One cannot deny the increasing global acceptance of a once parochial notion of law as rules backed by sanctions enforced by the state. This very modern, very European notion of law is not natural, not a given; it was produced at a specific moment in history and promulgated systematically and often forcibly through the institutions of what we now call the nation-state, especially those nations that were also colonial powers.)"; But see Alan Gledhill, The Influence of Common Law and Equity on Hindu Law Since 1800, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/755588 (Last visited on December 23, 2014); Werner Menski, Sanskrit Law: Excavating Vedic Legal Pluralism, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1621384 (Last visited on December 23, 2014) (However, this replacement of traditional legal systems did not extend to personal laws. Personal laws in India continue to be community-based, sometimes un-codified, draw from a diverse set of simultaneously applicable sources and traditional schools of jurisprudence.).

Supra note 8, Acharya & Marda.

Privacy International, A New Dawn: Privacy in Asia, available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/a-new-dawn-privacy-in-asia/background (Last visited on December 28, 2013) ("It is only recently that the debate around privacy was stuck in this "collectivist" vs. "individualistic" cultural discourse…we discovered that privacy concerns and the need for safeguards were often embedded deeply in a nation, and not just as a response to a modern phenomenon.").

Privacy International, A New Dawn: Privacy in Asia, available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/a-new-dawn-privacy-in-asia/background (Last visited on December 28, 2013)

J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Administration of Hindu Law by the British, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/177940 (Last visited on December 23, 2014).

Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 201.

Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 202.

Id.

Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law 31 (2009).

Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (2010).

Marc Galanter, The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1968.

Id.

Supra note 20, Galanter.

Supra note 10, Menski.

Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (2003).

Id.

Ashcroft as cited in Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (2003).

Supra note 20, Galanter.

Id.

Id .

Supra note 19, Davis.

Id.

Id .

J. Duncan M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (1963); Supra note 19, Davis.

Supra note 9, Lingat.

Id.

John D. Mayne, Hindu Law (1875).

Id.

Supra note 49, Mayne.

Id.

Supra note 19, Davis.

Id.

Supra note 49, Mayne.

Ludo Rocher, Studies in Hindu Law and Dharamasastra (2012).

For instance the Yajnawalkya Samhita has clear delineations in its chapters, segregating customary practices, legal procedure and punitive measures.

Madhu Kishwar, Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/4401625 (Last visited on December 23, 2014).

Id .

Supra note 59.

Id.

Supra note 20, Galanter.

See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 7.

Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadda, AIR 1984 SC 1562 (reflected the importance accorded by classical Hindu law to marital stability); M Govindaraju v. K Munisami Goundu 1996 SCALE (6) 13(The Supreme Court looked to ancient Shudra custom to adjudicate on a matter of adoption); Rajkumar Patni v. Manorama Patni, II (2000) DMC 702 (The Madhya Pradesh High Court, relied on the definition of Stridhan by Manu.).

Supra note 8, Acharya & Marda.

Semayne v. Gresham, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91, 195 (K.B. 1604).

As cited in Julius Jolly, The Minor Law Books 164 (1889), ("A householder's house and field are considered as the two fundamentals of his existence. Therefore let not the king upset either of them; for that is the root of the householders").

Manmath Nath Dutt, The Dharamshastra - Hindu Religious Codes, Volume 1, 103 (1978) (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II 235-236: "He…who opens the doors of a closed house [without the permission of the master]…should be punished with fifty panas. Such is the law.").

L.N. Rangarajan, Kautalya: The Arthashastra 371 (1992) ("O be built at a suitable distance from the neighbours property so as not to cause inconvenience to the neighbour").

Id ., ("…doors and windows shall be made so as not to cause annoyance by facing a neighbour's door or window directly").

Supra note 72, Rangarajan, ("when the house is occupied the doors and windows shall be suitably covered").

Id., 376.

See Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 201-202.

Supra note 71, Dutt, 27 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter I , 160: "One should avoid the bed, seat, garden-house and the conveyance belonging to another person.").

Supra note 71, Dutt, 89 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 146).

Manusmriti, Chapter IX, 194.

Supra note 71, Dutt Volume 2, 276 (Angiras Samhita, Chapter I, 71).

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, December 15, 1890, No.5.

Id.

Manusmriti, Chapter IV, 258; Supra note 71, Dutt, 134 (Yajnawalkya Samhita Chapter III, 111: "Having withdrawn the mind, understanding, retentive faculty and the senses from all their objects, the soul, the lord…should be meditated upon.").

Manu Chapter VI, 44.

Supra note 71, Dutt, 186 (Harita Chapter VII, 6: "Situated in a solitary place with a concentrated mind, he should, till death mediate on the atman, that is situated both in the mind and the external world… ").

Supra note 72, Rangarajan, (Arthashastra, 2.2.2).

Supra note72, Rangarajan, (Arthashastra 3.16.33-36).

Manusmriti IX, 84

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 2, 350 (Samvarta Samhita,163).

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 1, 112 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 291).

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 1, 113 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 294).

Supra note 72, Ranjarajan (Arthashastra 2.27.14).

Supra note 72, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 4.13.38).

Manusmriti, X, 62

Manusmriti Part VII, Supra note 101, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 1.15.2-5, 1.15.13-17).

Supra note 72, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 1.15.2-5 : The scrutiny of governance related affairs was take place in a secluded and well-guarded spot, where it could not be overheard. No unauthorised person was allowed to approach these meetings.).

Supra note 72, Rangarajan (Arthashastra 1.15.13-17: "…Only those who have to implement it should know when the work is begun or when it has been completed.").

Supra note 72, Rangarajan.

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 1, 112 (Yajnawalkya Samhita, Chapter II, 292).

Supra note 71, Dutt, Volume 4, 919 (Vishnu Samhita, Chapter LII, 16).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/loading-constructs-of-privacy-within-classical-hindu-law

Availability and Accessibility of Government Information in Public Domain

sunil — 2014-12-30T01:25:12Z

The information provided on most Government websites such as Acts, notifications, rules, orders, minutes of meetings and consultations, etc. is usually in the form of electronic documents. However, these lack authenticity and accessibility and cannot be (text) searched., This policy brief identifies the problem areas with the current work flow being used to publish documents and proposes suitable modifications to make them easy to locate, authentic and accessible.

Prepared by Sunil Abraham, Nirmita Narasimhan, Beliappa, and Anandhi Viswanathan and with inputs from Dipendra Manocha, Saksham, and Deepak Maheshwari, Symantec. Download the text as PDF here. (96 Kb)

Problem Statement: The information published on most government websites exist in the form of document files [including but not limited to the Acts, Rules and Regulations, Government Orders and Notifications, Consultation Papers, Reports etc.] which, even when published, more often than not lack authenticity and accessibility and cannot be (text) searched.

Analysis: The current workflow towards publishing documents on government websites is broadly as follows:

The document is born digital – that means it is created on a computer.
The document is printed.
The document is stamped with the official seal and signed in ink by the authorized person(s).
The paper document is scanned.
The scanned image is converted into a PDF file.
The document is uploaded on the website and thereby published in the public domain.

In fact, at times, even gazette notifications and other printed documents are also scanned as images.

This approach has numerous problems, including the following:

First and foremost, such a practice is against the letter and spirit of Section 4 (1) (a) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.[1] that inter alia, mandates every public authority to “maintain all its records duly catalogued and indexed in a manner and form which facilitates the right to information under this Act and ensure that all records that are appropriate to be computerised are, within a reasonable time and subject to availability of resources, computerised and connected through a network all over the country on different systems so that access to such records is facilitated”.
This does not realize the enabling provision of the Information Technology Act, 2000[2] which gives legal sanctity to digital signatures. The digital image of a physical signature is not a digital signature in the eye of the law, though at times it is mistakenly believed to be so.
This does not address the problem of repudiation. That means a government official can say “I didn't sign that document” and there is no way to tell whether what he or she is saying is true. One of the key features of digital signatures is non-repudiability.
Scanned images of printed text cannot be searched for specific text (character, word or phrase) even by people without disabilities but for people with disabilities, the documents become totally inaccessible since the accessibility software cannot parse such scanned images – against the underlying tenets and objectives of the National Universal Electronic Accessibility Policy 2013.[3]
As an extension, content of such documents cannot be indexed by search engines (such as Google, Bing and Raftaar, etc.) and hence, unlikely to be located even if technically the same are in the public domain.

Proposed Solution: The following work flow is proposed for publishing documents electronically on government websites:

The document is born digital by preparing it in or through a computer system. Documents in Indian languages should be produced using Unicode based fonts.
The government official authorized to sign the same, must sign it digitally.
The document is uploaded in an open standard based format such as EPUB using a content management system and made available on the website such that it is available, accessible, indexable and searchable.

This will ensure democratization of information in its truest sense – making available information to the public at large and ensuring that it can be easily located and remains accessible to one and all.

The process of formatting should be standardized in such a way that semantics (such as heading styles, lists and tables) can be added to the text of the document. The Web Style Guide provides information on good practices for creating well-structured documents:

Standardizing the formatting process by creating different templates for different types of documents will ensure uniform accessibility of the documents as well as provide a standard look and feel across government documents.

India became a global pioneer by making the legal provision for computerised, indexed and duly catalogued public records. It is high time that India takes the lead by living up to the legislative intent under the Right to Information Act, Information Technology Act and the National University of Educational Planning and Administration, and thereby establishes a global best practice.

Admittedly, legacy documents should also be converted electronically to accessible formats though before such a rendering, due editorial oversight may be necessary along with use of technologies such as Optical Character Recognition (OCR).

[1]. Government of India. The Right to Information Act, 2005. No. 22 of 2005. Retrieved on November 30, 2014 from http://rti.gov.in/webactrti.htm.

[2]. Government of India. The Information Technology Act, 2000. No. 21 of 2000. Retrieved on November 30, 2014 from http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/downloads/itact2000/itbill2000.pdf

[3]. Government of India. National Policy on Universal Electronic Accessibility. 2013. Retrieved on November 30, 2014 from http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/National Policy on Universal Electronics(1).pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/availability-and-accessibility-of-government-information-in-public-domain

Mapping Digital Humanities in India - Concluding Thoughts

sneha-pp — 2015-11-13T05:36:10Z

This final blog post on the mapping exercise undertaken by CIS-RAW summarises some of the key concepts and terms that have emerged as significant in the discourse around Digital Humanities in India.

The present exercise in mapping Digital Humanities (henceforth DH) in India has brought to the fore several learnings, and challenges in trying to locate the domain of enquiry even as our understanding of what constitutes new objects, methods and forms of research and pedagogy constantly undergo change and redefinition. Even as we wrap up this study, some of the key questions or problems of definition, ontology and method remain with us, as the 'field' as such is incipient in India, as with other parts of the world and the term itself is yet to find a resonance in many quarters, other than a few institutions and a number of individuals. However, what it does do for us immediately, is throw open several questions about how we understand the idea of the 'digital', and what may be the new areas of enquiry for the humanities at large.

We began with the understanding that DH is a new space of interdisciplinary research, scholarship and practice with several possibilities for thinking about the nature of the intersection of the humanities and technology. The term was a little more than a found name of sorts, which since then has taken on various meanings and undergone some form of creative re-appropriation. The ubiquitous history of the term in humanities computing in the Anglo-American context has helped in locating and defining the field globally within the ambit of certain kinds of practices and scholarship in the contemporary moment. As most of the literature around DH even globally has pointed out, the problem with arriving at a definition is ontological, more than epistemological. The conditions of its emergence and existence are yet to be completely understood, although if one is to take into account the larger history of science and technology studies or even cyber/digital culture studies, these 'epistemic shifts' have been in the making for some time now. In India particularly, where a clear picture of the 'field' as such is still to emerge in the form of a theorisation of its key concerns, areas of focus or object of enquiry, it is only through a practice-mapping that one may locate what are at best certain discursive shifts in the way we understand content, structures and methods in the humanities, within the context of the digital. The fundamental premise of the nature of the digital and its relation to the human subject still lacks adequate exploration which would be required to define the contours of the field. The inherited separation of humanities and technology further makes this a complex space to negotiate, when the term may now actually indicate the need to decode the rather tenuous relationship between the two supposedly separate domains.

The question of methodology then comes in as the next most important aspect here, as the method of DH is yet to be clearly defined. At present it looks like a combination and creative appropriation of methodologies drawn from different disciplines and creative practices. The change in the methodology of the humanities and social sciences itself as now longer remaining discipline-specific has been a contributory factor to the evolving methodology of DH. The practice itself is still evolving, and while DH in the Anglo-American context can trace a history in humanities computing, with now an active interest in other spaces where the digital is an inherent part of the discourse, in India there has been little work in mainstream academic spaces such as universities or research centres, and some interest from the information and technology sector. As such the skills and infrastructure needed to work with large data sets and new technologised processes of interpretation and visualisation still remain outside the ambit of the mainstream humanities. This mapping exercise largely relied on interviews as part of its methodology, without any engagement with the actual practice, mainly because of a lack of consensus on what constitutes DH practice. However, through an exploration of allied fields such as media, archival practice, design and education technology, the study tries to locate how certain practices in these areas inform what we understand of DH today.

The archive, media and now to a certain extent art and design have become the sites for most of the discussions around DH in India, primarily because of the nature of institutions and people who have engaged with the question so far. Archival practice has seen a vast change with the onset of digitisation, and the growth of more public and collaborative archival spaces will also bring forth new questions and concepts around the nature of the archive and its imagination as a dynamic space of knowledge production. At a more abstract level, the nature of the text as an unstable object itself, now increasingly being mediated and negotiated in different ways through digital spaces, tools and methods would be one way of locating an object of enquiry in DH and tracing its connection to the humanities, which are essentially still seen as 'text-based disciplines'. What has been a definite shift is the emphasis on process which has become an important point of enquiry, and one of the many axes around which the discourse around DH is constructed. The rethinking of existing processes of knowledge production, including traditional methods of teaching-learning, and the emergence of new tools and methods such as visualisation, data mapping, distant reading and design-thinking at a larger level would be some of the interesting prospects of enquiry in the field. The method of DH is however, necessarily collaborative and distributed at the same time, as evidenced by its practice in these various areas and disciplines.

While in the Anglo-American context the predominant narrative or raison d'etre of DH seems to be the so-called 'crisis' in the humanities, it may after all be just one of reasons, and not a primary cause, at least in the Indian context. Moreover, in a paradoxical sense the emergence of DH has been seen as endangering the future of the traditional humanities, in terms of a move away from certain conventional methods and forms of research and pedagogy. While this may be relevant to our understanding of the emergence of DH, understanding the emergence of the field as resolving a crisis also renders the discourse into a uni-dimensional, problem-solving approach, thus making invisible other factors, such as the technologised history of the humanities or several other factors that have contributed to these changes. The complex and somewhere problematic history of science and technology in India and the growth of the IT sector also forms part of this context, and will inform the manner in which DH grows as a concept, area of enquiry or even as a discipline. DH is yet another manifestation of changes that we have seen in the existing objects, processes, spaces and figures of learning, particularly the open, collaborative and participatory nature of knowledge production and dissemination that has come about with the advent of the internet and digital technologies. More importantly, they also point towards the larger changes in what where earlier considered unifying notions for the university, namely that of reason and culture, which have now moved towards an idea of excellence based on a certain techno-bureaucratic impulse, as noted by Bill Readings in his work on the rise of the post-modern university[1].

If one may try to locate within this the debates around DH, the subject of this new discourse around the digital is also now rather unclear. One could explore the notion of the digital humanist, or in a more abstract manner the digital subject as one example of this lack of clarity or the distance between the practice and the subject, which is also why it has been of much concern for several scholars. As Prof. Amlan Dasgupta, with English Department at the University of Jadavpur says, it is difficult to identify such a category of scholars, although a person who is able to situate his work in the digital space with the same kind of ease and confidence that people of a different generation could do in manuscripts and books would perhaps fit this description, and he is sure that such a person may be found. For example someone who knows Shakespeare well and can write a programme, and he is sure a day will come when this is a possibility. It is a familiarity in which the inherent distance between these two pursuits becomes lesser - DH is at that moment - a composite of these two approaches rather than the difference.

While many scholars concur with this explanation, others find the term misleading - humanities scholars do not call themselves 'humanists'. Also, by virtue of being a digital subject, anybody engaged with some form of digital practice is already a digital humanist of some sort. The problem also is in the rather unclear nature of the practice, all of which is not unanimously identified as DH, as a result of which not many scholars would want to identify with the term. As Patrik Svensson (2010) points out "The individual term digital humanist may be problematic because it may seem both too general in not relating to a specific discipline or competence (thus deemphasizing the discipline-specific or professional) and too specific in emphasizing the "digital" part of the scholarly identity (if you are scholar) or giving too much prominence to the humanities part of your professional identity (if you are a digital humanities programmer or a system architect). The more general and non-personal term digital humanities is more inclusive, but somewhat limited because of its lack of specificity and relatively weak disciplinary anchorage. For both variants, there is also a question of whether "the digital" needs to be specified at all, and it is not uncommon [9] to encounter the argument that technology and the digital are part or will be part of any academic area, and hence the denotation "digital" is not required" [2]. Svensson further points out that since the term, like digital humanities, has proliferated so much in academic spaces, through publishing and funding initiatives that it has become a term of self-identification, but it could be a reference to the digital as 'tool' rather that the object of study itself. However, he also speculates that given digital humanists work across several disciplines, their understanding of humanities as a construct is stronger as the identity is linked to it at large. [3]

This debate is importantly, symptomatic of a larger conflict over the authority of knowledge, because of what seems to be a move away from the university to alternate spaces and modes of knowledge production. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1996) suggests, such a conflict of authority has already been documented earlier, in terms of the displacement of theology first and then Newtonian mechanics as dominant sources of knowledge, and the now in the manner in which the separation of disciplines is being challenged. The potential of technology in general and the internet in particular in democratising knowledge has been explored in several cases, with many such online spaces now becoming a suitable 'alternate' to the university mode of teaching and learning. What they have also given rise to are questions about the authenticity of knowledge produced and disseminated and who are the stakeholders in the process. The debates over MOOC's and the Wikipedia, and at some level the criticism that DH and certain methods like distant reading have attracted from traditional humanities scholars are a case in point. However, many of these alternate or liminal spaces have always existed; they are perhaps becoming more visible and acknowledged now. DH, with its emphasis on interdisciplinarity and different kinds of knowledge drawn from a diverse set of practices definitely opens up space for a new mode of questioning; whether all of these different modes of questioning can coalesce as a new discipline or interdisciplinary field in itself will remain to be seen.

References

Patrik, Svensson, "The Landscape of Digital Humanities". Digital Humanities Quarterly,4:1 http://digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/4/1/000080/000080.html 2010.
Readings, Bill, The University in Ruins Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, pp 1-20.
Wallerstein, Immanuel, "The Structures of Knowledge, or How Many Ways May We Know?" Presentation at "Which Sciences for Tomorrow? Dialogue on the Gulbenkian Report: Open the Social Sciences," Stanford University, June 2-3, 1996 http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/iwstanfo.htm

The author would like to thank the Higher Education Innovation and Research Applications (HEIRA) programme at the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS), Bangalore for support towards the fieldwork conducted as part of this mapping exercise, and colleagues at CIS and CSCS for their feedback and inputs.

Concepts/Glossary of terms

Ontology - A lot of the work being done to define DH is in fact to understand its ontological status, the nature of its being and existence. As pointed out in the part of this section, the difficulty in arriving at a consensus on a definition is largely due to a lack of clarity over the ontological basis of such a field, rather than its epistemological stake, which one may already be able to discern in a few years. There is a slippage due to a lack of connection between the history of the term and its practice, particularly in India, where DH is still a 'found term' of sorts. See http://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/a-question-of-digital-humanities
Humanities - The predominant discourse in the Anglo-American context on DH seems to have set it up in a conflict with or as a threat to the traditional humanities disciplines, the causal link here being the 'crisis' of the disciplines. While there is such a narrative of crisis in the Indian con text as well, anything 'digital' is understood in terms of a problem-solving approach, and at another level seeks to further existing concerns of the humanities themselves, such as around the text. The important shift that DH may open up here is in terms of thinking about the inherited separation of technology and the humanities, and if it indeed possible now to think of a technologised history of the humanities.See http://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/a-question-of-digital-humanities
Digital - the debate around and interest in DH has reinforced the need for a larger and more elaborate exploration of the 'digital' itself, and as mentioned in an earlier post, deciphering the nuances of the current state of digitality we inhabit will be key to understanding the field of DH much better. This is challenging because India is a mutli-layered technological landscape, which is also quite dynamic, ever-changing and in a period of transition to the digital. Taking this back to more fundamental questions of technology and its relation to the subject would also provide more insights into DH.See http://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/digital-humanities-problem-of-definition
Subject - DH is a manifestation of the relationship between technology and the human subject, and provides different ways to negotiate the same. The 'digital humanist' as the likely subject of this discourse has remained largely undefined in this series of explorations, partly because of the lack of resonance with the term among humanities scholars and the fact that everybody at some level is already a digital subject, and therefore a digital humanist. An exploration of how the digital constitutes or constructs a subject position is likely to reveal better the nuances of this term and the reason for its relation to or distance from the practice.
Method - the methodology of a discipline is the connection between theory and field of practice, and the method of DH is still being developed. Whether it is data mining, distant reading, cultural informatics, sentiment analysis or creative visualisations of data sets drawing from aspects of media, art and design, the methodology and interests of DH are necessarily diverse and interdisciplinary. In many a case the distinction among methods, content and forms do blur as newer modes or approaches to DH come into being. This becomes a particular problem in understanding DH in the context of pedagogy and curricular resources, and would therefore require a rethinking of the understanding of a singular methodology itself.
Archive - A large part of the DH work in India seems to be focussed around the archive - both as a concept and practice. With the digital becoming in a sense the default mode of documentation across the humanities disciplines, and the opening up of the archive due to more public and digital archival efforts, the concept of the archive and archival practice have undergone several changes in terms of becoming now more networked and accessible. As mentioned earlier, we are living in an archival moment where there is a transition from analogue to digital, and it is in this moment of transition that a lot of new questions around data and knowledge will emerge. See http://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/living-in-the-archival-moment.
Text - the text has been one of significant aspects of the DH debate, given that the academic discourse on DH in the West and now in India is primarily located in English departments. The understanding of the text as object, method and practice as mediated through digital spaces and tools is an important part of the discourse around DH, and has implications for how we understand changes in the nature of the text, and reading and writing as technologised processes in the digital context. See http://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/reading-from-a-distance.
Process: An important point of emphasis in DH has been that of process, perhaps even more than content or outcomes. Given that the method of DH is collaborative and peer-to-peer, the processes of doing, making or teaching-learning etc become increasingly visible and important to understanding the nature of the field and knowledge production itself. More importantly, it also seeks to bring in the practitioner's experience into the realm of research and pedagogy.
Liminal : DH is a good example of a liminal space; which is a space that is on both sides of a threshold or boundary, and is therefore at some level undefined and transitional. The liminal space is often located at the margin of a body of knowledge or discipline, and it is at the margins of disciplines that new knowledge is produced. The discourse and even criticism around DH highlights the difficulties with defining the present nebulous nature of these liminal spaces and what they could transform into in the future. See http://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/digital-humanities-and-alt-academy.
Interdisciplinarity - Closely tied to the notion of liminal spaces is the notion of interdisciplinarity. DH by nature is interdisciplinary, given that it draws upon methods and concerns from the other disciplines, but instead of limiting the definition to just this, it also provides a space to understand the challenges of negotiating and using an interdisciplinary approach to the humanities and other disciplines and develop these questions further. See http://cis-india.org/raw/digital-humanities/digital-humanities-and-alt-academy.

