Access To Knowledge (A2K)

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text – II: What India’s ITU Proposal May Mean for Internet Governance

geetha — 2014-11-03T07:07:16Z

The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.

Disclaimer and update (2 November 2014): India's Draft Resolution was discussed during the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Internet-related Resolutions at the ITU Plenipot on the evening of November 1, 2014 (KST). After the discussion, India revised the text of the resolution, seeking to address concerns raised by ITU member states. The revised resolution may be found here. However, this blog post was written with reference to the original text of India's Draft Resolution.

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As I mentioned in my last post, India’s Draft Resolution on ‘ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society’ raises security and equity concerns. The Draft Resolution has 3 security concerns: (i) security weaknesses in the network architecture that permit “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication” and make “tracing of communication difficult”; (ii) non-systematic, non-contiguous allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, which makes it difficult to identify both the users and what states the IP addresses are located in; (iii) non-local routing and address resolution relating to traffic originating and terminating in the same country. Op. §§1, 3-7 seek to address these. It also identifies the present system of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources as inequitable, unfair, unjust and undemocratic (Op. §2 of the Draft Resolution offers a solution). I discussed some human rights implications of India’s Draft Resolution in my last post.

In this post, I explore the implications of the Draft Resolution for Internet governance and multi-stakeholder approaches (most notably, an equal footing model).[1] Given the uncertainties around defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance, this is rather ambitious. So I will try to point to concerns with certain textual interpretations of the Draft Resolution, map that against the positions India’s representatives have taken on Internet governance in the past, and the motivations/concerns that underlie the tabling of the Draft Resolution. This Resolution may not be the best way to allay India's concerns, for there are technical and rights implications. But the concerns it raises are worth discussion and knowledge, and at forums where concerns are heard, acknowledged and discussed collectively. The text of the Draft Resolution and its attendant implications are not, then, the sole subjects of this post.

The Draft Resolution and Internet governance:

The text of the Draft Resolution is problematic. Many of its clauses may be seen as taking positions against multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance. Introducing such a resolution at the ITU may itself bring back memories of the controversies surrounding Resolution 3 of the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), 2012.[2] In 3 ways, the text of the Draft Resolution has indications for multi-stakeholder approaches.

First, the Draft Resolution frames issues primarily from the perspective security. In its preamble, the Draft Resolution makes several references to security threats posed by and on the Internet. For instance, it points to the ability of the network to “camouflage the identity of the originator of the communication” (Pream. §(e) [recognizing]), as well as national security concerns in the present-day system of routing Internet traffic through multiple countries (Pream. §§(f) and (g), [recognizing]). The apparent difficulty in tracing IP addresses, due to their random allocation, is another concern (Pream. §(h), [recognizing]). Among the “significant public policy issues” identified in telecom/ICT management, “security and safety of the Telecom/ICTs” is specifically noted (Pream. §(i) [considering]). In the Context note to the Draft Resolution and in several places in the Preamble, there are references to ITU Resolution 130 (‘Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in the use of information and communication technologies’) and ITU’s Cyber-security Agenda. Given the (legitimate or otherwise) disproportionate involvement of governments and not other stakeholders in matters of cyber-security, the framing of issues from a security perspective may lend itself to worries for multi-stakeholderism. Specifically, the Draft Resolution notes: “ensuring security of ICT networks is sovereign right of Member States” (Pream. §(b) [recognizing]).

Second, the Draft Resolution emphasizes the sovereign right of states to regulate and control telecom/ICT. It says, for instance, “it is the sovereign right of each state to regulate its telecommunication” (Pream. §(b) [considering]). With regard to the Internet, the Context note to the Draft Resolution (page 1) considers the Internet to be synonymous with telecom/ICTs: “the Telecom/ICTs, which in common lexicon is used interchangeably many times as Internet…”. Public telecom networks managed by telecom service providers, interconnected with other networks, are necessary for “proper functioning of a telecom network resources namely, among others, naming, numbering and addressing” (Pream. §(k) [considering]). It is worth noting that the sovereign authority of states over Internet public policy issues is settled text from §35 of the Tunis Agenda, though expressing it as synonymous with telecom may lead to possibilities of licensing and registration, which Bulgaria, for instance, does not do.

Third, the Draft Resolution identifies issues of equity and fairness in the allocation of Internet resources such as naming, numbering and addressing (Pream. §(g) [consdering], Op. §2). It states that to correct this inequity, “facilitation and collaboration among international, inter-governmental organizations and individual member states to ensure planning, implementation, monitoring and cooperation in its policies” is required (Pream. §(g) [considering]). In operative paragaphs, our Draft Resolution calls for collaboration with “all the concerned stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations to develop policies for allocation, assignment and management of IP resources including naming, numbering and addressing which is systematic, equitable, fair, just, democratic and transparent” (Op. §2). One may pay attention to the oversight over implementation and the necessity of inter-governmental involvement in planning and monitoring as problematic to iterations of multi-stakeholderism.

These concerns are valid and legitimate, and it is desirable that the text of the resolution be altered to address them. The text should also be altered to address the human rights concerns I point out in my previous post. But human rights enforcement or implementation is within the domain of states, though civil society may be a careful watchdog. The Draft Resolution's text, most certainly, will face certain oppositions: for instance, that it is outside the scope and mandate of the ITU. That the ITU does not deal with content regulation – and this issue touches upon content – will be mentioned. That Internet governance is already being discussed and performed in multiple other multi-stakeholder fora, such as ICANN, the NRO and RIRs, IGF and WSIS, will be emphasized. That the Draft Resolution implicates national security concerns will be mentioned as well. But as an aside, on national security: under international law, states always mention their prerogative over national security, and so as a matter of international custom, national security is outside the scope of agreements unless expressly surrendered.

At the same time, debates around the role of ITU in Internet governance are not new, and those familiar will remember the ITU’s views right before the creation of ICANN (also see Mueller, Ruling the Root 145-48 (2002)), Resolution 3 of the WCIT, and the constant tug-of-war since then. The new Secretary-General of the ITU, Mr. Houlin Zhao, wrote a note in October 2004, before the Tunis phase of the WSIS, justifying ITU’s involvement in Internet governance, advocating that IPv6 address blocks be allocated to countries. Mr. Zhao describes, with specific examples, ITU's role in the development and widespread growth of the Internet. He takes the examples of standards developed within the ITU and ITU's policy role in liberalisation and spread of telecommunications (such as Articles 4 & 9 of the 1988 ITRs).

Mr. Zhao’s concrete proposals are rendered inapplicable by the creation of the NRO and RIRs, and the growth and entrenchment of ICANN. But it may be argued that his principled justifications for ITU involvement remain. It is these that India hopes to highlight, I was told, along with the inequities in resource allocation (IPv4 was spoken of), and the disproportionate weight some states enjoy in Internet governance. Her concerns are, I am told, also shared by some other states. Given that the text exhibits a less-than-friendly approach to multi-stakeholderism, India's previous positions on the issue are of interest. While this would not correct the snags in the Draft Resolution's text, allaying these concerns may be ideal to craft an inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder model for Internet governance.

India and Multi-stakeholderism in Internet Governance:

India’s position on multi-stakeholder models for Internet governance is a matter of some obscurity. Statements at various forums exhibit a certain disagreement – or at the least, lack of engagement – among India’s ministries on our position on multi-stakeholder approaches, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) and the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), both within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). While both the MEA and DOT have been cautious supporters of a diluted form of multi-stakeholderism (they have repeatedly emphasized §35 of the Tunis Agenda), DeitY has been more open in entertaining multi-stakeholder approaches for Internet governance.

