Centre for Internet & Society

The “Fifty Second Report on Cyber Crime, Cyber Security, and Right to Privacy” issued by the 2013 -2014 Standing Committee on Information Technology on February 12th 2014, highlights the urgent need for reform in India’s cyber security framework and the need for the much awaited privacy legislation to be finalized and made into a law.


Read the Fifty-Second Report on Cyber Crime, Cyber Security and Right to Privacy released by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology


The Report consists of questions on the state of cyber security, cyber crime, and privacy posed by the Standing Committee and briefings and evidence provided by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY ) in reply. The Report concludes with recommendations from the Standing Committee on the way forward.

The Report represents an important step forward in the realm of privacy and cyber security in India as the evidence provided by DEITY  clarifies a number of aspects of India’s present and upcoming cyber security policies and practices. Furthermore, the recommendations by the Standing Committee highlight present gaps and inadequacies in India’s policies and practices and needed steps forward– particularly the need for a privacy legislation in India in the context of cyber security, increased transactions of sensitive data, and governmental projects like the Unique Identification Project.

Broadly, the Standing Committee sought input from DEITY  on eight different aspects of cyber crime, cyber security, and privacy in India - namely:  the growing incidents of cyber crime and resulting financial loss, the challenges and constraints of cyber crime,  the role of relevant governmental organizations in India with respect to cyber security, preparedness and policy initiatives, cyber security and the right to privacy, monitoring and grievance redressal mechanism, and education and awareness initiatives. The evidence provided by DEITY  sheds light on the present mindset of the Government at this time, upcoming policies, and capacity and infrastructure gaps in India’s cyber security framework.

The Centre for Internet and Society appreciates the Report and we would like to highlight and emphasize the following aspects:

Need for a privacy legislation and inadequacy of privacy provisions in Information Technology Act: When asked by the Standing Committee about the right to privacy and cyber security, DEITY  highlighted the fact that the Information Technology Act contains sufficient safeguards for privacy, and added that the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) is in the process of developing a privacy legislation that will address the general concerns of privacy in the country, and thus the two together will be sufficient. DEITY  also noted that no study on the extent of privacy breach due to cyber crime in India has been conducted. In their recommendations, the Standing Committee noted that it was unhappy that the Government has yet to institute a legal framework on privacy, as the increased transfer of sensitive data and projects like the UID leave citizens vulnerable to privacy violations . Significantly, the Standing Committee recommended that though the DoPT is currently responsible for drafting the Privacy Bill, DEITY  should coordinate with the DoPT and become involved in the process.

As recognized by the Standing Committee, the Centre for Internet and Society would like to  further emphasize the inadequacy of the provisions relating to privacy in the Information Technology Act, and the need for a privacy legislation in India.  Inadequate aspects of the provisions have been pointed out by a number of sources. For example:

  1. The Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy: Prepared by the committee chaired by Justice AP Shah
  2. First Analysis of the Personal Data Protection Law in India: Prepared by the University of Namur for the Commission of the European Communities Directorate General for Justice, Freedom, and Security
  3. Comments on the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011: Prepared by the Centre for Internet and Society and submitted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the 15th Lok Sabha
  4. India’s U-Turns on Data Privacy: Prepared by Graham Greenleaf for the Privacy Laws & Business International Report, Issues 110 -114, 2011

Unclear Enforcement of 43A and associated rules: In evidence provided, DEITY, while discussing section 43A and the associated Rules, noted that the Data Security Council of India and empanelled security auditors through CERT-in are responsible for the ‘auditing of best practice’s (pg 24).  The Standing Committee did not directly respond to this comment.

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to point out that DEITY did not clearly state that DSCI and the auditors through CERT-in were responsible for auditing organizational security practices for compliance with 43A. Furthermore, there is no publicly available information regarding audits ensuring compliance with 43A or information about the number of companies  that have been found to be compliant.  The Centre for Internet and Society would like to encourage that this information be made public, and compliance with 43A be enforced at the organizational level.

UIDAI not in compliance with 43A and associated Rules:  In evidence provided, DEITY  noted that “..Section 43A and the rules published under that Section cover the entire privacy in case of digital data. These are being followed by UIDAI also and other organisations...” (pg.46) In their recommendations the Standing Committee did not directly address this comment, but did emphasize the need for a privacy legislation in light of the UID scheme.

The Centre for Internet and Society appreciates that the Standing Committee raised concern about the privacy implications of the UID project. We would like to highlight that the UIDAI is not a Body Corporate, and is not in compliance with 43A or the subsequent Rules in the Information Technology Act. Furthermore, the UID project involves the handling and processing of data in analogue and digital formats, and thus the privacy protections found under 43A are not sufficient.

The potential harms of metadata: In evidence provided, the Department noted  “...we have been assured that whatever data has been gathered by them for surveillance relates only to the metadata..but we expressed that any incursion into the content will not be tolerated and is not tolerable from the Indian stand and point of view.” (pg.47) The Standing Committee did not respond directly to this comment.

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to thank the Standing Committee for noting that the Government should have taken prior steps to preventing such an interception from taking place and for recommending the Department to take develop a policy to prevent future instances of interception from taking place. The Centre for Internet and Society would like to emphasize the importance and potential sensitive nature of metadata. Metadata can, and often does, disclose more about an individual or an activity than the actual content. For example, metadata can reveal identity, behaviour patterns, associations, and can enable the mapping of location and individual movement. As such, the Centre for Internet and Society would recommend that the Government of India treat access to all information generated by individual and governmental communications as sensitive and confidential.