[1] See Bill Readings, The University in Ruins Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, pp 1-20.

[2] See Patrik Svensson. "The Landscape of Digital Humanities". Digital Humanities Quarterly,4:1 http://digitalhumanities.org/dhq/vol/4/1/000080/000080.html

[3] Ibid.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/mapping-digital-humanities-in-india-concluding-thoughts

Privacy vs. Transparency: An Attempt at Resolving the Dichotomy

sunil — 2015-03-08T06:26:21Z

The right to privacy has been articulated in international law and in some national laws. In a few countries where the constitution does not explicitly guarantee such a right, courts have read the right to privacy into other rights (e.g., the right to life, the right to equal treatment under law and also the right to freedom of speech and expression).

With feedback and inputs from Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Elonnai Hickok, Bhairav Acharya and Geetha Hariharan. I would like to apologize for not providing proper citation to Julian Assange when the first version of this blog entry was published. I would also like to thank Micah Sifry for drawing this failure to his attention. The blog post originally published by Omidyar Network can be read here. Also see http://newint.org/features/2015/01/01/privacy-transparency/

In other countries where privacy is not yet an explicit or implicit right, harm to the individual is mitigated using older confidentiality or secrecy law. After the Snowden affair, the rise of social media and the sharing economy, some corporations and governments would like us to believe that “privacy is dead”. Privacy should not and cannot be dead, because that would mean that security is also dead. This is indeed the most dangerous consequence of total surveillance as it is technically impossible to architect a secure information system without privacy as a precondition. And conversely, it is impossible to guarantee privacy without security as a precondition.

The right to transparency [also known as the right to information or access to information] – while unavailable in international law – is increasingly available in national law. Over the last twenty years this right has become encoded in national laws – and across the world it is being used to hold government accountable and to balance the power asymmetry between states and citizens. Independent and autonomous offices of transparency regulators have been established. Apart from increasing government transparency, corporations are also increasingly required to be transparent as part of generic or industry specific regulation in the public interest. For instance, India’s Companies Act, 2013, requires greater transparency from the private sector. Other areas of human endeavor such as science and development are also becoming increasingly transparent though here it is still left up to self-regulation and there isn’t as much established law. Within science and research more generally, the rise of open data accompanied the growth of the Open Access and citizen science movement.

So the question before us is: Are these two rights – the right to transparency and the right to privacy – compatible? Is it a zero-sum game? Do we have to sacrifice one right to enforce the other? Unfortunately, many privacy and transparency activists think this is the case and this has resulted in some conflict. I suggest that these rights are completely compatible when it comes to addressing the question of power. These rights do not have to be balanced against one another. There is no need to settle for a sub-optimal solution. Rather this is an optimization problem and the solution is as follows: privacy protections must be inversely proportionate to power and as Julian Assange says transparency requirements should be directly proportionate to power.[*]

In most privacy laws, the public interest is an exception to privacy. If public interest is being undermined, then an individual privacy can be infringed upon by the state, by researchers, by the media, etc. And in transparency law, privacy is the exception. If the privacy of an individual can be infringed, transparency is not required unless it is in the public interest. In other words, the “public interest” test allows us to use privacy law and transparency law to address power asymmetries rather than exacerbate them. What constitutes “public interest” is of course left to courts, privacy regulators, and transparency regulators to decide. Like privacy, there are many other exceptions in any given transparency regime including confidentiality and secrecy. Given uneven quality of case law there will be a temptation by the corrupt to conflate exceptions. Here the old common-law principle of “there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity” – which prevents confidentiality law from being used to cover malfeasance or illegality – can be adopted in appropriate jurisdictions.

Around 10 years ago, the transparency movement gave birth to yet another movement – the open government data movement. The tension between privacy and transparency is most clearly seen in the open government data movement. The open government data movement in some parts of the world is dominated by ahistorical and apolitical technologists, and some of them seem intent on reinventing the wheel. In India, ever since the enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2003, 30 transparency activists are either killed, beaten or criminally intimidated every year. This is the statistic from media coverage alone. Many more silently suffer. RTI or transparency is without a doubt one of the most dangerous sectors within civil society that you could choose to work in. In contrast, not a single open data activist has ever been killed, beaten or criminally intimidated. I suspect this is because open data activists do not sufficiently challenge power hierarchies. Let us look a little bit closely at their work cycle. When a traditional transparency activist asks a question, that is usually enough to get them into trouble. When an open data activist publishes an answer [a dataset nicely scrubbed and machine readable, or a visualization, or a tool] they are often frustrated because nobody seems interested in using it. Often even the activist is unclear what the question is. This is because open data activist works where data is available. Open data activists are obsessed with big datasets, which are easier to find at the bottom of the pyramid. They contribute to growing surveillance practices [the nexus between Internet giants, states, and the security establishment] rather that focusing on sousveillance [citizen surveillance of the state, also referred to as citizen undersight or inverse surveillance]. They seem to be obsessed only with tools and technologies, rather than power asymmetries and injustices.

Finally, a case study to make my argument easier to understand – Aadhaar or UID, India’s ambitious centralized biometric identity and authentication management system. There are many serious issues with its centralized topology, proprietary technology, and dependence on biometrics as authentication factors – all of which I have written about in the past. In this article, I will explain how my optimization solution can be applied to the project to make it more effective in addressing its primary problem statement that corruption is a necessary outcome of power asymmetries in India.

In its current avatar – the Aadhaar project hopes to assign biometric-based identities to all citizens. The hope is that, by doing authentication in the last mile, corruption within India’s massive subsidy programmes will be reduced. This, in my view, might marginally reduce retail corruption at the bottom of the pyramid. It will do nothing to address wholesale corruption that occurs as subsidies travel from the top to the bottom of the pyramid. I have advocated over the last two years that we should abandon trying to issue biometric identities to all citizens, thereby making them more transparent to the state. Let us instead issue Aadhaar numbers to all politicians and bureaucrats and instead make the state more transparent to citizens. There is no public interest in reducing privacy for ordinary citizens – the powerless – but there are definitely huge public interest benefits to be secured by increasing transparency of politicians and bureaucrats, who are the powerful.

The Indian government has recently introduced a biometric-based attendance system for all bureaucrats and has created a portal that allows Indian citizens to track if their bureaucrats are arriving late or leaving early. This unfortunately is just bean counting [for being corrupt and being punctual are not mutually exclusive] and public access to the national portal was turned off because of legitimate protests from some of the bureaucrats. What bureaucrats do in office, who they meet, and which documents they process is more important than when they arrive at or depart from work. The increased transparency or reduced privacy was not contributing to the public interest.

Instead of first going after small-ticket corruption at the bottom of the pyramid, maximization of public interest requires us to focus on the top, for there is much greater ROI for the anti-corruption rupee. For example: constructing a digital signature based on audit trails that track all funds and subsidies as they move up and down the pyramid. These audit trails must be made public so that ordinary villagers can be supported by open data activists, journalists, social entrepreneurs, and traditional civil society in verification and course correction.

I hope open data activists, data scientists, and big data experts will draw inspiration from the giants of the transparency movement in India. I hope they will turn their attention to power, examine power asymmetries and then ask how the Aadhaar project can be leveraged to make India more rather than less equal.

Videos

Open Up? 2014: Risky Business: Transparency, Technology, Security, and Human Rights

Open Up? 2014: Data Collection and Sharing: Transparency and the Private Sector

The videos can also be watched on Vimeo:

[*].http://prospect.org/article/real-significance-wikileaks “Transparency should be proportional to the power that one has.”

Read the presentation on Risky Business: Transparency, Technology, Security and Privacy made at the Pecha Kucha session here. (ODP File, 35 kb)

Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by the author(s) of this blog are theirs alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, or positions of Omidyar Network. We make no representations as to accuracy, completeness, timeliness, suitability or validity of any information presented by individual authors of the blogs and will not be liable for any errors, omissions, or delays in this information or any losses, injuries or damages arising from its display or use.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/privacy-v-transparency

White Paper on RTI and Privacy V1.2

vipul — 2014-11-09T02:53:51Z

This white paper explores the relationship between privacy and transparency in the context of the right to information in India. Analysing pertinent case law and legislation - the paper highlights how the courts and the law in India address questions of transparency vs. privacy.

Introduction

Although the right to information is not specifically spelt out in the Constitution of India, 1950, it has been read into Articles 14 (right to equality), 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and 21 (right to life) through cases such as Bennet Coleman v. Union of India,[1] Tata Press Ltd. v. Maharashtra Telephone Nigam Ltd.,[2] etc. The same Articles of the Constitution were also interpreted in Kharak Singh v.State of U.P.,[3] Govind v. State of M.P., [4] and a number of other cases, to include within their scope a right to privacy. At the very outset it appears that a right to receive information -though achieving greater transparency in public life - could impinge on the right to privacy of certain people. The presumed tension between the right to privacy and the right to information has been widely recognized and a framework towards balancing the two rights, has been widely discussed across jurisdictions. In India, nowhere is this conflict and the attempt to balance it more evident than under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (the "RTI Act").

Supporting the constitutional right to information enjoyed by the citizens, is the statutorily recognized right to information granted under the RTI Act. Any potential infringement of the right to privacy by the provisions of the RTI Act are sought to be balanced by section 8 which provides that no information should be disclosed if it creates an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of any individual. This exception states that there is no obligation to disclose information which relates to personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information. [5] The Act further goes on to say that where any information relating to or supplied by a third party and treated by that party as confidential, is to be disclosed, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer has to give written notice to that party within five days of receiving such a request inviting such third party (within ten days) to make its case as to whether such information should or should not be disclosed.[6]

A plain reading of section 11 suggests that for the section to apply the following three conditions have to be satisfied, i.e. (i) if the PIO is considering disclosing the information (ii) the information relates to the third party or was given to a Public Authority by the third party in confidence; and (iii) the third party treated the information to be a confidential. It has been held that in order to satisfy the third part of the test stated above, the third party has to be consulted and therefore a notice has to be sent to the third party. Even if the third party claims confidentiality, the proviso to the section provides that the information cannot be withheld if the public interest in the disclosure outweighs the possible harm or injury that may be caused to the third party, except in cases of trade or commercial secrets.[7] The Courts have also held that section 11 should be read keeping in mind the exceptions contained in section 8 (discussed in detail later) and the exceptions contained therein. [8]

This principle of non disclosure of private information can be found across a number of common law jurisdictions. The United Kingdom's Freedom of Information Act, 2000 exempts the disclosure of information where it would violate the data protection principles contained in the Data Protection Act, 1998 or constitute an actionable breach of confidence.[9] The Australian Freedom of Information Act, 1982 categorizes documents involving unreasonable disclosure of personal information as conditionally exempt i.e. allows for their disclosure unless such disclosure would be contrary to public interest.[10] The Canadian Access to Information Act also has a provision which allows the authorities to refuse to disclose personal information except in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Privacy Act. [11]

An overview of the RTI Act, especially sections 6 to 8 seems to give the impression that the legislature has tried to balance and harmonize conflicting public and private rights and interests by building sufficient safeguards and exceptions to the general principles of disclosure under the Act. [12] This is why it is generally suggested that section 8, when applied, should be given a strict interpretation as it is a fetter on not only a statutory right granted under the RTI Act but also a pre-existing constitutional right. [13] Logical as this argument may seem and appropriate in some circumstances, it does present a problem when dealing with the privacy exception contained in section 8(1)(j). That is because the right to privacy envisaged in this section is also a pre-existing constitutional right which has been traced to the same provisions of the Constitution from which the constitutional right of freedom of information emanates.[14] Therefore there is an ambiguity regarding the treatment and priority given to the privacy exception vs. the disclosure mandate in the RTI Act, as it requires the balancing of not only two competing statutory rights but also two constitutional rights.

The Privacy Exception

As discussed earlier, the purpose of the RTI Act is to increase transparency and ensure that people have access to as much public information as possible. Such a right is critical in a democratic country as it allows for accountability of the State and allows individuals to seek out information and make informed decisions. However, it seems from the language of the RTI Act that at the time of its drafting the legislature did realize that there would be a conflict between the endeavor to provide information and the right to privacy of individuals over the information kept with public authorities, which is why a privacy exception was carved into section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act. The Act does not only protect the privacy of the third party who's information is at risk of being disclosed, but also the privacy of the applicant. In fact it has now been held that a private respondent need not give his/her ID or address as long as the information provided by him/her is sufficient to contact him/her.[15]

It is interesting to note that although the RTI Act gives every citizen a right to information, it does not limit this right with a stipulation as to how the information shall be used by the applicant or the reason for which the applicant wants such information. [16] This lack of a purpose limitation in the Act may have privacy implications as non sensitive personal information could be sought from different sources and processed by any person so as to convert such non-sensitive or anonymous information into identifiable information which could directly impact the privacy of individuals.

The exception in S. 8(1)(j) prohibits the disclosure of personal information for two reasons (i) its disclosure does not relate to any public activity or interest or (ii) it would be an unwarranted invasion into privacy. The above two conditions however get trumped if a larger public interest is satisfied by the disclosure of such information.

One interesting thing about the exception contained in section 8(1)(j) is that this exception itself has an exception to it in the form of a proviso. The proviso says that any information which cannot be denied to the central or state legislature shall not be denied to any person. Since the proviso has been placed at the end of sub-section 8(1) which is also the end of clause 8(1)(j), one might be tempted to ask whether this proviso applies only to the privacy exception i.e. clause 8(1)(j) or to the entire sub-section 8(1) (which includes other exceptions such as national interest, etc.). This issue was put to rest by the Bombay High Court when it held that since the proviso has been put only after clause 8(1)(j) and not before each and every clause, it would not apply to the entire sub-section 8(1) but only to clause 8(1)(j), thus ensuring that the exceptions to disclosure other than the right to privacy are not restricted by this proviso.[17]

Scope of Proviso to section 8(1)(j)
Though the courts have agreed that the proviso is applicable only to section 8(1)(j), the import of the proviso to section 8(1)(j) is a little more ambiguous and there are conflicting decisions by different High Courts on this point. Whereas the Bombay High Court has laid emphasis on the letter of the proviso and derived strength from the objects and overall scheme of the Act to water down the provisions of section 8(1)(j), [18] the Delhi High Court has disagreed with such an approach which gives "undue, even overwhelming deference" to Parliamentary privilege in seeking information. Such an approach would render the protection under section 8(1)j) meaningless, and the basic safeguard bereft of content.[19] In the words of the Delhi High Court:

" The proviso has to be only as confined to what it enacts, to the class of information that Parliament can ordinarily seek; if it were held that all information relating to all public servants, even private information, can be accessed by Parliament, Section 8(1)(j) would be devoid of any substance, because the provision makes no distinction between public and private information. Moreover there is no law which enables Parliament to demand all such information; it has to be necessarily in the context of some matter, or investigation. If the reasoning of the Bombay High Court were to be accepted, there would be nothing left of the right to privacy, elevated to the status of a fundamental right, by several judgments of the Supreme Court. "

The interpretation given by the Delhi High Court thus ensures that section 8(1)(j) still has some effect, as otherwise the privacy exception would have gotten steamrolled by parliamentary privilege and all sorts of information such as Income Tax Returns, etc. of both private and public individuals would have been liable to disclosure under the RTI Act.

Unfortunately, the RTI Act does not describe the terms "personal information" or "larger public interest" used in section 8(1)(j), which leaves some amount of ambiguity in interpreting the privacy exception to the RTI Act. Therefore the only option for anyone to understand these terms in greater depth is to discuss and analyse the case laws developed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Courts which have tried to throw some light on this issue.

We shall discuss some of these landmark judgments to understand the interpretations given to these terms and then move on to specific instances where (applying these principles) information has been disclosed or denied.

Personal Information
The RTI Act defines the term information but does not define the term "personal information". Therefore one has to rely on judicial pronouncements to understand the term a more clearly. Looking at the common understanding and dictionary meaning of "personal" as well as the definition of "information" contained in the RTI Act it could be said that personal information would be information, information that pertains to a person and as such it takes into its fold possibly every kind of information relating to the person. Now, such personal information of the person may, or may not, have relation to any public activity, or to public interest. At the same time, such personal information may, or may not, be private to the person. [20]

The Delhi High Court has tried to draw a distinction between the term "private information" which encompasses the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, child rearing and of the like nature and "personal information" which would be any information that pertains to an individual. This would logically imply that all private information would be part of personal information but not the other way round. [21] The term 'personal information' has in other cases, been variously described as "identity particulars of public servants, i.e. details such as their dates of birth, personal identification numbers",[22] and as including tax returns, medical records etc.[23] It is worth noting that just because the term used is "personal information" does not mean that the information always has to relate to an actual person, but may even be a juristic entity such as a trust or corporation, etc.[24]

Larger Public Interest
The term larger public interest has not been discussed or defined in the RTI Act, however the Courts have developed some tests to determine if in a given situation, personal information should be disclosed in the larger public interest.

Whenever a Public Information Officer is asked for personal information about any person, it has to balance the competing claims of the privacy of the third party on the one hand and claim of public interest on the other and determine whether the public interest in such a disclosure satisfies violating a person's privacy. The expression "public interest" is not capable of a precise definition and does not have a rigid meaning. It is therefore an elastic term and takes its colors from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and the state of the society and its needs. This seems to be the reason why the legislature and even the Courts have shied away from a precise definition of "public interest". However, the term public interest does not mean something that is merely interesting or satisfies the curiosity or love of information or amusement; but something in which a class of the community have some interest by which their rights or liabilities are affected.[25]

There have been suggestions that the use of the word "larger" before the term "public interest" denotes that the public interest involved should serve a large section of the society and not just a small section of it, i.e. if the information has a bearing on the economy, the moral values in the society; the environment; national safety, or the like, the same would qualify as "larger public interest".[26] However this is not a very well supported theory and the usage of the term "larger public interest" cannot be given such a narrow meaning, for example what if the disclosure of the information could save the lives of only 10 people or even just 5 children? Would the information not be released just because it violates one person's right to privacy and there is not a significant number of lives at stake? This does not seem to be what all the cases on the right to privacy, right from Kharak Singh[27] all the way to Naz Foundation, [28] seem to suggest. Infact, in the very same judgment where the above interpretation has been suggested, the Court undermines this argument by giving the example of a person with a previous crime of sexual assault being employed in an orphanage and says that the interest of the small group of children in the orphanage would outweigh the privacy concerns of the individual thus requiring disclosure of all information regarding the employee's past.

In light of the above understanding of section 8(1)(j), there seem to be two different tests that have been proposed by the Courts, which seem to connote the same principle although in different words:

1. The test laid down by Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain:

(i) The information sought must relate to „Personal information‟ as understood above of a third party. Therefore, if the information sought does not qualify as personal information, the exemption would not apply;

(ii) Such personal information should relate to a third person, i.e., a person other than the information seeker or the public authority; AND

(iii) (a) The information sought should not have a relation to any public activity qua such third person, or to public interest. If the information sought relates to public activity of the third party, i.e. to his activities falling within the public domain, the exemption would not apply. Similarly, if the disclosure of the personal information is found justified in public interest, the exemption would be lifted, otherwise not; OR (b) The disclosure of the information would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual, and that there is no larger public interest involved in such disclosure. [29]

2. The other test was laid down in Vijay Prakash v. Union of India, but in the specific circumstances of disclosure of personal information relating to a public official:

(i) whether the information is deemed to comprise the individual's private details, unrelated to his position in the organization;

(ii) whether the disclosure of the personal information is with the aim of providing knowledge of the proper performance of the duties and tasks assigned to the public servant in any specific case; and

(iii) whether the disclosure will furnish any information required to establish accountability or transparency in the use of public resources. [30]

Constitutional Restrictions
Since there is not extensive academic discussion on the meaning of the term "larger public interest" or "public interest" as provided in section 8(1)(j), one is forced to turn to other sources to get a better idea of these terms. One such source is constitutional law, since the right to privacy, as contained in section 8(1)(j) has its origins in Articles 14,[31] 19(1)(a) [32] and 21[33] of the Constitution of India. The constitutional right to privacy in India is also not an absolute right and various cases have carved out a number of exceptions to privacy, a perusal of which may give some indication as to what may be considered as 'larger public interest', these restrictions are:

a) Reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the right to privacy in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence; ^{^[34]}

b) Reasonable restrictions can be imposed upon the right to privacy either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe;^{^[35]}

c) The right to privacy can be restricted by procedure established by law which procedure would have to satisfy the test laid down in the Maneka Gandhi case.^{^[36]}

d) The right can be restricted if there is an important countervailing interest which is superior; ^{^[37]}

e) It can be restricted if there is a compelling state interest to be served by doing so; ^{^[38]}

f) It can be restricted in case there is a compelling public interest to be served by doing so; ^{^[39]}

g) The Rajagopal tests - This case lays down three exceptions to the rule that a person's private information cannot be published, viz. i) person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily raises or invites a controversy, ii) if publication is based on public records other than for sexual assault, kidnap and abduction, iii) there is no right to privacy for public officials with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. It must be noted that although the Court talks about public records, it does not use the term 'public domain' and thus it is possible that even if a document has been leaked in the public domain and is freely available, if it is not a matter of public record, the right to privacy can still be claimed in regard to it.^{^[40]}

Section 8(1)(j) in Practice

The discussion in the previous chapter regarding the interpretation of section 8(1)(j), though (hopefully) helpful still seems a little abstract without specific instances and illustrations to drive home the point. In this chapter we shall endeavor to briefly discuss some specific cases regarding information disclosure where the issue of violation of privacy of a third party was raised.

Private Information of Public Officials
Some of the most common problems regarding section 8(1)(j) come up when discussing information (personal or otherwise) regarding public officers. The issue comes up because an argument can be made that certain information such as income tax details, financial details, medical records, etc. of public officials should be disclosed since it has a bearing on their public activities and disclosure of such information in case of crooked officers would serve the interests of transparency and cleaner government (hence serving a larger public interest). Although section 8(1)(j) does not make any distinction between a private person and a public servant, a distinction in the way their personal information is treated does appear in reality due to the inherent nature of a public servant. Infact it has sometimes been argued that public servants must waive the right to privacy in favour of transparency.[41] However this argument has been repeatedly rejected by the Courts, [42] just because a person assumes public office does not mean that he/she would automatically lose their right to privacy in favour of transparency.