At the 66^th session of UN General Assembly, Mr. Dushyant Singh, Member of India’s Parliament from the Bharatiya Janata Party, presented our proposal for a Committee on Internet-related Policies. The proposal sought the establishment of a UN committee comprising 50 member-states, with advisory groups including the private sector and civil society, to deal with Internet-related matters.[3] Though India was not opposed to multi-stakeholder advisories in its CIRP proposal, it was less than inviting in this regard.

At NETmundial (April 2014), the Indian government’s contribution document highlighted §35 of the Tunis Agenda, which delineates ‘roles and responsibilities’ of ‘respective stakeholders’ – i.e., governments (with whom reside “sovereign policy authority”), the private sector (technical and economic development of the Internet) and civil society (grassroots participation). At NETmundial, Mr. Vinay Kwatra of the MEA echoed this, also noting the lack of consensus on what multi-stakeholderism means for Internet governance (page 64).

Admittedly, this is a legitimate concern. Internet governance at various fora does not seem to have a clear answer on what multi-stakeholderism means. The debate was/is alive, for instance, at NETmundial 2014, the ICANN-convened IANA transition process, the World Economic Forum’s new NETmundial Initiative, and in the many calls and suggestions (pages 38-46) made over the years on strengthening the IGF (see also, Malcolm, Multi-stakeholder Governance and the IGF (2008), chapter 6). It is hardly surprising then, that India and other states raise this as a concern.

With regard to multi-stakeholderism, the DeitY in India has been the outlier. Speaking at the 2014 IGF in Istanbul, Mr. R.S. Sharma, Secretary (DeitY), expressed “no doubt that Internet Governance mechanism require the involvement of all the stakeholders, since the evolution of Internet has been a product of many different diverse groups working together in a loosely coordinated manner”, advocating strengthening of the IGF and pointing to India’s proposed India-IGF as an example of multi-stakeholderism at home. Most interestingly, Mr. Sharma did not focus on international Internet-related policies being the “sovereign policy authority of states”. Also in the transcripts of the four meetings of the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation under the Committee for Science, Technology and Development (CSTD), I have been unable to find outright rejections of multi-stakeholder approaches, though India has not advocated multi-stakeholderism unequivocally either.

But this – the emphasis on “sovereign policy authority of states” in Internet governance – has been a consistent position for India, especially the MEA and DOT. Here at the ITU PP-14 as well, members of the Indian delegation also emphasized states’ sovereign monopoly over policy matters. “Why not take this to the ITU”, I was asked, as “many governments are uncomfortable” with the way Internet governance is being conducted at other fora. There are grave concerns, I was told, about the possibility of excessive control some governments have over both user and government data of other states (government-speak, of course, for the Snowden revelations).

These are, of course, concerns similar to those of authoritarian governments, or those reluctant to open up to multi-stakeholderism and looking for excuses to retain/increase government control. But it is equally possible that these concerns need not be limited only to such states. Perhaps for developing countries as well, these are real concerns. In conversation with members of the Indian delegation at the ITU Plenipot, I was able to discern 3 broad concerns. First, the definition of multi-stakeholderism in Internet governance. India has not shown herself comfortable with an all-out endorsement of multi-stakeholderism. This is troubling. Civil society and the private sector in India will attest to the difficulties in engaging with our government at all levels. For instance, seeking a place on India's delegation for the Plenipot proved a disheartening exercise for some members of India's civil society.

But there are also conflicting indications. India is in the process of instituting an India-IGF, and CIS' Executive Director, Sunil Abraham, is on the MAG. India expressed agreement, at least in informal conversation, to opening up ITU documents to the public on grounds of public interest. The Law Commission of India recently conducted a multi-stakeholder consultation on media laws in India, and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) regularly conducts consultations, though the private sector is more active there. What is lacking in India, however, is a set of clear procedures and processes for multi-stakeholder engagement, particularly on Internet issues. Clear, public, accessible, foreseeable and predictable set of rules or processes on participation from civil society, private sector and academia would make a world of difference to multi-stakeholderism within India. But this lack should not blind states or other stakeholders to the genuineness of privacy/security or equity concerns - for instance, of the protection of our information from mass surveillance or the feasibility and actual participation of developing countries at many Internet governance fora.

Second, members of the delegation expressed concern over inequalities in the allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources. While I am uncertain how IPv6 allocation falls within this concern, the inequalities of IPv4 allocations are well documented. To gather a sense of this, it would be useful to read chapter 5 of Professor DeNardis’ Protocol Politics, and to glance at Figure 5.7 (page 173). Africa controls, for instance, a mere 1% of all available IPv4 addresses, while North America and Europe control about 63%. A study on engagement from the Asia-Pacific in Internet standards organisations shows, for instance, greater participation from Western countries and from some states like Japan.[4] India and other states from Asia and Africa have lesser participation. Even at ICANN, with efforts to increase participation, meaningful engagement is still from a majority of Western countries. Perhaps states and other stakeholders on the other side of the table can address these concerns through clear, inclusive, non-discriminatory commitments and implementation.

Third, India emphasized how the Draft Resolution does not propose that ITU be involved in content management or resources control, but only seeks to systematize allocation by asking the ITU Secretary General to collaborate and coordinate with other Internet governance organisations to create a set of principles for fair, equitable, transparent and democratic - as well as secure - allocation of resources. ITU Resolution 101 already instructs the Secretary General to collaborate with relevant Internet governance organisations, and the Draft Resolution merely seeks to spell out his tasks. However, as I pointed out in my previous post, the text of the Draft Resolution is at odds with this intention of India's. By dint of its drafting, it gravely implicates human rights, as well as touching upon resource allocation oversight ("needs to be adhere to" in Op. §2). To reflect the above stated intention, the Draft Resolution would need to be redrafted.

Finally, the text of the Draft Resolution exhibits, unfortunately, a certain disregard for existing network architecture and efficiency within the Internet, and to the principles of a free, open and inter-operable and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop a network architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing. An argument may, of course, be made in favour of efficiency and costs, including reduced latency. But it is clear that this has the potential to increase domestic surveillance capabilities and government censorship of content. In any case, traffic localization (if not local address resolution) can be achieved without ITU coordination: through Internet Exchange Points, and through more efficient and better-negotiated peering and transit arrangements (pages 14-17). Internationally coordinated rules for localized traffic routing is not necessary; you just need to have a more efficient Internet Exchange Point. How to get more ISPs to interconnect through India’s National Internet Exchange (NIXI) is one of the very questions that India’s Telecom Regulatory Authority has taken up in its recent consultation on expanding broadband access (page 49). So it is possible that India's concerns could be addressed without ITU involvement, though I am unsure of its impact on the global Internet.

The Draft Resolution will be discussed at the ITU Plenipot today. The discussion will allow India and sympathetic countries to raise several of their concerns relating to the present system of Internet governance, and the direction of its progress. I will report on these discussions upon their completion.

A Note on Limitations:

The aim of this post is to clarify. I would caution against its being the last word on anything, much less India’s positions on Internet governance. An issue as important as this needs far greater access to and confirmation from India’s government – and a more in-depth understanding of the politics – than I do, at the moment.

At the same time, India has not been a model for civil society engagement, as illustratively, the Narmada Bachao Andolan and/or P. Sainath’s evaluation of government policies in Everybody Loves a Good Drought reveal. It has been harder to effectively engage with India’s government than in many states in North America, Latin America and Europe. But I believe the complex dynamics of that is not unique to India. The NSA and GCHQ revelations (as an example of governmental trust deficit of unmatched proportions) have shown that where governments want to keep everyone out and oblivious, they do it well.