Inadequacy of the Information Technology Act: When asked by the Standing Committee if the Information Technology Act provided sufficient legal safeguards for cyber security and cyber crime, DEITY  highlighted the fact that the Information Technology Act 2000 addresses all aspects of cyber crime in a comprehensive manner.  DEITY  also pointed out that the National Cyber Security Policy 2013 has provisions to enable the development of a legal framework, and the Department of Personnel and Training  is in the process of drafting a privacy legislation for India that will fill any gaps that exist. In their recommendations, the Standing Committee recognized that the Information Technology Act does contain provisions that address cyber security and cyber crime, but, especially in the recent controversy over section 66A of the Act, Standing Committee emphasized the need for periodical reviews of the IT Act.

The Centre for Internet and Society appreciates the fact that the Committee recognized the need for periodical review of the Information Technology Act, particularly in light of the controversy over 66 A. The Centre for Internet and Society would like to underscore the problems associated with 66A and would like to highlight that with regards to privacy and cyber security, the IT Act is not adequate and falls short in a number of areas. Research that the Centre for Internet and Society has conducted explaining these weaknesses can be found through the below links:

  1. Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act
  2. Short note on IT Amendment Act, 2008

Implications of domestic servers:  In response to questions posed by the Standing Committee about security risks associated with the importation of electronics and IT products, as well as the hosting of servers outside the country, DEITY  noted the security risk of using foreign infrastructure and pointed to the hosting of servers in India as a solution to protecting the security and privacy of Indian data. The Standing Committee supported this initiative, and encouraged DEITY  to take further steps towards securing and protecting the privacy of Indian data through the hosting of servers for critical sectors within India.

The Centre for Internet and Society appreciates the fact that the Standing Committee carefully limited the recommendation of locating servers in India to those in critical sectors, but would caution the Government of potential implications on users ability to freely access content and services, and highlight the fact that localization of servers is not a security solution in itself as a comprehensive solution and hardening of critical assets against cyber attacks is essential.

Incorporation of safeguards into MOU’s for international cooperation: When asked about MOU’s for international cooperation that DEITY  has engaged in with other countries, DEITY  reported that currently CERT-in is entering into a number of MOU’s with other countries to facilitate cooperation for cyber security purposes. Presently there are MOUs with the US, Japan, South Korea, Mauritius, Kasakhstan, Finland, and the Canada Electronics and ICT sector. DEITY  is also seeking MOUs with Malaysia, Israel, Egypt, Canada, and Brazil. The Standing Committee supported  India entering into MOU’s for purposes of international cooperation, and encouraged DEITY  to continue entering into MOU’s to mitigate jurisdictional complications when seeking to address issues related to cyber security.

The Centre for Internet and Society recognizes the importance of international cooperation when handling issues related to cyber security and cyber crime. To ensure that this process is in line with human rights, the Centre for Internet and Society would encourage DEITY  to ensure that all MOU’s and/or  Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements:

  • Uphold the principle of dual criminality
  • Apply the highest level of protection for individuals in the case where the laws of more than one state could apply to communications surveillance
  • Are not used by any party involved to circumvent domestic legal restrictions on communications surveillance.
  • Are clearly documented and publicly available
  • Contain provisions guaranteeing  procedural fairness.[1]

Hactivism as a benefit to society: In evidence provided on page 14, DEITY, among other elements, referred to Hactivism as a societal challenge to securing cyber security and tackling cyber crime. The Standing Committee did not directly address this comment.

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to point out that hacktivism is a complex topic and consists of methods. Though some methods used by hacktivists are illegal, and some use hacktivism for censorship purposes and to target certain groups, other forms of hacktivism  can benefit society and strengthen cyber security by  finding and revealing vulnerabilities in a system, and bringing attention to illegal or violative practices.

This works towards ensuring that a system is adequately secure. Because of the dynamic nature of hacktivism, the Centre for Internet and Society believes that hacktivism needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis and the Government should not broadly label hacktivism as a challenge to cyber security and cyber crime.[2]

Importance of the anonymous speech: In evidence provided, DEITY noted the threat to cyber security that the anonymous nature of the internet posed. This was reiterated by the Standing Committee in their recommendations.

While recognizing the potential threat to cyber security that the anonymous nature of the internet can pose, the Centre for Internet and Society would like to highlight the importance of anonymous speech online to an individual’s right to free expression.

Conclusion

Recognizing the direct connection between a strong privacy framework and a strong cyber security framework, as security cannot be achieved without privacy, and recognizing the need for a privacy legislation in light of governmental projects like the UID,  the Centre for Internet and Society welcomes the Fifty Second Report on Cyber Crime, Cyber Security, and the Right to Privacy and echoes the Standing Committees recommendation and emphasis on the need for a comprehensive privacy legislation to be passed in India.


[1]. These safeguards are reflected in the principle of “safeguards for International Cooperation” found in the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance”  https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text

[2]. For more information about hacktivism see: Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism. The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy. By Dorothy E. Denning. Georgetown University. Available at: http://www.iwar.org.uk/cyberterror/resources/denning.htm

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