If personal information regarding a public servant is asked for, then a distinction must be made between the information that is inherently personal to the person and that which has a connection with his/her public functions. The information exempted under section 8(1)(j) is personal information which is so intimately private in nature that the disclosure of the same would not benefit any other person, but would result in the invasion of the privacy of the third party.[43] In short, the Courts have concluded that there can be no blanket rule regarding what information can and cannot be disclosed when it comes to a public servant, and the disclosure (or lack of it) would depend upon the circumstances of each case.

Although the earlier thinking of the CIC as well as various High Courts of the country was that information regarding disciplinary proceedings and service records of public officials is to be treated as public information in order to boost transparency,[44] however this line of thinking took almost a U-turn in 2012 after the decision of the Supreme Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner,[45] and now the prevailing principle is that such information is personal information and should not be disclosed unless a larger public interest is would be served by the disclosure.

It would also be helpful to look at a list of the type of information regarding public servants which has been disclosed in the past, gleaned from various cases, to get a better understanding of the prevailing trends in such cases:

(i) Details of postings of public servants at various points of time, since this was not considered as personal information; [46]

(ii) Copies of posting/ transfer orders of public servants, since it was not considered personal information; [47]

(iii) Information regarding transfers of colleagues cannot be exempted from disclosure, since disclosure would not cause any unwarranted invasion of privacy and non disclosure would defeat the object of the RTI Act;[48]

(iv) Information regarding the criteria adopted and the marks allotted to various academic qualifications, experience and interview in selection process for government posts by the state Public Service Commission;[49]

(v) Information regarding marks obtained in written test, interview, annual confidential reports of the applicant as well as the marks in the written test and interview of the last candidate selected, since this information was not considered as personal information; [50]

(vi) Information relating to the appointment and educational certificates of teachers in an educational institution (which satisfies the requirements of being a public authority) was disclosed since this was considered as relevant to them performing their functions. [51]

The performance of an employee/officer in an organization is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are governed by the service rules which fall under the expression "personal information", the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or public interest. To understand this better below is a brief list of the type of information that has been considered by the Courts as personal information which is liable to be exempt from disclosure under section 8(1)(j):

(i) (a) Salary details, (b) show cause notice, memo and censure, (c) return of assets and liabilities, (d) details of investment and other related details, (e) details of gifts accepted, (f) complete enquiry proceedings, (g) details of income tax returns;[52]

(ii) All memos issued, show cause notices and orders of censure/punishment etc. are personal information. Cannot be revealed unless a larger public interest justifies such disclosure;[53]

(iii) Disciplinary information of an employee is personal information and is exempt under section 8(1)(j); [54]

(iv) Medical records cannot be disclosed due to section 8(1)(j) as they come under "personal information", unless a larger public interest can be shown meriting such disclosure;[55]

(v) Copy of personnel records and service book (containing Annual Confidential Reports, etc.) of a public servant is personal information and cannot be disclosed due to section 8(1)(j);[56]

(vi) Information regarding sexual disorder, DNA test between an officer and his surrogate mother, name of his biological father and step father, name of his mother and surrogate step mother and such other aspects were denied by the Courts as such information was considered beyond the perception of decency and was an invasion into another man's privacy.[57]

It is not just the issue of disclosure of personal details of public officials that raises complicated questions regarding the right to information, but the opposite is equally true, i.e. what about seemingly "public" details of private individuals. A very complicated question arose with regard to information relating to the passport details of private individuals.

Passport Information of Private Individuals
The disclosure of passport details of private individuals is complicated because for a long time there was some confusion because of the treatment to be given to passport details, i.e. would its disclosure cause an invasion of privacy since it contains personally identifying information, specially because photocopies of the passport are regularly given for various purposes such as travelling, getting a new phone connection, etc. The Central Information Commission used a somewhat convoluted logic that since a person providing information relating to his residence and identity while applying for a passport was engaging in a public activity therefore such information relates to a public activity and should be disclosed. This view was rejected by the Delhi High Court in the case of Union of India v. Hardev Singh,[58] and the view taken inHardev Singh was later endorsed and relied upon in Union of India v. Rajesh Bhatia, [59] while hearing a number of petitions to decide what details of a third party's passport should be disclosed and what should be exempt from disclosure.

A list of the Courts conclusions is given below:

Information that can be revealed:

(i) Name of passport holder;

(ii) Whether a visa was issued to a third party or not;

(iii) Details of the passport including dates of first issue, subsequent renewals, dates of application for renewals, numbers of the new passports and date of expiry;

(iv) Nature of documents submitted as proof;

(v) Name of police station from where verification for passport was done;

(vi) Whether any report was called for from the jurisdictional police;

(vii) Whether passport was renewed through an agent or through a foreign embassy;

(viii) Whether it was renewed in India or any foreign country;

(ix) Whether tatkal facility was availed by the passport holder;

Information that cannot be revealed:

(i) Contents of the documents submitted with the passport application;

(ii) Marital status and name and address of husband;

(iii) Whether person's name figures as mother/guardian in the passport of any minor;

(iv) Copy of passport application form;

(v) Residential address of passport holder;

(vi) Details of cases filed/pending against passport holder;

(vii) Copy of old passport;

(viii) Report of the police and CID for issuing the passport;

(ix) Copy of the Verification Certificate, if any such Verification Certificate was relied upon for the issue of the passport.

Other Instances

Apart from the above two broad categories of information that has been the subject of intense judicial discussion, certain other situations have also arisen where the Courts have had to decide the issue of disclosure under section 8(1)(j), a brief summary of such situations is given below:

(i) names and details of people who received money as donations from the President out of public funds was considered as information which has a definite link to public activities and was therefore liable to be disclosed;[60]

(ii) information regarding the religion practiced by a person, who is alleged to be a public figure, collected by the Census authorities was not disclosed since it was held that the quest to obtain the information about the religion professed or not professed by a citizen cannot be in any event; [61]

(iii) information regarding all FIRs against a person was not protected under section 8(1)(j) since it was already a matter of public record and Court record and could not be said to be an invasion of the person's privacy;[62]

(iv) information regarding the income tax returns of a public charitable trust was held not to be exempt under section 8(1)(j), since the trust involved was a public charitable trust functioning under a Scheme formulated by the District Court and registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act as such due to its character and activities its tax returns would be in relation to public interest or activities.[63]

Conclusion

A discussion of the provisions of section 8 and 11 of the RTI Act as well as the case laws under it reveals that the legislature was aware of the dangers posed to the privacy of individuals from such a powerful transparency law. However, it did not want the exceptions carved out to protect the privacy of individuals to nullify the objects of the RTI Act and therefore drafted the legislation to incorporate the principle that although the RTI Act should not be used to violate the privacy of individuals, such an exception will not be applicable if a larger public interest is to be served by the disclosure. This principle is in line with other common law jurisdictions such as the U.K, Austalia, Canada, etc. which have similar exceptions based on privacy or confidentiality.

However it is disappointing to note that the legislature has only left the legislation at the stage of the principle which has left the language of the exception very wide and open to varied interpretations. It is understandable that the legislature would try to keep specifics out of the scope of the section to make it future proof. It is obvious that it would be impossible for the legislature or the courts to imagine every single circumstance that could arise where the right to information and the right to privacy would be at loggerheads. However, such wide and ambiguous drafting has led to cases where the Courts and the Central Information Commission have taken opposing views, with the views of the Court obviously prevailing in the end. This was illustrated by the issue of disclosure of passport details of private individuals with a large number of CIC cases taking different views till the High Court of Delhi gave categorical findings on the issue in the Hardev Singh and Rajesh Bhatia cases. Similar was the issue of service details of public officials since before the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Girish Ramchandra Deshpande in 2012 the prevailing thinking of the CIC was that details of disciplinary proceedings against public officials are not covered by section 8(1)(j), however this thinking has now taken a U-turn as the Supreme Court's understanding of the right to privacy has taken stronger roots and such information is now outside the scope of the RTI Act, unless a larger public interest in the disclosure can be shown.

The ambiguity that arises in application when trying to balance the right to privacy against the right to information is a drawback in incorporating only a principle and leaving the language ambiguous in any legislation. This paper does not advocate that the legislature try to list out all the instances of this problem that are possibly imaginable, this would be too time consuming and may even be counterproductive. However, it is possible for the legislature to adopt an accepted practice of legislative drafting and list certain instances where there is an obvious balancing required between the two rights and put them as "Illustrations" to the section. This device has been utilised to great effect by some of the most fundamental legislations in India such as the Contract Act, 1872 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. An alternative to this approach could be to utilize the approach taken in the Australian Freedom of Information Act, where the Act itself gives certain factors which should be considered to determine whether access to a particular document would be in the public interest or not.

List of References

Primary Sources

1. Australia Freedom of Information Act, 1982.

2. Bennet Coleman v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.

3. Bhagat Singh v. Chief Information Commissioner, 2008 (64) AIC 284 (Del).

4. Calcutta High Court, WP (W) No. 33290 of 2013, dated 20-11-2013.

5. Canadian Access to Information Act.

6. Canara Bank v. Chief Information Commissioner, 2007 (58) AIC Ker 667

7. Constitution of India, 1950.

8. Govind v. State of M.P., Supreme Court of India, WP No. 72 of 1970, dated 18-03-1975.

9. Haryana Public Service Commission v. State Information Commission, AIR 2009 P & H 14.

10. Jamia Millia Islamia v. Sh. Ikramuddin, Delhi High Court, WP(C) 5677 of 2011 dated 22-11-2011.

11. Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., 2008 (66) AIC 685 (All).

12. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 129.

13. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Supreme Court of India, WP No. 231 of 1977, dated 25-01-1978.

14. Naz Foundation Delhi High Court, WP(C) No.7455/2001 dated 02-07-2009.

15. P.C. Wadhwa v. Central Information Commission, Punjab and Haryana High Court, LPA No. 1252 of 2009 dated 29-11-2010.

16. Paardarshita Public Welfare Foundation v. Union of India and others, AIR 2011 Del 82.

17. President's Secretariat v. Nitish Kumar Tripathi, Delhi High Court, WP (C) 3382 of 2012, dated 14-06-2012.

18. Public Information Officer v. Andhra Pradesh Information Commission,2009 (76) AIC 854 (AP).

19. R. Rajagopal v. Union of India, Supreme Court of India, dated 7-10-1994.

20. Rajendra Vasantlal Shah v. Central Information Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 2011 Guj 70.

21. Rajinder Jaina v. Central Information Commission, 2010 (86) AIC 510 (Del. H.C.).

22. Right to Information Act, 2005

23. Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra, Delhi High Court - Full Bench, LPA No.501/2009, dated 12-01-2010.

24. Srikant Pandaya v. State of M.P., AIR 2011 MP 14.

25. Surendra Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 2009 Alld. 106.

26. Surup Singh Hyra Naik v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (58) AIC 739 (Bom).

27. Tata Press Ltd. v. Maharashtra Telephone Nigam Ltd., (1995) 5 SCC 139.

28. U.K. Freedom of Information Act, 2000.

29. UCO Bank v. Central Information Commissioner and another, 2009 (79) AIC 545 (P&H).

30. Union Centre for Earth Science Studies v. Anson Sebastian, AIR 2010 Ker. 151

31. Union of India v. Hardev Singh WP(C) 3444 of 2012 dated 23-08-2013.

32. Union of India v. Rajesh Bhatia WP(C) 2232/2012 dated 17-09-2013.

33. Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain, Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 1243/2011 & C.M. No. 2618/2011 ( for stay), dated 13-07-2012.

34. Vijay Prakash v. Union of India, 2009 (82) AIC 583 (Del).

Secondary Sources

1. "Country Report for U.K.", Privacy International, available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/united-kingdom.

2. "Country Report for Australia", Privacy International, available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/australia.

3. "Country Report for Canada", Privacy International, available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/canada.

[1] AIR 1973 SC 106. This case held that the freedom of the press embodies in itself the right of the people to read.

[2] (1995) 5 SCC 139.

[3] AIR 1963 SC 129.

[4] Supreme Court of India, WP No. 72 of 1970, dated 18-03-1975.

[5] Section 8(1) in its entirety states as follows:

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,-

(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence;

(b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court;

(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;

(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;

(f) information received in confidence from foreign Government;

(g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes;

(h) information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders;

(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers:

Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over:

Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed;

(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information:

Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.

[6] Section 11 of the RTI Act.

[7] The Registrar General v. A. Kanagaraj, (Madras High Court, 14 June 2013, available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/36226888/.

[8] Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Public Information Officer, (Delhi High Court, 30 September 2011, available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1923225/.

[9] Sections 40 and 41 of the U.K. Freedom of Information Act, 2000.

[10] Section 11A read with section 47-F of the Australia Freedom of Information Act, 1982.

[11] Section 19 of the Canadian Access to Information Act.

[12] Public Information Officer v. Andhra Pradesh Information Commission,2009 (76) AIC 854 (AP).

[13] Bhagat Singh v. Chief Information Commissioner, 2008 (64) AIC 284 (Del).

[14] Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950.

[15] Calcutta High Court, WP(W) No. 33290 of 2013, dated 20-11-2013.

[16] Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., 2008 (66) AIC 685 (All).

[17] Surup Singh Hyra Naik v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (58) AIC 739 (Bom).

[18] Surup Singh Hyra Naik v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (58) AIC 739 (Bom), para 14. Where the Court held that since the medical records of a convict cannot be denied to Parliament or State legislature therefore they cannot be exempted from disclosure under the Act.

[19] Vijay Prakash v. Union of India, 2009 (82) AIC 583 (Del).

[20] Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain, Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 1243/2011 & C.M. No. 2618/2011 ( for stay), dated 13-07-2012.

[21] Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain, Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 1243/2011 & C.M. No. 2618/2011 ( for stay), dated 13-07-2012.

[22] Vijay Prakash v. Union of India, 2009 (82) AIC 583 (Del).

[23] Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra, Delhi High Court - Full Bench, LPA No.501/2009, dated 12-01-2010.

[24] Jamia Millia Islamia v. Sh. Ikramuddin , Delhi High Court, WP(C) 5677 of 2011 dated 22-11-2011.

[25] Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain, Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 1243/2011 & C.M. No. 2618/2011 ( for stay), dated 13-07-2012.

[26] Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain, Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 1243/2011 & C.M. No. 2618/2011 ( for stay), dated 13-07-2012.

[27] AIR 1963 SC 129.

[28] Delhi High Court, WP(C) No.7455/2001 dated 02-07-2009.

[29] Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain, Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 1243/2011 & C.M. No. 2618/2011 (for stay), dated 13-07-2012. This ruling was overturned by a Division Bench of the High Court relying upon a subsequent Supreme Court ruling, however, it could be argued that the Division Bench did not per se disagree with the discussion and the principles laid down in this case, but only the way they were applied.

[30] Vijay Prakash v. Union of India, 2009 (82) AIC 583 (Del).

[31] Right to equality.

[32] Freedom of speech and expression.

[33] Right to life.

[34] Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950.

[35] Article 19(5) of the Constitution of India, 1950.

[36] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Supreme Court of India, WP No. 231 of 1977, dated 25-01-1978. The test laid down in this case is universally considered to be that the procedure established by law which restricts the fundamental right should be just, fair and reasonable.

[37] Govind v. State of M.P., Supreme Court of India, WP No. 72 of 1970, dated 18-03-1975.

[38] Govind v. State of M.P., Supreme Court of India, WP No. 72 of 1970, dated 18-03-1975.

[39] Govind v. State of M.P., Supreme Court of India, WP No. 72 of 1970, dated 18-03-1975. However the Court later used phrases such as "reasonable restriction in public interest" and "reasonable restriction upon it for compelling interest of State" interchangeably which seems to suggest that the terms "compelling public interest" and "compelling state interest" used by the Court are being used synonymously and the Court does not draw any distinction between them. It is also important to note that the wider phrase "countervailing interest is shown to be superior" seems to suggest that it is possible, atleast in theory, to have other interests apart from public interest or state interest also which could trump the right to privacy.

[40] R. Rajagopal v. Union of India , Supreme Court of India, dated 7-10-1994. These tests have been listed as one group since they are all applicable in the specific context of publication of private information.

[41] Vijay Prakash v. Union of India, 2009 (82) AIC 583 (Del).

[42] Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra, Delhi High Court - Full Bench, LPA No.501/2009, dated 12-01-2010. Also see Vijay Prakash v. Union of India, 2009 (82) AIC 583 (Del).

[43] Canara Bank v. Chief Information Commissioner, 2007 (58) AIC Ker 667. This case also held that information cannot be denied on the ground that it would be too voluminous.

[44] Union Centre for Earth Science Studies v. Anson Sebastian, AIR 2010 Ker. 151; Union Public Service Commission v. R.K. Jain, Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 1243/2011 & C.M. No. 2618/2011 (for stay), dated 13-07-2012

[45] 2012 (119) AIC 105 (SC).

[46] Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner, 2012 (119) AIC 105 (SC).

[47] Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner, 2012 (119) AIC 105 (SC).

[48] Canara Bank v. Chief Information Commissioner, 2007 (58) AIC Ker 667.

[49] Haryana Public Service Commission v. State Information Commission, AIR 2009 P & H 14.

[50] UCO Bank v. Central Information Commissioner and another, 2009 (79) AIC 545 (P&H).

[51] Surendra Singh v. State of U.P, AIR 2009 Alld. 106.

[52] Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner, 2012 (119) AIC 105 (SC).

[53] Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner, 2012 (119) AIC 105 (SC).

[54] R.K. Jain v. Union Public Service Commission, Delhi High Court, LPA No. 618 of 2012, dated 12-11-2012.

[55] Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra, Delhi High Court - Full Bench, LPA No.501/2009, dated 12-01-2010.

[56] Srikant Pandaya v. State of M.P., AIR 2011 MP 14.

[57] Paardarshita Public Welfare Foundation v. Union of India and others, AIR 2011 Del 82. It must be mentioned that this case was not exactly under the procedure prescribed under the RTI Act but was a public interest litigation although the courts relied upon the provisions of the RTI Act.

[58] WP(C) 3444 of 2012 dated 23-08-2013.

[59] WP(C) 2232/2012 dated 17-09-2013.

[60] President's Secretariat v. Nitish Kumar Tripathi, Delhi High Court, WP (C) 3382 of 2012, dated 14-06-2012.

[61] P.C. Wadhwa v. Central Information Commission, Punjab and Haryana High Court, LPA No. 1252 of 2009 dated 29-11-2010.

[62] Rajinder Jaina v. Central Information Commission, 2010 (86) AIC 510 (Del. H.C.).

[63] Rajendra Vasantlal Shah v. Central Information Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 2011 Guj 70.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/white-paper-on-rti-and-privacy-v-1.2

Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions: Mapping the Stakeholders' Response

nehaa — 2015-01-05T17:01:50Z

The procedure and tests surrounding software patenting in India have remained ambiguous since the Parliament introduced the term “per se” through the Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002. In 2013, the Indian Patent Office released Draft Guidelines for the Examination of Computer Related Inventions, in an effort to clarify some of the ambiguity. Through this post, CIS intern, Shashank Singh, analyses the various responses by the stakeholders to these Guidelines and highlights the various issues put forth in the responses.

I. Introduction

In June, 2013 the Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks ('IPO'), released the Draft Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions ('Guidelines'). The aim of the Guidelines was to provide some much needed clarity around patentability of Computer Related Inventions ('CRI'). The Guidelines discuss the procedure to be adopted by the examiners while examining CRI patent applications. In response to the Guidelines, several stakeholders submitted their comments to either accept, reject or modify the interpretation provided by the IPO. Most of the comments circled around the phraseology of Section 3(k), Patents Act, 1970 ('Act'). In its current form, Section 3(k) reads as "a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms", and comes under Chapter III of the Act which lists inventions that are not patentable. Simply put, this means that software cannot be patented in India, unless it is embedded/combined in with some hardware. While this is the most widely accepted interpretation of this Section 3(k), there have been contradictory interpretations as well.

In this note, I shall look at the various ambiguities surrounding patent application for CRIs. The note has been divided into five parts. Part II briefly reiterates the legislative history behind Section 3(k) and CRI patenting. Part III would briefly summarize the various parts of the Guidelines where the IPO has given their interpretation and opinion on the various issues surrounding CRI patenting. Part IV would then map the position of the stakeholders on each ambiguous point. Lastly, Part V would give the conclusion.

II. Legislative History

Under the Patent Act, 1970, prior to the 2002 Amendment, there was no specific provision under which software could be patented. Nonetheless, there was no explicit embargo on software patenting either. For an invention to be patentable, under Section 2(1) (j) of the Act, which defines an invention, general criteria of novelty, non-obviousness and usefulness must be applied. Software is generally in the form of a mathematical formula or algorithm, both of which are not patentable under the Act as they do not produce anything tangible. However, if combined or embedded in a machine or a computer, the resultant product can be patented as it would pass the aforementioned criteria.

The Parliament, in 1999, sought to amend the Act to bring it in conformity with the changing technological landscape. Consequently, the Patent (Second Amendment) Bill, 1999 was introduced in the Parliament which was then referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee ('JPC'). The ensuing Bill proposed Section 3(k) in its current phraseology. It reasoned that:

" In the new proposed clause (k) the words ''per se" have been inserted. This change has been proposed because sometimes the computer programme may include certain other things, ancillary thereto or developed thereon. The intention here is not to reject them for grant of patent if they are inventions. However, the computer programmes as such are not intended to be granted patent. This amendment has been proposed to clarify the purpose. "

The Bill was then enacted as the Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002 and reads in its current form as:

Section 3(k) - "a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithm"

This created some ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of the term "per se". It was interpreted to mean that software cannot be patented unless it is combined with some hardware. This combination would then have to comply with all the tests of patentability under the Act.

In December, 2004 the Patent (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 ('Ordinance') was enacted which amended Section 3(k) to divide it into two parts, namely Section 3(k) and Section 3(ka).

"(k) a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware;

(ka) a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms; ".

In February, 2005 the Ordinance was introduced in the Parliament as the Patent (Amendment) Bill, 2005.This included the amendment to Section 3(k) as under the Ordinance. In the Objects and Reasons it clarified that the intention behind the amendment was to " modify and clarify the provisions relating to patenting of software related inventions when they have technical application to industry or in combination with hardware ". However, the final amending Act did not divide Section 3(k) as proposed by the Ordinance. In the press note, by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry it was noted that:

"It is proposed to omit the clarification relating to patenting of software related inventions introduced by the Ordinance as Section 3(k) and 3 (ka). The clarification was objected to on the ground that this may give rise to monopoly of multinationals."