I am not in favour of a purely multilateral approach to Internet governance. But at the same time, I share concerns over definition and the evolution of processes as well, as I am sure others in civil society also do. Particularly on the issue of Internet governance and multi-stakeholderism, evidence reveals inconsistency among India’s various ministries. Until this is addressed by our government (hopefully in consultation with all concerned stakeholders), an open mind would probably be the best thing we - including states - could keep.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash, Rishabh Dara, Arun Sukumar, Anja Kovacs and Parminder Jeet Singh for the freedom to bounce ideas, feedback and the many discussions about multi-stakeholder approaches and Internet governance. I also wish to acknowledge Samir Saran’s article in CFR, which offers an interesting perspective on India’s Draft Resolution.

[1] For this post, I will use ‘multi-stakeholder approaches’ as an umbrella term, but would urge readers to keep in mind the many uncertainties and disagreements about defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance. These disagreements exist among and within all stakeholders, including government and civil society. In addition to various iterations of the ‘equal footing model’, the model proposed in §35 of the Tunis Agenda is also multi-stakeholder, albeit in a different – and for many in civil society, less desirable – sense.

[2] For those unacquainted with WCIT, see Mueller, ITU Phobia: Why WCIT was derailed, Internet Governance Blog (18 December 2012), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobia-why-wcit-was-derailed/; Kleinwächter, WCIT and Internet governance: Harmless resolution or Trojan horse?, CircleID Blog (17 December 2012), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20121217_wcit_and_internet_governance_harmless_resolution_or_trojan_horse/.

[3] For a commentary, see Mueller, A United Nations Committee for Internet-related Policies? A Fair Assessment, Internet Governance Blog (29 October 2011), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2011/10/29/a-united-nations-committee-for-internet-related-policies-a-fair-assessment/.

[4] Contreras, Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan, Korea and China. I am unable to find this paper online. Please email me for information.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-recalcitrant-text-2013-ii-what-india2019s-itu-proposal-may-mean-for-internet-governance

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms

geetha — 2014-11-02T15:13:45Z

At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled a draft proposal on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“Draft Resolution”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.

Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:

First, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “security weaknesses” such as “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication”;[1] random IP address distribution also makes “tracing of communication difficult”;[2]
Second, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;[3]
Third, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;[4] similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.[5]

In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:

First, to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “effectively ensure the traceability of communication”;[6]
Second, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an “IP address plan” which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;[7]
Third, to develop and recommend “a public telecom network architecture” that localizes both routing[8] as well as address resolution[9] for local/domestic traffic to “within the country”.

Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “systematic, fair and equitable allocation” of, inter alia, naming, numbering and addressing resources,[10] keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.[11] In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “concentration of control over Internet resources”, though “certain governments” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “roadmap for the systematization” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the Geneva Plan of Action, 2003.

Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. First, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s NSA files and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,[12] either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. Second, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and finally, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.

In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.

Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:

India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:

Pream. §(e): “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;
Pream. §(h): “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. Snowden used Tor while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is reported to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were coerced into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the NSA and GCHQ have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has offered a reward to anyone who can.

Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports suggesting that Tor is being used by offenders, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after Snowden’s revelations, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been recognized by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…”.

Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to dismantle the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].[13] Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, wrote Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).

So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and prima facie violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.

To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in Weber & Saravia v. Germany [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that enables surveillance without sufficient safeguards is prima facie unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in Delfi AS v. Estonia [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.

The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for all IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been arbitrary, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.

In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of WHOIS records and registries with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a licence to operate and offer services.

If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as traceroute or IP look-up that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.

If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.

[1] Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.

[2] Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

[3] Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.

[4] Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.

[5] Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.

[6] Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.

[7] Op. §1, Draft Resolution; see note 3.

[8] Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.

[9] Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.

[10] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”

[11] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.

[12] See, for instance, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf. See esp. note 30 of the Report, ¶35.

[13] Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; ex. see Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms

Gone in a flash

praskrishna — 2011-04-20T04:58:48Z

Net-savvy crowds gather in public places for moments of wacky fun, then vanish. This article by Neha Thirani was published in the Times of India Crest Edition on April 16, 2011.

It's an ordinary day at the MGF mall in Gurgaon, when a group of fifteen people suddenly appears carrying lanterns made from discarded plastic bottles and starts passing them along in relay fashion. Starting from the plaza in front of the mall, the crowd goes into the metro station nearby and back again, and then suddenly disperses, attracting amused stares from befuddled passersby. This lantern-wielding crowd is a flash mob, a global phenomenon that has now hit India.

So is this part of a mass social experiment? Political movement? Performance art? Pointless fun? Malini Kochupillai and Kanishka Prasad, both professors at the Sushant School of Art and Architecture in Gurgaon who orchestrated the event, say it's an effort to add a modicum of vibrancy to otherwise ignored public places, reclaiming the space for public use. Along with their students, the duo has organised about a dozen such 'flash mobs'.

For the uninitiated, a flash mob appears to be entirely random - a group of people, performing an unusual and seemingly pointless act and then dispersing. For those in the know, the flash mob is mobilised by an organiser, who brings together a crowd of people at a predefined location and time via social media, viral emails or mass texting. The crowd then carries out a scripted series of actions. The participants are typically strangers and the purpose is usually satire. Their actions transform a public place for the period of the performance, and engender discussion at the unexpected.

This rather quirky social phenomenon, popular in the US and Europe, originated in 2003 when Bill Wasik, senior editor of Harper's Magazine, organised the first successful flash mob in Macy's department store. Over a hundred people converged on the store, gathered over an expensive rug and pretended to be shopping for a 'love rug' for their shared apartment. Wasik's aim was apolitical. Through amusement, he wanted to question notions of conformity and the hipster culture of wanting to be a part of the 'next big thing'. Since then, there have been hugely successful flash mobs all over Europe and America. The biggest recorded flash mob has been the International Pillow Fight Day, which took place on March 22, 2008 in over 25 cities simultaneously. More recently, Egypt has seen a series of flash mobs who left security forces befuddled by their silent protests.

While the word was officially coined in 2003, the phenomenon can be traced back to 18th century England where workers in an assembly line would stitch secret messages into garments to plan a congregation of strangers.

Nishant Shah, research director for the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore, says the growth in places of globalised consumption parallels the formation of flash mobs. "We can call malls places of public consumption, but at the back of our minds is the uneasy thought that the sign reads - rights of entry reserved. The mall, then, is only for certain public, " says Shah. "What flash mobs do is abuse the space - subverting the intention of the space that they are orchestrated in. "

This social experiment that has now made its way to metros across the country has been loosely related to locations of consumerism. The first ever flash mob in India took place on October 4, 2003 when a group of over 60 people swarmed the then newly built Crossroads mall in Mumbai. The flash mobbers shocked the malls security guards when they inexplicably starting screaming into their cellphones vague directions such as: "Infosys becho ek hazaar, and SBI gheun tak don she. " This was followed by some frenzied dancing, and a moment later, they were gone.

New media professional Noel Braganza, 26, organised a flash mob in the main courtyard of Phoenix Mills, Mumbai on Independence Day last year. Along with his colleague Nicole, Braganza spread the message over social media entirely;"We didn't take any prior permission, and this was possible because we organised it around Independence Day - our concept was patriotic, not disruptive, " says Braganza. At 4 pm on August 15, 2010, a crowd of over one hundred people, dressed in tri-color, lined up in rows in the courtyard of Pheonix Mills, sang the national anthem and then dispersed. Though most were there by design, some of the shoppers present joined spontaneously. "There was a huge snaking queue outside Big Bazaar that stopped in its tracks and started singing. "

The Urban Gorillaz - as the Gurgaon group is called - has organised its events with a particular focus on reclaiming spaces that have largely been ignored, or usurped by private developers. "Most public spaces in Delhi are decrepit and in desperate need of refurbishment, " says Kochupillai. "Perhaps increased use of these spaces will push the authorities to look beyond roads, flyovers and parking lots and give pedestrians an equally deserving space in the public realm. " The group encourages people to engage with the spaces available to them so that they do not become unused and unsafe.