Later, in the same year the IPO release a Manual of Patent Office Practice and Procedure, 2005. Here, it noted that "a computer readable storage medium having a program recorded thereon…irrespective of the medium of its storage are not patentable". This did nothing to clarify the ambiguity that existed.

Similarly, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, 88^th Report on the Patent and Trademark System in India (2008) noted the uncertainty surrounding the term 'per se' and said that there was a need to clarify the same. It did not do anything in furtherance of pointing this out.

The 2011 Manual of Patent Office and Procedure, 2011 tried to elaborately deal with the ambiguity. Nonetheless, substantively it did not change the uncertainty. It stated that:

"If the claimed subject matter in a patent application is only a computer programme, it is considered as a computer programme per se and hence not patentable. Claims directed at computer programme products' are computer programmes per se stored in a computer readable medium and as such are not allowable. Even if the claims, inter alia, contain a subject matter which is not a computer programme, it is examined whether such subject matter is sufficiently disclosed in the specification and forms an essential part of the invention."

III. Draft Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions, 2013

The Draft Guidelines were released on June 28, 2013, following which stakeholders were invited to give comments.

Terms/ Definitions used while dealing with CRIs

At the outset, the IPO put a caveat to say that the Guidelines do not constitute 'rule making'. Consequently, in case of a conflict between the Guidelines and the Act, the Act shall prevail. After the Introduction and Background, in Part I and Part II respectively, the Guidelines looked at the various definitions/terms that correspond to CRI patent claims in Part III. In all, there were 21 such definitions/terms that were sought to be clarified. These definitions can be branched into three categories.

Category I- Where the definition/term was borrowed from some other Indian stature.
Category II- Where the definition/term was construed according to the plain dictionary meaning. Category III- Where the Guidelines tried to give their interpretation to the term/definition.

Under Category I, there were seven definitions whose meaning was derived from some other stature. The meaning of Computer Network, Computer System, Data, Information and Function were derived from Information Technology Act, 2000 ('IT Act'). The definition of Computer Programme was taken from Copyright Act, 1957. Lastly, the definition of Computer was taken from both Copyright Act and IT Act.

Under Category II, the Guidelines underscored five definitions whose meaning was to be borrowed from the Oxford Dictionary. These were algorithm, software, per se, firm ware and hardware. Importantly, it was noted that these definitions have not been defined anywhere in Indian legislations. Lastly, under Category III the Guidelines tried to interpret certain terms according to their understanding. These terms included, Embedded Systems, Technical Effects, Technical Advancement, Mathematical Methods, Business Methods etc.

Categorization of CRI claims

In Part IV, the Guidelines tried to broadly group the various CRI patent applications under four heads. These categorizations tried to give an insight into what the patent examiners look for while rejecting a patent application.

Method/process:

Without defining what a method or process would entail, the Guidelines stated that any claim carrying a preamble with "method/process for..." shall not be patentable. It clarified that claims relating to mathematical methods, business methods, computer programme per se, algorithm or mental act are cannot be patented as they are prime illustrations of claims under this category. Further, the Guidelines gave specific examples of each of the aforementioned claims.

Apparatus/system

The second category consisted of claims whose preamble stated that the patent application was for an "apparatus/system". Under this, the patent application must not only comply with the standard tests of patentability- novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, but also define the inventive constructional or hardware feature of the CRI. However, in contradictory statements, the Guidelines try to narrow down the prerequisites for a claim under this category, only to state that such claims cannot be patented.

Computer readable medium

While stating this as a category, the Guidelines do not elaborate on what this exactly means and what types of claims would be rejected being under this category.

Computer program product

This category includes computer programs that are expressed on a computer readable medium (CD, DVD, Signal etc.). Further, infusing ambiguity to the debate, the Guidelines failed to differentiate between Computer Readable Medium and Computer Program Product.

Examination Procedure used by IPO

The examination procedure for CRI patent application in the Guidelines is similar to other patent applications which look at novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. However, claims relating to determination of specific subject matter under the excluded categories (Method/Process, Computer Readable Medium, Apparatus/system, and Computer Program Product) require specific examination skills from the examiner.

Under the excluded category itself, Method/Process requires subjective judgement by the examiner as to whether such a claim qualifies to be classified under this category or not. For investigating the inventive step involved in the 'method/process', the technical advancement over existing knowledge in the technological field has to be analyzed. Any patent claim from a non-technological field shall not be considered.

The Guidelines then tried to clarify the controversial Section 3(k) which eliminates the patenting of computer programmes per se. While previously stating that the definition of the term 'per se' as borrowed from the Oxford dictionary meant 'by itself', the Guidelines stated that computer programme loaded on a general purpose computer or related device cannot be patented. Nonetheless, while filing patent application for a novel hardware, with a loaded computer programme, the likelihood patenting the combination cannot be ruled out. Further, the stated hardware must be something more than a general purpose machine. Essentially, a patent for a novel computer programme combined with a novel hardware, which must be more than a general purpose machine, may be considered for patenting. It then gave several examples which were followed by flowcharts to further clarify ambiguities surrounding CRI patentability. Interestingly, all these examples and flowcharts only listed the inventions that are not patentable.

IV. Response by Stakeholders

Many and various comments were received from 36 stakeholders that including lawyers, civil society members, law firms, students, global and national trade bodies and industry representatives.

Our compilation (and the first level of analysis) of the Stakeholders' Responses is available here.

While all the stakeholders' applauded the much needed transparency in the IPO, substantively they differed considerably on various issues and highlighted some inconsistencies. In this part, I shall map the responses of the various stakeholders'. While doing so, I shall also try and find specific patterns to the responses corresponding to the following segments:

1. Civil Society

2. Law Firm/Advocates ('law Firms')

3. Industry/ Industry Representatives/Global Trade Body (Industry)

4. Students

These segments have been created on the assumption that each of the aforementioned segment would lobby for similar kind of policy.

Interpretation of Section 3(k)

One of the major points of deviation between the stakeholders was regarding the interpretation of Section 3(k) which encapsulates the term "computer programme per se".

The industry responded by critiquing the current CRI patenting regime in India as being "restrictive" ( FICCI , NASSCOM, US India Business Council and Bosch ). While some industry representatives sought clarifications due to uncertain phraseology, there was no industry representative that favored restricted interpretation to exclude software patenting altogether. While opposing the Guidelines, they sought assistance from the legislative history behind introduction of Section 3(k). It was pointed out that the term 'per se' was included to raise the threshold of patentability to something higher than the previous patentability standard, but it did not explicitly exclude patent protection for software.

The general perception of the stakeholders, keeping in mind the current Guidelines, was that for patenting software it had to be combined with some hardware. This combination would then be scrutinized against the triple test of novelty, inventive step and industrial application.

While the Guidelines noted that the hardware involved must not be general purpose hardware and that the chances of software patentability would increase significantly if novelty resides in the hardware; however, most of the industry and global trade bodies disagreed with this interpretation. They argued that if software in combination of hardware technically advances the existing technology, then such an innovation must be patentable, despite being combined with a general purpose machine (Bosch). Another explanation supporting expanded interpretation was that much of the technological innovation is accomplished through software development as compared to hardware innovation and novel software can achieve technical effect without the hardware developments ( BSA- The Software Alliance ). Consequently, software development that allows a general purpose machine to perform tasks that were once performed by a special machine must be incentivized. Some stakeholders interpreted the Guidelines to reason that hardware must be completely disregarded while examining patentability of software (Majumdar & Co. ).

Most of the responses from the civil society argued for a restricted interpretation of Section 3(k) ( Centre for Internet & Society). They concurred with the interpretation provided by the IPO to exclude software patentability. Most of the stakeholders responded seeking further clarification on the subject (Software Freedom Law Centre , K&S Partners and Xellect IP Solutions).

However, within each segments itself there was difference of opinion on the interpretation of Section 3(k). For instance, out of the five civil society members, four wanted to restrictive interpretation while one of them favoured expansive interpretation to include software patenting. Similarly, 13 law firms sought further clarification on the subject matter, while seven argued for expansive interpretation and one of them argued for restricted interpretation. The most consistent response was from the industry that clearly favoured software patenting and called the Guidelines "restrictive". Seven out of the nine industry representatives supported expansive interpretation and the other two sought further clarifications on the subject.

Section 5.4.6- Hardware

The interpretation of Section 3(k) until the release of the Guidelines was that software in combination with some hardware could be considered for patenting. However, the Guidelines increased the threshold stating that this hardware must be "something more than a general purpose machine". A stakeholder pointed out that increasing this threshold would go against the legislative intent as the requirement of a novel hardware has not been mentioned anywhere in the Act ( Anand & Anand ).

The industry's perspective on this matter was largely uniform. They pointed out the large technological field that would be eliminated from the scope of patentability if the interpretation provided by the Guidelines is adopted ( Bosch). Also, the investigation of novelty in the hardware would disincentives inventors in the field of CRIs ( Kan & Krishme ). Most of the stakeholders, across segments, sought more clarification on the role of hardware under Section 3(k) (Majumdar & Co. Centre for Internet & Society).

Comparative Analysis

Much of the criticism surrounding CRI patenting policy in India is based on the comparative inconsistency with similar laws in other jurisdictions. Comparative analysis on the subject has only been provided by the stakeholders that support software patentability. They point out that most countries like US, UK, Japan and the European Patent Convention allow patenting of software, and India must also do the same in order to comply with its international obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. Paradoxically, stakeholders who supported the current practice chose not to comparatively analyze CRI policy of other jurisdictions. While most of the stakeholders simply jumped to analyze comparative jurisprudence on the subject, only one of them gave a reasonable explanation for such a comparison ( LKS). It was noted that the Supreme Court of India and the Intellectual Property Appellate Board regularly borrow from foreign decisions to either accept or deny patents. Therefore, while formulating any policy on the matter, the position in other jurisdictions must be considered.

It was reasoned that the term 'per se' used in the Act, is similar to the European Patent Convention and UK Patent Act, 1977 where the term 'as such' has been used. Therefore, while juxtaposing both the terms, the interpretation of 'per se' must be similar to 'as such'. Consequently, software patenting must be allowed subject to the tests evolved by the courts. Similarly, the term 'as such' has been used by several Asian countries including China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. In these countries, software in concert with a specific hardware that resolves a technical problem thereby achieving a technical result can be patented ( Krishna and Saurastri Associates ).

Likewise, while comparing the jurisprudence of US, the landmark case Diamond vs. Diehr, which marked the beginning of software patenting was cited ( Subhojeet Ghosh and US India Business Council ). Several others argued that India must align their laws with global standards ( Bosch, Phillips Intellectual Property and Standards , Sun Smart IP Services , United Overseas Patent Firm).

Business Method

The Guidelines tried to narrow down the definition of 'Business Method' to clarify that such claims cannot be patented. It was urged that the Guidelines reconsider such a blanket embargo ( Legasis Partners- Advocates and Solicitors, Anand & Anand ). While judging patentability, a patent must not be rejected simply because it mentions business method or business method related terminology. What must be examined is whether the inventive step resides in the technical or non-technical part of the claim ( Legasis Partners- Advocates and Solicitors). A distinction must be made differentiating as to what software implementing business method and a software relating to the technical aspect of the transaction ( Anand & Anand ). While the former can be rejected, the latter must be accepted subject to the triple test of patenting.

It was pointed out that reevaluating a business method claim apart from a method involving financial transaction; monopoly claim over trade and new business strategies; monopoly claim over new types of carrying out business and method of increasing revenue; must be rejected (Law Offices of Mohan Associates , Remfry and Sagar, FICCI ). The more overarching opinion of the stakeholders was there is no objection to the exclusion of business method patents, but what constitutes business methods need more clarity (D. Moses Jeyakaran, Law Firm of Naren Thappeta , Japan Intellectual Property Association ).

Critique of Examples and Flowcharts

The Guidelines provided for several examples and flowcharts to foster a better understanding of the subject matter. However, a notable feature of each of these was that they only gave examples of what claims would be rejected. This was sufficiently pointed out by most of the stakeholders who sought more positive examples (Bosch, BSA- The Software Alliance , K&S Partners , FICCI , Xellect IP Solutions, Japan Intellectual Property Association , In-House Intellectual Property Professional Forum, NASSCOM , Obhan & Associates , Remfry & Sagar, Tata Consultancy Services ). It was pointed out that the examples have not sufficiently elaborated on their relation with Section 3(k) ( FICCI ), and some of them are "weak, obscure and incorrect" ( Software Freedom Law Centre). These examples also fail to elaborate on the tests that have previously been applied by the Patent Office ( LKS). Overall, the general perception was that, the examples were confusing and greater clarity along with positive examples was needed ( LKS, Anand & Anand ).

Interestingly, out of the 25 stakeholders' who commented on the illustrations, 16 sought positive examples. Further, most of the positive examples were sought by industry representatives and law firms who supported software patenting.

V. Conclusion

It has been over a year since IPO released the CRI Guidelines. On release, it invited suggestions in order to revise the Guidelines, but the revised version has still not been released by the IPO. The Guidelines were authored from a patent examiner's perspective; however, while doing so it obscured the matter further. It was argued that in totality the application of the Guidelines would now make the patentability of software stricter. It was also pointed out that the Guidelines have not taken into account the legislative history and the specific rejection of the Ordinance in the 2005 Amendment.

The responses received by IPO gave conflicting opinion on the same issue. In general, it can be concluded that the industry and law firms were in favour of allowing software patenting. They sought removal of the hardware requirement for software patentability. Most of the stakeholder's who favoured software patenting also undertook a comparative study of jurisdictions like US, UK, EU and Japan to point out the difference in the software patenting policy. Further, they also wanted the Guidelines to give positive examples wherein CRIs patenting has previously been allowed.

Admittedly, the Guidelines have no legal standing and much like the Patent Manual, they serve merely to guide the patent applicants and provide transparency patent examination. Overall, the Guidelines failed to explain the previous inconsistencies surrounding the subject matter. In conclusion the Guidelines mention that it would periodically release and update the Guidelines incorporating the stakeholder's comments. Considering the diverse set of opinions received by the IPO, it now needs to be seen which suggestions are accepted until the next round of comments.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/guidelines-for-examination-of-computer-related-inventions

Big Data and Positive Social Change in the Developing World: A White Paper for Practitioners and Researchers

nishant — 2014-10-01T03:52:35Z

I was a part of a working group writing a white paper on big data and social change, over the last six months. This white paper was produced by a group of activists, researchers and data experts who met at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Centre to discuss the question of whether, and how, big data is becoming a resource for positive social change in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).

Bellagio Big Data Workshop Participants. (2014). “Big data and positive social change in the developing world: A white paper for practitioners and researchers.” Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute. Available online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2491555.

Summary

Our working definition of big data includes, but is not limited to, sources such as social media, mobile phone use, digitally mediated transactions, the online news media, and administrative records. It can be categorised as data that is provided explicitly (e.g. social media feedback); data that is observed (e.g. mobile phone call records); and data that is inferred and derived by algorithms (for example social network structure or inflation rates). We defined four main areas where big data has potential for those interested in promoting positive social change: advocating and facilitating; describing and predicting; facilitating information exchange and promoting accountability and transparency.

In terms of advocating and facilitating, we discussed ways in which volunteered data may help organisations to open up new public spaces for discussion and awareness-building; how both aggregating data and working across different databases can be tools for building awareness, and howthe digital data commons can also configure new communities and actions (sometimes serendipitously) through data science and aggregation. Finally, we also looked at the problem of overexposure and howactivists and organisations can protect themselves and hide their digital footprints. The challenges we identified in this area were how to interpret data correctly when supplementary information may be lacking; organisational capacity constraints around processing and storing data, and issues around data dissemination, i.e. the possible negative consequences of inadvertently identifying groups or individuals.

Next, we looked at the way big data can help describe and predict, functions which are particularly important in the academic, development and humanitarian areas of work where researchers can combine data into new dynamic, high-resolution datasets to detect new correlations and surface new questions. With data such as mobile phone data and Twitter analytics, understanding the data’s comprehensiveness, meaning and bias are the main challenges, accompanied by the problem of developing new and more comprehensive ethical systems to protect data subjects where data is observed rather than volunteered.

The next group of activities discussed was facilitating information exchange. We looked at mobile-based information services, where it is possible for a platform created around a particular aim (e.g. agricultural knowledge-building) to incorporate multiple feedback loops which feed into both research and action. The pitfalls include the technical challenge of developing a platform which is lean yet multifaceted in terms of its uses, and particularly making it reliably available to low-income users. This kind of platform, addressed by big data analytics, also offers new insights through data discovery and allows the provider to steer service provision according to users’ revealed needs and priorities.

Our last category for big data use was accountability and transparency, where organisations are using crowdsourcing methods to aggregate and analyse information in real time to establish new spaces for critical discussion, awareness and action. Flows of digital information can be managed to prioritise participation and feedback, provide a safe space to engage with policy decisions and expose abuse. The main challenges are how to keep sensitive information (and informants) safe while also exposing data and making authorities accountable; how to make the work sustainable without selling data, and how to establish feedback loops so that users remain involved in the work beyond an initial posting. In the crowdsourcing context, new challenges are also arising in terms of how to verify and moderate real-time flows of information, and how to make this process itself transparent.

Finally, we also discussed the relationship between big and open data. Open data can be seen as a system of governance and a knowledge commons, whereas big data does not by its nature involve the idea of the commons, so we leaned toward the term ‘opening data’, i.e. processes which could apply to commercially generated as much as public-sector datasets. It is also important to understand where to prioritise opening, and where this may exclude people who are not using the ‘right’ technologies: for example, analogue methods (e.g. nailing a local authority budget to a town hall door every month) may be more open than ‘open’ digital data that’s available online.

Our discussion surfaced many questions to do with representation and meaning: must datasets be interpreted by people with local knowledge? For researchers to get access to data that is fully representative, do we need a data commons? How are data proprietors engaging with the power dynamics and inequalities in the research field, and how can civil society engage with the private sector on its own terms if data access is skewed towards elites? We also looked at issues of privacy and risk: do we need a contextual risk perspective rather than a single set of standards? What is the role of local knowledge in protecting data subjects, and what kinds of institutions and practices are necessary? We concluded that there is a case to be made for building a data commons for private/public data, and for setting up new and more appropriate ethical guidelines to deal with big data, since aggregating, linking and merging data present new kinds of privacy risk. In particular, organisations advocating for opening datasets must admit the limitations of anonymisation, which is currently being ascribed more power to protect data subjects than it merits in the era of big data.

Our analysis makes a strong case that it is time for civil society groups in particular to become part of the conversation about the power of data. These groups are the connectors between individuals and governments, corporations and governance institutions, and have the potential to promote big data analysis that is locally driven and rooted. Civil society groups are also crucially important but currently underrepresented in debates about privacy and the rights of technology users, and civil society as a whole has a responsibility for building critical awareness of the ways big data is being used to sort, categorise and intervene in LMICs by corporations, governments and other actors. Big data is shaping up to be one of the key battlefields of our era, incorporating many of the issues civil society activists worldwide have been working on for decades. We hope that this paper can inform organisations and
individuals as to where their particular interests may gain traction in the debate, and what their contribution may look like.

Click to download the full white paper here. (PDF, 1.95 Mb)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/big-data-and-positive-social-change-in-developing-world

Expanding the World of Telugu Wikipedia – CIS-A2K and ALC join hands

T Vishnu Vardhan and Rahmanuddin Shaik — 2014-09-30T05:11:29Z

Students and faculty of Andhra Loyola College in Vijayawada aim to enhance Telugu Wikipedia through increased contributions to Wikipedia and make it available under free license.

The Access to Knowledge (A2K) programme of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in its quest to catalyze the growth of open knowledge movement in Indic languages recently added another feather to its cap by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Andhra Loyola College (ALC) in Vijayawada on August 14, 2014 to work collaboratively to improve Telugu Wikipedia and Telugu Wikisource. College Principal Fr. G.A.P. Kishore, Vice-Principals Fr. P. Anil Kumar and Fr. Rex Angelo, correspondent Fr. Raju signed the agreement with CIS-A2K programme director T. Vishnu Vardhan.

The MoU signed with ALC is for a period of five years and encompasses four activities: Open knowledge creation in Telugu across various disciplines on Telugu Wikipedia: ALC faculty and students will be trained by CIS-A2K staff and interested Telugu Wikimedians to understand the principles that govern Wikipedia in order to generate quality entries. Faculty from Botany, Physics, Statistics, Ethics, Religion, Telugu Literature, and Music will work with CIS-A2K. Each of the faculty in the coming months will come up with a plan to generate open knowledge in Telugu in their respective disciplines. Content donation and digitization on Telugu Wikisource: ALC through its networks will help CIS-A2K to bring Telugu content under CC-BY-SA 4.0 license. The Telugu department of the college expressed keen interest to work with CIS-A2K in digitizing historical Telugu content and to make it available on Telugu Wikisource. Various competitions will be planned in the future. Creating a free software environment at Andhra Loyola College: 400 machines within various labs on the campus will be converted into FOSS systems with free and open source software including support for Telugu and other Indic languages. It should be noted that all the existing computers of ALC are run on proprietary software. As a pilot initiative CIS-A2K has already converted 30 systems in a lab and named it as Loyola FOSS Lab. CIS-A2K to revise the FIT (Fundamentals in Information Technology): A mandatory course for all undergraduate students which will introduce students to FOSS, Openness and Wikipedia. This is an outcome of the FOSS orientation done by T. Vishnu Vardhan and Rahimanuddin Shaik during the two workshops that were held at ALC.

CIS-A2K will put every effort to involve Telugu Wikimedians and FOSS community in taking this collaboration with ALC forward. CIS-A2K will also create a project page on Telugu Wikipedia to actively document and publicly share the detailed plans and progress. More updates will also be shared on this website.


Above: Representatives from ALC and CIS-A2K seen during the signing ceremony.

The signing of the MoU was done at a public event in the presence of students, faculty and management of ALC and various representatives from media. The media covered this event enthusiastically. The Hindu coverage can be found here and Eenadu article coverage is here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/expanding-the-world-of-telugu-wikipedia-cis-and-alc-join-hands

NIE Steps in to Grow Konkani Wikipedia

vishnu — 2014-10-10T11:26:26Z

The Centre for Internet & Society's Access to Knowledge team (CIS-A2K) signed a memorandum of agreement (MoU) with Nirmala Institute of Education, Goa to enhance digital literacy in Konkani in the education sector across Goa.

The Access to Knowledge (A2K) programme of CIS, in its sustained efforts to enhance the content and reach of Kokani Wikepedia (which is in incubation), has signed an MoU for a period of five years with Nirmala Insitute of Education (NIE), a Secondary Teacher Education College established in 1963 by the Society of the Daughters of the Heart of Mary in response to the then urgent need for trained teachers in post liberation Goa. The key objectives of this partnership are: a) to design, develop and execute a certificate course titled "Teaching in the Age of Wikipedia", which is aimed at middle and high school teacher-trainees and teachers; and b) to introduce Wikimedia projects into the pedagogic curriculum of NIE.

Both CIS and NIE share a mutual interest in conserving, developing and disseminating knowledge free of cost in Konkani, which incidentally is Goa’s official language. Konkani as a language faces several challenges — it has no official script. The population who speak it are dispersed across the world and have little motivation to further the cause of Konkani, and there are few educational venues that offer a formal course to study Konkani or offer Konkani based curriculum. NIE Principal Dr. Denzil Martins welcomed this MoU and said that "it will guide our teacher-trainees to upload relevant information in Konkani that can be freely accessed by the local population" and "provide the volunteer-trainees with skills that they will be able to use to contribute and enhance the free knowledge in Konkani". The MoU was signed by Dr. Denzil Martins from NIE and T. Vishnu Vardhan (Programme Director, Access to Knowledge, CIS) in the presence of staff and students of NIE and volunteers Harriet Vidyasagar and Gayathri Rao Konkar. Dr. Rita Paes, ex-Principal of NIE who worked to forge this MoU sent her best wishes.

CIS-A2K since 2013, has worked to develop partnerships with key educational institutions to promote and grow Konkani Wikipedia. It has previously worked with NIE to design and implement a program to enroll 100 B.Ed. students to increase the amount of information available in Goan villages and towns on Konkani Wikipedia. A2K has also been instrumental in convincing Goa University to re-release Konkani Vishwakosh (encyclopedia) under CC-BY-SA 3.0 , making it freely available to public, giving them the right to share, use and even build upon the work that has already been done.

The course ‘Teaching in the Age of Wikipedia’ will enable the teacher participant to have a) a comprehensive understanding of changes due to digital technology to the knowledge domain; b) an introduction to various openness movements that inform the discourse on Open Educational Resources; c) exposure and training to participate on open knowledge platforms like Wikipedia; and d) practical examples and best practices of using Wikipedia and sister projects within the classroom context. The parties will also co-design and jointly implement programmes to introduce Wikipedia in the NIE curriculum. The curriculum for this workshop is positioned within the context of indian languages (particularly Konkani) and school education to ensure that any learning is practical and can be applied within the teachers immediate pedagogic environment. Speaking about the relevance of this course Gayathri and Harriet (who have been associated with NIE as volunteers) mentioned that "the Goa government has handed out tablets to all school going children in Goa. In order to use them effectively in the classroom will require teachers to rethink their role and teaching methodologies and this course is an important step towards that". Agreeing with this Denzil Martins feels that this course "will provide the teacher-trainees with ideas and inputs for using Wikipedia in creative ways in the classroom".

This partnership could bring huge momentum and scale for the growth of Konkani as participants who graduate from this course will as teachers act as anchors and mentors to teach and assign Wikipedia editing assignments in their respective schools and classrooms.

As Gayathri feels "such courses once fine tuned should be made available to teachers from all over the country and should be part of the package for introducing the digital technology in the school system. Today it ends with setting up computer labls in schools or distribution of hardware to students - they may have a 'computer teacher' but the class and subject teachers never become part of these new initiatives. Only when this happens can we move away from 'teaching computers' to using computers as tools to learn and teach, which is the primary objective of digital technology in schools".

CIS will develop this open course and welcomes anyone to partner in this effort, which will be made available for anyone to use it within their context. The efforts to build free and open knowledge platforms like Konkani Wikipedia will continue and partnerships like NIE will play a crucial role in building a robust knowledge society in India.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/nie-steps-in-to-grow-konkani-wikipedia

Privacy in Healthcare: Policy Guide

tanvi — 2014-08-31T15:18:12Z

The Health Policy Guide seeks to understand what are the legal regulations governing data flow in the health sector — particularly hospitals, and how are these regulations implemented. Towards this objective, the research reviews data practices in a variety of public and private hospitals and diagnostics labs. The research is based on legislation, case law, publicly available documents, and anonymous interviews.

Click to download the PDF (320 Kb)

Introduction

To this date, there exists no universally acceptable definition of the right to privacy. It is a continuously evolving concept whose nature and extent is largely context driven. There are numerous aspects to the right to privacy, each different from the other in terms of the circumstance in which it is invoked. Bodily privacy however, is to date, the most guarded facet of this vastly expansive right. The privacy over one’s own body including the organs, genetic material and biological functions that make up one’s health is an inherent right that does not; as in the case of other forms of privacy such as communication or transactional privacy, emanate from the State. It is a right that has its foundations in the Natural Law conceptions of The Right to Life, which although regulated by the State can at no point be taken away by it except under extreme circumstances of a superseding Right to Life of a larger number of people.

The deliberation leading to the construction of a universally applicable Right to Privacy has up until now however only been in terms of its interpretation as an extension of the Fundamental Right to Life and Liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 as well as the freedom of expression and movement under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India. While this may be a valid interpretation, it narrows the ambit of the right as one that can only be exercised against the State. The Right to privacy however has much larger implications in spheres that are often removed from the State. There is thus an impending need to create an efficient and durable structure of Law and policy that regulates the protection of privacy in Institutions that may not always be agents of the State.

It is in this regard that the following analysis studies the existing conceptions of privacy in the Healthcare sector. It aims to study the existing mechanisms of privacy protection and their pragmatic application in everyday practices. Further, it determines definitive policy gaps in the existing framework and endeavors to provide effective recommendations to not only redress these shortcomings but also create a system that is efficient in its fulfillment of the larger objective of the actualization of the Right to Privacy at an individual, state and institutional level.

Purpose

The purpose of this research study is to formulate a comprehensive guide that maps the synthesis, structure and implementation of privacy regulations within the healthcare sector in India. It traces the domestic legislation pertaining to various aspects of the healthcare sector and the specific provisions of the law that facilitate the protection of the privacy of individuals who furnish their personal information as well as genetic material to institutions of healthcare, either for the purpose of seeking treatment or to contribute to research studies. It is however imperative that the nature and extent of the information collected be restricted through the establishment of requisite safeguards at an institutional level that percolate down to everyday practices of data collection, handling and storage within healthcare institutions. The study thus aims to collate the existing systems of privacy protection in the form of laws, regulations and guidelines and compare these with actual practices in government and private hospitals and diagnostic laboratories to determine whether these laws are in fact effective in meeting the required standards of privacy protection. Further, the study also broadly looks at International practices of privacy protection and offers recommendations to better the existing mechanisms of delimiting unnecessary intrusions on the privacy of patients.

Importance

The Indian Healthcare sector although at par with international standards in its methods of diagnosis, treatment and the use of contemporary technology, is still nascent in the nature and extent of its interaction with the Law. There are a number of aspects of healthcare that lie on the somewhat blurred line between the interest of the public and the sole right of the individual seeking treatment. One such aspect is the slowly evolving right to privacy. The numerous facets of this right have come to the fore largely through unique case laws that are reflective of a dynamic social structure, one that seeks to reconcile the socio economic rights that once governed society with individual interests that it has slowly come to realize. The right of an individual to disclose the nature of his disease, the liberty of a woman not to be compelled to undergo a blood test, the bodily autonomy to decide to bear children or not, the decisional privacy with regards to the termination of a pregnancy and the custodial rights of two individuals to their child are certain contentious aspects of healthcare that have constructed the porous interface between the right to privacy and the need for medical treatment. It is in this context that this study aims to delve into the existing basic structure of domestic legislation, case laws and regulations and their subsequent application in order to determine important gaps in the formulation of Law and Policy. The study thus aims to draw relevant conclusions to fill these gaps through recommendations sourced from international best practice in order to construct a broad framework upon which one can base future policy considerations and amendments to the existing law.

Methodology

This research study was undertaken in two major parts. The first part assesses domestic legislation and its efficacy in the current context. This is done through the determination of relevant provisions within the Act that are in consonance with the broader privacy principles as highlighted in the A.P Shah Committee report on Privacy Protection[1]. This part of the research paper is based on secondary sources, both in terms of books as well as online resources. The second part of the paper analyses the actual practices with regard to the assimilation, organization, use and storage of personal data as practiced in Government and Private hospitals and Diagnostic laboratories. Three Private hospitals, a prominent Government hospital and a Diagnostic laboratory were taken into consideration for this study. The information was provided by the concerned personnel at the medical records department of these institutions of healthcare through a survey conducted on the condition of anonymity. The information provided was analyzed and collated in accordance with the compliance of the practices of these institutions with the Principles of privacy envisioned in the Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy.

The Embodiment of Privacy Regulation within Domestic Legislation

This section of the study analyses the viability of an approach that takes into account the efficacy of domestic legislation in regulating practices pertaining to the privacy of individuals in the healthcare sector. This approach perceives the letter and spirit of the law as the foundational structure upon which internal practices, self regulation and the effective implementation of policy considerations that aim to create an atmosphere of effective privacy regulation take shape, within institutions that offer healthcare services. To this effect, domestic legislationthat provides for the protection of a patient’s privacy has been examined. The law has been further studied with respect to its tendency to percolate into the everyday practices, regulations and guidelines that private and government hospitals adhere to. The extent of its permeation into actual practice; in light of its efficacy in fulfilling the perambulatory objectives of ensuring safe and unobtrusive practices,within the construct of which a patient is allowed to recover and seek treatment, has also been examined.

The term ‘Privacy’ is used in a multitude of domestic legislations primarily in the context of the foundation of the fiduciary relationship between a doctor and a patient.This fiduciary relationship emanates from a reasonable expectation of mutual trust between the doctor and his patients and is established through the Indian Medical Council Act of 1952, specifically section 20(A) of the Act which lays down the code of ethics which a doctor must adhere to at all times. Privacy within the healthcare sector includes a number of aspects including but not limited to informational privacy (e.g., confidentiality, anonymity, secrecy and data security); physical privacy (e.g., modesty and bodily integrity); associational privacy (e.g. intimate sharing of death, illness and recovery); proprietary privacy (e.g., self-ownership and control over personal identifiers, genetic data, and body tissues); and decisional privacy (e.g., autonomy and choice in medical decision-making).

Privacy Violations stem from policy and information gaps: Violations in the healthcare sector that stem from policy formulation as well and implementation gaps[2] include the disclosure of personal health information to third parties without consent, inadequate notification to a patient of a data breach, unlimited or unnecessary collection of personal health data, collection of personal health data that is not accurate or relevant, the purpose of collecting data is not specified, refusal to provide medical records upon request by client, provision of personal health data to public health, research, and commercial uses without de-identification of data and improper security standards, storage and disposal. The disclosure of personal health information has the potential to be embarrassing, stigmatizing or discriminatory.[3] Furthermore, various goods such as employment, life, and medical insurance, could be placed at risk [4]if the flow of medical information were not restricted. ^{^[5]}

Disclosure of personal health information is permitted and does not amount to a violation of privacy in the following situations: 1) during referral, 2) when demanded by the court or by the police on a written requisition, 3) when demanded by insurance companies as provided by the Insurance Act when the patient has relinquished his rights on taking the insurance, and 4) when required for specific provisions of workmen's compensation cases, consumer protection cases, or for income tax authorities,^{^[6]} 5) disease registration, 6) communicable disease investigations, 7) vaccination studies, or 8) drug adverse event reporting. ^{^[7]}

The following domestic legislations have been studied and relevant provisions of the Act have been accentuated in order to analyse their compliance with the basic principles of privacy as laid out in the A.P Shah Committee report on Privacy.

Mental Health Act, 1987[8]
The Provisions under the Act pertaining to the protection of privacy of the patient have been examined. The principles embodied within the Act include aspects of the Law that determine the nature and extent of oversight exercised by the relevant authorities over the collection of information, the limitation on the collection of data and the restrictions on the disclosure of the data collected. The principle of oversight is embodied under the legislation within the provisions that allow for the inspection of records in psychiatric hospitals and nursing homes only by officers authorized by the State Government.^{^[9]} The limitation on the Collection of information is imposed by the Inspection of living conditionsby a psychiatrist and two social workers are on a monthly basis. This would include analyzing the living condition of every patient and the administrative processes of the psychiatric hospital and/or psychiatric nursing home. ^{^[10]}Additionally, Visitors must maintain a book regarding their observations and remarks.^{^[11]} Medical certificates may be issued by a doctor, containing information regarding the nature and degree of the mental disorder as reasons for the detention of a person in a psychiatric hospital or psychiatric nursing home. ^{^[12]}Lastly, the disclosure of personal records of any facility under this Act by inspecting officers is prohibited^{^[13]}

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 ^{^[14]}
The Act was instituted in light of a prevalent public interest consideration of preventing female foeticide. However, it is imperative that the provision of the Act remain just shy of unnecessarily intrusive techniques and do not violate the basic human requirement of privacy in an inherently personal sphere. The procedure that a mother has to follow in order to avail of pre-natal diagnostic testing is mandatory consent of age, abortion history and family history. These conditions require a woman to reveal sensitive information concerning family history of mental retardation or physical deformities.[15] Aspecial concern for privacy and confidentiality should be exercised with regards to disclosure of genetic information. [16]

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 ^{^[17]}
Although, the right to an abortion is afforded to a woman within the construct of her inherent right to bodily privacy, decisional privacy (for e.g., autonomy and choice in medical decision-making) is not afforded to patients and their families with regards to determining the sex of the baby. The sections of the Act that have been examined lay down the provisions available within the Act to facilitate the protection of a woman’s right to privacy during the possible termination of a pregnancy. These include the principles pertaining to the choice and consent of the patient to undergo the procedure, a limit on the amount of information that can be collected from the patient, the prevention of disclosure of sensitive information and the security measures in place to prevent the unauthorized access to this information. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 2003 supplement the Act and provide relevant restrictions within every day practices of data collection use and storage in order to protect the privacy of patients. The Act mandates Written Consent of the patient in order to facilitate an abortion .Consent implies that the patient is aware of all her options, has been counselled about the procedure, the risks and post-abortion care.[18]. The Act prohibits the disclosure of matters relating to treatment for termination of pregnancy to anyone other than the Chief Medical Officer of the State. [19]The Register of women who have terminated their pregnancy, as maintained by the hospital, must be destroyed on the expiry of a period of five years from the date of the last entry.[20] The Act also emphasizes upon the security of information collected. The medical practitioner assigns a serial number for the woman terminating her pregnancy.[21]Additionally, the admission register is stored in safe custody of the head of the hospital. [22]

Indian Medical Council (Professional conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 (Code of Ethics Regulations, 2002)
The Medical Council of India (MCI) Code of Ethics Regulations^{^[23]} sets the professional standards for medical practice. These provisions regulate the nature and extent of doctor patient confidentiality. It also establishes universally recognized norms pertaining to consent to a particular medical procedure and sets the institutionally acceptable limit for intrusive procedure or gathering excessively personal information when it is not mandatorily required for the said procedure. The provisions addressed under these regulations pertain to the Security of the information collected by medical practitioners and the nature of doctor patient confidentiality.

Physicians are obliged to protect the confidentiality of patients⁵during all stages of the procedure and with regard to all aspects of the information provided by the patient to the doctor, includinginformation relating to their personal and domestic lives. ^{^[24]}The only exception to this mandate of confidentiality is if the law requires the revelation of certain information, or if there is a serious and identifiable risk to a specific person and / or community ofa notifiable disease.

Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects [25]
The provisions for the regulation of privacy pertaining to biomedical research include aspects of consent as well as a limitation on the information that may be collected and its subsequent use. The provisions of this act aim to regulate the protection of privacy during clinical trials and during other methods of research. The principal of informed consent is an integral part of this set of guidelines. ThePrivacy related information included in the participant/ patient information sheet includes: the choice to prevent the use of their biological sample, the extent to which confidentiality of records could be maintained and the consequences of breach of confidentiality, possible current and future uses of the biological material and of the data to be generated from the research and if the material is likely to be used for secondary purposes or would be shared with others, the risk of discovery of biologically sensitive information and publications, including photographs and pedigree charts.[26] The Guidelines require special concern for privacy and confidentiality when conducting genetic family studies. [27]The protection of privacy and maintenance of confidentiality, specifically surrounding the identity and records, is maintained whenusing the information or genetic material provided by participants for research purposes. ^{^[28]}The Guidelines require investigators to maintain confidentiality of epidemiological data due to the particular concern that some population based data may also have implications on issues like national security or public safety.[29]All documentation and communication of the Institutional Ethics Committee (IEC) must be dated, filed and preserved according to the written procedures.Data of individual participants can be disclosed in a court of law under the orders of the presiding judge, if there is a threat to a person’s life, communication to the drug registration authority regarding cases of severe adverse reaction and communication to the health authority if there is risk to public health.[30]

Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Third Party Administrators) Health Services Regulations, 2001
The provisions of the Act that have been addressed within the scope of the study regulate the practices of third party administrators within the healthcare sector so as to ensure their compliance with the basic principles of privacy.An exception to the maintenance and confidentiality of information confidentiality clause in the code of conduct, requires TPAs to provide relevant information to any Court of Law/Tribunal, the Government, or the Authority in the case of any investigation carried out or proposed to be carried out by the Authority against the insurance company, TPA or any other person or for any other reason.[31]In July 2010, the IRDA notified theInsurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Sharing of Database for Distribution of Insurance Products) Regulations [32]. These regulations restrict referral companies from providing details of their customers without their prior consent.[33]TPAs must maintain the confidentiality of the data collected by it in the course of its agreement and maintain proper records of all transactions carried out by it on behalf of an insurance company and are also required to refrain from trading information and the records of its business[34].TPA’s must keep records for a period of not less than three years.[35]

IDRA Guidelines on Outsourcing of Activities by Insurance Companies [36]
These guidelines require the insurer to take appropriate steps that require third party service providers protect confidential information of both the Insurer and its clients from intentional or inadvertent disclosure to unauthorized persons.[37]

Exceptions to the Protection of Privacy
The legal provisions with regard to privacy, confidentiality and secrecy are often superseded by Public Interest Considerations. The right to privacy, although recognized in the course of Indian jurisprudence and embodied within domestic legislation is often overruled prima facie when faced with situations or instances that involve a larger interest of a greater number of people. This policy is in keeping with India’s policy goals as a social welfare state to aid in the effectuation of its utilitarian ideals. This does not allow individual interest to at any point surpass the interest of the masses.

Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 [38]
Implicit within this formulation of this Act is the assumption that in the case of infectious diseases, the right to privacy, of infected individuals must give way to the overriding interest of protecting public health.[39] This can be ascertained not only from the black letter of the Law but also from its spirit. Thus, in the absolute positivist as well as a more liberal interpretation, at the crux of the legislation lies the undeniable fundamental covenant of the preservation of public health, even at the cost of the privacy of a select few individuals [40].

Policy and Regulations

National Policy for Persons with Disabilities, 2006[41]
The following provisions of the Act provide for the incorporation of privacy considerations in prevalent practices with regard to persons with disabilities. The National Sample Survey Organization collects the following information on persons with disabilities: the socio- economic and cultural context, cause of disabilities, early childhood education methodologies and all matters connected with disabilities, at least once in five years.[42]This data is collected by non-medical investigators. [43]There is thus an inherent limit on the information collected. Additionally, this information is used only for the purpose for which it has been collected.

The Special Employment Exchange, as established under The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 Act, collects and furnishes information in registers, regarding provisions for employment. Access to such data is limited to any person who is authorized by the Special Employment Exchange as well as persons authorized by general or special order by the Government, to access, inspect, question and copy any relevant record, document or information in the possession of any establishment. [44] When conducting research on persons with disabilities consent is required from the individual or their family members or caregivers.[45]

HIV Interventions
In 1992, the Government of India instituted the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) for the prevention and control of AIDS. NACO aims to control the spread of HIV in India through the implementation of Targeted Interventions (TIs) for most at risk populations (MARPs) primarily, sex workers, men having sex with men and people who inject drugs.[46]The Targeted Interventions (TIs) system of testing under this organization has however raised numerous concerns about relevant policy gaps in the maintenance of the confidentiality and privacy of persons living with HIV/ AIDS. The shortcomings in the existing policy framework include: The Lack of a limitation and subsequent confidentiality in the amount of Information collected. Project staff inTIsrecordthe name, address and other contact information of MARPs and share this data with Technical Support Unit and State AIDS Control Societies.[47] Proof of address and identity documents are required to get enrolled in government ART programs.[48]Peer-educators operate under a system known as line-listing, used to make referrals and conduct follow-ups. Peer-educators have to follow-up with those who have not gone at regular intervals for testing. [49] This practice can result in peer-educators noticing and concluding that the names missing are those who have tested positive. [50] Although voluntary in nature, the policy encourage the fulfillment of fulfilling of numerical targets, and in doing so supports unethical ways of testing.[51]

The right to privacy is an essential requirement for persons living with HIV/AIDS due to the potential stigmatizing and discriminatory impact of the revelation of this sensitive information, in any form.[52] The lack of privacy rights often fuels the spread of the disease and exacerbates its impact on high risk communities of individuals. Fears emanating from a privacy breach or a disclosure of data often deter people from getting tested and seeking medical care. The impact of such disclosure of sensitive information including the revelation of tests results to individuals other than the person being tested include low self esteem, fear of loss of support from family/peers, loss of earnings especially for female and transgender sex workers, fear of incrimination for illicit sex/drug use and the insensitivity of counselors. [53]HIV positive individualslive in constant fear of their positive status being leaked. They also shy away from treatment as they fear people might see them taking their medicines and thereby guess their status. Thus breaches in confidentiality and policy gaps in privacy regulation, especially with respect to diseases such as HIV also prevents people from seeking out treatment. [54]

Case Law

The following cases have been used to deliberate upon important points of contention within the ambit of the implementation and impact of Privacy Regulationsin the healthcare sector. This includes the nature and extent of privacy enjoyed by the patient and instances where in the privacy of the patient can be compromised in light of public interest considerations.

Mr. Surupsingh Hrya Naik vs. State of Maharashtra ,[55] (2007)

The decision in this case held that The RTI Act 2005 would supersede The Medical Council Code of Ethics. The health records of an individual in judicial custody should be made available under the Act and can only be denied in exceptional cases, for valid reasons.

Since the Code of Ethics Regulations are only delegated legislation, it was held in the case of Mr. SurupsinghHrya Naik v.State Of Maharashtra[56] that these would not prevail over the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) unless the information sought falls under the exceptions contained in Section 8 of the RTI Act. This case dealt with the important point of contention of whether making the health records public under the RTI Act would constitute a violation of the right to privacy. These health records were required to determine why the convict in question was allowed to stay in a hospital as opposed to prison. In this context the Bombay High Court held thatThe Right to Information Act supersedes the regulation that mandate the confidentiality od a person, or in this case a convict’s medical records. It was held that the medical records of a a person sentenced or convicted or remanded to police or judicial custody, if during that period such person is admitted in hospital and nursing home, should be made available to the person asking the information provided such hospital nursing home is maintained by the State or Public Authority or any other Public Body. It is only in rare and in exceptional cases and for good and valid reasons recorded in writing can the information may be denied.