By studying what prevents or promotes the use of public space - such as movement patterns, active/ inactive zones and traffic interference in pedestrian areas - the group hopes to encourage architects and urban planners to create spaces where people can relax without feeling like they are trespassing or encroaching. "A flash mob says that you can create public spaces but we will decide how we will use them, " says Nishant Shah. "It gives a certain sense of power to the user who is no longer a consumer but an architect of the space. "

Started as an exercise in an architecture class at the Sushant School of Art and Architecture, the Urban Gorillaz facebook group has grown to over 400 members.

Up until now, they have orchestrated over ten flash mobs doing a variety of random acts from exercising in the main courtyard of Heritage city, flying paper planes in an office complex, sketching people passing by in a mall, creating installations for passersby to paint and building a canopy on a sidewalk with rope and bamboo. The one which attracted the most attention was during the Commonwealth Games, where they organised the 'Common Man Games' at Nehru Place to entertain Delhi citizens who were sidelined during the games. The games included track and field and pitthu.

"The first reaction of most people is what are you selling or promoting? And I reply that I am promoting public space, " says Kochupillai. "On occasions when guards have asked us to stop, we simply move into an area that is not under their jurisdiction. " The group has not encountered much antagonism, with most people amused rather than angry. Pragya Vig, 19, is a member of the group and a second year student at the college. "It set me thinking - why aren't we using the public spaces?" says Vig.

In the coming month, the Urban Gorillaz are planning flash mobs in the metro to raise awareness for a women's right to personal space.

Not all flash mobs have any apparent rationale. In the week after the death of Michael Jackson, Bangalore saw a spontaneous flash mob. At every red light signal, whenever the traffic would stop, people would suddenly come together and perform popular Michael Jackson dance moves. When the light changed, they would be gone in a flash.

Read the article in the Times of India

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/changing-tide

GoldenEye ransomware attack hit operations at Pipavav Port, JNPT

praskrishna — 2017-07-06T22:53:13Z

Shipping ministry says the GoldenEye ransomware attack at JNPT and Pipavav port may result in bunching of inbound and outbound cargo.

The article by Jyotika Sood and Utpal Bhaskar was published in Livemint on June 28, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Operations at one of three terminals at India’s largest container port, Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) run by AP Moller-Maersk, near Mumbai, were disrupted by a global ransomware attack, the port said on Wednesday. The version that caused the disruption has been dubbed GoldenEye by security firm Bitdefender Labs.

Operations at the Danish firm’s terminal at Gujarat Pipavav Port were also affected, but by the Petya variant of the ransomware.

Ransomware typically logs users out of their own systems and asks them to pay a ransom if they want to access the encrypted data.

“The central server is in Europe which we can’t control. It is not a problem aimed at India... we have become collateral damage,” said a senior Indian government official involved in cybersecurity operations.

The ransomware hit the integrated transport and logistics firm’s global operations on Tuesday across its 75 terminals. It also impacted Chernobyl’s radiation monitoring system, law firm DLA Piper, pharma firm Merck, a number of banks, an airport, the Kiev metro, British advertising giant WPP and Russian oil firm Rosneft, according to Bitdefender Labs.

“The IT (information technology) department of JNPT became aware of the attack at around 4.30pm on Tuesday. The Windows server started conking off and the master file got encrypted and we couldn’t access any data. The operations immediately came to a standstill,” said a JNPT official requesting anonymity.

AP Moller-Maersk operates the Gateway Terminals India (GTI) at JNPT which has a capacity to handle 1.8 million standard container units. JNPT, which ships more than half the containerized cargo passing through India’s ports, serves a vast hinterland comprising all of northern and western India.

“While DP World and JNPT terminals are operational, the Gateway Terminals India operated by APM is completely shut,” said the JNPT official.

This is the second major ransomware attack since May after hackers exploited a loophole that was first identified by the US National Security Agency, to create WannaCry, that affected several businesses in more than 150 countries including India.

The ministry of corporate affairs and the Andhra Pradesh Police were affected, besides several large organizations..

“While the terminal operator is taking steps to address the issues disrupting operations, it is anticipated that there could be bunching of in-bound and out-bound container cargo,” India’s shipping ministry said in a statement.

Maersk group, through its terminal and infrastructure business, has invested $800 million in India.

“The global attack has impacted APM terminal of the JNPT port. The operations at the terminal have slowed down and are being entered manually. We are trying to handle the crisis by diverting traffic to other terminals,” JNPT chairman Anil Diggikar said, adding that JNPT’s operations have not been affected to a great extent.

He said it would take around 24 hours to clear the backlog.

Gujarat Pipavav Port told stock exchanges that the ransomware did not have “any major impact on the company at this point in time”.

Concerns have been expressed about the safety of India’s infrastructure projects with power generation and transmission projects figuring high on terrorist threat lists.

Ravi Shankar Prasad, minister of electronics and information technology, on Wednesday said advisories have been issued and the government is keeping a close watch on developments.

The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), the agency coordinating efforts on cybersecurity issues, in a 27 June advisory warned, “It has been reported that variants of Petya ransomware with work-like capabilities are spreading.”

Such attacks pose a grave threat to the economy and businesses. Cybersecurity Ventures predicts global annual cybercrime costs will grow from $3 trillion in 2015 to $6 trillion by 2021.

Experts believe India is ill-equipped to face such attacks.

“These cases of malware attacks highlight the need for proper planning of cybersecurity at all levels, especially for the government infrastructure networks,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a Bengaluru-based think tank.

“Transportation and shipping companies are ill-prepared for cyberattacks,” added Amit Jaju, executive director, fraud investigation and dispute services, EY.

The emergency playing out at the ports assumes significance, given India’s Rs8 trillion investment plan until 2035 under the Sagarmala programme, which involves the construction of new ports to harness the country’s 7,517km coastline and setting up of as many as 142 cargo terminals at major ports.

“Indian companies lose approximately Rs40,000 crore due to cybercrime every year. India is among the top 5 countries today in terms of the frequency and the number of cyber attacks,” Jaju said.

“We are not prepared at all. This is a question of cyber literacy because the latest attack has reused the same Windows vulnerability that was exploited by WannaCry ransomware last month and for which security patches were released almost three months ago by Microsoft,” added cybersecurity expert Mohit Kumar.

Anirudh Laskar, Mayank Aggarwal, Shally Seth & Komal Gupta contributed to the story.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-june-28-2017-jyotika-sood-utpal-bhaskar-golden-eye-ransomware-attack-hit-operations-at-pipavav-port-jnpt

GNI-Industry Dialogue Learning Session: Human Rights Impact Assessments and Due Diligence in the ICT sector

elonnai — 2016-04-06T15:42:41Z

Elonnai Hickok attended the meeting organized by Global Network Initiative on March 11, 2016 in Washington D.C.

The GNI welcomed its new observers from the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue by holding a learning session in conjunction with the GNI Board Meeting on March 10. This learning session aimed to increase understanding between the GNI and the ID by examining some of the common challenges that face ICT companies in the area of human rights due diligence and highlighting good practices. A second objective was to help the GNI develop a learning program and materials that will be useful for its members and draw on their expertise. Finally, this learning session informed the review of the GNI Implementation Guidelines that will take place during 2016.

The session took place according to the Chatham House Rule. Each short presentation was followed by a space for questions and answers.