Radiological & Imaging Association v. Union of India ,^{^[57]} (2011)
On 14 January 2011 a circular was issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, Kolhapur requiring the Radiologists and Sonologists to submit an on-line form “F” under the PNDT Rules. This was challenged by the Radiological and Imaging Association, inter alia, on the ground that it violates the privacy of their patients. Deciding the above issue the Bombay High Court held that .The images stored in the silent observer are not transmitted on-line to any server and thus remain embedded in the ultra-sound machine. Further, the silent observer is to be opened only on request of the Collector/ the civil surgeonin the presence of the concerned radiologist/sonologist/doctor incharge of the Ultra-sound Clinic. In light of these considerations and the fact that the `F' form submitted on-line is submitted only to the Collector and District Magistrate is no violation of the doctor's duty of confidentiality or the patient's right to privacy. It was further observed that The contours of the right to privacy must be circumscribed by the compelling public interest flowing through each and every provision of the PC&PNDT Act, when read in the background of the following figures of declining sex ratio in the last five decades.

The use of a Silent Observer system on a sonograph has requisite safeguards and doesn’t violate privacy rights. The declining sex ratio of the country was considered a compelling public Interest that could supersede the right to privacy.

Smt. Selvi and Ors. v.State of Karnataka (2010)
The Supreme Court held that involuntary subjection of a person to narco analysis, polygraph test and brain-mapping violates the ‘right against self-incrimination' which finds its place in Article 20(3)[58] of the Constitution. [59] The court also found that narco analysis violated individuals’ right to privacy by intruding into a “subject’s mental privacy,” denying an opportunity to choose whether to speak or remain silent, and physically restraining a subject to the location of the tests and amounted to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[60]

The Supreme Court found that Narco-analysis violated an individuals’ right to privacy by intruding into a “subject’s mental privacy,” denying an opportunity to choose whether to speak or remain silent.

Neera Mathur v. Life Insurance Corporation (LIC),[61] (1991)
In this casethe plaintiff contested a wrongful termination after she availed of maternity leave. LIC required women applicants to furnish personal details like their menstrual cycles, conceptions, pregnancies, etc. at the time of appointment. Such a requirement was held to go against the modesty and self respect of women. The Court held that termination was only because of disclosures in application, which was held to be intrusive, embarrassing and humiliating. LIC was directed to delete such questions.

The Court did not refer to the term privacy however it used the term personal details as well as modesty and self respect, but did not specifically link them to the right to life or any other fundamental right. These terms (modesty and self respect) are usually not connected to privacy but although they may be the harm which comes from an intrusion of one’s privacy.

The Supreme Court held that Questions related to an individual’s reproductive issues are personal details and should not be asked in the service application forms.

Ms. X vs. Mr. Z &Anr ,[62] (2001)
In this case, the Delhi High Court held that an aborted foetus was not a part of the body of a woman and allowed the DNA test of the aborted foetus at the instance of the husband. The application for a DNA test of the foetus was contested by the wife on the ground of “Right to Privacy”.7In this regard the court held that The Supreme Court had previously decided that a party may be directed to provide blood as a DNA sample but cannot be compelled to do so. The Court may only draw an adverse interference against such party who refuses to follow the direction of the Court in this respect.The position of the court in this case was that the claim that the preservation of a foetus in the laboratory of the All India Institute of Medical Science, violates the petitioner’s right to privacy, cannot be entertained as the foetus had been voluntarily discharges from her body previously, with her consent. The foetus, that she herself has dischargedis claimed to be subjected to DNA test. Thus, in light of the particular facts and the context of the case, it was held that petitioner does not have any right of privacy.

A woman’s right to privacy does not extend to a foetus, which is no longer a part of her body. The right to privacy may arise from a contract as well as a specific relationship, including a marital relationship. The principle in this case has been laid down in broad enough terms that it may be applied to other body parts which have been disassociated from the body of the individual.

It is important to note here that the fact that the Court is relying upon the principles laid down in the case of R. Rajagopal seems to suggest that the Court is treating organic tissue preserved in a public hospital in the same manner as it would treat a public document, insofar as the exception to the right to privacy is concerned.

B.K Parthasarthi vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh ,[63] (1999)
In this case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court was to decide the validity of a provision in the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 which stipulated that any person having more than two children should be disqualified from contesting elections. This clause was challenged on a number of grounds including the ground that it violated the right to privacy. The Court, in deciding upon the right to privacy and the right to reproductive autonomy, held thatThe impugned provision, i.eSection 19(3) of the said Act does not compel directly anyone to stop procreation, but only disqualifies any person who is otherwise eligible to seek election to various public offices coming within the ambit of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 or declares such persons who have already been holding such offices to be disqualified from continuing in such offices if they procreate more than two children.Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the petitioners 'right to privacy' is infringed, is untenable and must be rejected.”

Mr. X v. Hospital Z, Supreme Court of India ,[64] (1998 and 2002)
The petitioner was engaged to be married and thereafter during tests for some other illness in the hospital it was found that the petitioner was HIV positive. This information was released by the doctor to the petitioner’s family and through them to the family of the girl to whom the petitioner was engaged, all without the consent of the petitioner. The Court held that:

“The Right to privacy is not treated as absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedoms of others.”

Right to privacy and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedoms of others.

This decision of this case could be interpreted to extend the principle, of disclosure to the person at risk, to other communicable and life threatening diseases as well. However, a positivist interpretation would render these principle applicable to only to HIV+ cases.

M. Vijaya v. Chairman and Managing Director, Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. [65] (2001)
The petitioner alleged that she had contracted the HIV virus due to the negligence of the authorities of Maternity and Family Welfare Hospital, Godavarikhani, a hospital under the control of Singareni Collieries Company Ltd., (SCCL), in conducting relevant precautionary blood tests before transfusion of blood of her brother (donor) into her body when she was operated for hysterectomy (Chronic Cervicitis) at the hospital. The petition was initially filed as a Public Interest Litigation,which the court duly expanded in order to address the problem of the lack of adequate precautionary measures in hospitals, thereby also dealing with issues of medical confidentiality and privacy of HIV patients. The court thus deliberated upon the conflict between the right to privacy of an HIV infected person and the duty of the state to prevent further transmission and held:

In the interests of the general public, it is necessary for the State to identify HIV positive cases and any action taken in that regard cannot be termed as unconstitutional. As under Article 47 of the Constitution, the State was under an obligation to take all steps for the improvement of the public health. A law designed to achieve this object, if fair and reasonable, in our opinion, will not be in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India

The right of reproductive autonomy is a component of the right to privacy .A provision disqualifying a person from standing for elections due to the number of children had, does not violate the right to privacy as the object of the legislation is not to violate the autonomy of an individual but to mitigate the population growth in the country. Measures to control population growth shall be considered legal unless they impermissibly violate a fundamental right.

However, another aspect of the matter is whether compelling a person to take HIV test amounts to denying the right to privacy? The Court analyzed the existing domestic legislation to arrive at the conclusion that there is no general law that can compel a person to undergo an HIV-AIDS test. However, specific provisions under the Prison Laws[66]

provide that as soon as a prisoner is admitted to prison, he is required to be examined medically and the record of prisoner's health is to be maintained in a register. Further, Under the ITP Act, the sex workers can also be compelled to undergo HIV/ AIDS test.[67]

Additionally, under Sections 269 and 270 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a person can be punished for negligent act of spreading infectious diseases.

The right to privacy of a person suspected to be HIV+ would be subordinate to the power and duty of the state to identify HIV+ patients in order to protect public interest and improve public health. However any law designed to achieve this object must be fair and reasonable. In a conflict between the individual’s privacy right and the public’s right in dealing with the cases of HIV-AIDS, the Roman Law principle 'SalusPopuliestSuprema' (regard for the public wealth is the highest law) applies when there is a necessity.

After mapping legislation that permit the invasion of bodily privacy, the Court concluded that they are not comprehensive enough to enable the State to collect information regarding patients of HIV/AIDS and devise appropriate strategies and therefore the State should draft a new legislation in this regard. Further the Court gave certain directions to the state regarding how to handle the epidemic of HIV/AIDS and one of those directions was that the “Identity of patients who come for treatment of HIV+/AIDS should not be disclosed so that other patients will also come forward for taking treatment.”

Sharda v. Dharmpal ,[68] (2003)

The basic question in this case was whether a party to a divorce proceeding can be compelled to a medical examination. The wife in the divorce proceeding refused to submit herself to medical examination to determine whether she was of unsound mind on the ground that such an act would violate her right to personal liberty. Discussing the balance between protecting the right to privacy and other principles that may be involved in matrimonial cases such as the ‘best interest of the child’ in case child custody is also in issue, the Court held:

If the best interest of a child is in issue in the case then the patient’s right to privacy and confidentiality would get limited. The right to privacy of an individual would be subordinate to the power of a court to arrive at a conclusion in a matrimonial dispute and the right of a party to protect his/her rights in a Court of law would trump the right to privacy of the other.

"Privacy" is defined as "the state of being free from intrusion or disturbance in one's private life or affairs". However, the right to privacy in India, is only conferred through an extensive interpretation of Article 21 and cannot therefore in any circumstance be considered an absolute right. Mental health treatment involves disclosure of one's most private feelings However, like any other privilege the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute and may only be recognized if the benefit to society outweighs the costs of keeping the information private. Thus if a child's best interest is jeopardized by maintaining confidentiality the privilege may be limited.” Thus, the power of a court to direct medical examination of a party to a matrimonial litigation in a case of this nature cannot beheld to violate the petitioner’s right to privacy.

Regulation of Privacy in Government and Private Hospitals and Diagnostic Laborataries

A. Field Study
The Hospitals that have been chosen for the analysis of the efficacy of these legislations include prominent Government Hospitals, Private Hospitals and Diagnostic Centers. These Institutes were chosen because of their widely accredited status as centers of medical research and cutting edge treatment. They have also had a long standing reputation due to their staff of experienced and skilled on call doctors and surgeons. The Private Hospitals chosen had patient welfare centers that addressed the concerns of patients including questions and doubts relating to but not limited to confidentiality and consent. The Government hospitals had a public relations office that addressed the concerns of discharged patients. They also provided counseling services to patients to aid them in addressing concerns relate to the treatment that they might want to be kept confidential. Diagnostic laboratories also have an HR department that addresses similar concerns. The laboratory also has a patient welfare manager who addresses the concerns and queries of the patient prior to and during the procedure.

The following section describes the practices promulgated by Government and Private Hospitals, as well as Diagnostic Laboratories in their endeavor to comply with the basic principles of privacy as laid down in the A.P Shah Committee report on Privacy.

(i) Notice

Through an analysis of the information provided by Government and Private hospitals and diagnostic laboratories, relevant conclusions were drawn with regard to the nature, process and method in which the patient information is recorded. Through interviews of various medical personnel including administrative staff in the patient welfare and medical records departments we observed an environment of openness and accountability within the structure of the patient registration system.

In Government Hospitals, the patient is notified of all types of information that is collected, in terms of both personal information as well as medical history. The Patient admission as well as the patient consent form is filled out by the patient or the attending relative accompanying the patient and assistance for the same is provided by the attending staff members, who explain the required details that need to be filled in a language that the patient is able to understand. The patient is notified of the purpose for which such information is collected and the procedure that he/ she might have to undergo depending on his injury or illness. The patient is not however, notified of the method in which he/she may correct or withdraw the information that is provided. There is no protocol provided for the correction or withdrawal of information, once provided. The patient is, at all times notified of the extent and nature of doctor patient confidentiality including the fact that his/her personal information would not be shared even with his/her immediate relatives , insurance companies, consulting doctors who are not directly involved with his/her treatment or any unauthorized third party without requisite consent from the patient. The patient is informed of the fact that in some cases the medical records of the patient will have to be shared with consulting doctors and that all the patient’s medical records would be provided to insurance companies, but this will only be done with the consent of the patient.

The same system of transparency and accountability transcends across private hospitals and diagnostic laboratories as well. In private hospitals, the patient is informed of all the information that is collected and the purpose for which such information may be collected. Diagnostic laboratories have specific patient consent forms for specific types of procedures which the patient will have to fill out depending on the required tests. These forms contain provisions with regard to the confidential nature of all the information provided. This information can only be accessed by the patient and the consulting doctor with the consent of the patient. Both private hospitals and diagnostic laboratories have a specific protocol and procedure in place to correct or withdraw information that has been provided. In order to do so the patient would have to contact the medical records department with requisite proof of the correct information. Private hospitals inform patients of the nature and extent of doctor patient confidentiality at every stage of the registration process. Some private hospitals contain patient safety brochures which inform patients about the nature and extent of consent and confidentiality, even with regard to consulting doctors and insurance agencies. If the patient does not want certain information revealed to insurance agencies the hospital will retain such records and refraining from providing them to third party insurance agencies. Thus, all information provided by the patient remains confidential at the behest of the patient.

(ii) Choice and Consent

Choice and consent are two integral aspects of the regulation of privacy within the healthcare sector. Government and Private hospitals as well as diagnostic laboratories have specific protocols in place to ensure that the consent of the patient is taken at every stage of the procedure. The consent of the patient can also be withdrawn just prior to the procedure even if this consent has already been given by the patient in writing, previously. The choice of the patient is also given ample importance at all stages of the procedure. The patient can refuse to provide any information that may not mandatorily required for the treatment provided basic information regarding his identity and contact information in case of emergency correspondence has been given.

(iii) Collection Limitation

The information collected from the patient in both government and private hospitals is used solely for the purpose that the patient has been informed of. In case this information is used for purposes other than for the purpose that the patient has been informed of, the patient is informed of this new purpose as well. Patient records in both Government and Private hospitals are stored in the Medical Records Department as hard copies and in some cases as scanned soft copies of the hard copy as well. These Medical Records are all stored within the facility. The duration for which the records are stored range from a minimum of two years to a maximum of ten years in most private hospitals. Some private hospitals store these records for life. Government hospitals store these records for a term of thirty years only as hard copies after which the records are discarded. Private hospitals make medical records accessible to any medical personnel who may ask for it provided the requisite proof of identity and reasons for accessing the same are provided, along with an attested letter of authorization of the doctor who is currently involved or had been involved in the treatment of the patient. Government hospitals however do not let any medical personnel access these records except for the doctor involved in the treatment of that particular patient. Both private and government hospitals are required to share the medical records of the patient with the insurance companies. Government Hospitals only share patient records with nationalized insurance agencies such as The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) but not with private insurance agencies. The insurance claims forms that are required prior to providing medical records to the insurance companies mandatorily require the signature of the patient. The patient is thus informed that his records will be shared with the insurance agencies and his signature is a proof of his implied consent to the sharing of these records with the company with which he has filed a health insurance claim.

Diagnostic laboratories collect patient information solely for the purpose of the particular test that they have been asked to conduct by the treating or consulting doctor. Genetic samples (Blood, Semen, Urine etc) are collected at one time and the various tests required are conducted on these samples. In case of any additional testing that is required to be conducted on these samples, the patient is informed. Additional testing is conducted only in critical cases and in cases where the referral doctor requests for the same to be conducted on the collected samples. In critical cases, where immediate testing is required and the patient is unreachable, the testing is conducted without informing the patient. The patient is mandatorily informed after the test that such additional testing was conducted. The patient sample is stored for one week within the same facility. The Patient records are digitized. They can only be accessed by the patient, who is provided with a particular username and password using which he can access only his records. The information is stored for a minimum of two years. This information can be made available to a medical personnel only if such medical personnel has the required lab no, the patients name, and reason for which it needs to be accessed. He thus requires the permission of the authorities at the facility as well as the permission and consent of the patient to access such records. The Medical test records of a patient are kept completely confidential. Even insurance companies cannot access such records unless they are provided to the company by the patient himself. In critical cases however, the patient information and tests results are shared with the treating or referral doctor without the consent of the patient.

(iv) Purpose Limitation

In Government and Private Hospitals, the information is only used for the purpose for which it is collected. There is thus a direct and relevant connection between the information collected and the purpose for which it used. Additional information is collected to gauge the medical history of the patient that may be relevant to the disease that has to be treated. The information is never deleted after it has been used for the purpose for which it had been collected. The Medical Records of the patient are kept for extended periods in hard copy as well as soft copy versions. There is a provision for informing the patient in case the information is used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was collected. Consent of the patient is taken at all stages of collecting and utilizing the information provided by him.

Diagnostic Laboratories have a database of all the information collected which is saved in the server. The information is mandatorily deleted after it has been used for the purpose for which it was collected after a period of two years. In case the information is used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was collected, for example, in critical cases where additional tests have to be conducted the patient is\ always informed of the same.

(v) Access and Correction

In private hospitals, the patient is allowed to access his own records during his stay at the hospital. He is given a copy of his file upon his discharge from the hospital in the form of a discharge summary. However, if he needs to access the original records at a later stage, he can do so by filing a request for the same at the Medical Records Department of the hospital. A patient can make amendments or corrections to his records by providing requisite proof to substantiate the amended information. The patient however at no stage can confirm if the hospital is holding or processing personal information about him or her with the exception of the provisions provided for the amendment or correction to the information held.

The Medical records of a patient in a government hospital are completely sealed. A patient has no access to his own records. Only the concerned doctor who was treating the patient during his stay at the hospital can access the records of the patient. This doctor has to be necessarily associated with the hospital and had to have been directly involved in the patient’s treatment in order to access the records. The patient is allowed to amend information in his medical records but only generic information such as the spelling of his name, his address, telephone number etc. The patient is at no point allowed to access his own records and therefore cannot confirm if the hospital is holding or processing any information about him/her. The patient is only provided with a discharge summary that includes his personal information, the details of his disease and the treatment provided in simple language.

Diagnostic laboratories have an online database of patient records. The patient is given a username and a password and can access the information at any point. The patient may also amend or correct any information provided by contacting the Medical records department for the same. The patient can at any time view the status of his record and confirm if it is being held or processed by the hospital. A copy of such information can be obtained by the patient at any time.

(vi) Disclosure of Information

Private Hospitals are extremely cautious with regard to the disclosure of patient information. Medical records of patients cannot be accessed by anyone except the doctor treating that particular patient or consulting on the case. The patient is informed whenever his records are disclosed even to doctors. Usually, even immediate relatives of the patient cannot access the patient’s records without the consent of the patient except in cases where the condition of the patient is critical. The patient is always informed about the type and extent of information that may be disclosed whenever it is disclosed. No information of the patient is made available publicly at any stage. The patient can refuse to consent to sharing of information collected from him/her with non-authorized agencies. However, in no circumstance is the information collected from him/her shared with non authorized agencies. Some private hospitals also provide the patient with patient’s safety brochures highlighting the extent of doctor patient confidentiality, the patient’s rights including the right to withdraw consent at any stage and refuse access of records by unauthorized agencies.

In government hospitals, the medical records of the patient can only be disclosed to authorized agencies with the prior approval of patient. The patient is made aware of the type and extent of information that is collected from him/her and is mandatorily shared with authorized bodies such as insurance agencies or the treating doctor. No information of the patient is made publicly available. In cases where the information is shared with insurance agencies or any such authorized body the patient gives an undertaking via a letter of his consent to such disclosure. The insurance companies only use medical records for verification purposes and have to do so at the facility. They cannot take any original documents or make copies of the records without the consent of the patient as provided in the undertaking.

Diagnostic Laboratories provide information regarding the patient’s medical records only to the concerned or referred doctor. The patient is always informed of any instance where his information may be disclosed and the consent of the patient is always taken for the same. No information is made available publicly or shared with unauthorized agencies at any stage. Information regarding the patient’s medical records is not even shared with insurance companies.

Government and Private Hospitals provide medical records of patients to the police only when a summons for the same has been issued by a judge. Diagnostic laboratories however do not provide information regarding a patient’s records at any stage to any law enforcement agencies unless there is summons from a judge specifying exactly the nature and extent of information required.

Patients are not made aware of laws which may govern the disclosure of information in private and government hospitals as well as in diagnostic laboratories. The patient is merely informed that the information provided by him to the medical personnel will remain confidential.

(vii) Security

The security measures that are put in place to ensure the safety of the collected information is not adequately specified in the forms or during the collection of information from the patient in Government or Private Hospitals. Diagnostic laboratories however do provide the patient with information regarding the security measures put in place to ensure the confidentiality of the information.

(viii) Openness

The information made available to the patient at government and private hospital and diagnostic laboratories is easily intelligible. At every stage of the procedure the explicit consent of the patient is obtained. In government and private hospitals the signature of the patient is obtained on consent forms at every stage of the procedure and the nature and extent of the procedure is explained to the patient in a language that he understands and is comfortable speaking. The information provided is detailed and is provided in simplistic terms so that the patient does at all stages understand the nature of any procedure he is consenting to undergo.

(ix) Accountability

Private hospitals and Diagnostic laboratories have internal and external audit mechanisms in place to check the efficacy of privacy measures. They both have grievance redress mechanisms in the form of patient welfare cells and complaint cells. There is an assigned officer in place to take patient feedback and address and manage the privacy concerns of the patient.

Government hospitals do not have an internal or external audit mechanism in place to check the efficacy of privacy measures. There is however a grievance redressal mechanism in government hospitals in the form of a Public Relations Office that addresses the concerns, complaints, feedback and suggestions of the patients. There is an officer in charge of addressing and managing the privacy concerns of patients. This officer also offers counseling to the patients in case of privacy concerns regarding sensitive information.

International Best Practices and Recommendations

A. European Union
An official EU data protection regulation [69]was issued in January 2012. A key objective of this was to introduce a uniform policy directive across all member states. The regulation, once implemented was to be applicable in all member states and left no room for alteration or amendments.

The regulation calls for Privacy Impact Assessments[70]when there are specific risks to privacy which would include profiling, sensitive data related to health, genetic material or biometric information. This is an important step towards evaluating the nature and extent of privacy regulation required for various procedures and would be effective in the creation of a systematic structure for the implementation of these regulations. The regulation also established the need for explicit consent for sensitive personal data. The basis for this is an inherent imbalance in the positions of the data subject and the data controller, or in simpler terms the patient and the hospital or the life sciences company conducting the research. Thus, implied consent is not enough [71]and a need arises to proceed with the testing only when there is explicit informed consent.

Embedded within the regulation is the right to be forgotten [72]wherein patients can request for their data to be deleted after they have been discharged or the clinical trial has been concluded. In the Indian scenario, patient information is kept for extended periods of time. This can be subject to unauthorized access and misuse. The deletion of patient information once it has been used for the purpose for which it was collected is thus imperative towards the creation of an environment of privacy protection.

Article 81 of the regulation specifies that health data may be processed only for three major processes[73] :

a) In cases of Preventative or occupational medicine, medical diagnosis, the care, treatment or management of healthcare services, and in cases where the data is processed by the healthcare professionals, the data is subject to the obligation of professional secrecy;

b) Considerations of public interest bearing a direct nexus to public health, for example, the protection of legitimate cross border threats to health or ensuring a high standard of quality and safety for medicinal products or services;

c) Or other reasons of public interest such as social protection.

An added concern is the nature and extent of consent. The consent obtained during a clinical trial may not always be sufficient to cover additional research even in instances of data being coded adequately. Thus, it may not be possible to anticipate additional research while carrying out initial research. Article 83[74] of the regulation prohibits the use of data collected for an additional purpose, other that the purpose for which it was collected.

Lastly, the regulation covers data that may be transferred outside the EEA, unless there is an additional level of data protection. If a court located outside the EU makes a request for the disclosure of personal data, prior authorization must be obtained from the local data protection authority before such transfer is made. It is imperative that this be implemented within Indian legislation as currently there is no mechanism to regulate the cross border transfer of personal data.

B. The United States of America
The Health Maintenance Organizations Act, 1973 [75]was enacted with a view to keep up with the rapid development in the Information Technology sector. The digitization of personal information led to new forms of threats with regard to the privacy of a patient. In the face of this threat, the overarching goal of providing effective and yet unobtrusive healthcare still remains paramount.

To this effect, several important federal regulations have been implemented. These include the Privacy and Security Ruled under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 1996[76] and the State Alliance for eHealth (2007) [77].The HIPAA privacy rules addressed the use and subsequent disclosure of a patient's personal information under various healthcare plans, medical providers, and clearinghouses. These insurance agencies were the primary agents involved in obtaining a patients information for purposes such as treatment, payment, managing healthcare operations, medical research and subcontracting. Under the HIPAA it is required of insurance agencies to ensure the implementation of various administrative safeguards such as policies, guidelines, regulations or rules to monitor and control inter as well as intra organizational access.

Apart from the HIPAA, approximately 60 laws related to privacy in the healthcare sector have been enacted in more than 34 states. These legislations have been instrumental in creating awareness about privacy requirements in the healthcare sector and improving the efficiency of data collection and transfer. Similar legislative initiative is required in the Indian context to aid in the creation of a regulated and secure atmosphere pertaining to the protection of privacy within the healthcare sector.

C. Australia
Australia has a comprehensive law that deals with sectoral regulations of the right to privacy.An amendment to the Privacy Act1988 [78]applies to all healthcare providers and was made applicable from 21st December 2001.The privacy Act includes the followingpractices:

a. A stringent requirement for informed consent prior to the collection of health related information

b. A provision regarding the information that needs to be provided to individuals before information is collected from them

c. The considerations that have to be taken into account before the transfer of information to third parties such as insurance agencies, including the specific instances wherein this information can be passed on

d. The details that must be included in the Privacy policy of the healthcare service providers' Privacy Policy

e. The securing and storing of information; and

f. Providing individuals with a right to access their health records.

These provisions are in keeping with the 13 National Privacy [79]Principles that represent the minimum standards of privacy regulation with respect to the handling of personal information in the healthcare sector.These guidelines are advisory in nature and have been issued by the Privacy Commissioner in exercise of his power under Section 27(1)(e) [80]of the Privacy Act.

The Act also embodiessimilar privacy principles which include a collection limitation, a definitive use and purpose for the information collected, a specific set of circumstance and an established protocol for the disclosure of information to third parties including the nature and extent of such disclosure, maintenance accuracy ofthe data collected, requisite security measures to ensure the data collected is at all times protected, a sense of transparency,accountability and openness in the administrative functioning of thehealthcare provider and accessibility of the patient to his ownrecords for the purpose of viewing, corroboration or correction.

Additionally, the Act includes the system of identifiers which includes a number assigned by the organization to an individual to identify the purpose of that person's data for the operation of the organization. Further, the Act provides for anonymity wherein individuals have the optionnot to identify themselves while entering into transactions with an organization. The Act also provides for restrictions on the transfer of personal data outside Australia and establishes conclusive and stringent barriers to the extent of collection of personal and sensitive data.These principles although vaguely similar to those highlighted in the A.P. Shah Committee report can be usedto streamline the regulations pertaining to privacy in the healthcare sector and make them more efficient.

Key Recommendations

It is Imperative that Privacy concerns relating to the transnational flow of Private data be addressed in the most efficient way possible. This would involve international cooperation and collaboration to address privacy concerns including clear provisions and the development of coherent minimum standards pertaining to international data transfer agreements. This exchange of ideas and multilateral deliberation would result in creating more efficient methods of applying the provisions of privacy legislation even within domestic jurisdictions.

There is a universal need for the development of a foundational structure for the physical collection, use and storage of human biological specimens (in contrast to the personalinformation that may be derived from those specimens) as these are extremely important aspects of biomedical research and clinical trials. The need for Privacy Impact Assessments would also arise in the context of clinical trials, research studies and the gathering of biomedical data.

Further, there also arises the need for patients to be allowed to request for the deletion of their personal information once it has served the purpose for which it was obtained. The keeping of records for extended periods of time by hospitals and laboratories is unnecessary and can often result in the unauthorized access to and subsequent misuse of such data.

There is a definitive need to ensure the incorporation of safeguards to regulate the protection of patient’s data once accessed by third parties, such as insurance companies. In the Indian Context as well as insurance agencies often have unrestricted access to a patient's medical records however there is a definitive lack of sufficient safeguards to ensure that this information is not released to or access by unauthorized persons either within these insurance agencies or outsourced consultants

The system of identifiers which allocate specific numbers to an individual’s data which can only be accessed using that specific number or series of numbers can be incorporated into the Indian system as well and can simplify the administrative process thus increasing its efficacy. This would afford individuals the privilege of anonymity while entering into transactions with specific healthcare institutions.

An important means of responding to public concerns over potential unauthorized use ofpersonal information gathered for research, could be through the issuing of Certificates of confidentiality as issued in the United States to protectsensitive information on research participants from forced disclosure. [81]

Additionally, it is imperative that frequent discussions, deliberations, conferences and roundtables take place involving multiple stakeholders form the healthcare sector, insurance companies, patient’s rights advocacy groups and the government. This would aid in evolving a comprehensive policy that would aid in the protection of privacy in the healthcare sector in an efficient and collusive manner.

Conclusions

The Right to Privacy has been embodied in a multitude of domestic legislations pertaining to the healthcare sector. The privacy principles envisioned in the A.P Shah Committee report have also been incorporated into the everyday practices of healthcare institutions to the greatest possible extent. There are however significant gaps in the policy formulation that essentially do not account for the data once it has been collected or its subsequent transfer. There is thus an imminent need for institutional collaboration in order to redress these gaps. Recommendations for the same have been made in the report. However, for an effective framework to be laid down there is still a need for the State to play an active role in enabling the engagement between different institutions both in the private and public domain across a multitude of sectors including insurance companies, online servers that are used to harbour a data base of patient records and civil action groups that demand patient privacy while at the same time seek to access records under the Right to Information Act. The collaborative efforts of these multiple stakeholders will ensure the creation of a strong foundational framework upon which the Right to Privacy can be efficiently constructed.

[1] . Report of the group of experts on Privacy chaired by Justice A.P Shah <http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_privacy.pdf> [Accessed on 14^th May 2014]

[2] . Nissenbaum, H. (2004). Privacy as Contextual Integrity. Washington Law Review, 79(1), 101-139.

[3] . Ibid.

[4] . Thomas, J. (2009). Medical Records and Issues in Negligence, Indian Journal of Urology : IJU : Journal of the Urological Society of India, 25(3), 384-388. doi:10.4103/0970-1591.56208.

[5] . Ibid

[6] . Plaza, J., &Fischbach, R. (n.d.). Current Issues in Research Ethics : Privacy and Confidentiality. Retrieved December 5, 2011, from http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/cire/pac/foundation/index.html.

[7] . Ibid.

[8] . The Mental Health Act, 1987 <https://sadm.maharashtra.gov.in/sadm/GRs/Mental%20health%20act.pdf> [Accessed on 14^th May 2014]

[9] . The Mental Health Act, 1987, s. 13(1).

[10] .The Mental Health Act, 1987, s. 38.

[11] .The Mental Health Act, 1987, s. 40.

[12] .The Mental Health Act, 1987, s. 21(2).

[13] .The Mental Health Act, 1987, s. 13(1), Proviso.

[14] . Also see the: Pre-Conception and and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996.

[15] . Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, s. 4(3).

[16] . Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, s. 4(2). Pre-natal diagnostic techniques shall be conducted for the purposes of detection of: chromosomal abnormalities, genetic metabolic diseases, haemoglobinopathies, sex-linked genetic diseases, congenital anomalies any other abnormalities or diseases as may be specified by the Central Supervisory Board.

[17] .Medical Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act, 2002, Notification on Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Act, Medical Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 2003 and Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003.

[18] .Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (Amended in 2002), s. 2(4) and 4, and Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003, Rule 8

[19] .Medical Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 2003, Regulation 4(5).

[20] .Medical Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 2003, Regulation 5.

[21] .Medical Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 2003, Regulation 4(2).

[22] .Medical Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 2003, Regulations 4(2) and 4(4).

[23] . Code of Ethics Regulations, 2002 available at

http://www.mciindia.org/RulesandRegulations/CodeofMedicalEthicsRegulations2002.aspx .

[24] . Code of Ethics Regulations, 2002 Chapter 2, Section 2.2.

[25] .Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects. (2006) Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi.

[26] . Informed Consent Process, Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical ResearchonHuman Subjects (2006). Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi.P. 21.

[27] . Statement of Specific Principles for Human Genetics Research, Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical ResearchonHuman Subjects (2000) . Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi.P. 62.

[28] . General Ethical Issues. Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical ResearchonHuman Subjects (2006). Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi.P. 29.

[29] . Statement of Specific Principles for Epidemiological Studies, Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical ResearchonHuman Subjects (2000) . Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi P. 56.

[30] . Statement of General Principles, Principle IV and Essential Information on Confidentiality for Prospective Research Participants, Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical ResearchonHuman Subjects (2006). Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi.P. 29.

[31] . The IRDA (Third Party Administrators - Health Services) Regulations 2001, (2001), Chapter 5. Section 2.

[32] . The IRDA (Sharing Of Database for Distribution of Insurance Products) Regulations 2010.

[33] . The IRDA (Sharing Of Database For Distribution Of Insurance Products) Regulations 2010.

[34] . The IRDA (Sharing Of Database For Distribution Of Insurance Products) Regulations 2010

[35] . List of TPAs Updated as on 19th December, 2011, Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (2011), http://www.irda.gov.in/ADMINCMS/cms/NormalData_Layout.aspx?page=PageNo646 (last visited Dec 19, 2011).

[36] . The IRDA, Guideline on Outsourcing of Activities by Insurance Companies, (2011).

[37] . The IRDA, Guideline on Outsourcing of Activities by Insurance Companies, (2011), Section 9.11. P. 8.

[38] .The Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897.

[39] .The Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897. s. 2.1.

[40] .The Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, s. 2.2(b).

[41] . The National Policy for Persons with Disabilities, 2006, Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Rules, 1996.

[42] . Research, National Policy for Persons with Disabilities, 1993.

[43] . Survey of Disabled Persons in India. (December 2003) National Sample Survey Organization. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. Government of India.

[44] .Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act. 1995, Section 35.

[45]. Research. National Policy for Persons with Disabilities, 2003.

[46]. http://www.lawyerscollective.org/files/Anti%20rights%20practices%20in%20Targetted%20Interventions.pdf

[47]. http://www.lawyerscollective.org/files/Anti%20rights%20practices%20in%20Targetted%20Interventions.pdf

[48]. Aneka, Karnataka Sexual Minorities Forum. (2011)“Chasing Numbers, Betraying People: Relooking at HIV Services in Karnataka”, p.22.

[49]. Aneka, Karnataka Sexual Minorities Forum. (2011)“Chasing Numbers, Betraying People: Relooking at HIV Services in Karnataka”, p.16.

[50]. Aneka, Karnataka Sexual Minorities Forum. (2011)“Chasing Numbers, Betraying People: Relooking at HIV Services in Karnataka”, p.16.

[51]. Aneka, Karnataka Sexual Minorities Forum. (2011)“Chasing Numbers, Betraying People: Relooking at HIV Services in Karnataka”, p.14.

[52]. http://www.hivaidsonline.in/index.php/HIV-Human-Rights/legal-issues-that-arise-in-the-hiv-context.html

[53]. Chakrapani et al, (2008) ‘HIV Testing Barriers and Facilitators among Populations at-risk in Chennai, India’, INP, p 12.

[54]. Aneka, Karnataka Sexual Minorities Forum. (2011)“Chasing Numbers, Betraying People: Relooking at HIV Services in Karnataka”, p.24.

[55] .http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/570038/

[56] .http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/570038/

[57] .http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/680703/

[58] . No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself’, (the 'right to silence').

[59] . http://indiankanoon.org/doc/338008/

[60] . http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF205.pdf

[61] . AIR 1992 SC 392.

[62] . 96 (2002) DLT 354.

[63] .AIR 2000 A.P 156.

[64] .http://indiankanoon.org/doc/382721/

[65] .http://indiankanoon.org/doc/859256/

[66] .See Sections 24, 37, 38 and 39 of The Prisons Act, 1894 (Central Act 9 of 1894) Rules 583 to 653 (Chapter XXXV) and Rules 1007 to 1014 (Chapter LVII) of Andhra Pradesh Prisons Rules, 1979

[67] .Section 10-A,17(4) ,19(2) Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956

[68] .http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1309207/

[69] . http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf

[70] . Article 33, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf> [Accessed on 14^th May, 2014]

[71] .Article 4 (Definition of “Data Subject’s Consent”), Article 7, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

[72] . Article 17, “Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World – A European Data Protection Framework for the 21st

Century” COM(2012) 9 final. Based on, Article 12(b), EU Directive 95/46/EC – The Data Protection Directive at <http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/EU-Directive-95-46-EC-Chapter-2/93.htm> [Accessed on 14^th May, 2014]

[73] . Article 81, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

[74] .Article 83, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

[75] . Health Maintainence and Organization Act 1973, Notes and Brief Reports available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v37n3/v37n3p35.pdf [Accessed on 14th May 2014].

[76] . Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 1996 available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/statute/hipaastatutepdf.pdf [Accessed on 14th May 2014]

[77] . Illinois Alliance for Health Innovation plan available at http://www2.illinois.gov/gov/healthcarereform/Documents/Alliance/Alliance%20011614.pdf [Accessed on 14^th May 2014]

[78] . The Privacy Act 1988 available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A03712 [Accessed on 14th May 2014]

[79] . Schedule 1, Privacy Act 1988 [Accessed on 14^th May 2014]

[80] .Section 27(e), Privacy Act 1988 [Accessed on 14^th May 2014]

[81] . Guidance on Certificates of Confidentiality, Office of Human Research Protections, U.S Department of Health and Human Services available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/certconf.pdf [Accessed on 14^th May, 2014].

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-in-healthcare-policy-guide

Grounds for Compulsory Patent Licensing in United States, Canada, China, and India

maggie — 2014-07-29T08:45:25Z

The research paper seeks to answer questions about the grounds of compulsory licensing in international treaties with specific examples from America and Asia. The grounds for granting compulsory licenses, jurisdictional comparison of compulsory licensing, etc., are examined.

Holding ownership to a patented invention means one has certain exclusive rights: a) the right to decide who may use the invention during the time of protection; b) the right to give licenses to other parties to use the invention on mutually agreed terms; and, c) the right to sell and transfer ownership of the patent to someone else[1]. Once this patent expires, the invention would enter the public domain to be shared freely[2].

However, given certain conditions, a compulsory license can be granted, in which “authorization [is] given by national authority to a person without or against the consent of the titleholder, for the exploitation of a subject matter protected by a patent or other intellectual property rights” [3].

Compulsory licensing has been most contentiously applied for patented pharmaceutical companies who are often looking to recoup research and development costs. Proponents of this instrument are now also growing amongst advocates for climate change mitigation technologies [4]. The Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace project is broadly assessing access to knowledge through sub-100 dollar devices. The accessibility of these critical technologies, and subsequent access to knowledge, information, and culture through these devices may be implicated by this policy lever[5]

Thus, this paper seeks to answer the following questions:

What are the grounds for compulsory licensing set in international treaties?
How does Canada, United States (i.e. North America), India, and China (i.e. Asia) provide for compulsory licensing within its national laws?

This will be done through first providing an overview of the relevant international treaties to understand the compulsory licensing framework which signatory nations must follow. Then, utilizing Correa (1999)'s study as a foundation, an analysis of the text within the four aforementioned's codified laws will be assessed to understand all the possible grounds compulsory licensing can be provided. This paper will conclude by summarizing any significant distinctions across the four jurisdictions.

Compulsory Patent Licensing in International Law and Regional Trade Agreements
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) [6]
Article 5(2) of the Paris Convention provides each country with the right to "grant compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result form the exercise of exclusive rights conferred by the patent… " United States, Canada, China, and India are four of the 175 contracting parties to this convention [7]. This can only be done after 4 years of applying for the patent, or 3 years from the date in which the patent was granted. This means, a sufficient amount of time must have elapsed to allow the rights holder to exploit the invention.

North American Free Trade Agreement (1994)[8]
Article 1704 in NAFTA provides that "appropriate measures" can be taken to control abusive or anticompetitive practices. The United States and Canada have utilized this ground of anti-competition to grant numerous compulsory licenses.

Article 1709 notes that there must not be a discrimination of technology – patents may only be revoked when the grant has not remedied lack of exploitation, and that the use of the patent adheres to certain criteria.

In 1993, Canada repealed the compulsory licensing regulations from its Patent Law to comply with the international TRIPS and NAFTA treaties.

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) [9]
All members of the World Trade Organization is provided the right to use compulsory licenses via Article 31 Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder within the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. This Article stipulates 12 procedural provisions: compulsory licensing should be granted on 'individual merits'[10], must have shown prior effort to obtain authorization under reasonable commercial terms [11], must be non-exclusive[12], adequate renumeration must be provided[13], and the license must be terminated as soon as the circumstances for which it was granted cease to exist[14].

Suggested, but not obligatory grounds for which compulsory licensing could be granted under the TRIPs agreement are a) emergency and extreme urgency, b) anticompetitive practices, c) public non-commercial use, and the d) use of dependent patents[15].

Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2001)
The Doha Declaration is a clarification of the earlier TRIPS agreement in response to some countries' public health concerns due to obstacles to accessing patented medicines.[16]

Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration expressly allows Members to take measures to protect public health, while paragraph 5b states that "each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted". Freedom of each country to define the terms of their intellectual property rights is also further reiterated.

Grounds for granting compulsory licenses
Correa (1999) in his paper Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory License: Options for Developing Countries outlines eight common grounds which provided the framework for this comparative analysis between the jurisdictions of the United States, Canada, India, and China. Through analyzing the codified law on compulsory licensing, a few other grounds were added to the list.

Refusal to deal
In principle, the patent owner has an exclusive right to determine whether or not to issue a license to a third party. However, if under reasonable terms, one still refuses to issue a license, national courts may interpret this as an abuse of patent rights, resulting in lack of availability of the product and commercial development. In the United States, this is often raised as an anticompetitive issue.

Non-working and inadequate supply
The "working obligation" was initially understood as the industrial use of an invention, which according to Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement required working 'predominantly' for local markets. However, many countries have defined 'working' to include commercial use of the invention, in which importation of a product would suffice[17].

Public interest
The public interest needs to be balanced with individuals' rights, and it is the responsibility of the courts or administration in each respective country to determine this. Thus, what actually constitutes as "public interest" varies depending on time and jurisdiction. For example, countries with limited industrial development could consider a compulsory patent to develop its national industries as for public interest [18]. Accessibility of a product at the lowest price have been argued to be in public interest, but some courts have ruled this to be invalid[19]

Anticompetitive practices
A patent is essentially a temporary monopoly meant to provide an economic reward for the inventor's work, as well as additional incentive to continue producing[20]. However, excessive monopolization through unlawful or unfair practices, such as when a patent is overly broad, acquiring and accumulating patent portfolios, and subsequent patent trolling are some acts that be considered anticompetitive patent practices[21]. Compulsory licenses have also been granted through this ground under anti-monopoly, antitrust, and competition laws.

Governmental use
Each country's government decides what is to be considered as governmental use. Occasionally synonymous to government use has also been public, non-commercial use, or as suggested by the TRIPs agreement, for the purposes of national emergency or urgency. This is assuming the government is acting on behalf of public interest; given its lack of an international standardized definition, this ground can be utilized and interpreted in other ways.

Facilitate use of dependent patents
When a new invention (dependent invention) cannot be developed without infringing on the license of an existing patented invention, (principle invention) a compulsory licensing can be granted to facilitate innovation. This ensures the patents of principle inventions would not block technical progress. The TRIPs agreement expressly allows this, provided reasonable compensation is articulated. In some jurisdictions, cross-licensing, (which involves a licensing agreement between two parties to exploit each other's intellectual property[22]) can be negotiated to resolve this issue.

Compulsory licenses for medicines
Numerous countries have issued licenses for increased accessibility to food and medicine. Prior to the Doha Round, TRIPs prohibited this, as Article 27 states "national laws cannot discriminate in exercise of patent rights on the basis of field of technology". However, the Doha Declaration addressed this, allowing pharmaceuticals to have increased accessibility (via pricing, production, and importation) for the sake of public health.

Exclusive Grant Back or Coercive Package Licensing
A grant back can be agreed upon when there is an expectation of an improvement on the licensed technology through increased superiority or method [23]. This allows the licensee to commercialize an improved product without having to file for another patent[24]. Exclusive grant back provides the licensor the exclusive right to use or sublicense improvements, while licensee retains non-exclusive right to practice the improvements.[25] Grant-backs, particularly exclusive ones are sometimes deemed as anticompetitive.

A package license, otherwise known as patent pools is used when the licensing of more than one patent is necessary to commercialize an invention [26] Coercive package licensing can occur when the licensing of other patents within the package is forceful and unnecessary. The defining and interpretation of 'coercion' ultimately depends on each country's respective authorities.

Hindrance from Importation of Abroad[27]
This ground may fall under non-working, but is unique in that it notes a state's ability to grant compulsory license on behalf of a foreign-owned patent. Yang (2012) cites that this as one of the most controversial aspects of compulsory patent licensing, as countries may feel undermined when another state can grant compulsory licenses that are against their own interests[28].