Human Rights Impact Assessments in the ICT sector – Michael Samway
The Human Rights Due Diligence Process at Nokia – Laura Okkonen
Yahoo’s approach to Human Rights Impact Assessments– Nicole Karlebach and Katie Shay
Orange’s challenges and approach to doing business in Africa – Yves Nissim
Microsoft’s human rights impacts and the warrant case – Steve Crown and Bernard Shen
TeliaSonera’s approach to withdrawing from Eurasia – Patrik Hiselius
Considerations for company due diligence on the ground – Kathleen Reen and Babette Ngene, Internews

For discussion:

What are some of the common challenges facing current GNI member companies and ID member companies?
What do we consider to be good practices that are applicable to all?
What lessons can be applied to the review of the GNI Implementation Guidelines that will take place during 2016?

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/gni-industry-dialogue-learning-session-human-rights-impact-assessments-and-due-diligence-in-the-ict-sector

GNI Assessment Finds ICT Companies Protect User Privacy and Freedom of Expression

elonnai — 2014-01-20T06:17:46Z

Elonnai Hickok analyses a public report recently published by GNI on the independent assessment process for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. The report finds Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo to be in compliance with the GNI principles on privacy and freedom of expression.

Introduction

In January 2014, the Global Network Initiative (GNI) published the Public Report on the Independent Assessment Process for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. GNI is an industry consortium that was started in 2008 with the objective of protecting user’s right to privacy and freedom of expression globally. The main objectives of GNI are to provide a framework for companies that is based on international standards, ensure accountability of ICT companies through independent assessments, create opportunities for policy engagement, and create opportunities for stakeholders from multiple jurisdictions to engage in dialogue with each other. The Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, is a member of GNI. Companies based in India have yet to join as members to the GNI network.

Overview of the Public Report

The Public Report provides an overview of assessments completed on the practices and policies of Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft from 2011 - 2013 to measure company compliance with the GNI principles on freedom of expression and privacy. The principles lay out broad guidelines that member companies should seek to incorporate in their internal and external practices and speak to freedom of expression, privacy, responsible company decision making, multi – stakeholder collaboration, and organizational governance, accountability, and transparency. The GNI principles have also been developed with Implementation Guidelines to provide companies with a framework for companies to respond to government requests. The assessment carried out by GNI reviewed cases in each company pertaining to governmental: blocking and filtering, takedown requests, criminalization of speech, intermediary liability, selective enforcement, content surveillance, and requests for user information.

Importantly, the assessment undertaken by GNI finds Yahoo, Microsoft, and Google to be in compliance with the GNI principles on freedom of expression and privacy. The Report highlights practices by the companies that work to protect freedom of expression and privacy such as conducting human rights impact assessments, issuing transparency reports, and notifying affected users when content is removed, have been, adopted by these companies. For example, Google conducts Human Rights Impact Assessments to assess potential threats to freedom of expression and privacy. Google also has in place internal processes to review governmental requests impacting freedom of expression and privacy, and the legal team at Google prepares a “global removal report” to provide a bird’s eye view of trends emerging from content removal requests. If Google has the email address of a user who’s posted content is removed, Google will often notify the user and directs the user to the Chilling Effects website. Google has also published a transparency report since 2010. Like Google, Microsoft conducts Human Rights Impact Assessments before making decisions on whether to incorporate certain features into its platforms when operating in high risk markets. Microsoft has also issued two global law enforcement requests reports in 2013. Yahoo has established a Business and Human Rights Program to ensure responsible actions are taken by the company with regards to freedom of expression and privacy, and now issues transparency reports about government requests. Yahoo’s Public Policy team also engages in dialogue with governments on an international level about existing and proposed legislation impacting and implicating privacy and freedom of expression.

The Report highlights challenges to compliance with the GNI principles that companies face – namely legal restraints and mandates that they are faced with. On the issue of transparency, the assessment found that companies do not disclose information when there are legal prohibitions on such disclosure, when users privacy would be implicated, when companies choose to assert attorney client privilege, and when trade secrets are involved. Despite this, the assessment found that companies do deny and push back on governmental requests impacting freedom of expression and privacy for reasons such as the request needed clarification and modification, or that the request needed to follow established procedure.

A number of findings came out of the assessments undertaken for the Report including:

As demonstrated by the lack of ability to access information about secret national security requests, and the lack of ability for companies to disclose information on this topic there is a dire need for governments to reform surveillance policy and law impacting freedom of expression and privacy.
The implementation of the GNI Principles is challenging when a company is undergoing an acquisition. In this scenario, contractual provisions limiting third party disclosure are critical in ensuring protection of privacy and free expression rights.
Companies need to pro-actively and on an ongoing basis internally review governmental restrictions on content to determine if it is in compliance with the commitment made by that company to the GNI Principles.

The assessment resulted in GNI defining a number of actionable (non-binding) recommendations for companies such as:

Improving the integration of human rights considerations in the due diligence process with respect to the acquiring and selling companies.
Consider the impact of hardware on freedom of expression and privacy.
Improve external and internal reporting.
Review employee access to user data to ensure that employee access rights are restricted by both policy and technical measures on a ‘need to know’ basis across global operations.
Review executive management training.
Improve stakeholder engagement.
Improve communication with users.
Increase sharing of best practices.
The GNI principles are focused on freedom of expression and privacy and are based on internationally recognized laws and standards for human rights.

NSA leaks, global push for governmental surveillance reform, and the Public Report

With special attention given to the various companies responses to the NSA leaks, the Report notes that in response to the NSA leaks the assessed companies have issued public statements and filed legal challenges with the US government and filed suit with the FISA Court seeking the right to disclose data relating to the number of FISA requests received with the public. All three companies have also supported legislation and policy that would allow for such transparency. Furthermore in December 2014, the companies , along with other internet companies, developed and issued the five Principles on Global Government Surveillance Reform. Similar to other efforts to end mass and disproportionate surveillance, such as the Necessary and Proportionate principles, the Principles on Global Government Surveillance Reform address: Limiting Governments’ Authority to Collect Users’ Information, Oversight and Accountability, Transparency about Government Demands, Respecting the Free Flow of Information, Avoiding Conflicts Among Governments. Other companies that signed these principles include AOL, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter.

Along these lines, on January 14^th, GNI released the statement “Surveillance Reforms to Protect Rights and Restore Trust”, urging the U.S Government to review and enact surveillance legislation that incorporate a ‘rights based’ approach to issues involving national security. In the statement, GNI specifically recommends the Government to action and: end mass collection of communications metadata, protect and uphold the rights of non-Americans, continue to increase transparency of surveillance practices, support the use of strong encryption standards.

Conclusion and way forward

Looking ahead, GNI is planning on developing and implementing a mechanism to address effectively address consumer engagement and complaints issued by individuals who feel that GNI member companies have not acted consistently with the commitments made as a GNI member. GNI is also looking to expand work around public policy and surveillance.

The Public Report on the Independent Assessment Process for Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo is an important step towards ensuring ICT sector companies are accountable to the public in their practices impacting freedom of expression and privacy. The assessment comes at a time when ICT companies often find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place – with Governments issuing surveillance and censorship demands with mandates for non-disclosure, and the public demanding transparency, company resistance to such demands from the Government, and a strong commitment to users freedom of expression and privacy. Hopefully, the GNI assessment is and will evolve into a middle ground for ICT companies – where they can be accountable to the public and their customers and compliant with Governmental mandates in all jurisdictions that they operate in. It will be interesting to see if in the future Indian companies join GNI as members and being to adopt the GNI principles and undergo GNI assessments.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-assessment-finds-ict-companies-protect-user-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression

GNI and IAMAI Launch Interactive Slideshow Exploring Impact of India's Internet Laws

jyoti — 2014-07-17T12:01:01Z

The Global Network Initiative and the Internet and Mobile Association of India have come together to explain how India’s Internet and technology laws impact economic innovation and freedom of expression.

The Global Network Initiative (GNI), and the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) have launched an interactive slide show exploring the impact of existing Internet laws on users and businesses in India. The slide show created by Newsbound, and to which Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has contributed its comments—explain the existing legislative mechanisms prevalent in India, map the challenges of the regulatory environment and highlight areas where such mechanisms can be strengthened.