Jurisdictional comparison of Compulsory Licensing
The following table was developed as an exercise to review compulsory licensing within the jurisdictions of the United States, Canada, India, and China. Utilizing Correa (1999)'s findings as a skeletal framework, the four aforementioned countries' codified patent laws were used to determine the grounds for compulsory licensing. The main compairson was done through analyzing the specific text within the laws of the four jurisdiction – one approach to treaty and law interpretation[29] However, for those countries that were lacking general provisions on compulsory licensing (i.e. United States, and eventually Canada in 1993[30]), there was a need to expand to a more comprehensive approach and look through other codified laws beyond patents and intellectual property, as well as through case law to see if the mentioned grounds have been used to provide for compulsory licenses[31].

Grounds		Countries	Law
Refusal to deal and/or abuses of patentees' exclusive rights		U.S	n/a in codified law…refusal to deal is an essential element of intellectual property rights…but can lead to anti-competition in which Antitrust laws can be used
		Canada	Patent Law - Abuse of Rights 65.2(d): "if by reason of refusal of patentee to grant* a license or licenses on reasonable terms…*
		India	Patent Act 1970 S.4(d) *"Refusal to deal"* includes any agreement which restricts, or is likely to restrict, by any method the persons or classes of persons to whom goods are sold or from whom goods are bought Patent Act, 1970 S. 84.7(a) " If by reason of refusal…ii) demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms; or iii) a market for the patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied or developed; or iv) the establishment or development of commercial activities in India is not prejudiced Patent Act 1970 S.84 (6) " …Controller shall take into account, - i) nature of invention, the time which has elapsed since the sealing of the patent and the measures already taken by the patentee or any licensee to make full use of the invention; iv) ..whether applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms conditions, and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period *period not ordinarily exceeding a period of six months* as the Controller may deem fit
		China	Patent Law of the People's Republic of China - Article 48 (1): " When it has been 3 years since the date the patent right is granted, and four years since the date the patent application is submitted, the patentee, without legitimate reasons, fails to have the patent exploited or fully exploited"
Non-working and inadequate supply		U.S.	n/a
		Canada	Patent Act 1935: s.65 a): "… is capable of being worked within Canada but is not being worked within Canada on a commercial scale, and no satisfactory reason can be given for that non-working…" REPEALED in 1993 due to NAFTA and TRIPS
		India	Patents Act, 1970 S. 84 (1): " At any time after expiration of 3 years from the date of the grant of a patent, any person interested may make an application… b)…not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or c) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price Patent Act 1970 S.84(2): "…reasonable requirements of the public.. not satisfied or that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India, Patent Act, 1970 S. 84.7(a) "If by reason of refusal…ii) demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms; or iii) a market for the patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied or developed; or iv) the establishment or development of commercial activities in India is not prejudiced Patent Act, 1970 S. 84.7(d): " If the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent, or is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable
		China	Measures for Compulsory licensing of Patent Implementation (2012) - Ch 2 Art. 5: "If without good reason not implemented or fully implemented, their licensing patent within 3 years from the date of grant of patent right..and 4 years from the date of filing patent"
Public interest:		U.S.	"...no general provision allowing authorities to override patents in the larger public interest” [32] Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 - allow government to exercise "march in" rights with regard to government funded research results that universities might otherwise patent But US has granted compulsory licenses when felt public interest was at stake (Atomic Energy Act and Clean Air Act 1970, Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act 1973)
Canada	Patent Law - Abuse of Rights 65.2(d): "if by reason of refusal of patentee to grant a license or licenses on reasonable terms… in public interest that license/licenses should be granted" Patent Act S. 39. (3) License under patent relating to food: " In the case of any patent…of food…shall grant to any person applying…Commissioner shall have regard to the desirability of making the food available to the public at the lowest possible price consistent with giving to the inventor due reward for the research leading to the invention" REPEALED in 1993 due to NAFTA and TRIPS
India	Patent Act 1970, S. 84 (2)…not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price Patent Act 1970 S. 84 (6) " …Controller shall take into account, ii) the ability of the applicant to work the invention to the public advantage Patent Act, 1970 - S. 92 Special provision for compulsory licenses on notifications by Central Government-(1): " If Central Government is satisfied… circumstances of national emergency or in circumstances of extreme urgency, or in case of public non commercial use...
China	Patent Law - Article 49: " Where a national emergency or any extraordinary state of affairs occurs, or public interests so require…" Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation - Article 6: If emergency or irregular event of the state…or for purposes of public interest
Anti-competitive practices		U.S.	Antitrust & Trade Law: Sherman Act 15 U.S. C.S. 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty: " Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize…any part of trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign nations…deemed guilty of a felony, and conviction.."
		Canada	Competition Act (S. 32 RSC 1985): " …where use has been made of exclusive rights and privileges conferred by one or more patents for invention…(a) limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying…may be a subject of trade or commerce, (b) restrain or injure, unduly, trade or commerce…(c) prevent, limit, or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production…or unreasonably enhance the price thereof, or (d) prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in…
India	India Patent Law Chapter 90 (1.ix) Terms and Conditions of compulsory licenses… granted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive…
China	Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation, 2012 - Article 11: " …that actions of patent holder in exercising patent right…deemed to be monopolistic actions" Patent Law of the People's Republic of China - Article 48 (2): " …patentee's exercise of the patent right is in accordance with law, confirmed as monopoly and its negative impact on competition needs to be eliminated or reduced"
Governmental use		United States	28 United States Code 1498: " …when used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner…remedy shall be..Claims for recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture…" ie. Government does not have to seek license or negotiate for use, and the only appeal for patent owner is compensation
		Canada	Under the 1993 and 1994 amendments to the Patent Act of 1985, section 19.1: "the Commissioner may, on application by the Government of Canada or the government of a province, authorize the use of a patented invention by that government ."
		India	Patent Act, 1970 - S. 100 Power of Central Government to use inventions for purposes of Government (1): "…at any time…the Central Government and any person authorized in writing… may use the invention for the purposes of Government in accordance with provisions of this chapter" Patent Act, 1970 S. 100 Power of Central Government to use inventions for purposes of Government (2): " Where an invention has, before priority date of relevant claim, been duly recorded in a document, or tested or tried, by or on behalf of the Government or Government undertaking… any use of the invention by the Central Government or any person authorized in writing by it for the purposes of Government may be made free of any royalty or other renumeration to the patentee " Patent Act, 1970 S. 100 Power of Central Government to use inventions for purposes of Government (6): " The right to make, use, exercise, and vend an invention for the purposes of Government under sub-section (1) shall include the right to sell on noncommercial basis, and person c laiming through..as if Central Government or authorized were the patentee of the invention
China	Patent Law of PRC Art. 14: "If an invention patent of a State-owned enterprise or institution is of great significance to national or public interests, upon approval by State Council.. Patent Law PRC Article 49: " Where a national emergency or any extraordinary state of affairs occurs…patent administration department under the State council may grant a compulsory license for exploitation of an inanition patent or utility model patent" Patent Law PRC Article 14: “ If an invention patent of a State-owned enterprise or institution is o f great significance to national or public interests, upon approval by the State Council, the relevant competent department under the State Council ...may decide to have the patent widely applied within an approved scope and allow the designated units to exploit the patent, and the said units shall pay royalties to the patentee in accordance with the regulations of the State.
Facilitate use of dependent patents		United States	N/A - U.S. Does has not formally codified a general provision for Compulsory licensing of Dependent Patents [33]
		Canada	N/A
		India	Patent Act 1970 - Section 88 Power of Controller in Granting Compulsory licenses (3): …if Controller satisfied that the applicant cannot efficiently or satisfactorily work the license granted to him under those patents without infringing the other patents held by the patentee, and if those patents involve important technical advancement of considerable economic significance …may direct grant of a license…
		China	Patent Law - Ch 6 Art 51: " If an invention/utility model…represents major technological advancement of remarkable economic significance, compared with an earlier invention or utility model for which the patent right has already been obtained, and exploitation of former relies on exploitation of latter…may grant it a compulsory license to exploit..."
Compulsory licenses for medicines		United States	N/A but has threatened Bayer for compulsory licensing of Ciproflaxin medicine who subsequently dropped their prices drastically [34]
		Canada	Bill C-9 Amendment to Food and Drugs Act, 2004: "…pharmaceutical products intended for export in accordance with that WTO General Council decision…to comply with…sold on domestic market" Patent Act (4) License under patent relating to medicine - " ..intended or capable of being used for the preparation of production of medicine…Commissioner shall grant.. REPEALED in 1993 due to NAFTA and TRIPS
India	Patent Act 1970 Section 92.A Compulsory license for export of patent pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional circumstances: " …shall be available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products [35] to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public health problems…" Patent Act, 1970 Section 83.(d): "General principles applicable to working of patented inventions… do not impede protection of public health and nutrition…
China	Patent Law of PRC: Article 50: " For the benefit of public health…grant compulsory license for manufacture of the drug, for which a patent right has been obtained, and for its export to the countries or regions that conform to the provisions…" Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation, 2012 - Ch 2 Art 7: " For purposes of public health…able to implement petition for compulsory licensing…for manufacture of patented medicines..and export of, to following countries/regions: 1) The most underdeveloped countries/regions; 2) Developed/developing members of the WTO
Exclusive grant-back and Coercive package licensing		U.S.	Legal in the past – granted in Transparent Wrap Machine Corp v Stokes & Smith Co. but discouraged... interpreted by Rule of Reason doctrine which is an interpretation of Sherman Antitrust (Anti-competition) Act[36] Now Department Of Justice from 2007 has said must be non-exclusive under its Antitrust laws [37]
		Canada	N/A
		India	Patent Act, 1970 Section 84 (7.c): …Reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied [38] - c) if the patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of license under the patent to provide exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to validity of patent, or coercive package licensing
		China	N/A
Hindered by importation from abroad		U.S.	N/A
		Canada	N/A
		India	Patent Act, 1970 Section 84 (7.e): " if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article by…i) patentee..ii) persons purchasing…iii) other persons not taking proceedings for infringement
China	N/A

Summary of Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison
As mentioned previously, this comparison necessitated an expansion into codified law outside of compulsory licensing and patent law into case law, since the United States had never written a general provision for compulsory licensing, and Canada had repealed theirs in 1993 upon the signing of the NAFTA and TRIPS agreement. For Canada, compulsory licenses (CLs) continued to be granted following the repeal through the Foods and Drugs Act, as well as the Competition Act. Despite United States' lack of general provisions, Knowledge Ecology International claims it is the world's leader in the use of CLs, yet hypocritical to developing countries' requests for affordable patented pharmaceuticals.[39]

In general, India and China both have very extensive compulsory licensing laws. China's State Intellectual Property Office even developed additional Measures to account for the execution of compulsory licensing. Despite comprehensive CL provisions, India has had only one compulsory license ever granted in the case of Natco Pharma Ltd v. Bayer Corporation, for the domestic production of cancer-drug Nexavar. [40] China has yet to grant any compulsory license, but the new Measures may signify an increasing willingness to do so, or even to be used as a bargaining tool. However, given its goal of developing domestic intellectual property (i.e. China's 5-year plan), it is unlikely that China will grant compulsory licenses in the masses.[41]

In regards to the specific grounds themselves, some grounds noted particular differences per country.

Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, refusal to deal is actually is considered a right, thus does not provide for compulsory licensing; depending on the degree however, it could lead to anti-competition[42]. According to the Paris Convention, one can only request consideration for a CLs 3 years from the granting of a patent, or 4 years from application, allowing said time for provision of dealing. However, India seems to have a more stringent period of not exceeding a period of six months, while China noted specifically not 'without legitimate reasons'.

The non-working and inadequate supply was again not present in U.S. Law, yet Canada did include it in its former compulsory licensing provision prior to repeal. Canada had defined 'working' specifically referring to a commercial scale when compulsory licensing was in effect. India's 'working' means being available at a reasonably affordable price, and supplied or developed, through the establishment of commercial activities, worked to the fullest extent that is fully practicable, while China mentioned non-working 'if without good reason, it is not implemented or fully implemented'.

The United States does not have any provision providing explicitly for public interest. However, under the Bayh-Dole Act, government-funding for research during the economic crisis in the 1970s was granted as long as the inventors agreed to allow petition for 'march-in rights', in which the government or a third party “shall have the right...to require the contractor...to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license” (35 U.S. Code S203(a)) if it meets one of four requirements - one being to “...alleviate health and safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied...” (35 U.S. Code Section 203). Canada's public interest clause had existed, but was repealed. India now states that CLs can be granted to make available to the public “at a reasonably affordable price, to public advantage, and for public non-commercial use”. In China, public interest is provided in conditions of 'national emergency or extraordinary state of affairs, for the purpose of public interest'.

The United States does however strongly uphold and value competition, and have granted CLs to remedy anticompetitive practices under its Antitrust laws, prohibiting any 'attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce'. China also uses the language of 'monopolistic actions' and allows compulsory licensing if its “negative impact on competition needs to be eliminated or reduced.” Canada's Competition Act allows for compulsory licensing if one 'limits unduly, the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing... restrain or injure unduly, trade or commercial etc..' .preventing fair competition. India also notes the remedying of anticompetitive acts in its patent laws.

Governmental use in the United States have been granted for use by the Department of Defense and as mentioned previously for the Bayh-Dole Act. However, unlike the other countries of focus, there is no way to appeal a CL for the purposes of government-use. The only way to remedy this as a patent owner is compensation. In Canada, the Commissioner may on application by the Government of Canada or province authorize a CL. Indian patent law also allows CLs for the purposes of the Government, with the explicit possibility of being made free of any royalty or renumeration. It also expressly notes within S103 that one can petition to the Government if this occurs. The Chinese Patent Law notes governmental use through the language of 'great significance to national or public interests', and 'national emergency or extraordinary state of affairs. The possibility of appeal is also expressly noted in Article 58.

Neither United States or Canada have formally codified any mention of compulsory licensing for the use of dependent patents, though it does exist in the TRIPs agreement they both comply to. In India patent law, CLs is granted through this ground “only if it involves important technical advancement of considerable economic significance, and... only if it cannot be accomplished without infringing other patents.” In China, the law states that if an “invention/utility model represents major technological advancement...compared with earlier invention or utility model...and the exploitation of former relies on exploitation of the latter...”, a compulsory license may be granted.

Compulsory licensing for medicine in the United States again have never been codified, but have been used to encourage Bayer to reduce their prices under the possibility of being issued compulsory liceninsg. Home to many of the pharmaceutical industries who own patents to medicines, the United States has been called hypocritical due to its common lack of providing affordable pharmaceuticals. Canada allows for CLs under the Food and Drugs Act which points to the World Trade Organization guidelines. Prior to the repeal of its compulsory licensing act, Canada also had specific provisions relating to medicines, and was actually the first country to authorize the compulsory licensing of an AIDS drug for Rwanda for export.[43] In India, the only compulsory license that has ever been granted was for cancer drug Nexavar. In its compulsory licensing provision, it states that CLs are “available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products...to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing” abilities. Similar to the TRIPs agreement, it also states that none of the principles should impede the protection of public health and nutrition. China's patent laws state that CLs can be used for the benefit of public health. The Measures for Implementation specifies more specifically which countries and regions are allowed, which includes WTO members, or the 'underdeveloped' nations.

Only in the Indian Patent Law does it explicitly allow for CL in the event of exclusive grant backs due to anti-competition and/or not being reasonable to the public. On the contrary, the United States actually had allowed exclusive grant back in the Transparent Wrap Machine Corp v Stokes & Smith Co. case[44]. However, the FTC now strongly recommends against it as it is considered anticompetitive when a grant-back is exclusive[45]. Canada and China does not seem to have this condition in their laws.

Similarly, only in the Indian patent law does coercive package licensing provide for compulsory licensing. This clause may have implications on standard-essential patent pools when attempting to determine which patents are indeed 'essential', and if they comply with fair, reasonable, and non discriminatory regulations[46].

Indian Patent Law also expressly allows for compulsory licensing on the ground that a product is hindered by importation from abroad. It must be proven the lack of accessibility is soley due to the process of it being imported, perhaps affected by natural disasters, socioeconomic reasons, political instability, sanctions, or more – ultimately affecting the cost and availability of this product. [47]

Conclusion and Further Reflections on Compulsory Licensing
Ultimately, there seems to be no correlation between the detail and scope of compulsory licensing (and other codified) law, and the number of compulsory licenses granted. However, it must be noted that the Eastern countries of focus in this review have had much less time developing its intellectual property landscape. In addition, the comprehensiveness of India and China's patent laws also reflect the incorporation of valuable lessons learned from poor implementation of other countries.

The prevalence of broadly defined patents, patent trolling, and the increasing need to navigate patent thickets all act as barriers to innovation and production to a commercial scale in which these technologies can actually be disseminated. The Pervasive Technologies project looks ultimately at bridging the digital divide through providing access to low-cost technology, and subsequently access to information, culture, and knowledge.

Compulsory licenses can be used to decrease the cost burden of production, and reduce barriers to innovation, ultimately providing greater accessibility to these tools for all of society. The Centre for Internet and Society has proposed and continues to advocate the establishment of patent pools for low-access devices through the use of compulsory licenses to achieve this goal[48].

[1] WIPO. What Is Intellectual Property. World Intellectual Property Organization, 2012. Print. 5

[2] WIPO, 6

[3] Correa, Carlos M. “Intellectual Property Rights and the.” Trade Related Agenda Development and Equity (1999): 3

[4] Contreras, Jorge L., and Charles R. McManis. “Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property: A Viable Policy Lever for Promoting Access to Critical Technologies?” TRIPS and Developing Countries – Towards a New World Order? (Gustavo Ghidini, Rudolph J.R. Peritz & Marco Ricolfi, eds., 2014 (Edward Elgar)) (2014): 112 Print.

[5] Abraham, Sunil. Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-Cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses. 27 June 2013. Accessed: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices

[6] The Paris Convention is an intellectual property treaty covering industrial property: patents, trademarks, industrial designs, utility models, service marks, trade names, and geographical indicators.

WIPO. “Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883).” World Intellectual Property Organization. Website. http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html

[7] WIPO. “WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties.” World Intellectual Property Organization. Website. http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2

[8] The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the largest free trade agreement in the world, with members Canada, United States, and Mexico.
USTR. “North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).” Office of the United States Representative. Website. http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta

[9] The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property RIghts (TRIPS) agreement is a treaty which provides basic intellectual property provisions for international law, and stipulates that members shall be free to determine methods of implementing the provisions, in addition to enact more specific measures provided it coincides with the rest of the agreement.
World Trade Organization. “Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods.”WTO Legal Texts - A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. Website. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement

[10] TRIPS - Article 31.a)

[11] TRIPS - Article 31.b)

[12] TRIPS - Article 31.b)

[13] TRIPS – Article 31.h)

[14] TRIPS – Article 31.c)

[15] TRIPS – Article 31

[16] fWHO. “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health.” World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/

[17] Correa, 11-12.

[18] Fauver, Cole M. “Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come.” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 8.3 (1988): 666–685. Print. p671

[19] Correa, 13

[20] Ferrell, John. Patent Pro Se: The Entrepreneur’s Guide to Provisional Patent Applications. BayWater Publishing, 2010. Print.

[21] Milchenko, Oleg. “Contemporary Anti-Competetive Practices of Patents Usage.” Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 8.3 (2013): 1-13. Print.

[22] Shapiro, Carl. “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licneses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting.” Innovation Policy and the Economy 1 (2001): 119–150. Print.

[23] McGurk, Thomas B. “The Grant-Back Clause in Your Technology License.” Biodiesel Magazine 17 Jan. 2013.

[24] Origin IP Academy. “Exclusive Grant Back License.” Origiin IP Academy 15 Nov. 2009. Blog. Accessed: http://origiinipae.blogspot.in/2009/11/exclusive-grant-back-license.html

[25] Dykeman, David J. “When Licensing out Patents, Make Sure Improvements Are Granted Back.” Boston Business Journal 8 Mar. 2006. Blog retrieved from: http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2006/03/when-licensing-out-patents-make-sure.html?page=all

[26] Origiin IP Academy. “Coercive Package Licensing.” Origiin IP Academy 11 Nov. 2009. Accessed: http://origiinipae.blogspot.in/2009/11/coercive-package-licensing.html

[27] Reddy, Prashant. “‘Working’ a Patent under the Indian Patent Act, 970 - Does Importation of a Patented Invention Count?” Spicy IP - Decoding Indian Intellectual Property Law. 22 Apr. 2010. Retrieved: http://spicyip.com/2010/04/working-patent-under-indian-patent-act.html

[28] Yang, Deli. “Compulsory Licesning: For Better or for Worse, the Done Deal Lies in the Balance.” Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 17 (2012): 76–81; p80 Print. Global IP Debates

[29] Shaw, Malcom N. International Law 7th Edition. 5th ed. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.

[30] Canada had repealed its section on Compulsory Licensing in order to comply with the TRIPS and NAFTA agreements

[31] A more comprehensive approach could be to assess broadly ALL the compulsory licensing cases rather than just a select few ….particularly for United States and Canada...

[32] http://www.aals.org/documents/2006intprop/JeromeReichmanOutline.pdf

[33] Reichman, Jerome. “Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing United States Law and Practice with Options under the TRIPS Agreement.” Vancouver, Canada: Duke University School of Law, 2006.

[34] Reichman, Jerome H. “Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options.” The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 37.2 (2009): 247–263. Print.

[35] Pharmaceutical products' means any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary for their manufacture and diagnostic kits required for their use"

[36] Dratler, Jay. Licensing of Intellectual Property. New York: Law Journal Press, 2005: 7.89 Print.

[37] Miller, Mark E., and David S. Almeling. “DOJ, FTC Redefine Antitrust Rules on Patent Pools.” National Law Journal. 29 Oct. 2007.

[38] Therefore compulsory licensing can be granted given Controller agrees

[39] Raja, Kanaga. “US Leads the World in Use of Compulsory Licenses, Says KEI.” Third World Network. N.p., 18 Mar. 2014.

[40] Bakhru, Rachna. “India Grants First Compulsory Licence under Patents Act.” Intellectual Property Magazine June 2012: 46–47. Print.

[41] Miller Canfield. “China Allows Compulsory Licensing.” Law FIrm of Miller Canfield. Dec. 2012. Retreived: http://www.millercanfield.com/resources-321.html

[42] Genevaz, Simon. “Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusal to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distingusih between IP and Other Property Rights.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 19.2 (2014): 742–784. Print.

[43] World Trade Organization. “Canada Is First to Notify Compulsory License to Export Generic Drug.” WTO | 2007 News Items. N.p., 4 Oct. 2007.

[44] sSchmalbeck, Richard L. “The Validity of Grant-Back Clauses in Patent Licensing Agreements.” University of Chicago Law Review 42 (1975): 733–748.

[45] Miller & Ameling, 2007: 3

[46] Lerner, Josh, and Jean Tirole. “Standard-Essential Patents.” Working Paper 43.

[47] Reddy, 2010

[48] See Executive Director of CIS' letter to the government here: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/grounds-for-compulsory-patent-licensing-in-us-canada-china-and-india