Foregrounding the difficulties of content regulation, the slides are aimed at informing users and the public of the constraints of current legal mechanisms in place, including safe harbour and take down and notice provisions. Highlighting Section 79(3) and the Intermediary Liability Rules issued in 2011, the slide show identifies some of the challenges faced by Internet platforms, such as the broad interpretation of the legislation by the executive branch.

Challenges governing Internet platforms highlighted in the slide show include uniform Terms of Service that do not consider the type of service being provided by the platform, uncertain requirements for taking down content and compliance obligations related to information disclosure. Further the issues of over compliance and misuse of the legal notice and take down system introduced under Section 79 of the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules 2011.

The Rules were created with the purpose of providing guidelines for the ‘post-publication redressal mechanism expression as envisioned in the Constitution of India'. However, since their introduction, the Rules have been criticised extensively, by both the national and the international media on account of not conforming to principles of natural justice and freedom of expression. Critics have pointed out that by not recognising the different functions performed by the different intermediaries and by not providing safeguards against misuse of such mechanism for suppressing legitimate expression, the Rules have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Under the current Rules, the third party provider/creator of information is not given a chance to be heard by the intermediary, nor is there a requirement to give a reasoned decision by the intermediary to the creator whose content has been taken down. The take down procedure also, does not have any provisions for restoring the removed information, such as providing a counter notice filing mechanism or appealing to a higher authority. Further, the content criteria for removal of content includes terms like 'disparaging' and 'objectionable', which are not defined and prima facie seem to be beyond the reasonable restrictions envisioned by the Constitution of India. With uncertainty in content criteria and no safeguards to prevent abuse complainant may send frivolous complaints and suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions.

Most importantly, the redressal mechanism under the Rules shifts the burden of censorship, previously, the exclusive domain of the judiciary or the executive, and makes it the responsibility of private intermediaries. Often, private intermediaries, do not have sufficient legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim, resulting in over compliance to limit liability. The slide show cites the 2011 CIS research carried out by Rishabh Dara to determine whether the Rules lead to a chilling effect on online free expression, towards highlighting the issue of over compliance and self censorship.

The initiative is timely, given the change of guard in India, and stresses, not only the economic impact of fixing the Internet legal framework, but also the larger impact on users rights and freedom of expression. The initiative calls for a legal environment for the Internet that enables innovation, protects the rights of users, and provides clear rules and regulations for businesses large and small.

See the slideshow here: How India’s Internet Laws Can Help Propel the Country Forward

Other GNI reports and resources:

Closing the Gap: Indian Online Intermediaries and a Liability System Not Yet Fit for Purpose

Strengthening Protections for Online Platforms Could Add Billions to India’s GDP

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-and-iamai-launch-interactive-slideshow-exploring-impact-of-indias-internet-laws

Gmail users beware while giving access

Admin — 2018-10-08T15:25:26Z

Recently, Google admitted to giving hundreds of firms access to users’ Gmail inboxes. It also revealed that many apps are able to scan and share data from email inboxes. However, Google explained that it vets third parties that are given access, and permission should be given by the user.

The article by Surupasree Sarmmah was published in Deccan Herald on October 4, 2018.

Metrolife asks Gmail users if they were aware of giving permission to third-party apps and talks to an expert to see if access to emails can make a user vulnerable to blackmail, loss of individual liberty and compromise on one’s safety.

Vinod Singha, finance lead, IDP Events, says, “It is shocking that a third party is given access to a user’s Facebook and Gmail data. These third-party apps will put the user’s name on a target group to sell products and services, without the person’s knowledge. It’s high time we, as users, become aware of both advantages and disadvantages of online data sharing.”

Pallavi Shivakumar, assistant professor, says, “There should be more transparency and accountability from these app developers. There might not be any violation from their end but this is definitely a case of infiltration. I also feel that people need to be more aware of the footprint they are leaving behind.”

Aayush Rathi, policy officer, Centre for Internet and Society, says that the Cambridge Analytica scandal is an example of misuse of access to data granted to third parties.

He elaborates, “Google mandates every user to give consent to a third-party app before the app can access their information. A screen asking your permission to let the app access to your inbox pops up. While you may willingly click on that, the ripple effects will create problems — people you send emails to and who you receive emails from may also be impacted. Further, while as a user I may consent to a third party getting access to my inbox, what we may not be able to control is their sharing of our data with a fourth party.”

He adds that technically, Google is in the clear because unless an app gets consent from the user, it can’t access your inbox. The apps are also vetted by Google to see if they are in consonance with privacy standards; this is even before they are permitted to take permission from a user. “From a security point of view, Google claims to have high-end malware detection systems in place. Apps within the play store ecosystem can be vetted by Google but there are applications outside the ecosystem that can be used too. One of the central questions then becomes the degree to which we want Google to close down its API while maintaining data portability and interoperability considerations,” Aayush told Metrolife.

What can a user do?

Do your own vetting before giving access to a third-party app.
Regular review of the third-party applications you have given access to through Google settings on Gmail. email ID Google Google Account

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-october-4-2018-surupasree-sarmmah-gmail-users-beware-while-giving-access

Gmail ban looms for Indian gov't workers

praskrishna — 2013-09-19T07:19:11Z

Government workers in India will soon be banned from using Google’s Gmail service for official communication in a move said to be in response to revelations of widespread cyberspying by the US, a national paper reported.

Beatrice Thomas's blog post was published in Arabian Business.com on September 1, 2013. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

Two weeks after Dubai announced a ban on private emails by Government staff, a senior official in India’s Ministry of Communications and Information Technology said the crackdown would apply to 500,000 government employees, according to The Times of India.

They would be banned from using providers such as Gmail, which had servers based in the US, and instead asked to stick to the official email service provided by India's National Informatics Centre.

"Gmail data of Indian users resides in other countries as the servers are located outside," J Satyanarayana, secretary in the Department of Electronics and Information Technology, told the Times.

“Currently, we are looking to address this in the Government domain, where there are large amounts of critical data.”

The move comes in the wake of revelations by former US National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden that the US government had direct access to large amounts of personal data on the internet such as emails and chat messages from companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple through a program called PRISM.

The Times said several senior government officials in India, including ministers of state for communications and IT, Milind Deora and Kruparani Killi, had their Gmail IDs listed in government portals as their official email.

However, IT Minister Kapil Sibal said last week there had been no evidence of the US accessing internet data from India.

The newspaper quoted a senior official in the IT Department saying Gmail was preferred by employees because, compared to official email services, it was easy to set up.

Sibal said the new policy would require all government officials living abroad to use NIC servers that were directly linked to a server in India while accessing government email services.

Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bangalore-based research firm Centre for Internet and Society, said he agreed with the ban.

“After Snowden’s revelations, we can never be sure to what extent foreign governments are intercepting government emails," he told the Times.

It emerged last month that Dubai government employees had been banned from sending and receiving private emails at work, including the use of independent email providers such as Hotmail, Yahoo! and Gmail.

The new regulations announced by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President, Prime Minister and ruler of Dubai, specifically referred to religious and political communication as well as messages relating to charitable causes.

Workers are also not allowed to open unsolicited mail, spam or emails that contain viruses, or alter the date, time, source of destination information on an email.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/arabian-business-september-1-2013-beatrice-thomas-gmail-ban-looms-for-indian-govt-workers

Global Technology Summit 2017

Admin — 2017-12-05T13:47:57Z

The 2017 Global Technology Summit will take place on December 7 and 8, 2017 at the Hotel Leela Palace, Bangalore. Sunil Abraham is a speaker at the event.

Link to the original published by Carnegie here

The inaugural edition of the Global Technology Summit convened leading scholars, experts, and officials from more than ten countries for wide-ranging discussions on policy frameworks for technological innovation.

Building on its success, leading innovators, researchers, and entrepreneurs in cutting-edge technologies from around the world will engage with regulators, policy experts, and civil society actors this December in Bangalore.

The Summit will focus on new directions in technology policy, such as tech-diplomacy, data protection, and building an innovation ecosystem, as well as fields like digital finance, e-mobility, robotics, and smart cities, where massive technological transformation is likely in the coming years.

Agenda here

Panel Description

Navigating Big Data Challenges: Access to data, and capabilities to analyze the same, redefine the business moat for corporations and governance opportunities for governments. Data dictates product and policy success. It also raises complex challenges. With ever increasing hacks and vulnerabilities, data security continues to confound us. Data-driven businesses and governments also question core assumptions of privacy and individual reputation. Machine learning and deep learning, facilitated by data crunching algorithms, can either be coded to discriminate or learn from human data sets and imbibe the very same prejudices. This panel will deliberate upon these varied challenges, and explore possible policy frameworks to address them.

The panelists are:

Ann Cavoukian
Rahul Matthan
Vishnu Shankar
Rob Sherman
Sunil Abraham

Chaired by B.N. Srikrishna, former judge, Supreme Court of India

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/global-technology-summit-2017

Global Partners Meeting @ London

praskrishna — 2013-03-20T06:37:48Z

Privacy International is organizing the Global Partners Meeting in London from March 22 to 25, 2013. The workshop will be held at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Sunil Abraham and Malavika Jayaram will be participating in this event.

Click to read the full details published by Privacy International here.

The meeting is an opportunity to connect global partners with each other and with researchers, human rights advocates, and privacy and technology experts from over 20 countries. This will provide an opportunity for discussion and debate, that will enrich global research and advocacy agenda for the next two years.

Workshop Overview

The purpose of the three day workshop is as follows:

To understand the privacy discourse and identify the challenges faced in advancing the right to privacy across the globe.
To consolidate our network and look for opportunities for collaboration and cross-pollination for research and advocacy initiatives.
To share experiences about research, dissemination and advocacy strategies that influence policy change.

We envisage this workshop as a launching pad for the work that Privacy International and our global partners will conduct over the next two years under the ambit of the Surveillance and Freedom: Global Understandings and Rights Development (SAFEGUARD) project, funded by the International Development

Research Centre. The focus of the SAFEGUARD project is to understand what are the threats, challenges and obstacles to, and opportunities for, the protection of privacy in developing countries.

Background to the SAFEGUARD project

Nowhere are the challenges to, and opportunities for, privacy protections as dynamic and complex as in the developing world. As these countries seek new measures to develop their economies, build social and technological infrastructures, sustain their social systems, and ensure security they need to consider what are the modern policy frameworks they require to ensure a just society. The windows around these policy frameworks are key opportunities for reflection about rights and democratic values, and in the case of this project, the protection of privacy.

The vast scope and relevance of the right to privacy in this age of technology gives rise to a myriad of challenges and issues, many of which have relevance across, as well as within, borders. This is particularly the case in the developing world, where South-South collaboration is gaining increasing currency in the development sector, and donor countries continue to contribute to and influence policy in recipient countries, particularly with respect to the adoption of new technologies. Many of the trends in developing countries – communications surveillance, biometrics and DNA databases, and identity cards – mirror those being adopted in the global North. Policy laundering and modelling, such as that witnessed with respect to counter-terrorism policies in the aftermath of 9/11 is taking hold in the context of communications surveillance laws and national ID databases. Such phenomena raise concerns not only as to the spread of practices that threaten to undermine privacy, but also with respect to the stifling of national policy discourses and legislative processes.

Conceptual framework

This projects sets out to isolate and understand the challenges to privacy in the developing world. In order to ensure that the research developed is sufficiently targeted to influence policy debates, we have identified a set of themes that cover the range of privacy-related issues and that together will give a comprehensive picture of the difficult relationship between privacy and technology. This set of themes has been developed in collaboration with our partners, who have identified those discussions around which there is perfect storm of advancing surveillance policies and technologies, poor legal and technical safeguards, and a scarcity of research and understanding. We have designed our conceptual framework accordingly.

Research questions

The legal and constitutional landscape: What laws and constitutional provisions exist to protect privacy, how are they implemented and monitored, and where are the legal and policy gaps?

Data protection: What is the state of data protection in partner countries, and what are the local and regional regulatory standards and good practices?

Communications surveillance: What communications surveillance regimes are in place, how are they designed in law and how do they operate in practice?

Adoption of surveillance technologies: Where are governments buying surveillance technologies, and how are they using them? What legal regimes are in place to establish safeguards over the use of advanced surveillance technologies? What is the state of the art in legal protections?

Political intelligence oversight: What is the nature and operation of local intelligence services, what oversight mechanisms are in place, and how can these mechanisms be implemented or enforced?

Politics, Identity, sexual and reproductive health and social sorting: To what the extent do governments misuse personal information to pursue social sorting practices?

Delivery of public services: What is the state of privacy protections in public service delivery, particularly those related to e-health systems and social protection programmes, and how can protections be improved?

ID, DNA and biometrics: What privacy risks are associated with the collection and use of personal information for ID and biometric systems?

Partners

Africa	Latin America	Asia
Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, Zimbabwe Kenyan Ethical and Legal Issues Network, Kenya Media Institute of Southern Africa, Namibia Jonction, Senegal Centre for Social Sciences Research, University of Cape Town African Platform for Social Protection, Kenya	Dejusticia, Columbia Asociacion por los Derechos Civiles, Argentina Autonomous University of Mexico State, Mexico Centro de Tecnologia y Sociedad, Universidad San Andres, Argentina, in collaboration with the Centro de Tecnologica da Escola de Direito da Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brasil Instituto NUPEF, Brazil Derechos Digitales, Chile	VOICE, Bangladesh University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Centre for Internet and Society, India Thai Netizen Network, Thailand Thai Media Policy Center, Thailand Bytes For All, Pakistan Centre for Cyber Law Studies, Indonesia Foundation for Media Alternatives, Philippines

Africa

Latin America

Asia

Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, Zimbabwe

Kenyan Ethical and Legal Issues Network, Kenya

Media Institute of Southern Africa, Namibia

Jonction, Senegal

Centre for Social Sciences Research, University of Cape Town

African Platform for Social Protection, Kenya

Dejusticia, Columbia

Asociacion por los Derechos Civiles, Argentina

Autonomous University of Mexico State, Mexico

Centro de Tecnologia y Sociedad, Universidad San Andres, Argentina, in collaboration with the Centro de Tecnologica da Escola de Direito da Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brasil

Instituto NUPEF, Brazil

Derechos Digitales, Chile

VOICE, Bangladesh
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Centre for Internet and Society, India
Thai Netizen Network, Thailand
Thai Media Policy Center, Thailand
Bytes For All, Pakistan
Centre for Cyber Law Studies, Indonesia
Foundation for Media Alternatives, Philippines

Participants

Ababacar Diop
Allan Maleche
Anna Fielder
Anthony Jackson
Arthit Suriyawongkul
Arthur Gwagwa
Ben Hayes
Ben Wagner
Benjamin Barretto
Carly Nyst
Carolin Moeller
Charles Dhewa
Claudio Ruiz
Clement Chen
Danilo Doneda
Eric King
Farjana Akter
Fieke Jansen
Graciela Sulamein
Gus Hosein
Helen Wallace
Juan Camilo Rivera
Karelle Dagon
Katitza Rodriguez
Kevin Donovan
Levinson Kabwato
Malavika Jayaram
Mathias Vermeulen
Michael Rispoli
Nelson Arteaga Botello
Pablo Palazzi
Pirongrong Ramasoota
Ramiro Alvarez Ugarte
Richie Tynan
Sam Smith
Sinta Dewi Rosadi
Shahzad Ahmed
Sinta Dewi Rosadi
Sunil Abraham
Stephanie Perrin
Tavengwa Nhongo
Vera Franz
Vicky Nida
Vivian Newman Pont

Agenda

Friday, March 22, 2013: Reception

Meet with Privacy International staff members and advisors, and workshop participants from more than 20 countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Europe and Central Asia. Food and drinks will be provided.

Time: 6.00 p.m.
Location: 2nd Floor, 46 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4LR
Contact: 0207 242 2836
Getting there: Our office is a short walk 10 minute from your hotel. See Map 1 below for directions.

Saturday, March 23, 2013: Day 1 (Objectives and Reviewing the Landscape)

10:00 a.m. - Welcome Breakfast: Setting The Scene
Location: Mercure London Bloomsbury restaurant

Welcome and introduction

Overview of PI’s work in developing countries

Participant introductions

Setting the agenda

12:30 p.m. - Session 1: Reviewing The Landscape
Location: Old Building, Room 3.21, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE

Mapping privacy in constitutions

Masterclass 1: communications surveillance laws around the world

Break-out groups on assigned topics, and reporting back

2:30 p.m. - Afternoon tea

Privacy quiz

Masterclass 2: SIM card registration

Building a network: how can PI facilitate your work?

Masterclass 3: Oversight of intelligence agencies

6:00 p.m. - Drinks

7:00 p.m. - Dinner

Location: Tohbang, 164 Clerkenwell Road
http://www.tohbang.com/sub_eng/main.php

Sunday, March 24: Day 2 (Research Topics and Strategies)

Location: Old Building, Room 3.21, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE

10:00 a.m. - Recap of day one

Masterclass 4 - The UN Universal Periodic Review

Open-space - research and policy priorities

1:00 p.m. - Lunch
Location: Ship Tavern, Holborn

2:30 p.m. - Reconvene

Open space - research, dissemination and communication strategies

Wrapping up and going forward

6:00 p.m. - Dinner
Location: Wahaca, Charlotte St, http://www.wahaca.co.uk/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/global-partners-meeting-london

Global Networks, Individual Freedoms: A Peer Forum on Internet Freedom and Human Rights

praskrishna — 2012-06-28T09:12:28Z

In Connection with the 2012 Internet Freedom Fellows Program, the United States Mission to the United Nations in Geneva is pleased to invite Pranesh Prakash to a peer forum at the United States Mission to the United Nations on Thursday, June 21, 2012, from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.

Join the Internet Freedom Fellows, diplomats, UN representatives, civil society, technologists and social media experts, Geneva media and other professionals engaged in the intersection of human rights, internet freedom and technology.

This peer forum is part of the Internet Freedom Fellows program, which brings human rights activists from across the globe to Geneva, Washington, and Silicon Valley to meet with fellow activists, U.S. and international government leaders, and members of civil society and the private sector engaged in technology and human rights.

This year’s Internet Freedom Fellows, all human rights activists and active practitioners of digital media, are from Syria, India, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Venezuela and Azerbaijan.

For additional information on the program, please visit Internet Freedom Fellows.

Program

9:00 a.m.	Welcome and introduction David Kennedy / John Horniblow
9:15 - 10:15	Freedom to Connect and Freedom from Fear: The problem of surveillance in a networked world. Rebecca MacKinnon – Co Founder Global Voices Online, Author “Consent of the Networked”, Boards of Directors of the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Global Network Initiative
10:15 - 10:45	Developing Networked Voices and Promoting the protection of Human Rights Andreas Harsono, blogger and human rights activist (Indonesia), and Rosebell Kagumire, multimedia journalist working on peace and conflict issues in the Eastern Africa region (Uganda) 2011 Internet Freedom Fellows and journalists (via Skype)
10:45 - 11:00	Coffee break
11:00 - 12:00	Moderated Panel Discussion – How Do we Protect Human Rights in a world of global networks? How do the needs of the grassroots, civil society and business inform the process of upholding the UDHR and IHL in networks and technologies? Dr. Robert Whelan (ICRC), Pranesh Prakash, Salil Trepathi (IHRB), Nicolas Seidler (ISOC), Emin Milli Moderated Panel Discussion followed by Q &A
12:00 - 13:00	Buffet Luncheon
13:00 - 13:30	The Open Internet - Empowering Digital Humanitarianism Paul Conneally - Head of Communications for ITU and a former Red Cross delegate (in various positions, locations and with IFRC plus ICRC and the Irish Red Cross).
13:40 - 14:10	Global Network Initiative and the multistakeholder approach ensuring an Open Internet David Sullivan -Policy and Communications Director Global Network Initiative
14.15 - 14.40	The Silicon Valley Standard and implications for technology companies in the protection of Human Rights and other freedoms Brett Solomon -Exec Director Access Now (via Skype)
15:00	Twiplomacy Matthias Luefkins Managing Director, Digital, EMEA– Burson Marstellar

Participation is limited. Please RSVP by noon on Friday, June 15 to iff@usmission.ch. When responding, please indicate whether you will also join us for the luncheon buffet.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/peer-forum-on-internet-freedom-and-human-rights

Global Governance Futures 2027 - Session 3, New Delhi

sumandro — 2017-01-15T11:46:27Z

The Global Governance Futures program (GGF) initiated by Global Public Policy Institute and supported by Robert Bosch Stiftung brings together young professionals to look ahead ten years and recommend ways to address global challenges. Sumandro Chattapadhyay will join Ankhi Das (Facebook) and Arun Mohan Sukumar (Observer Research Foundation) on Tuesday, January 17, to discuss the "data governance" scenarios developed by the GGF 2027 Fellows.

About the Programme: External Link.

GGF 2027 Fellows: External Link.

GGF 2027 Session 3, New Delhi - Agenda: Download (PDF).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/global-governance-futures-2027-session-3-new-delhi

Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC)

Admin — 2017-11-23T14:38:12Z

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace organized a meeting on November 21, 2017 in New Delhi. The meeting took place at Taj Diplomatic Enclave Hotel on the sidelines of the 5th Global Conference on Cyberspace. Pranesh Prakash participated in the event.

GSC commissioners engaged in discussions with leading experts on cyber diplomacy, cyber norms and counter-proliferation. See the Draft Agenda here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/global-commission-on-the-stability-of-cyberspace-gcsc

Global Challenges to Freedom of Expression

praskrishna — 2011-04-04T07:17:59Z

The Centre for Culture, Media & Governance, Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, Human Rights Law Network, Delhi and the Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore are pleased to invite you to a public lecture by Mr. Frank La Rue, President of the Central American Institute for Studies of Social Democracy and UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression on March 4, 2011, 6 pm at the Constitutional Club in New Delhi.

Frank La Rue

Mr. La Rue is the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. He has worked on human rights for the past 25 years. He is the founder of the Centre for Legal Action for Human Rights (CALDH), both in Washington DC and Guatemala, which became the first Guatemalan NGO to bring cases of human rights violations to the Inter-American System. CALDH was also the first Guatemalan NGO to promote economic, social and cultural rights. Mr. La Rue also brought the first genocide case against the military dictatorship in Guatemala. As a human rights activist, his name was presented to the Nobel Peace Prize committee in 2004.

La Rue has previously served as a Presidential Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala, as a Human Rights Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala and as a consultant to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. He is President of Instituto Demos in Guatemala City. La Rue holds a BA in Legal and Social Sciences from the University of San Carlos, Guatemala and a postgraduate degree in U.S. foreign policy from Johns Hopkins University.

The entrance is free. Refreshments will be served from 5.30 pm onwards.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/global-freedom-expression